Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
CANADIAN OPPORTUNITIES
UNLIMITED, INC., Petitioner, - versus - BART Q. DALANGIN, JR., Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 172223
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February
6, 2012 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For resolution is the petition for
review on certiorari[1] to
nullify the decision dated December 19, 2005[2]
and the resolution dated March 30, 2006[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 84907.
The Antecedents
On
November 20, 2001, respondent Bart Q. Dalangin, Jr. filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement and backwages, as well as
damages (moral and exemplary) and attorneys fees, against petitioner Canadian
Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. (company). The company, based in Pasong Tamo,
Dalangin
was hired by the company only in the previous month, or in October 2001, as
Immigration and Legal Manager, with a monthly salary of P15,000.00. He
was placed on probation for six months. He was to report directly to the Chief
Operations Officer, Annie Llamanzares Abad. His tasks involved principally the
review of the clients applications for immigration to
Through
a memorandum[4] dated
October 27, 2001, signed by Abad, the company terminated Dalangins employment,
declaring him unfit and unqualified to continue as Immigration and Legal
Manager, for the following reasons:
a)
Obstinacy
and utter disregard of company policies. Propensity to take prolonged and
extended lunch breaks, shows no interest in familiarizing oneself with the
policies and objectives.
b)
Lack of
concern for the companys interest despite having just been employed in the
company. (Declined to attend company sponsored activities, seminars intended to familiarize company employees
with Management objectives and enhancement of company interest and objectives.)
c)
Showed
lack of enthusiasm toward work.
d)
Showed
lack of interest in fostering relationship with his co-employees.[5]
The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings
Dalangins
submission
Dalangin
alleged, in his Position Paper,[6]
that the company issued a memorandum requiring its employees to attend a
Values Formation Seminar scheduled for October 27, 2001 (a Saturday) at 2:00
p.m. onwards. He inquired from Abad
about the subject and purpose of the seminar and when he learned that it bore
no relation to his duties, he told Abad that he would not attend the seminar.
He said that he would have to leave at 2:00 p.m. in order to be with his family
in the province. Dalangin claimed that
Abad insisted that he attend the seminar so that the other employees would also
attend. He replied that he should not be
treated similarly with the other employees as there are marked differences
between their respective positions and duties.
Nonetheless, he signified his willingness to attend the seminar, but
requested Abad to have it conducted within office hours to enable everybody to
attend.
Dalangin
further alleged that Abad refused his request and stressed that all company
employees may be required to stay beyond
On
October 26, 2001, Dalangin claimed that Abad issued a memorandum[8]
requiring him to explain why he could not attend the seminar scheduled for October
27, 2001 and the other forthcoming seminars. The following day,
The companys defense
Through
their position paper,[10] the company and its principal officers
alleged that at the time of Dalangins engagement, he was advised that he was
under probation for six months and his employment could be terminated should he
fail to meet the standards to qualify him as a regular employee. He was informed that he would be evaluated on
the basis of the results of his work; on his attitude towards the company, his
work and his co-employees, as spelled out in his job description;[11]
and on the basis of Abads affidavit.[12]
They
further alleged that during his brief employment in the company, Dalangin
showed lack of enthusiasm towards his work and was indifferent towards his
co-employees and the company clients.
Dalangin refused to comply with the companys policies and procedures,
routinely taking long lunch breaks, exceeding the one hour allotted to
employees, and leaving the company premises without informing his immediate
superior, only to call the office later and say that he would be unable to
return because he had some personal matters to attend to. He also showed lack
of interpersonal skills and initiative which he manifested when the immigration
application of a company client, Mrs. Jennifer Tecson, was denied by the
Canadian Embassy. Dalangin failed to provide counsel to Tecson; he also should
have found a way to appeal her denied application, but he did not. As it turned
out, the explanation he gave to Tecson led her to believe that the company did
not handle her application well.
Dalangins lack of interest in the company was further manifested when
he refused to attend company-sponsored seminars designed to acquaint or update
the employees with the companys policies and objectives.
The
company argued that since Dalangin failed to qualify for the position of
Immigration and Legal Manager, the company decided to terminate his services,
after duly notifying him of the companys decision and the reason for his
separation.
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
In
his decision dated P75,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00
and exemplary damages of P50,000.00, plus 10% attorneys fees. The labor
arbiter found that the charges against Dalangin, which led to his dismissal,
were not established by clear and substantial proof.
On
appeal by the company, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a decision on
The CA Decision
In
its now assailed decision,[15]
the CA held that the NLRC erred when it ruled that Dalangin was not illegally
dismissed. As the labor arbiter did, the CA found that the company failed to
support, with substantial evidence, its claim that Dalangin failed to meet the
standards to qualify as a regular employee.
Citing
a ruling of the Court in an earlier case,[16]
the CA pointed out that the company did not allow Dalangin to prove that he
possessed the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for his regular
employment; instead, it dismissed Dalangin peremptorily from the service. It
opined that it was quite improbable that the company could fully determine
Dalangins performance barely one month into his employment.[17]
The
CA denied the companys subsequent motion for reconsideration in its resolution
of March 30, 2006.[18]
Hence, this appeal.
The Companys Case
Through
its submissions the Petition,[19] the
Reply[20]
and the Memorandum[21]
the company seeks a reversal of the CA rulings, raising the following issues:
(1) whether the requirements of notice and hearing in employee dismissals are
applicable to Dalangins case; and (2) whether Dalangin is entitled to moral
and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
On
the first issue, the company argues that the notice and hearing requirements
are to be observed only in termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Dalangins dismissal, it maintains, was not based on a just cause under
Article 282, but was due to his failure to meet the companys standards for
regular employment. It contends that under the Labor Codes Implementing Rules
and Regulations, [i]f the termination is
brought about x x x by failure of an employee to meet the standards of the
employer in the case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a
written notice is served the employee within a reasonable time from the
effective date of termination.[22]
It points out that it properly observed the notice requirement when it notified
Dalangin of his dismissal on October 27, 2001,[23]
after it asked him to explain (memorandum of October 26, 2001) why he could not
attend the seminar scheduled for October 27, 2001; Dalangin failed to submit
his explanation. It posits that contrary to the CAs conclusion, the companys finding
that Dalangin failed to meet its standards for regular employment was supported
by substantial evidence.
With
respect to the second issue, the company submits that Dalangin is not entitled
to moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. It maintains that Dalangin
failed to present convincing evidence establishing bad faith or ill-motive on
its part. It insists that it dismissed Dalangin in good faith with the belief
that he would not contribute any good to the company, as manifested by his
behavior towards his work and co-employees.
The Case for Dalangin
Through
his Comment[24] and
Memorandum,[25]
Dalangin asks the Court to deny the petition. He argues that (1) probationary
employees, under existing laws and jurisprudence, are entitled to notice and
hearing prior to the termination of their employment; and (2) he is entitled to
moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Dalangin
disputes the companys submission that under the Labor Codes implementing
rules, only a written notice is required for the dismissal of probationary
employees. He argues that the rules cited by the company clearly mandate the
employer to (1) serve the employee a written notice and (2) within a reasonable
time before effecting the dismissal. He stresses that for the dismissal to be
valid, these requirements must go hand in hand.
He
explains that in the present case, the company did not observe the above two
requirements as he was dismissed the day after he was asked, by way of a
memorandum dated October 26, 2001,[26]
to explain within twenty-four hours why he could not attend the October 27,
2001 seminar. He adds that on the assumption that the termination letter dated
On
the companys claim that he failed to perform in accordance with its standards,
Dalangin argues that a perusal of the grounds in support of his dismissal
reveals that none of the charges leveled against him is supported by concrete
and tangible evidence. He maintains that the company miserably failed to cite a
single company policy which he allegedly violated and defied. He refutes the
companys claim that his job description and his employment contract apprise
him of the company policy that he is to observe for the duration of his
employment. He, thus, maintains that he
had not been previously informed of the company standards he was supposed to
satisfy. He stresses that the CA did not
err in holding that the companys general averments regarding his failure to
meet its standards for regular employment were not corroborated by any other
evidence and, therefore, are insufficient to justify his dismissal.
Dalangin
insists that he is entitled to backwages, moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys fees, claiming that his dismissal was unjust, oppressive, tainted
with bad faith, and contrary to existing morals, good customs and public
policy. There was bad faith, he argues, because he was dismissed without the
requisite notice and hearing required under the law; and merely on the basis of
the companys bare, sweeping and general allegations that he is difficult to
deal with and that he might cause problems to the companys future business
operations. He is entitled to attorneys
fees, he submits, because he was forced
to litigate and vindicate his rights.
He
bewails what he considers as a pre-conceived plan and determined design[27]
on the part of Sichani and Abad to immediately terminate his employment.
Elaborating, he points out that the company, through Abad, prepared two
memoranda, both dated
The Courts Ruling
As
a rule, the Court is not a trier of facts, the resolution of factual issues
being the function of lower courts whose findings are received with respect and
are binding on the Court subject to certain exceptions.[30] A
recognized exception to the rule is the circumstance in which there are conflicting
findings of fact by the CA, on the one hand, and the trial court or government
agency concerned, on the other, as in the present case. The factual findings of the NLRC on the
dispute between Dalangin and the company are at variance with those of the CA,
thus necessitating our review of the case, especially the evidence on record.[31]
We now resolve the core issue of whether
Dalangin, a probationary employee, was validly dismissed.
In
International Catholic Migration
Commission v. NLRC,[32]
the Court explained that a probationary employee, as understood under Article
281 of the Labor Code, is one who is on trial by an employer, during which, the
latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A
probationary appointment gives the employer an opportunity to observe the
fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he would be a
proper and efficient employee.
Dalangin
was barely a month on the job when the company terminated his employment. He
was found wanting in qualities that would make him a proper and efficient
employee or, as the company put it, he was unfit and unqualified to continue as
its Immigration and Legal Manager.
Dalangins
dismissal was viewed differently by the NLRC and the CA. The NLRC upheld the
dismissal as it was, it declared, in the exercise of the companys management
prerogative. On the other hand, the CA found that the dismissal was not
supported by substantial evidence and that the company did not allow Dalangin
to prove that he had the qualifications to meet the companys standards for his
regular employment. The CA did not
believe that the company could fully assess Dalangins performance within a
month. It viewed Dalangins dismissal as arbitrary, considering that the company
had very little time to determine his fitness for the job.
We disagree.
The
essence of a probationary period of employment fundamentally lies in the
purpose or objective of both the employer and the employee during the period.
While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a
probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the latter
seeks to prove to the former that he has the qualifications to meet the
reasonable standards for permanent employment.[33]
The
trial period or the length of time the probationary employee remains on
probation depends on the parties agreement, but it shall not exceed six (6)
months under Article 281 of the Labor Code, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. Article 281 provides:
Probationary employment. Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
As
the Court explained in International
Catholic Migration Commission, the word probationary, as used to
describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period,
but not its length.[34]
Thus, the fact that Dalangin was separated from the service after only about
four weeks does not necessarily mean that his separation from the service is
without basis.
Contrary to the CAs conclusions, we
find substantial evidence indicating that the company was justified in
terminating Dalangins employment, however brief it had been. Time and again, we have emphasized that
substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[35]
Dalangin overlooks the fact,
wittingly or unwittingly, that he offered glimpses of his own behavior and
actuations during his four-week stay with the company; he betrayed his negative
attitude and regard for the company, his co-employees and his work.
Dalangin admitted in compulsory
arbitration that the proximate cause for his dismissal was his refusal to
attend the companys Values Formation Seminar scheduled for October 27, 2001,
a Saturday. He refused to attend the seminar after he learned that it had no
relation to his duties, as he claimed, and that he had to leave at
The Values Formation Seminar
incident is an eye-opener on the kind of person and employee Dalangin was. His
refusal to attend the seminar brings into focus and validates what was wrong
with him, as Abad narrated in her affidavit[36]
and as reflected in the termination of employment memorandum.[37]
It highlights his lack of interest in familiarizing himself with the companys objectives and policies.
Significantly, the seminar involved acquainting and updating the employees with
the companys policies and objectives.
Had he attended the seminar, Dalangin could have broadened his awareness
of the companys policies, in addition to Abads briefing him about the companys
policies on punctuality and attendance, and the procedures to be followed in
handling the clients applications. No wonder the company charged him with
obstinacy.
The incident also reveals Dalangins
lack of interest in establishing good working relationship with his
co-employees, especially the rank and file; he did not want to join them
because of his view that the seminar was not relevant to his position and
duties. It also betrays an arrogant and condescending attitude on his part
towards his co-employees, and a lack of support for the company objective that
company managers be examples to the rank and file employees.
Additionally, very early in his
employment, Dalangin exhibited negative working habits, particularly with
respect to the one hour lunch break policy of the company and the observance of
the companys working hours. Thus, Abad stated that Dalangin would take prolonged
lunch breaks or would go out of the office without leave of the company only
to call the personnel manager later to inform the latter that he would be
unable to return as he had to attend to personal matters. Without expressly
countering or denying Abads statement, Dalangin dismissed the charge for the
companys failure to produce his daily time record.[38]
The same thing is true with
Dalangins handling of Tecsons application for immigration to
In the face of Abads direct
statements, as well as those of his co-employees, it is puzzling that Dalangin
chose to be silent about the charges, other than saying that the company could
not cite any policy he violated. All along, he had been complaining that he was
not able to explain his side, yet from the labor arbiters level, all the way
to this Court, he offered no satisfactory explanation of the charges. In this
light, coupled with Dalangins adamant refusal to attend the companys Values Formation
Seminar and a similar program scheduled earlier, we find credence in the
companys submission that Dalangin was unfit to continue as its Immigration and
Legal Manager. As we stressed earlier, we are convinced that the company had
seen enough from Dalangins actuations, behavior and deportment during a
four-week period to realize that Dalangin would be a liability rather than an
asset to its operations.
We, therefore, disagree with the CA
that the company could not have fully determined Dalangins performance barely
one month into his employment. As we said in International Catholic Migration Commission, the probationary term
or period denotes its purpose but not its length. To our mind, four weeks was enough for the
company to assess Dalangins fitness for the job and he was found wanting. In separating Dalangin from the service
before the situation got worse, we find the company not liable for illegal dismissal.
The procedural due process issue
Section
2, Rule I, Book VI of the Labor Codes Implementing Rules and Regulations provides:
If the termination is brought about by the completion of a contract or phase thereof, or by failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in the case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.
The
company contends that it complied with the above rule when it asked Dalangin,
through Abads Memorandum dated October 26, 2001,[39]
to explain why he could not attend the seminar scheduled for October 27, 2001.
When he failed to submit his explanation, the company, again through Abad,
served him a notice the following day, October 27, 2001, terminating his
employment. Dalangin takes strong exception to the companys submission. He
insists that the company failed to comply with the rules as he was not afforded
a reasonable time to defend himself before he was dismissed.
The
records support Dalangins contention. The notice served on him did not give
him a reasonable time, from the effective date of his separation, as required
by the rules. He was dismissed on the very day the notice was given to him, or,
on October 27, 2001. Although we cannot invalidate his dismissal in light of
the valid cause for his separation, the companys non-compliance with the
notice requirement entitles Dalangin to indemnity, in the form of nominal
damages in an amount subject to our discretion.[40]
Under the circumstances, we consider appropriate an award of nominal damages of
P10,000.00 to Dalangin.
Damages and attorneys fees
Finally,
given the valid reason for Dalangins dismissal, the claim for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, must necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Petitioner
Canadian Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. is DIRECTED
to pay respondent Bart Q. Dalangin, Jr. nominal damages in the amount of P10,000.00.
Costs
against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-28; filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Ibid.
[6]
[7]
[8] Supra note 6, at 89.
[9] Ibid.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Supra note 2.
[16]
[17] Miranda v. Carreon, 449 Phil. 285 (2003).
[18] Supra note 3.
[19] Supra note 1.
[20] Rollo, pp. 255-268.
[21]
[22] Book VI, Rule 1, Section 2, not Book V, Rule XXIII, III (2) as cited.
[23] Supra note 4.
[24] Rollo, pp. 228-252; dated September 21, 2006.
[25]
[26] Supra note 8.
[27] Supra note 25, at 317.
[28] Supra note 8.
[29] Supra note 25, at 305.
[30] Lanuza v. Muoz, 473 Phil. 616 (2004).
[31] Palecpec,
Jr. v.
[32] 251 Phil. 560 (1989).
[33]
[34] Ibid.
[35] Madrigalejos v. Geminilou Trucking Service, G.R. No. 179174, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 570.
[36] Supra note 12.
[37] Supra note 4.
[38] Supra note 25, at 319.
[39] Supra note 8.
[40] Agabon v. NLRC, 485 Phil. 248 (2004).