Republic
of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE Petitioner, - versus
- ABEDIN
LIMPAO OSOP, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 172448 Present:
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ. Promulgated: February 22, 2012 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assails the Decision[1]
dated
The instant controversy arose from
the following factual background:
Herein respondent Abedin Limpao Osop
(Osop) is the former Chancellor of the Mindanao State University-General Santos
City (MSU-GSC) campus. Osop retired in
1987 under the Early Retirement Law, but several years after his retirement, he
was appointed by Moner M. Bajunaid, then MSU-GSC Chancellor, as a substitute for
another professor of the Electrical Engineering Department,
In 1997, Muslim, the succeeding
Chancellor of MSU-GSC, renewed Osops appointment as Assistant Professor IV,
effective
Muslim allowed Osop to continue teaching
at MSU-GSC even after
However, on
Dear Prof. Osop:
In view of the return to the campus
of Prof. Danilo Dadula for whom you have been serving as substitute since
On behalf of MSU-GSC, we thank you for your services.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
MACAPADO A. MUSLIM, Ph. D.
Chancellor
Muslim also issued Memorandum Order
No. 010-98C[6] dated
In compliance with Memorandum Order
No. 010-98C, Ramos explained in his letter dated
Basing on our records, there was no request for substitute of Engr. Danilo P. Dadula when he went on study leave in June 1994.
On
Per DBM Plantilla of Personnel, page 336 of 444 pages, Prof. Abedin Limpao Osop has an item. For this, I presumed Prof. A.L. Osop was not a contractual or substitute faculty of the college.
x x x x
Regarding the distribution of Prof. A. L. Osops teaching load to appropriate faculty members at this time poses some problems. He is handling major courses in electrical engineering and the electrical engineers have excessive overload.
x x x x
It has been noted and experienced that real excessive overload is more on the number of preparations than on overload teaching units. For the interest of our students and with much concern on the efficient delivery of instruction, the faculty of the Electrical Engineering Department could not absorb the load of Prof. A. L. Osop. Since his load are major EE courses, the same could not be handled by any of the faculty in the other departments.
In view thereof, may we request for the reconsideration of your decision to terminate the services of Prof. Abedin Limpao Osop.[7]
Muslim responded by issuing
handwritten Memorandum Order No. 012-98C[8]
dated
On July 21, 1998, Osop filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 22, a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Damages and Attorneys Fees against Muslim and Ramos. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6381.[9]
Osop filed two days later, on P20,000.00 to answer for damages that Muslim and Ramos might
suffer if it turns out that Osop was not entitled to an injunction/TRO. Osop filed his injunction/TRO bond on
At the hearing of Osops application
for the issuance of a TRO on July 27, 1998, the RTC issued an Order,[10] whereby,
in consideration of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it
suggested that Osop first write Muslim to seek reconsideration of Muslims
letter and Memorandum Order No. 010-98C both dated July 14, 1998. Osop accordingly
wrote Muslim such a letter dated
Muslim endorsed Osops letter dated
Based on the meticulous study made, the management is not legally nor morally under obligation to retain Prof. Osop in the service or liable for the non-renewal of his appointment the nature of which was temporary and contingent on the return of Prof. Danilo Dadula. With the return of Prof. Dadula, the renewal of the appointment of Prof. Osop would have been an unjustifiable superfluity.
This Office, concurring with the opinion of Director Imam, upholds your position on the case of Prof. Osop.
Marohombsars aforequoted decision
was based on the Brief from the MSU Human Resources Development Office dated
August 6, 1998, signed by Director Lomala O. Imam, stating that [t]he issue is
not one of termination or dismissal but an expiration of an appointment which
is not permanent in nature and that [t]he renewal or non-renewal of a
temporary or probationary appointment is a management prerogative.[13]
On
The RTC issued an Omnibus Order on
The
complaint is essentially one for illegal dismissal filed by [herein respondent]
Abedin Limpao Osop, a faculty member of the Mindanao State University (MSU),
against defendant Macapagal A. Muslim, Chancellor of the MSU, and Virgilio
Ramos, Dean of the College of Engineering of the same university. A party aggrieved by a decision, ruling,
order or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to
entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the
Civil Service Law. (Mateo v.
Thus, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, [Osops] application for preliminary injunction, being merely ancillary to the principal action is also hereby dismissed without prejudice. The injunction bond is cancelled ipso facto.[16]
The RTC denied Osops Motion for Reconsideration in an Order[17] dated September 25, 1998, prompting him to file with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, [18] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49966, in which he argued, inter alia, that:
2) The issue of removal from office of [Osop], who is faculty member of a state university, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission;
x x x x
4) In Civil Case No. 6381 [Osop] is suing [Muslim and Ramos] also for damages, a subject matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.[19]
In
the meantime, concerned students of MSU-GSC filed before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Regional Office No. 11 a Complaint for the illegal termination
of Osop by Muslim. CSC Regional Office
No. 11 issued an Order dated
Eventually, on
Anent
the order of the Civil Service Commission Regional Office dated
Secondly, [Osops] side of the issue was never heard because only Muslim was allowed to adduce evidence hence a denial of due process on the part of [Osop].
Coming now to the issue of whether or not [Osops] complaint was correctly dismissed by the trial court for having failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that consequently this case falls with the Civil Service Commission, we answer in the negative.
[Osop] cites Sections 4, 5 and 6(e)(h) of the MSU charter R.A. 1387 as amended by R.A. Nos. 1893, 3791, 3868, to wit:
Sec. 4. The
government of said University is vested in a board of regents to be known as
the Board of Regents of the
Sec. 5. The Mindanao State University shall have the
general powers set out in Section thirteen of Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and
fifty-nine and the administration of said university and the exercise of its
corporate powers are hereby vested exclusively in the Board of Regents and in
the President of the University, insofar as authorized by said Board.
Sec. 6. The
Board of Regents shall have the following powers of administration and the exercise
of the powers of the corporation.
x x x x
(e) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President
of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of
the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion
leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had; and to extend with their consent
the tenure of faculty members of the University beyond the age of sixty-five,
any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, on recommendation
of the President of the University, whenever in his opinion their services are
specially needed; Provided, however, that no extension of service shall be made
beyond the age of seventy.
x x x x
(h) To prescribe rules for its own government, and to
enact for the government of the University such general ordinances and
regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the
University as defined in Section 2 of this Act.
Moreover, Article 152 of the Code of MSU provides:
Art. 152. Terms and Conditions of Appointment. The
precise terms and conditions of every appointment shall be stated in
writing. In case of a non-renewal of a
probationary appointment the person so concerned shall be so informed in
writing at least sixty days before the termination date.
Proceeding from all the foregoing, it appears clearly that the authority to remove is vested in the Board of Regents and only after an investigation and hearing.
Due process was clearly not observed in the removal of [Osop]. First of all, only the Board of Regents have the power of removal which must be for cause and after an investigation and hearing shall have been had. Secondly, even a mere probationary appointment requires that in case of non-renewal the person so concerned shall be informed in writing at least sixty (60) days before termination date. These basic requisites were not at all observed in the termination of [Osop].
Therefore, we agree with [Osop] that his non-referral of the matter of his removal to the Board of Regents before he resorted to court action is accepted as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of several exception[s], to wit:
1. When there is a violation of due process.
x x x x
On
another point, the two grounds relied upon by Muslim for terminating [Osop] to
wit: (1) that Prof. Danilo Dadula for whom [Osop] has been serving as
substitute since
[Osop] contends and respondent Muslim does not deny that the notation vice Danilo Dadula on study grant contained in [Osops] appointment is erroneous because [Osop] was recruited as a substitute for Engineer Julito Fuerzas.
Assuming
that [Osop] merely substituted for Dadula, [Muslim] does not deny that Danilo
Dadula returned to MSU General Santos from his study grant in June 1996 and has
taught in the Department of Mechanical Engineering of the
Further,
contradicting Muslims claim that [Osop] is a mere substitute of Dadula on
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
Omnibus Order of the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 22 dated
The Motion for Reconsideration of
Muslim and Ramos was denied by the Court of Appeal in its Resolution dated
Muslim then appealed the foregoing
judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49966 by way of a Petition
for Review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 141276. However, in a Resolution dated July 3, 2000, the
Court denied Muslims Petition for Review; and in a Resolution dated April 4,
2001, the Court likewise denied Muslims Motion for Reconsideration.[25]
On
Considering that no responsive pleading has yet been filed by [Muslim and Ramos], the amended complaint is hereby ADMITTED.
WHEREFORE,
the defendants Macapado Muslim and Virgilio Ramos are ordered to file their
answers within ten (10) days from today, and as prayed for by the counsel of [Osop],
issue the corresponding summons to newly impleaded defendant Mindanao State
University (MSU) at its main office in
The Solicitor General is hereby ordered to enter his appearance as counsel for defendant Macapado A. Muslim and Virgilio Ramos, who were both sued in their official and personal capacities and defendant MSU.
Muslim and Ramos, through counsel,
Atty. Emmanuel C. Fontanilla, filed their Answer to Amended Complaint on July
20, 2001.[28]
On July 27, 2001, RTC Clerk of Court
Asuncion de Leon Omila served summons upon MSU at its main campus in Marawi
City which required the university to enter its appearance in Civil Case No.
6381 and to answer Osops Amended Complaint within 15 days after service of
said summons.[29]
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) entered its appearance before the RTC in Civil Case No. 6381 on September
14, 2001 as counsel for Muslim, Ramos, and MSU (Muslim, et al.). The OSG requested
that it be furnished with a copy of the Amended Complaint and that the period
to file the answer be suspended until receipt of said Amended Complaint.[30] In its Order[31]
dated
For failure of MSU to file an answer
to the Amended Complaint within the given period, Osop filed a Motion to
Declare Defendant MSU in Default.[32] Osops Motion was denied by the RTC in its
Order[33]
dated
The OSG filed a Manifestation on February
14, 2002 which stated that upon verification with its Record Section, it
discovered that Atty. Fontanilla, counsel for Muslim and Ramos, was actually
deputized by the OSG to handle Civil Case No. 6381; and that MSU is adopting the
Answer to the Amended Complaint already filed by Ramos and Muslim, as all the defendants
in said case were in the same position.[34]
Osop filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated
Meanwhile, Osop filed on
In an Order[38]
dated
After an exchange of pleadings among
the parties, the RTC issued an Order[39] dated
The law itself determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleading appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensure as a matter of law. What is crucial for determination, therefore, is the presence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which require (sic) the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue of trial.
Applying these (sic) principle to the present case, it can be said that [Osop] has clearly demonstrate (sic) the absence of any genuine issue of fact, as well as the issue posed by [Muslim, et al.] that [Osop] is a contractual employee is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for a full-blown trial.
From the decision rendered by the Seventeenth Division Court of Appeals concerning the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by [Osop], in this case it ruled that the appointment of [Osop] by [Muslim] ceases to be probationary in character when the former was allowed to continue teaching up to July 15, 1998 (sic) and even appointed as Chairperson of the Electrical Engineering Department. The issue raised by [Muslim, et al.] in their answer that [Osop] is a contractual employee is indeed patently unsubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue in this case for trial. Once and for all, such an issue has already been settled by the honorable Court of Appeals whose decision has become final and executory. Thus, there was no more genuine issue that was left to be tried except the amount of damages and attorneys fees.
x x
x x
After having been taken into account the foregoing premises and pleadings of the parties in support of their respective stand on the matter under consideration as well as from the implied admissions arising from the failure of [Muslim, et al.] to set forth reasons why [they] could not truthfully either admit or deny those matters alleged in the amended complaint, and having concluded from the attendant circumstances that [Osop] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for such amount as may be found to be due him in damages.
Consequently,
the RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, a summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Osop] by ordering [Muslim and Ramos] or their successors, and defendant Mindanao State University to give teaching loads to [Osop] and to pay such amount as may be found to be due him in damages.
For the meantime, let this case be called for trial to resolve the sole issue of damages that may be awarded in favor of [Osop] on May 30, 2003, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.[40]
Muslim, et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned
Order on
Osop, for his part, filed a Motion
for Execution Pending Appeal, and Muslim,
et al. filed a Comment thereon.
In an Order[41]
dated August 21, 2003, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated March 20, 2003 filed by Muslim, et
al., thus:
In
resolving [Muslim, et al.s] Motion
for Reconsideration, the Court casts doubt on the veracity of [Muslim, et al.s] claim that the findings of the
Court of Appeals as to the appointment of [Osop] was a mere opinion and that
there could be no final determination on the matters not principally raised
before it. It was emphasized in the
ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Padua vs. Robles, G.R. No. 127930,
[Muslim, et al.] lost sight of the fact that the court gave due course to [Osops] Motion for Summary Judgment only after finding that the issue raised by them in their answer was patently unsubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. Inasmuch as [Muslim, et al.] failed to show a plausible ground of defense something fairly arguable and of substantial character, they cannot therefore further insist that they have a genuine issue to warrant this Court to hear and try the above-entitled case.
Hence, in the present recourse, [Muslim, et al.s] Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied due course for bereft of any merit.
In the same Order, the RTC granted Osops
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, to wit:
Anent
[Osops] Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, it alleged that [Osop] has been
unemployed for almost five (5) years and if [Muslim, et al.s] appeal on the resolution of this Court, it will be just
for the purpose of delaying the termination of the case and to cause further
misery to [Osop].
Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, lays down the rule for execution pending appeal, categorized as discretionary execution. It is evident from the said provision that a primary consideration for allowing execution pending appeal would be the existence of good reasons. In turn, good reasons has been held to consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory. Such reason must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the resolution issued by this Court.
After weighing the reasons presented, the Court deemed it wise to give due course to [Osops] Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. The effective and efficient administration of justice requires that the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict rendered in his favor. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the decision/order from attaining finality.
With the foregoing reasons, [Osops] Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is hereby given due course, but insofar as to the giving of teaching loads to [Osop] only inasmuch as no amount of damages could be ascertained at this moment.
Let
therefore a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal be issued in this case directing [Muslim
and Ramos] or their successors and defendant Mindanao State University to give
teaching loads to [Osop] with a bond fix at Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos.[42]
Muslim, et al., filed a Motion for Reconsideration[43]
of the Order dated
On October 1, 2003, Osop filed a
Motion for Partial Execution (Based on a Final Executory Judgment) praying that
a writ of execution be issued ordering Muslim, et al. to give him teaching loads.[45]
Two days after, on October 3, 2003, Muslim,
et al. filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration
and Supplement to the Opposition (also Reply to Motion for Partial Execution).[46]
In an Order[47]
dated October 9, 2003 the RTC denied Muslim, et al.s Second Motion for Reconsideration and Supplement to the
Opposition (also Reply to Motion for Partial Execution) for being a pro forma motion.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order[48]
dated November 10, 2003 granting Osops Motion for Partial Execution and ordering
the issuance of a writ for the partial execution of the Order dated March 20,
2003, particularly, for its directive that Muslim, et al. give Osop teaching load.
RTC Clerk of Court Fulgar issued the
Writ of Execution[49]
the next day, November 11, 2003. As
shown in the Sheriffs Return[50]
dated November 17, 2003, original copies of RTC Order dated November 10, 2003
and Writ of Execution dated November 11, 2003 were duly served upon Muslim, et al. on November 12, 2003.
Aggrieved, Muslim, in his personal
capacity,[51] filed on
January 12, 2004, with the Court of Appeals, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary and Instant Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82052.[52] Muslim averred that in issuing the Order dated
1. Consider[ed] the Decision of the Court of Appeals in a Certiorari as a judgment on the merit.
2. Plac[ed] the action in the lower court within the purview of summary procedure.
3. Grant[ed] partial execution.
4. Consider[ed] the order of finding no genuine issue as a final order.[53]
After the parties filed their
respective Memorandum, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated
On
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 82052 on
In
the instant case, it is indubitably shown that the main issue that needs to be
resolved is whether or not [Osop] was a probationary employee. In CA-G.R. SP No. 49966, the appellate court,
despite the fact that the issue brought therein was whether or not public
respondent gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction, nevertheless ruled that the appointment of [Osop] ceased to be
probationary in character. Respondent
judge merely took judicial notice of the appellate courts findings that [Osop]
had indeed ceased to be a probationary employee. To Our assessment, what respondent judge may
have had on his mind was that even if he decided otherwise, the case would
still be appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as adverted to, already made a
finding that [Osop] was a permanent employee.
Moreover, the appellate courts decision was also binding between the
parties; it was deemed to be the law of the case, hence, it was only proper
for public respondent to conform to this Courts decision.
x x x x
A trial court which has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the case, can grant a motion for summary judgment, and such is within its power or authority in law to perform. Its propriety rests on its sound exercise of discretion and judgment. In the event that it errs in finding that there is no genuine issue to thus call for the rendition of a summary judgment, the resulting decision may not be set aside either directly or indirectly by petition for certiorari, but may only be corrected on appeal or other direct review. The court a quo categorically stated that its March 20, 2003 [Order] had become final and executory as quoted hereunder:
A review of the records of the case
will show that the [Muslim, et al.]
received the Order dated [20] March 2003, granting the summary judgment, on
Again, carefully going over the
records, the Court finds that the Orders issued were already final and
executory. [Muslim, et al.] received the Order granting the summary judgment of [Osop]
dated
Indeed, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and within the time frame provided by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. Failure of a party to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory. After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party who has the right to enjoy the finality of the case.
To determine whether a judgment or order is final or interlocutory, the test is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory, if it does not, it is final. A final judgment is one that disposes of a case in a manner that leaves nothing more to be done by the court in respect thereto. A summary judgment is one which is final as it already adjudicated the issues and determined the rights of the parties. It is only interlocutory when the court denies a motion for summary judgment or renders a partial summary judgment as there would still be issues left to be determined by the court. In the instant case, the March 20, 2003 Order was unequivocal, other than setting a hearing to determine the amount of damages, but had, on the other hand, already disposed of the case. As such, the issuance of the November 10, 2003 Order granting the motion for partial execution was proper as the summary judgment already became final and executory as adverted to.
In a petition for certiorari, even if, in the greater interest of substantial justice, certiorari may be availed of, it must be shown that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that is, that the trial court exercised its powers in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostilities, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. We find that such abuse is not extant in the instant case.[58]
Muslim filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the foregoing judgment on
On July 11, 2006, the Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution stating that it received on June 8, 2006 a copy of
the instant Petition (G.R. No. 172448) filed by MSU; and since said Petition
assails its Decision dated March 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 82052, it was
constrained to await the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 172448. Hence, the Court of Appeals opted to hold in
abeyance the resolution of Muslims Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
The issue relevant to the Petition at
bar insofar as MSU is concerned arises from the pronouncement of the Court of
Appeals in the same Decision dated March 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 82052 quoted
hereunder:
At the outset this case was deemed submitted for decision on October 6, 2004. On January 10, 2005, this Court received a Motion to Intervene (with Motion to Admit Memorandum) filed by Mindanao State University (MSU) through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). However, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, allows intervention only at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court, and We hold the motion to intervene is a stray pleading and is deemed not filed.[61]
The instant Petition of MSU presented
the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS MOTION FOR INTERVENTION WAS IMPROVIDENTLY FILED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER ALTHOUGH PETITIONER PRESENTED DEFENSES IN THEIR ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT TENDERING FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ACQUIRED PERMANENT STATUS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF PARTIAL WRIT OF EXECUTION.[62]
MSU anchors its right to intervene on
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
MSU stresses that it has a legal interest in the controversy considering
that, ultimately, it will be the one liable for the relief Osop prays for,
particularly, Osops reinstatement at MSU-GSC.
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
In Alfelor v. Halasan,[63]
the Court held that:
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.[64]
Jurisprudence describes intervention as
a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a
right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings.[65] The right to intervene is not an absolute
right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant establishes facts
which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it.[66]
While undoubtedly, MSU has a legal
interest in the outcome of the case, it may not avail itself of the remedy of
intervention in CA-G.R. SP No. 82052 simply because MSU is not a third party in
the proceedings herein.
In Osops Amended Complaint before
the RTC, MSU was already impleaded as one of the defendants in Civil Case No.
6381. MSU came under the jurisdiction of
the RTC when it was served with summons.
It participated in Civil Case No. 6381, where it was represented by
Atty. Fontanilla, counsel for Muslim and Ramos, who was deputized by the OSG as
counsel for MSU. MSU adopted the Answer to
the Amended Complaint of its co-defendants, Muslim and Ramos, and also joined
Muslim and Ramos in subsequent pleadings filed before the RTC in Civil Case No.
6381. Evidently, the rights and
interests of MSU were duly presented before the RTC in Civil Case No.
6381. Unfortunately, the RTC issued the
Orders dated March 20, 2003 and August 21, 2003 in Civil Case No. 6381 adverse
to MSU and its co-defendants, Muslim and Ramos.
The Orders dated March 20, 2003 and
August 21, 2003 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 6381 granted summary judgment in
Osops favor. Muslim filed his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82052 which is still pending before the Court of Appeals (which
has yet to resolve Muslims Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration). Consequently, we
are careful not to make any declarations herein that will prematurely judge the
merits of CA-G.R. SP No. 82052.
MSU, on its part, neither filed an
appeal nor a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals to challenge the adverse RTC Orders. MSU sat on its rights. Despite receiving on September 2, 2003[67] a
copy of the RTC Order dated August 21, 2003 (denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated March 20, 2003 filed by MSU, together
with Muslim and Ramos) in Civil Case No. 6381, MSU did not act until it filed
its Motion for Intervention on January
14, 2005[68] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82052, after an interval of 16
months. Evidently, it was already
way beyond the reglementary period for MSU to file an appeal (15 days)[69]
or a Petition for Certiorari (60
days).[70] The RTC Orders dated
In view of the foregoing, the Court
finds no further need to address the other assignment of errors of MSU. Given that the Court of Appeals did not allow
MSU to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 82052, it has no personality to question the
judgment of the appellate court in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice |
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
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ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice |
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* Per Special Order No. 1203 dated February 17, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 54-65; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.
[2] Records, Vol. 1, p. 49.
[3] Id. at 21-56.
[4] Id. at 56.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 81.
[13]
[14] Records, Vol. I, p. 201.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Id. at 507.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Id. at 660.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Records, Vol. II, p. 23.
[34]
[35]
[36] Records, Vol. I, pp. 759-782.
[37] Records, Vol. II, pp. 1-7.
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51] In the Amended Complaint, Muslim was sued not only in his official capacity but also in his personal capacity.
[52] Records, Vol. II, pp. 418-438.
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57] Muslims Motion for Reconsideration is still pending in court.
[58] Rollo, pp. 60-65.
[59] CA rollo, pp. 575-586.
[60] Id. at 886-904.
[61] Records, Vol. II, pp. 951-952.
[62] Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[63] G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451.
[64] Id. at 460.
[65] Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 169914, March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 44, 48.
[66]
[67] Records, Vol. II, p. 368.
[68]
[69] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 3.
[70]