Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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Julies Bakeshop and/or Edgar Reyes, |
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G.R. No. 173882 |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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- versus- |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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BERSAMIN, |
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Henry Arnaiz |
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EDGAR NAPAL,⃰ and |
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VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
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Jonathan Tolores, |
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Respondents. |
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Promulgated: |
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February 15, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
Management has a wide latitude to
conduct its own affairs in accordance with the necessities of its business. This so-called management prerogative, however,
should be exercised in accordance with justice and fair play.
By this Petition
for Review on Certiorari,[1] petitioners
Julies Bakeshop and/or Edgar Reyes (Reyes) assail the September 23, 2005 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86257, which reversed the
Resolutions dated December 18, 2003[3]
and April 19, 2004[4] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and ordered petitioners to
reinstate respondents Henry Arnaiz (Arnaiz), Edgar Napal (Napal) and Jonathan
Tolores (Tolores) and to pay them their backwages for having been constructively
dismissed, as well
as their
other monetary
benefits.
Factual
Antecedents
Reyes hired respondents as chief bakers
in his three franchise branches of Julies Bakeshop in Sibalom and San Jose,
Antique. On January 26, 2000, respondents
filed separate complaints against petitioners for underpayment of wages,
payment of premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, cost of living allowance (COLA) and attorneys fees.
These complaints were later on
consolidated.
Subsequently, in a memorandum dated
February 16, 2000, Reyes reassigned respondents as utility/security personnel
tasked to clean the outside vicinity of his bakeshops and to maintain peace and
order in the area. Upon service of the
memo, respondents, however, refused to sign the same and likewise refused to
perform their new assignments by not reporting for work.
In a letter-memorandum dated March
13, 2000, Reyes directed respondents to report back for work and to explain why
they failed to assume their duties as utility/security personnel. A second
letter-memorandum of the same tenor dated March 28, 2000 was also sent to
respondents. Respondents did not heed both
memoranda.
Proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter
Meanwhile, in the preliminary conference
set on
The supposed signing of the
compromise agreement (which could have culminated in respondents receiving the
total amount of P54,126.00 as payment for their 13th month
pay and separation pay) was reset to March 28, 2000 because of respondents
non-appearance in the hearing of March 7, 2000. On March 28, 2000, Atty.
Pefianco failed to appear despite due notice.
On the next hearing scheduled on April 24, 2000, both Atty. Delicana and
Atty. Pefianco appeared but the latter verbally manifested his withdrawal as
counsel for respondents. Thus, respondents,
through Atty. Delicana, and Reyes, continued to explore the possibility of
settling the case amicably. Manifesting
that they need to sleep on the proposed settlement, respondents requested for
continuance of the hearing on April 26, 2000. Come said date, however, respondents did not
appear.
Realizing the futility of further
resetting the case to give way to a possible settlement, the Labor Arbiter
ordered the parties to file their respective position papers.
Despite his earlier withdrawal as
counsel, Atty. Pefianco filed a Joint Position Paper[5]
on behalf of respondents alleging that they were dismissed from employment on
February 21, 2000 without valid cause. As
for petitioners, they stated in their position paper[6]
that respondents were never dismissed but that they abandoned their jobs after
filing their complaints. Petitioners
denied that Reyes is the employer of Arnaiz and Napal but admitted such fact
insofar as Tolores is concerned.
In his Decision[7]
dated August 25, 2000, the Labor Arbiter expressed dismay over respondents lack
of good faith in negotiating a settlement. The Labor Arbiter denounced the way
respondents dealt with Atty. Delicana during their discussions for a possible
settlement since respondents themselves later on informed the said tribunal
that at the time of the said discussions, they no longer considered Atty.
Delicana as their counsel. Despite this,
the Labor Arbiter still required the parties to submit their respective position
papers. And as respondents position paper was filed late and no evidence was
attached to prove the allegations therein, the Labor Arbiter resolved to
dismiss the complaints, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the above-entitled
cases should be, as they are hereby dismissed without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations
Commission
Respondents filed a joint appeal[9]
with the NLRC. In a Decision[10]
dated January 17, 2002, the NLRC overruled the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
and held that the burden of proof lies on herein petitioners as Reyes admitted
being the employer of Tolores. Hence, petitioners
not Tolores, had the duty to advance proof. With respect to Arnaiz and Napal, the NLRC
noted that since their alleged employer was not impleaded, said respondents
cases should be remanded to the Labor Arbiter, and tried as new and separate
cases. The dispositive portion of the NLRCs
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the case is REMANDED for purposes of identifying the real respondents,
to be separated as discussed, if warranted, and for further proceedings to be conducted.
SO
ORDERED.[11]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[12]
alleging that the NLRC
Decision
violated their right to speedy disposition of their cases. They also insisted that Reyes is their
employer as shown by his letter-memorandum dated March 13, 2000 which directed
all of them to report back for work. In
addition, the fact that Reyes was willing to pay all the respondents the amount
of P54,126.00 as settlement only proves that there is an employer-employee
relationship between them and Reyes.
In a Resolution[13]
dated September 23, 2003, the NLRC found merit in respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
It held that Reyes failed to present
concrete proof of his allegation that a certain Rodrigo Gandiongco is the
employer of Arnaiz and Napal; hence, Reyes is still presumed to be their
employer as franchise owner of the branches where these employees were
assigned. The NLRC further ruled that
respondents demotion in rank from chief bakers to utility/security personnel
is tantamount to constructive dismissal which entitles them to the reliefs
available to illegally dismissed employees. As for the money claims, the NLRC granted respondents
their salary differentials, premium pay for rest day, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and COLA. In awarding such monetary awards, the NLRC ratiocinated that the employer bears the
burden of proving that the employees received their wages and benefits. In this case, however, no proof of such
payment was presented by the petitioners. The claim for overtime pay though was
denied since proof of overtime work is necessary to warrant such award. Lastly, for Reyes unjustified act done in bad
faith, respondents were awarded 10% attorneys fees. The NLRC ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, Our previous Decision is VACATED and a
new one rendered declaring complainants to have been illegally dismissed.
Complainants are to be reinstated to their former positions without loss of
seniority rights. Complainants are further awarded backwages reckoned from the
time they were constructively dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement,
whether physically or on payroll.
Complainants being underpaid are to be [paid] their
salary differentials reckoned three (3) years backwards from the time they
filed the instant complaints on January 26, 2000, premium pay for holiday,
premium pay for rest day, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay and COLA, if these have not been paid to them yet.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners
sought to reconsider this ruling via a Motion for Reconsideration,[15]
insisting that respondents were not illegally dismissed and that their
reassignment or transfer as utility/security personnel was indispensable, made
in good faith and in the exercise of a valid management prerogative. Hence, such reassignment does not amount to constructive
dismissal. Reyes claimed that it would
be likely for respondents, after filing complaints against him, to do something
prejudicial to the business as chief bakers, like mixing harmful ingredients into
the bread that they bake. This could be inimical
to the health of the consuming public. Petitioners averred that respondents reassignment
as utility/security personnel is a preventive measure designed to protect the
business and its customers. They
likewise added that the transfer was meant to be only temporary and besides,
same does not involve any diminution in pay, rights and privileges of the
respondents. Petitioners also alleged
that respondents wage of P115.00 per day is in consonance with and is even
higher than the mandated minimum wage of P105.00 under Wage Order No.
RB6-09 for retail and service establishments employing not more than 10 workers
as in his business.
The NLRC, in its
Resolution[16]
dated December 18, 2003, again reconsidered its own ruling and held that
respondents were not dismissed, either actually or constructively, but instead
willfully disobeyed the return to work order of their employer. The NLRC upheld
petitioners prerogative to transfer respondents if only to serve the greater
interest, safety and well-being of the buying public by forestalling irregular
acts of said employees. The NLRC then put
the blame on respondents for disobeying the lawful orders of their employer,
noting that it was the same attitude displayed by them in their dealings with
their counsel, Atty. Delicana, in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. It also reversed its previous ruling that
respondents were underpaid their wages and adjudged them to be even overpaid by
P10.00 per Wage Order No. RB 6-09-A. Thus, respondents complaints were
dismissed except for their claims for premium pay for holiday, and rest day,
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and COLA, which awards would
stand only if no payment therefor has yet been made.
Respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17]
and sought for the execution of the NLRC Resolution dated September 23, 2003
due to the alleged finality of the ruling.
According to them, petitioners pro forma Motion for Reconsideration
of the said resolution did not suspend the running of the period for taking an
appeal. This motion was, however, denied in the NLRC Resolution[18]
dated
Proceedings
before the Court of Appeals
Respondents appealed to the CA
through a petition for certiorari,[19]
wherein they imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in not
declaring them to have been illegally dismissed and entitled to salary
differentials.
The CA, in its
Decision[20]
dated September 23, 2005, found merit in the petition, ruling that respondents
were constructively dismissed since their designation from chief bakers to
utility/security personnel is undoubtedly a demotion in rank which involved a
drastic change in the nature of work resulting to a demeaning and humiliating
work condition. It also held that petitioners fear that respondents might
introduce harmful foreign substances in baking bread is more imaginary than
real. Further, respondents could not be
held guilty of abandonment of work as this was negated by their immediate
filing of complaints to specifically ask for reinstatement. Nevertheless, the CA denied the claim for
salary differentials by totally agreeing with the NLRCs finding on the matter.
Said court then resolved to award
respondents the rest of their monetary claims for failure of petitioners to
present proof of payment and 10% attorneys fees as respondents dismissal was
attended with bad faith which forced them to litigate, viz:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us SETTING
ASIDE and REVERSING the Resolutions dated
Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration[22]
but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution[23]
dated May 25, 2006.
Issues
Hence, this present petition raising
the following issues for the Courts
consideration:
I.
DID THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE LABOR
ARBITER AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL LABOR [RELATIONS] COMMISSION WHO HAVE TRIED THE
CASE, [COMMIT] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION?
II.
DID THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY [OVERLOOK] RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY
THE RESPONDENTS, WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED COULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT
CONCLUSION?
III. WAS THE TRANSFER/REASSIGNMENT OF RESPONDENTS TO
ANOTHER POSITION WITHOUT DIMINUTION IN PAY AND OTHER PRIVILEGES TANTAMOUNT TO
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL?[24]
Petitioners maintain
that the NLRC, in its Resolution dated December 18, 2003, merely upheld the
findings of the Labor Arbiter that there was no constructive dismissal because
of the absence of any evidence to prove such allegation. As such, Reyes supposition is that the CA
erred in coming up with a contrary finding.
Petitioners insist
that the order transferring or reassigning respondents from chief bakers to
utility/security personnel is a valid exercise of management prerogative for it
does not involve any diminution in pay and privileges and that same is in
accordance with the requirements of the business, viz: to protect its
goodwill and reputation as well as the health and welfare of the consuming
public.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
The Court of Appeals is correct
in reviewing the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Petitioners claim that the CA should
have accorded respect and finality to the factual findings rendered by the NLRC
in its December 18, 2003 Resolution as the same merely affirmed the findings of
the Labor Arbiter. Citing several jurisprudence on the matter, petitioners add
that factual findings of labor officials who acquired expertise on matters
within their jurisdiction have conclusive effect.
We reject
this contention as none of the NLRC divergent
rulings affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. To recall, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed respondents
complaints on a technicality, that is, on the ground that respondents Joint Position
Paper was filed late and that it did not contain any attachments to prove the
allegations therein. Upon appeal, the
NLRC rendered its first Decision on January 17, 2002 which remanded the case to
the Labor Arbiter for purposes of identifying the real respondents and
separating the consolidated cases if warranted, and for the conduct of further
proceedings due to Reyess allegation that Arnaiz and Napal have a different
employer. The NLRC also disagreed with the
Labor Arbiters ratiocination that it behooved upon respondents to attach proof
of their illegal dismissal. According to
the NLRC, since Reyes admitted that he is Toloress employer, the burden to
prove that the termination is valid as well as the due payment of money claims
falls upon petitioners. Upon
petitioners motion, however, the NLRC reconsidered this ruling and resolved
the case on the merits. In so doing, it found the respondents to have been constructively
dismissed through its Resolution dated
Indeed, factual
findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in
matters within their respective jurisdictions are generally accorded not only
respect, but even finality.[25]
It is a well-entrenched
rule that findings of facts of the NLRC, affirming those of the Labor Arbiter,
are accorded respect and due consideration when supported by substantial
evidence.[26]
We, however, find that the doctrine
of great respect and finality has no application to the case at bar. As stated, the Labor Arbiter dismissed
respondents complaints on mere technicality. The NLRC, upon appeal, then came up with three
divergent rulings. At first, it remanded
the case to the Labor Arbiter. However,
in a subsequent resolution, it decided to resolve the case on the merits by
ruling that respondents were constructively dismissed. But later on, it again reversed itself in its
third and final resolution of the case and ruled in petitioners favor. Therefore, contrary to Reyess claim, the NLRC did
not, on any occasion, affirm any factual findings of the Labor Arbiter. The CA
is thus correct in reviewing the entire records of the case to determine which
findings of the NLRC is sound and in accordance with law. Besides, the CA, at any rate, may still
resolve factual issues by express mandate of the law despite the respect given
to administrative findings of fact.[27]
The transfer/reassignment of
respondents constitutes constructive dismissal.
Petitioners
contend that the order transferring or reassigning respondents from their
position as chief bakers to utility/security personnel is within the ambit of management
prerogative as employer. They harp on
the fact that no evidence was presented by respondents to show that they were
dismissed from employment.
We have held
that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments,
working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers. The exercise of management
prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and
with due regard to the rights of labor.[28]
In constructive dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving
that the transfer of an employee is for just or valid ground, such as genuine
business necessity. The employer must
demonstrate that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial
to the employee and that the transfer does not involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution in salary and other benefits. If the employer fails to overcome this burden
of proof, the employees transfer is tantamount to unlawful constructive
dismissal.[29]
In this case, petitioners insist that the transfer of respondents was a
measure of self-preservation and was prompted by a desire to protect the health
of the buying public, claiming that respondents should be transferred to a
position where they could not sabotage the business pending resolution of their
cases. According to petitioners, the
possibility that respondents might introduce harmful substances to the bread
while in the performance of their duties as chief bakers is not imaginary but
real as borne out by what Tolores did in one of the bakeshops in Culasi,
Antique where he was assigned as baker.
This postulation is not well-taken. On the contrary, petitioners failed to satisfy
the burden of proving that the transfer was based on just or valid ground. Petitioners
bare assertions of imminent threat from the respondents are mere accusations
which are not substantiated by any proof. This Court is proscribed from making
conclusions based on mere presumptions or suppositions. An employees fate cannot be justly hinged
upon conjectures and surmises.[30]
The act attributed against Tolores does
not even convince us as he was merely a suspected culprit in the alleged
sabotage for which no investigation took place to establish his guilt or culpability.
Besides, Reyes still retained Tolores as
an employee and chief baker when he could have dismissed him for cause if the
allegations were indeed found true. In view of these, this Court finds no compelling
reason to justify the transfer of respondents from chief bakers to
utility/security personnel. What appears
to this Court is that respondents transfer was an act of retaliation on the
part of petitioners due to the formers filing of complaints against them, and
thus, was clearly made in bad faith. In
fact, petitioner Reyes even admitted that he caused the reassignments due to
the pending complaints filed against him. As the CA aptly held:
In the case at bench, respondent Reyes failed to
justify petitioners transfer from the position of chief bakers to
utility/security personnel. We find that the threat being alluded to by
respondent Reyes that the petitioners might introduce harmful foreign
substances in baking bread is imaginary and not real. We recall that what
triggered the petitioners reassignment was the filing of their complaints
against private respondents in the NLRC. The petitioners were not even given an
opportunity to refute the reason for the transfer. The drastic change in
petitioners nature of work unquestionably resulted in, as rightly perceived by
them, a demeaning and humiliating work condition. The transfer was a demotion
in rank, beyond doubt. There is demotion when an employee is transferred from a
position of dignity to a servile or menial job. One does not need to stretch
the imagination to distinguish the work of a chief baker to that of a security
cum utility man.[31]
[D]emotion
involves a situation in which an employee is relegated to a subordinate or less
important position constituting a reduction to a lower grade or rank, with a
corresponding decrease in duties and responsibilities, and usually accompanied
by a decrease in salary.[32]
When there is a demotion in rank and/or a
diminution in pay; when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee; or when continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, the transfer of an employee may
constitute constructive dismissal.[33]
We agree with
the CA in ruling that the transfer of respondents amounted to a demotion. Although there was no diminution in pay, there
was undoubtedly a demotion in titular rank. One cannot deny the disparity
between the duties and functions of a chief baker to that of a utility/security
personnel tasked to clean and manage the orderliness of the outside premises of
the bakeshop. Respondents were even
prohibited from entering the bakeshop. The change in the nature of their work
undeniably resulted to a demeaning and humiliating work condition.
In Globe
Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores,[34] we held:
The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel
must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion. It must always bear in
mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right must not be
confused with the manner that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a
subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.
Petitioners
claim that respondents abandoned their job stands on shallow grounds. Respondents cannot be faulted for refusing to
report for work as they were compelled to quit their job due to a demotion without
any just cause. Moreover, we have
consistently held that a charge of abandonment is inconsistent with the filing
of a complaint for constructive dismissal.[35]
Respondents demand to maintain their
positions as chief bakers by filing a case and asking for the relief of
reinstatement belies abandonment.[36]
As the transfer proves
unbearable to respondents as to foreclose any choice on their part except to
forego continued employment, same amounts to constructive dismissal for which
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the
time their compensation was withheld up to the time of their actual
reinstatement, should be granted.[37]
The CA, therefore, did not err in
awarding the reliefs prayed for by the respondents as they were, without a
doubt, constructively dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The September 23, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 86257 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
⃰ Also spelled as Naval in some parts of
the records.
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-17.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 131-151; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato Jr. and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Supra note 3.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 54-58.
[18] Supra note 4.
[19] CA rollo, pp. 2-12.
[20] Supra note 2.
[21] CA rollo, p. 151.
[22]
[23]
[24] Rollo, p. 122.
[25] Alfaro v.
Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 310, 318 (2001).
[26] Master Shirt Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 360 Phil. 837, 842 (1998).
[27] Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, Jr., G.R. No. 164403, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 571, 588-589.
[28] Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte,
486 Phil. 493, 505. (2004).
[29] Merck
Sharp and Dohme (
[30] Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. v. Diamse, 524 Phil. 549, 557 (2006).
[31] CA rollo, p. 139.
[32] Norkis Trading Co., Inc. v. Gnilo, G.R. No. 159730, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 279, 291.
[33] Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Fianza,
468 Phil. 980, 992 (2004).
[34] 438 Phil. 756, 769 (2002).
[35] Unicorn Safety Glass, Inc. v. Basarte, supra note 28 at 506.
[36] Micro Sales Operation Network v. National Labor Relations Commission, 509 Phil. 313, 322 (2005).
[37] Westmont Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Samaniego, 518 Phil. 41, 51-52 (2006).