Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
LAND BANK OF THE Petitioner, - versus - HONEYCOMB FARMS
CORPORATION, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 169903
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February
29, 2012 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review before us
assails the decision[1]
dated March 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66023, which affirmed with modification the judgment
dated July 6, 1999 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, acting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC) in Special Civil Case No.
4323 for Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The petition also
prays for the reversal of the resolution of the CA,[2]
dated October 4, 2005, denying reconsideration.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered
owner of two parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan, P10,480,000.00,[4] or
P21,165.00 per hectare.[5]
From the entire area offered, the government chose to acquire only 486.0907
hectares.
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the
responsibility of determining the land valuation and compensation for parcels
of land acquired pursuant to the CARL,[6] and
using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series of 1989, as amended
by DAR AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed the value of these parcels of land, as
follows:
|
Acquired property |
Area in hectares |
Value |
|
TCT No. T-2872 |
231.8406 |
|
|
TCT No. T-2549 |
254.25 |
|
When Honeycomb Farms rejected this
valuation for being too low, the Voluntary Offer to Sell was referred to the
DAR Adjudication Board, Region V, P5,324,549.00, broken down as follows:
I.
TCT No. T-2872
|
Land use |
Value per hectare |
Area |
Total (Pesos) |
|
Cornland |
|
69.158 |
829,896.00 |
|
|
12,000.00 |
1.3888 |
16,665.60 |
|
Cocoland |
15,000.00 |
13.65 |
204,750.00 |
|
Grass land |
10,000.00 |
147.6438 |
1,476,438.00 |
|
TOTAL |
231.8408 |
2,527,749.60 |
|
II.
TCT No. T-2549
|
Land use |
Value per hectare |
Area |
Total (Pesos) |
|
Coconut land |
|
4.6 |
69,000.00 |
|
Cornland |
12,000.00 |
101 |
212,000.00 |
|
Riceland (upland) |
14,000.00 |
5 |
70,000.00 |
|
Cassava |
12,000.00 |
4.65 |
55,800.00 |
|
Cogon |
10,000.00 |
139 |
1,390,000.00 |
|
TOTAL |
|
254.25 |
2,796,800.00[10] |
Still, Honeycomb Farms rejected this
valuation.
On
July 4, 1994, Honeycomb Farms filed a case with the RTC, acting as a SAC, against
the DAR Secretary and the LBP, praying that it be compensated for its
landholdings in the amount of P12,440,000.00,
with damages and attorneys fees.
The
RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners to aid the court in determining the
just compensation for the subject properties. The Board of Commissioners,
however, failed to agree on a common valuation for the properties.
Honeycomb
Farms, thereafter, filed an amended complaint, where it increased the valuation
of the properties to P20,000,000.00.[11]
The LBP, on the other hand, filed an amended answer where it admitted the
preliminary valuation it made on the properties, but alleged that it had
revalued the land registered under TCT No. T-2872 at P1,373,244.78, while the land registered under TCT No. T-2549
was revalued at P1,513,097.57.[12]
THE RTC DECISION
On
July 6, 1999, the RTC issued a judgment whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by:
1.)
Fixing the just compensation of the two parcels of land
owned by the Honeycomb Farm[s] Corp. under TCT No. T-2872 and TCT No. T-2549
with a total area of 486.0907 hectares which is considered a[s] Carpable in the
sum of P25,232,000 subject
to the lien for the docket fee the amount in excess of P20,000,000 as pleaded for in the
amended complaint.
2.) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay Attorneys fee[s] equivalent to 10% of the total just compensation; without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Since the Board of Commissioners
could not reach a common valuation for the properties, the RTC made its own
valuation. First, the RTC took judicial notice of the fact that a portion of
the land, measuring approximately 10 hectares, is commercial land, since it is
located a few kilometers away from Sitio Curvada, Pitago, Cataingan, P100,000.00
per hectare and the remaining 476 hectares at P32,000.00 per hectare.
Both
parties appealed to the CA.
Honeycomb
Farms alleged that the government failed to pay just compensation for its land
when the LBP opened a trust account in its behalf, in violation of the Courts
ruling in Landbank of the Phils. v. CA.[14]
Since it was never paid just compensation, the taking of its land is illegal.
Consequently, the just compensation should thus be determined based on factors
existing at the time of the fixing of just compensation, and not at the time
the properties were actually taken.
The
LBP, on the other hand, argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it
disregarded the formula for fixing just compensation embodied in DAR AO No. 6,
series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994. The LBP also
argued that the RTC erred in taking judicial notice that 10 hectares of the
land in question is commercial land. Lastly, the LBP assailed the award of
attorneys fees for having no legal or factual basis.[15]
THE CA DECISION
The CA, in its March 31, 2005
decision, affirmed with modification the assailed RTC judgment. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is MODIFIED only with respect
to the computation of the amount fixed by the trial court which is hereby
corrected and fixed in the total amount of P16,232,000.00, and the award of attorneys fees is deleted.
The rest of the decision is AFFIRMED.[16]
The CA held that the lower courts are
not bound by the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 which are mere
statutory guideposts in determining just compensation. Moreover, while the LBP
valued the land based on the formula provided for in DAR AO No. 11, series of
1994, this valuation was too low and, therefore, confiscatory.
The CA thus affirmed the RTCs
valuation of the 10 hectares of commercial land at P100,000.00 per hectare, and the remaining 476 hectares at P32,000.00 per hectare.
THE PETITION
The
LBP argues that the CA committed a serious error of law when it failed to apply
the mandatory formula for determining just compensation fixed in DAR AO No. 11,
series of 1994. In fixing the just compensation for the subject landholdings at
P16,232,000.00, the CA
adopted the values fixed by the SAC, despite the fact that the valuation was not
based on law. According to the LBP, land taken pursuant to the States agrarian
reform program involves both the exercise of the States power of eminent
domain and the police power of the State. Consequently, the just compensation
for land taken for agrarian reform should be less than the just compensation
given in the ordinary exercise of eminent domain.
In contrast, Honeycomb Farms
maintains that the DAR AOs were issued merely to serve as guidelines for the DAR
and the LBP in administratively fixing the valuation to be offered by the DAR
to the landowner for acceptance or rejection. However, it is not mandatory for
courts to use the DAR AOs to fix just compensation as this would amount to an
administrative imposition on an otherwise purely judicial function and
prerogative of determination of just compensation for expropriated lands
specifically reserved by the Constitution to the courts.
THE COURTS RULING
We GRANT the LBPs
petition.
Agrarian reform and the guarantee of just
compensation
We begin by
debunking the premise on which the LBPs main argument rests since the taking
done by the government for purposes of agrarian reform is not a traditional
exercise of the power of eminent domain but one which is done in pursuance of
social justice and which involves the States police power, the just
compensation to be paid to the landowners for these parcels of agricultural
land should be less than the market value of the property.
When the State exercises its inherent
power of eminent domain, the Constitution imposes the corresponding obligation
to compensate the landowner for the expropriated property. This principle is
embodied in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, which provides: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
When the
State exercises the power of eminent domain in the implementation of its
agrarian reform program, the constitutional provision which governs is Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution,
which provides:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. [emphasis ours]
Notably, this provision also imposes
upon the State the obligation of paying the landowner compensation for the land
taken, even if it is for the governments agrarian reform purposes.
Specifically, the provision makes use of the phrase just compensation, the
same phrase used in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. That the
compensation mentioned here pertains to the fair and full price of the taken
property is evident from the following exchange between the
members of the Constitutional Commission during the discussion on the
governments agrarian reform program:
Fr. Bernas. We discussed
earlier the idea of a progressive system of compensation and I must admit, that
it was before I discussed it with Commissioner Monsod. I think what is
confusing the matter is the fact that when we speak of progressive taxation,
the bigger the tax base, the higher the rate of tax. Here, what we are saying
is that the bigger the land is, the lower the value per square meter. So, it is
really regressive, not progressive.
Mr. Monsod. Yes, Madam
President, it is true. It is progressive with respect to the beneficiary and regressive
with respect to the landowner.
Fr. Bernas. But is it
the intention of the Committee that the owner should receive less than the
market value?
Mr. Monsod. It is not
the intention of the Committee that the owner should receive less than the just
compensation. [17] (emphases ours)
Even more
to the point is the following statement made by Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon
Jr., taken from the same discussion quoted above:
Mr. Bengzon. Madam
President, as we stated earlier, the term just compensation is as it is
defined by the Supreme Court in so many cases and which we have accepted. So,
there is no difference between just compensation as stated here in Section 5
and just compensation as stated elsewhere. There are no two different
interpretations.[18]
Consistent
with these discussions, the Court, in the definitive case of Assn of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,[19]
defined just compensation for parcels of land taken pursuant to the agrarian
reform program as:
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
More
recently, we brushed aside the LBPs attempt to differentiate just compensation
paid in what it terms as traditional exercise of eminent domain and eminent
domain in the context of agrarian reform in Apo
Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[20]
thus:
To our mind, nothing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land reform and the right of landowners to receive just compensation for the expropriation by the State of their properties. That the petitioners are corporations that used to own large tracts of land should not be taken against them. As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:
[S]ocial justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
Mandatory
application of the DAR formula
The CA, in
affirming the RTCs valuation and disregarding that of the LBP, explained its
position, as follows:
A careful perusal of the assailed decision
shows that after the trial court dismissed the valuation made by [Honeycomb
Farms] as exorbitant and that fixed by [the LBP and the DAR] as confiscatory
and therefore unconstitutional, it fixed the value of the properties at P100,000.00 per hectare for the portion near
the Curvada market and P32,000.00
per hectare for the rest, taking judicial notice of the fact that the so-called
Sitio Curvada, Pitago, Cataingan, just a few kilometers away from Poblacion,
Cataingan, Masbate, is a commercial district. In this respect, while it is true
that the trial court should have announced its intention to take judicial
notice of the commercial nature of the area near the Curvada Market with an
area of ten (10) hectares, under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
We find, however, that the parties were afforded ample opportunity to present
evidence on the nature of the subject property and were actually heard thereon.
Thus, We see no error on the part of the trial court in fixing the value of the
land near the Curvada Market with an area of 10 hectares at P1,000,000.00 after evaluating the evidence
adduced by the parties. The board of commissioners constituted by the trial
court to aid it in determining the just compensation for the subject properties
conducted an ocular inspection of the property and thereafter made its
observation that 95% of the property covered by TCT No. T-2549 and 65% of the
land covered by TCT No. T-28872 are developed. [Honeycomb Farms] witness,
Engr. Calauag, taking into consideration the location of the subject property,
made a comparative valuation of similar properties located in other
geographical areas of the country, based on listings obtained from newspapers,
advertisements, and real estate brokers. In countering the said valuation, [the
LBP] and the DAR merely insisted on their own computation of the value of the
lands under the guidelines set by the DAR in its administrative orders,
disregarding factors such as the location of the subject property in relation
to adjacent properties, as well as its nature and the actual use for which this
property is devoted. The determination of just compensation logically should
take into consideration as essential factor the nature of the land based on its
location.
While we agree with [the LBP and the DAR]
that they merely followed the guidelines set forth in the administrative orders
issued by the DAR in arriving at the amount of P2,890,787.89, as the basis for compensation,
the courts of justice are not bound by such valuation as the final
determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the latter guided
by factors set forth in RA 6657.[21]
The LBP
disputes this ruling, maintaining that while the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function, courts should take into serious
consideration the facts and data gathered by the DAR, through the LBP, as the
administrative agency mandated by law to make an initial determination of the
valuation of the parcels of agricultural land acquired for land reform.
We agree.
That it is
the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation
for parcels of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program,
is made clear in Section 57 of RA 6657, which reads:
Section
57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts unless modified by this Act.
The
Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
To guide
the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors that
have to be taken into consideration to accurately determine just compensation.
This provision states:
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,[22]
we recognized that the DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the
implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula
to determine just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in
Section 17 of RA 6657. We said:
These factors [enumerated in Section 17] have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended. [emphases ours]
In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada,[23] we
emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply the formula provided in the applicable
DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that:
While [the RTC] is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR [Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The [RTC] was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision.
It is elementary that rules and
regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their
favor a presumption of legality. As
such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this
case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is
declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same. [emphases ours]
We
reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the applicable DAR
administrative regulations in Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Lim,[24]
Land Bank of the
While the determination of just compensation is essentially
a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a
These
rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in
the pertinent DAR administrative regulations to determine just compensation.
Clearly, the CA and the RTC acted with grievous error when they disregarded the
formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of
the subject land.
Hearing
necessary before RTC takes judicial notice of nature of land
Apart from disregarding the formula found in the applicable DAR AO, the
RTC, and, correspondingly, the CA, when it affirmed the trial court, committed
further error in concluding that the 10 hectares of the subject property is commercial
land after taking judicial notice of the fact that this portion of land is near
Sitio Curvada, Pitago, Cataingan, a commercial district.
While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of
certain facts, it must exercise this right within the clear boundary provided
by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment
or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. [emphasis ours]
The classification of the land is
obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property, which is the very issue in the present case. The parties should thus
have been given the opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the
property before the lower court took judicial notice of the commercial nature
of a portion of the subject landholdings. As we said in Land
Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco:[28]
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by
courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of
land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. To say that a
court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that
the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can
be otherwise acquired. This
is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not
be disputed. But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
the basis of his action.
In these lights, we find that a
remand of this case to the court of origin is necessary for the determination
of just compensation, in accordance with the formula stated in DAR AO No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by
DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994, which are the applicable issuances on fixing
just compensation.
Payment through trust account
As a final
point, we have not failed to notice that the LBP in this case made use of trust
accounts to pay Honeycomb Farms. In Land Bank of the Phil. v. CA,[29]
this Court struck down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of
1990, providing for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in
cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16(e) of RA 6657. We said:
It is very explicit x x x [from Section 16(e)] that the
deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear
nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it
were the intention to include a trust account among the valid modes of
deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words
ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust
account is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657
to warrant an expanded construction of the term deposit.
x x x x
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits
of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative
Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in
behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore
discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be
made only in cash or in LBP bonds. In the same vein, petitioners cannot
invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations
cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did
not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being
null and void.[30]
As a result,
the DAR issued AO No. 2, Series of 1996, converting trust accounts into deposit
accounts. The pertinent portion of the AO provides:
VI. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
x x x x
All previously established Trust Deposits
which served as the basis for the transfer of the landowners title to the
Republic of the
Recognizing
that the belated conversion of the trust account into a deposit account failed
to address the injustice caused to the landowner by the delay in its receipt of
the just compensation due, we held in Wycoco
that:
In light of the foregoing, the trust account
opened by LBP in the name of Wycoco as the mode of payment of just compensation
should be converted to a deposit account. Such conversion should be
retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in
opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to
payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals. Otherwise, petitioners
right to payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his
property would be violated. The interest earnings accruing on the deposit
account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just
compensation.
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed
an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these
cases, the imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for delay in
payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one
of forbearance. It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be
applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in
tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in
order. This is because the replacement
of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the
determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process.
Accordingly, the just compensation due
Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened a trust
account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into
cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The
basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be
determined by the
In line with this ruling, the LBP is
instructed to immediately convert the trust account opened in the name of Honeycomb
Farms to a deposit account. Furthermore, the just compensation due Honeycomb
Farms, as determined by the RTC, should bear 12% interest per annum from the
time LBP opened the trust account in its name until the account is converted
into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Special Civil Case No. 4323 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, for the determination of just compensation, based
on the applicable administrative orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform, subject to a 12% interest
per annum from the time the Land Bank of the Philippines opened the trust
account for respondent Honeycomb Farms Corporation up to the time this account is
actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court) and Fernanda
Lampas Peralta; rollo, pp. 32-41.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Pursuant
to Executive Order No. 405. See also Republic
of the Philippines v. CA, 331 Phil. 1070 (1996).
[7] Records, p. 8.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] 327
Phil. 1047 (1996).
[15] Rollo, pp. 66-84.
[16]
[17] Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Volume III, August 7, 1986, p. 17.
[18]
[19] 256
Phil. 777, 812 (1989).
[20] G.R. No. 164195, April 5,
2011.
[21] Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[22] 478
Phil. 701, 710 (2004).
[23] 515 Phil. 467, 478-479 (2006).
[24] G.R. No. 171941, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 129
[25] G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 31.
[26] G.R. No. 183688, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 454.
[27]
[28] 464
Phil. 83, 97-98 (2004).
[29] 319 Phil. 246 (1995).
[30]
[31] Supra note 28, at 99-101.