Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO,
Accused-Appellant. |
G.R. No. 173476 Present: CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA,
JR., and *PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: February 22, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a
victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of
admissibility under the Rules of Court
and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a
part of the res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder
for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of
the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23,
2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA)
through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.[1]
Salafranca has come to the Court on a
final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who had
incriminated him.
The established facts show that past
midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex
in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon
was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to
seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was
Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the
hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing
of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of
13 years, who was in the complex at the time.[2]
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing
Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest
being issued. He was finally arrested
on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted
Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanons death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.[3]
The
RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness Mendoza on how Salafranca
had effected his attack
against Bolanon, observing that by
encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the victim on the latters
neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand, Salafranca did
not give Bolanon any opportunity to defend himself.[4] The RTC noted inconsistencies in
Salafrancas and his witness
testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his residence the day
after the incident and had stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his
arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been hiding, there would be no reason
for him to immediately leave his residence, especially because he was also
working near the area.[5]
The RTC disposed
thus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the
custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National Penitentiary,
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On
appeal, the CA affirmed the
findings and conclusions of the RTC,[7] citing the dying declaration made to
his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,[8] and Salafrancas positive
identification as the culprit by Mendoza.[9] It stressed that Salafrancas denial
and his alibi of being in his home
during the incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as
his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment,
constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.[10]
Presently,
Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as
witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly
concluded that Mendoza and Estao were credible and reliable. The determination
of the competence and credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with
the RTC as the trial court due to its unique and unequalled position of
observing their deportment during testimony, and of assessing their credibility and appreciating their
truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the
assessment made and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing
court was bound by such assessment and conclusions,[11] considering that the CA as the
appellate court could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different
conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the
circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary matters that would alter the
result.[12] Salafranca did not persuasively show
a misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is
in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA,
which were entitled to great weight and respect.[13]
Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive
identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts
properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca
did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify
against him unless it was upon the truth.[14]
Based on Mendozas account,
Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had encircled his left arm
over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the
right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic)
up right sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the left
nipple.[15] Relying on Mendozas recollection of
how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant in
the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CAs concurrence
because Mendozas eyewitness account
of the manner of attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted
on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca
employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included
an aggressive physical control of the latters movements that ensured the
success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on the part of
Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal
Code,[16]
treachery is present when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.
The Court further notes Estaos
testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as
his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:
Q Can
you tell what happened on the said date?
A My
nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q What
time was that?
A
12:50 a.m.
Q When
you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A Tito
dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako.
Q What
did you do?
A I
immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q
On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A
While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he
answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q
Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A
Yes, Sir.
Q How
long have you known him?
A Matagal
na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami.
Q
If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A
Yes, Sir.
Q Will
you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness
pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
A He
was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he
will just suffer more.
Q What
happened when you told him that?
A He
kept silent.
Q What
time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I
cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
Q When
you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He
was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When
he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A He
was pronounced dead.[17]
It appears from the foregoing
testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek
help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his
nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the
hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told
Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the
utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estao
to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission
at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been
pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both
a dying declaration and as part of the res
gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the
victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all
the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.[18]
A dying declaration, although
generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless
be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b)
that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a
consciousness of an impending death; (c)
that the declarant is competent as a witness;
and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.[19]
All the requisites were met herein.
Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca
as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was
conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest
and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon
succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred
under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view
that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the
declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature
of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his
physician.[20] Bolanon would have been competent to
testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying
declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon
was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is
deemed as part of the res gestae and
thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the
statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[21]
The requisites for admissibility of a
declaration as part of the res gestae
concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e.,
his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the
hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the
assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was
relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act.[22] In a
general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve
to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.[23] The rule
on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.[24] The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.[25]
We modify the limiting of civil
damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs
of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the
damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for
the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d)
exemplary damages; and (e) temperate
damages.[26]
We hold that the CA and the RTC
should have further granted moral damages which were different from the death
indemnity.[27] The death indemnity compensated the
loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would
justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving
family of the victim.[28] Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision,
the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs
of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante.
Given the circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral
damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,[29] we are bound to award despite the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional
suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having
shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.[30]
The CA and the RTC committed another
omission consisting in their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon
to temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual
damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated by receipts,
temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it would certainly
be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by way
of actual damages.[31]
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in
criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.[32]
The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.[33] Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and
the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the
victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of treachery. It was of
no moment that treachery
was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed
in murder. The Court explained so in People
v. Catubig:[34]
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the
other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which
is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of
the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike
the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make
little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended
party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it
is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.
For
the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of P30,000.00 is deemed
reasonable and proper,[35]
because we think that a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of P50,000.00
awarded as death indemnity the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00
as temperate damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards
shall bear interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall further
pay the costs of suit.
SO
ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice
* Vice Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo, who is on sick leave, per Special Order No. 1203 dated
February 17, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-11; penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice, now retired), with Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring.
[2] Id., pp. 3-4.
[3] CA rollo, p. 36.
[4] Id., p. 38.
[5] Id., pp. 36-38.
[6] Id., p. 39.
[7] Supra, at note 1.
[8] Id. at p. 6.
[9] Id. at p. 9.
[10] CA rollo, p. 110.
[11] People v. Resuma, G.R. No. 179189, February
26, 2008, 546 SCRA 728, 737.
[12] People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219, 230; Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 157804, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 489, 496.
[13] People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 177569, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 306,
314; People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No.
172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547, People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219, 230;
Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150443,
January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 209, 219; People
v. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139, 153-154; People v. Genita, Jr., G.R. No. 126171,
March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 343, 349; People
v. Pacheco, G.R. No. 142887, March 2, 2004, 424 SCRA 164, 174; People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231,
February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260, 265-266; People
v. Santiago, G.R. No. 137542-43, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 248, 256.
[14] Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 488, 508.
[15] TSN, September 1, 2003, pp. 3-4.
[16] Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.
[17] TSN, March 18, 2003, pp. 3-4.
[18] People v. Loste, G.R. No. 94785, July 1, 1992, 210 SCRA 614, 621, citing People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480, February 26, 1991, 194 SCRA 432, 339-340.
[19] People v. Labagala, G.R. No. 184603, August 2, 2010, 626 SCRA 267, 278; see also People v. Garma, G.R. No. 110872, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 517, 522; People v. Elizaga, No. L-78794, November 21, 1988, 167 SCRA 516, 520; People v. Lanza, No. L-31782, December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 613, 625; People v. Saliling, No. L-27874, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 427, 438.
[20] M.
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Evidence 7074, Interim Edition, Vol. 30B, 2000, West Group, St. Paul,
Minnesota; citing Shepard v. United
States, 290 US 96, 100; Mattox v.
United States, 146 US 140, 151 (sense of impending death may be made to
appear from the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted, being obviously
such that he must have felt or known that he could not survive.); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395-396 (7th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Mobley,
491 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1970).
[21] People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 94570, September 28, 1994, 237 SCRA 218, 224; People v. Maguikay, G.R. No. 103226-28, October 14, 1994, 237 SCRA 587, 600.
[22] Alhambra Bldg. & Loan Assn v. DeCelle, 118 P. 2d 19, 47 C.A. 2d 409; Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp. v. Lewis, 61 N.E. 2d 297, 326 Ill. App. 117.
[23] Kaiko v. Dolinger, 440 A. 2d 198, 184 Conn. 509; Southern Surety Co. v. Weaver, Com. App. 273 S.W. 838.
[24] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74740, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 70, 79.
[25] Molloy v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 166 N.E. 530, 335 Ill. 164; Campbell v. Gladden, 118 A. 2d 133, 383 Pa. 144, 53 A.L.R. 2d 1222.
[26] People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743,
January 25, 2012; People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009,
580 SCRA 436, 455.
[27] Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 333.
[28] Article 2206, (3), in relation to Article 2217 and Article 2219, Civil Code, and Article 107, Revised Penal Code.
[29] People v. Salva, G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002, 373 SCRA 55, 69; People v. Osianas, G.R. No. 182548, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 319, 340; People v. Buduhan, G.R. No. 178196, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 337, 367-368; People v. Berondo, Jr., G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547.
[30] People
v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439,
[31] People
v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682,
[32] Article 2230, Civil Code.
[33] Article 2229, Civil Code.
[34] G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, 635.
[35] See People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, February
16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738, 752, People v. Del
Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 625, 637-638.