Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
THIRD
DIVISION
|
LAND
BANK OF THE Petitioner, - versus - ESTATE
OF J. AMADO ARANETA, Respondent. x-------------------------------------------------x DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM,[1] Petitioner, NORBERTO RESULTA, EDITHA
ABAD, LEDELIA ASIDOY, GIL PAGARAGAN, ROSALITO PAGHUBASAN, EDWIN FAUSTINO,
FELOMINO JUSOL, EDELBERTO POBLARES, EFREN APON, NELSON VILLAREAL, JIMMY
ZONIO, SERLISTO ZONIO, WILFREDO MARCELINO, ROGELIO RODERO, SERGIO ZONIO,
NORBERTO FRANCISCO, AURORA VILLACORTE, JOVITO NINONUEVO, ELIZABETH ZAUSA,
RUBEN VILLANUEVA, VICENTA RACCA, ROGELIO RACCA, MERCEDES VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO
BIUTE, APOLINARIO TORRAL, BENJAMIN TANJER, JR., MINDA SOLIMAN, CIPRIANO
REQUIOLA, GLORIA ROMERO, SILVERIO ZONIO, NESTOR ZONIO, NILO ZAUSA, ROMUALDO
ZAUSA, REYNALDO ZAUSA, LUMILYN ZAUSA, GILBERT BAUTISTA, GILDA PACETES, ALUDIA
CALUB, LOURDES CAGNO, ABELARDO CAGNO, BENJAMIN MARINAS, CRISPINA ARNAIZ,
MARIA CABUS, RESTITUTA PRETENCIO, MA. LUZ ABALOS, ABELARDO DEL ROSARIO,
CANDELARIA CEPEDA, HAYDEE MARQUILENCIA, LEONCIA ZATA, LUCIA LOPEZ, MARGARITA
MANLANGIT, CRISTINA PACIS, LEONELDA FIDELA, MA. BLESS MASAGNAY, AGUSTIN
CADAO, DOLORES FELICIANO, MA. JESSICA FELICIANO, MA. Petitioners-Intervenors, ESTELA MARIE MALOLOS,
LORETO DELA CRUZ, JOSE PAJARILLO, IMELDA ZAUSA, FEDERICO ZAUSA represented by
ROSALINDA ZAUSA, LUDEVICO ZAUSA, GLORIA VILLANUEVA, ZENAIDA MASAGNAY, ELSIO
ESTO, RODOLFO VILLONES, ALVINO NARCI represented by LILIA VILLONES, RUFINO
ZONIO, ALBERTO ROSI, ZENAIDA VILLENA, ANTONIO ZAUSA, SALDITO ZONIO, ZACARIAS
CORTEZ, LARRY MASAGNAY represented by LEONEL MASAGNAY, ERLINDA MORISON, JUAN
CORTEZ, PRIMITIBO NICASIO, CARMELO CESAR, ANDRES ZONIO represented by RUFINO
ZONIO, JUANITO ZONIO, JERENCIO ZONIO, ALEX CORTEZ, PEPITO VILLAREAL, Petitioners-Movants, - versus - ESTATE
OF J. AMADO ARANETA, Respondent. x-------------------------------------------------x ERNESTO B. DURAN, LOPE P. ABALOS
(deceased) represented by LOPE ABALOS, JR., ARTEMIO T. GONZALES (deceased)
represented by PAUL GONZALES, AUGUSTO LIM, IMELDA MARCELINO, ERNESTO NAVARTE (deceased)
represented by surviving spouse NELIA NAVARTE, FLORANTE M. QUIMZON, MANUEL R.
QUIMZON (deceased) represented by FLORANTE M. QUIMZON, NELIA ZAUSA, Petitioners-Intervenors, - versus - ESTATE
OF J. AMADO ARANETA, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 161796 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. G.R. No. 161830 G.R. No. 190456 Promulgated: February 8, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO,
JR., J.:
In these three petitions for review under Rule 45,
petitioners Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), and Ernesto B. Duran, et al.
(Duran, et al.) separately assail and seek to nullify the Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65822 that
set aside the February 7, 2001 Decision of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
in DARAB Case No. 4176. Likewise sought
to be annulled is the Resolution of the CA dated January 22, 2004[3] that
denied separate motions for reconsideration of the September 19, 2003 Decision.
The
reversed DARAB decision upheld the agrarian reform coverage of 1,266 hectares of
respondent estates 1,644.55-hectare property and its award to over a thousand
farmer-beneficiaries. The CAs reversing decision, on the other hand, is hinged
on the illegality of the coverage and the consequent award. According to the
CA, the property in question, having meanwhile ceased to be agricultural, is
not amenable to land reform coverage and, hence, falls outside of DARs jurisdiction
to implement agrarian enactments.
In G.R.
No. 161796, petitioner Land Bank faults the CA insofar as it accorded retroactive
exclusionary application to Presidential Proclamation No. (Proclamation) 1283,[4] as
amended by Proclamation 1637.[5] In
so doing, so Land Bank claims, the appellate court effectively but illegally extended
exempt-coverage status to the subject land and in the process negated the purpose behind Presidential Decree No. (PD)
27: to emancipate rice/corn land tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil
under their tillage.
Pursuing cognate arguments, petitioner
DAR, in G.R. No. 161830, assails the CAs holding, and the premises tying it
together, on the departments jurisdiction over the property subject of the
case.
In
G.R. No. 190456, petitioners Duran, et al. take issue at the CAs pronouncement
on the validity of service of the petition for review effected by respondent upon
their long-deceased counsel of record, Atty. Eduardo Soliven Lara (Atty. Lara).[6] Like Land Bank and DAR, Duran, et al. impute
reversible error on the CA for holding that the concerned farmer-beneficiaries never
acquired ownership over their respective portions subject of the DAR award, owing
to the prior conversion of the whole property to non-agricultural uses before
the completion of the land reform process.
Per
its Resolution of June 28, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R.
Nos. 161796 and 161830 with G.R. No. 163174 (Nell-Armin Raralio v. Estate of J. Amado Araneta). Another
Resolution issued on November 17, 2010 directed that G.R. No. 190456 be
consolidated with G.R. Nos. 161796, 161830 and 163174.
Due,
however, to the denial, per Resolution of August 18, 2004, of the petition in
G.R. No. 163174 and pursuant to entry of judgment dated December 9, 2004, the
Court, by Resolution dated July 11, 2011, deconsolidated G.R. No. 163174 with the
other three cases and considered it closed and terminated.[7]
The Facts
At
the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land, denominated as Lot No.
23 of the Montalban Cadastre (
On
June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out a
wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving
the segregated area for townsite purposes, subject to private rights, if any there be. In its pertinent
parts, Proclamation 1283 reads:
Excluding
from the Operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as Amended by
Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, Both Series of 1915, which Established the
Watershed Reservation Situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon, a Certain Portion of the Land Embraced therein and
Reserving the Same, Together with the Adjacent Parcel of Land of the Public
Domain, for Townsite Purposes Under the Provisions of Chapter XI of the Public
Land Act
Upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources x x x, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No.
33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended x x x, which established the Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island
of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same,
together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite
purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be,
and to future subdivision survey in accordance with the development plan to be
prepared and approved by the Department of Local Government and Community
Development, which parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed
Reservation)
A
parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans
[technical description omitted]
Containing an area
of THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable
Land)
A
parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans
[technical description omitted]
Containing an area
of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Then
came the amendatory issuance, Proclamation 1637 dated April 18, 1977, thereby increasing
the size of the reservation, designated as Lungsod Silangan Townsite (LS
Townsite), by 20.312 hectares and revising its technical description so as to
include, within its coverage, other lands in the municipalities of San Mateo
and Montalban, Rizal to absorb the
population overspill in Greater Manila Area, but again subject to private rights, if any there be,
thus:
Upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Natural Resources x x x, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974
which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo
and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and
revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
(Proposed
Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod
Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing
the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of
Antipolo,
Beginning at a
point marked 1 on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is
the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation.
[technical
description omitted]
Containting an area
of TWENTY THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWELVE (20,312) hectares, more or less.
NOTE: all data are approximate and
subject to change based on future survey. (Emphasis supplied.)
On November 9, 1977, Letter of
Instructions No. (LOI) 625 addressed to several agencies was issued for the
implementation of the aforementioned proclamations. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in
particular, was directed to initiate condemnation proceedings for the
acquisition of private lands within the new townsite, among which was Lot 23
(the Doronilla property).
Prior
to the issuance of the LS Townsite proclamations, the following events
transpired:
(1) On October 21, 1972, PD 27 (Tenants Emancipation Decree) was issued.
In accordance with PD 27 in relation to LOI 474 and related issuances, the DAR
undertook to place under the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) program of the government all tenanted rice/corn lands
with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other
agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. In line with this program, the tenants of
Doronilla tilling portions of his property, who claimed their primary crops to
be rice and/or corn, organized themselves into farmers cooperatives or Samahang
Nayons and applied for certificates of land transfer (CLTs); and
(2) The DAR, to which the processed
applications were forwarded, processed 106
CLTs involving 100
tenants-beneficiaries covering 73
hectares out of the total 1,645 hectares of
Upon the issuance of Proclamation
1637 on April 18, 1977, on-going parcellary mapping, survey and other processing
activities related to the Doronilla property were stopped.[8]
In 1978, the OSG, conformably with
the directive embodied in LOI 625, filed with the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla property. Meanwhile, on June 6, 1979, Doronilla issued
a Certification,[9] copy
furnished the Agrarian Reform Office, among other agencies, listing
seventy-nine (79) bona fide planters he allegedly permitted to occupy a
portion of his land. On September 9,
1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation proceedings, the OSG
moved[10]
for and secured, per the Rizal CFI Order[11]
dated September 18, 1987, the dismissal of the expropriation case.
Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J.
Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla
property by virtue of court litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT
No. 7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. N-70860 in his name.
On July 22, 1987, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 131 instituting the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thereafter, then DAR Undersecretary Jose C.
Medina, in a memorandum of March 10, 1988, ordered the Regional Director of DAR
Region IV to proceed with the OLT coverage and final survey of the Doronilla
property.[12] Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL)[13]
of 1988, was then enacted, and took effect on June 15, 1988.
On July 27, 1989, Jorge L. Araneta,
as heir of J. Amado Araneta and administrator of his estate, wrote the DAR
Secretary requesting approval, for reasons stated in the covering letter, of
the conversion of
On December 12, 1989, DAR issued a
Notice of Acquisition addressed to Doronilla, covering 7.53 hectares of the land
now covered by TCT No. 216746 and offering compensation at a valuation stated
in the notice.[15] Alarmed by the turn of events whereby DAR was
having its property, or a portion of it, surveyed, incidental to effecting
compulsory land acquisition, the Araneta Estate addressed a letter[16]
to DAR dated June 27, 1990, formally protesting the series of land surveys
being conducted by the Bureau of Lands on what is now its property. It claimed that the CARL does not cover the
said property, being part of the LS Townsite reservation, apart from being mountainous,
with a slope of more than 70 degrees and containing commercial quantities of
marble deposit. The Araneta Estate
followed its protest letter with two (2) more letters dated June 20, 1990 and
May 28, 1991, in which it reiterated its request for conversion, citing, for
the purpose, Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 181, Series of 1990.[17]
On November 29, 1991, the Office of
the Provincial Adjudication Board of Rizal set a hearing to determine the just
compensation for the subject property, docketed as P.A. Case No. IV-Ri-0024-91.
Notwithstanding Aranetas protest against the compulsory agrarian reform
coverage and acquisition of the property in question, the Land Bank,
nonetheless, proceeded to approve, on January 21, 1992, the land transfer claim
(Claim No. EO-91-1266) covering 1,266 hectares.
On February 26, 1992, Land Bank notified Araneta of its entitlement,
upon its compliance with certain requirements, of the amount of PhP 3,324,412.05,
representing just compensation for its covered parcels of land.[18]
By September 25, 1990, some 1,200 emancipation
patents (EPs) had been generated in favor of 912 farmer-beneficiaries and TCTs derived from the EPs issued.[19]
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of
events that Araneta, sometime in April 1992, filed with the DARAB an action
against the DAR and Land Bank for Cancellation
of Compulsory Coverage under PD 27 and Exemption from CARL Coverage of the erstwhile
Doronilla property, docketed as DARAB Case No. DCN-JC-RIV-R12-026-CO.[20] Thereafter, DARAB turned over the case folder
to the Rizal Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) where the matter
was re-docketed as PARAD Case No. IV-Ri-0057-92. Before the Rizal PARAD Office and with its
leave, some 1,022 individuals affiliated with different farmer groups intervened
and filed an answer-in- intervention,[21]
joining a group of earlier intervenors led by one Anastacia Ferrer claiming to
be EP grantees.
Save for Land Bank, all the parties subsequently
submitted their respective position papers.
Ruling of the Regional Adjudicator
By
Decision dated October 17, 1994,[22] Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) Fe Arche-Manalang ruled against Araneta, denying its bid to have its
property excluded from OLT coverage and/or the compulsory scheme under CARL. The fallo
of the RARADs Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the petition for lack of merit;
2. Upholding the OLT coverage of the property described in Paragraph 1 of the Petition, pursuant to the provision of P.D. 27 as affirmed by E.O. 228 in relation to Section 7 of R.A. 6657;
3. Affirming the regularity of the OLT processing undertaken on the subject Property and sustaining the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title emanating from the Emancipation Patents generated in favor of the Intervenors-awardees;
4.
Directing the Respondent Land Bank of the
5. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom,
Araneta appealed to the DARAB proper. The appeal was docketed as DARAB Case No.
4176. In due time, the DARAB, following
the RARADs line that the intervenor-appellees were deemed owners of the land
they tilled as of October 21, 1972, rendered a Decision dated February 7, 2001[23]
affirming in toto that of the RARADs, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision in toto without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Just like that of the RARAD, the
DARAB ruling did not name individuals in whose favor the EPs were specifically
generated, albeit, 86 were, per Our count, impleaded as intervenor-appellees
in DARAB Case No. 4176.
Subsequently, Araneta went to the CA via
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the
stated principal issue of whether or not the DARAB in its appealed decision unduly
expanded the scope of coverage of PD 27.
Ruling of the CA
By
Decision of September 19, 2003, the CA, as earlier stated, set aside the Decision
of the DARAB, in effect nullifying all the individual farm lots awards thus
made by the DARAB ostensibly in favor of the named intervenor-appellees and necessarily all
other unnamed awardees. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The challenged Decision of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 4176 (Reg. Case No. IV-RI-0057-92) is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The DARAB is hereby ordered to reconvey to petitioner [Araneta] the subject portions of petitioners property embraced in TCT No. N-70860, earlier awarded to intervenors-appellees under their individual EPs now covered by their respective certificates of title, in accordance with pertinent administrative issuances of DARAB.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
In the main, the CA predicated its
reversal action on the interplay of the ensuing premises, juxtaposed with the
pertinent pronouncements in the cited cases of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[24]
and Paris v. Alfeche,[25]
among other landmark agrarian cases, thus:
(1) Agricultural lands found within
the boundaries of declared townsite reservations are reclassified for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their
inclusion in the reservation, as in the case of agricultural lands situated
within the LS Townsite reservation upon its establishment pursuant to
Proclamation 1637.
(2) The processing of the OLT coverage
of the Doronilla property was not completed prior to the passage of CARL or RA 6657;
hence, the governing law should be RA 6657, with PD 27 and Executive Order No.
(EO) 228[26] only having
suppletory effect.
(3) Full payment of the cost of the
land, inclusive of interest, is in every case considered a mandatory
requirement prior to the transfer of the title to the farmer-beneficiary. Before that time, the term subject to
private rights, if any found in Proclamation 1637 refers to the landowners
private rights. At the time Proclamation
1637 was issued, the farmer-beneficiaries of the Doronilla property have no
vested rights yet under PD 27 to their allotted lot, as erroneously ruled by
the DARAB.
(4) The DARAB, as the adjudicating
arm of DAR, was divested of jurisdiction over the Araneta property upon its inclusion
in the LS Townsite reservation by virtue of Proclamation 1637, as can be
gleaned from LOI 625 which directed the implementation of Proclamation 1637.
From the foregoing decision, Land
Bank, DAR/DARAB and Araneta separately moved for but were denied
reconsideration by the appellate court in its Resolution of January 22, 2004.
In due time, Land Bank and DARAB/DAR
interposed before the Court separate petitions for review.
On
the other hand, in December 2009, or some six (6) years after the CA rendered its
appealed judgment, Duran and eight others, as self-styled petitioners-intervenors,
came to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45. In a bid to justify the six-year hiatus
between the two events, Duran, et al. claimed that, through the machinations of
Aranetas counsel, they have been virtually kept in the dark about CA-G.R. SP
No. 65822 and consequently were deprived of their right to appeal what turned
out to be an adverse CA ruling. How the supposed deprivation came about, per
Duran, et al.s version, shall be explained shortly. Duran, et al. presently allege
being EP holders over portions of the property in question, their rights to the
patents having been decreed in the October 17, 1994 RARAD Decision, as affirmed
by the DARAB.
The Issues
Apart from what it considers the
appellate courts misapplication of the holdings in Natalia Realty, Inc. and Paris, Land Bank, in G.R. No. 161796,[27] ascribes
to the CA the commission of serious errors of law:
1) When it gave retroactive effect or application to Proclamation Nos. 1283 & 1637 resulting in the negation of full land ownership to qualified farmer-beneficiaries covered by P.D. No. 27 x x x.
2) When it gave imprimatur to the virtual conversion through Proclamation Nos. 1283 & 1637 of erstwhile agricultural lands to residential use without the requisite expropriation/condemnation proceedings pursuant to LOI No. 625.
3) When it upheld the nullification of the CLTs and EPs in the name of farmer-beneficiaries through a mere collateral attack which is not allowed by law.
4)
When it recognized respondents alleged private
right which had been reduced into a mere claim for just compensation upon
promulgation or effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972.
In G.R. No. 161830,[28]
the DAR raises the following issues:
1) Whether the subject agricultural landholding is exempt from CARP coverage, being non-agricultural, pursuant to Proclamation Nos. 1283, as amended, over and above the statutory emancipation of the tenants from the bondage of the soil under P.D. No. 27;
2) Whether or not DAR was no longer possessed of jurisdiction over respondent Aranetas landholding after the same was included in the LS Townsite; and
3)
Whether or not DAR should reconvey to Araneta
the portion of its property that was subjected to OLT under P.D. 27.
Aside from the procedural concerns articulated
in their petition, the main substantive issue raised by Duran, et al. in G.R.
No. 190456,[29] as
outlined at the outset, revolves around the question, and its implication on
their ownership rights over a portion of the subject estate, of whether or not the
process of land reform was incomplete at the time of issuance of Proclamation
1637.
The
different but oftentimes overlapping issues tendered in this consolidated recourse
boil down to this relatively simple but pregnant question: whether or not the
Doronilla, now the Araneta, property, in light of the issuance of the land reclassifying
Proclamation 1283, as amended, is, as held by the CA, entirely outside the
ambit of PD 27 and RA 6657, and, thus, excluded from compulsory agrarian reform
coverage, unfettered by the private claim of the farmer-beneficiaries.
The Courts Ruling
We find the
petitions partly meritorious.
Classification of the Doronilla Property
Several
basic premises should be made clear at the outset. Immediately prior to the promulgation of PD 27
in October 1972, the 1,645-hectare Doronilla property, or a large portion of it,
was indisputably agricultural, some parts devoted to rice and/or corn
production tilled by Doronillas tenants.
Doronilla, in fact, provided concerned government agencies with a list of
seventy-nine (79)[30]
names he considered bona fide
planters of his land. These planters, who may reasonably be considered tenant-farmers,
had purposely, so it seems, organized themselves into Samahang Nayon(s) so that the DAR could start processing their
applications under the PD 27 OLT program. CLTs were eventually generated
covering 73 hectares, with about 75 CLTs actually distributed to the
tenant-beneficiaries. However, upon the
issuance of Proclamation 1637, all activities related to the OLT were stopped.[31]
The
discontinuance of the OLT processing was obviously DARs way of acknowledging
the implication of the townsite proclamation on the agricultural classification
of the Doronilla property. It ought to be emphasized, as a general proposition,
however, that the former agricultural lands of Doronillasituated as they were
within areas duly set aside for townsite purposes, by virtue particularly of
Proclamation 1637were converted for residential use. By the terms of Natalia Realty, Inc., they would be exempt from land reform
and, by necessarily corollary, beyond DARs or DARABs jurisdictional reach. Excerpts from Natalia Realty, Inc.:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivison cannot in any language be considered as agricultural lands. These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. x x x
x x x x
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15, June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.[32] (Emphasis added; italics in the original.)
Guided
by the foregoing doctrinal pronouncement, the key date to reckon, as a
preliminary matter, is the precise time when Doronillas
Applicability of PD 27, RA 6657
and Proclamation 1637 to the Doronilla
Estate
From
the standpoint of agrarian reform, PD 27, being in context the earliest issuance,
governed at the start the disposition of the rice-and-corn land portions of the
Doronilla property. And true enough, the
DAR began processing land transfers through the OLT program under PD 27 and
thereafter issued the corresponding CLTs. However, when Proclamation 1637 went into
effect, DAR discontinued with the OLT processing. The tenants of Doronilla during that time
desisted from questioning the halt in the issuance of the CLTs. It is fairly evident that DAR noted the
effect of the issuance of Proclamation 1637 on the subject land and decided not
to pursue its original operation, recognizing the change of classification of
the property from agricultural to residential.
When
it took effect on June 15, 1988, RA 6657 became the prevailing agrarian reform
law. This is not to say, however, that its
coming into effect necessarily impeded the operation of PD 27, which, to repeat,
covers only rice and corn land. Far
from it, for RA 6657, which identifies rice and corn land under PD 27 as
among the properties the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless,[33]
no less provides that PD 27 shall be of suppletory application. We stated in Land Bank of the
All
told, the primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be
they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement and
crops produced, is now RA 6657. Section
3(c) of RA 6657 defines agricultural lands as lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in the Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The DAR itself refers to agricultural lands
as:
those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in RA 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.[35]
At
the time of the effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15, 1998, the process of
agrarian reform on the Doronilla property was, however, to reiterate, far from
complete. In fact, the DAR sent out a
Notice of Acquisition to Araneta only on December 12, 1989, after the lapse of
around 12 years following its discontinuance of all activities incident to the
OLT.
Proclamation
1637, a martial law and legislative-powers issuance, partakes the nature of a
law. In Natalia Realty, Inc., the Court in fact considered and
categorically declared Proclamation 1637 a special law, since it referred
specifically to the LS Townsite Reservation.[36] As such, Proclamation 1637 enjoys, so Natalia Realty, Inc. intones, applying basic tenets of statutory
construction, primacy over general laws, like RA 6657.
In
light of the foregoing legal framework, the question that comes to the fore is
whether or not the OLT coverage of the Doronilla property after June 15, 1988,
ordered by DAR pursuant to the provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657, was still valid,
given the classificatory effect of the townsite proclamation.
To
restate a basic postulate, the provisions of RA 6657 apply only to agricultural
lands under which category the Doronilla property, during the period material,
no longer falls, having been effectively classified as residential by force of
Proclamation 1637. It ceased, following Natalia Realty, Inc., to be agricultural
land upon approval of its inclusion in the LS Townsite Reservation pursuant to
the said reclassifying presidential issuance.
In this regard, the Court cites with approval the following excerpts
from the appealed CA decision:
The above [Natalia Realty, Inc.] ruling was reiterated in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde where the Supreme Court held that lands reserved for, converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies other than the [DAR], prior to the effectivity of [RA] 6657 x x x are not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said law. The High Court declared that since the Tala Estate as early as April 26, 1971 was reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the [NHA], the same has been categorized as not being devoted to agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657, and therefore outside the coverage of CARL.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
Private Rights and Just Compensation as Payment
Unlike
in Natalia Realty, Inc., however, where
pre-existing tenancy arrangement over the Natalia land, among other crucial
considerations, was not part of the equation, this case involves farmers
claiming before April 18, 1979 to be actual tenants of the rice and/or corn
portion of the Doronilla property. The Court has, to be sure, taken stock of the
fact that PD 27 ordains the emancipation of tenants and deems them owners of
the rice and corn lands they till as of October 21, 1972. The following provisions of the decree have
concretized this emancipation and ownership policy:
This [decree] shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not;
The tenant farmer x x x shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis added.)
Complementing PD 27 is EO 228, Series of 1987, Sec. 1 of which states, All qualified farmer beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners DAR, Land Bank and Duran,
et al. uniformly maintain that the PD 27 tenant-beneficiaries have acquired
vested rights over the lands they tilled as of October 21, 1972 when the
decree took effect. Pursuing this point,
they argue that, as of that date, the farmer-beneficiaries were deemed owners
of what was to be Aranetas property, and the issuance of Proclamation 1637 did
not alter the legal situation.
The CA, however, was of a different
mind, predicating its stance on the following:
Since actual title remained with the landowner Alfonso Doronilla at the time Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 was issued in 1977, it follows that it is the private rights of such owner which are contemplated by the exemption declared in said proclamation. Definitely, the proviso subject to private rights could not refer to the farmer-tenants the process of land reform having just been commenced with the filing of their application with the DAR. The conclusion finds support in a similar proclamation covering the Baguio Townsite Reservation. Our Supreme Court in a case involving an application for registration of lots situated within the Baguio Townsite Reservation cited the decision dated November 13, 1922 of the Land Registration Court in Civil Reservation No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, which held that all lands within the Baguio Townsite are public land with the exception of (1) lands reserved for specific public uses and (2) lands claimed and adjudicated as private property. It is therefore in that sense that the term private rights under the subject proviso in Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 must be understood.[38] x x x (Emphasis added.)
In
fine, the CA held that the private rights referred to in the proclamation
pertained to the rights of the registered owner of the property in question,
meaning Doronilla or Araneta, as the case may be.
The Court cannot lend full
concurrence to the above holding of the appellate court and the consequent
wholesale nullification of the awards made by the DARAB.
The
facts show that several farmer-beneficiaries received 75 CLTs prior to the
issuance of Proclamation 1637 on June 21, 1974. The 75 CLTs seemingly represent
the first batch of certificates of bona
fide planting rice and corn. These certificates were processed pursuant to
the OLT program under PD 27. It bears to stress, however, that the mere
issuance of the CLT does not vest on the recipient-farmer-tenant ownership of
the lot described in it. At best, the certificate, in the phraseology of Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella,[39] merely evidences the governments
recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory
mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land [tilled] by him as
provided under [PD] 27.
The clause now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 could not be pure
rhetoric, without any beneficial effect whatsoever descending on the actual tillers
of rice and/or corn lands, as the appealed decision seems to convey. To Us, the
clause in context means that, with respect to the parcel of agricultural land covered
by PD 27 and which is under his or her tillage, the farmer-beneficiary ipso facto acquires, by weight of that
decree, ownership rights over it. That ownership right may perhaps not be irrevocable
and permanent, nay vested, until the tenant-farmer shall have complied with the
amortization payments on the cost of the land and other requirements exacted in
the circular promulgated to implement PD 27. Vinzons-Magana holds:
This Court has therefore clarified that it is only compliance with the prescribed conditions which entitled the farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent by which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholdinga right which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt and controversy.[40] x x x
Said ownership right is, nonetheless,
a statutory right to be respected.
Plainly enough then, the farmer-beneficiaries
vis--vis the PD 27 parcel they till, especially that brought within the
coverage of OLT under PD 27, own in a sense the lot which they can validly set
up against the original owners notwithstanding the fact that the latter have
not yet been paid by Land Bank and/or even if the farmers have not yet fully
paid their amortization obligation to the Land Bank, if that be the case. After all, the former landowners, by force of
PD 27, is already divested of their ownership of the covered lot, their right to
payment of just compensation or of the un-amortized portion payable by Land
Bank[41] being
assured under EO 228 and RA 6657.
If
only to stress, while the PD 27 tenant-farmers are considered the owners by
virtue of that decree, they cannot yet exercise all the attributes inherent in ownership,
such as selling the lot, because, with respect to the government represented by
DAR and LBP, they have in the meantime only inchoate rights in the lotthe
being amortizing owners. This is
because they must still pay all the amortizations over the lot to Land Bank
before an EP is issued to them. Then and only then do they acquire, in the
phraseology of Vinzons-Magana, the
vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding.
This
brings us to the question, to whom does private rights referred to in Proclamation
1637 pertain? Absent any agrarian relationship involving the tract of lands
covered by the proclamation, We can categorically state that the reference is
to the private rights of the registered lot owner, in this case Doronilla and
subsequently, Araneta. But then the
reality on the ground was that the Araneta property or at least a portion was placed
under OLT pursuant to PD 27 and subject to compulsory acquisition by DAR prior
to the issuance of Proclamation 1637 on June 21, 1974, and 75 CLTs were also
issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. Stated a bit differently, before Proclamation
1637 came to be, there were already PD 27 tenant-farmers in said property. In a very real sense, the private rights
belong to these tenant-farmers. Since
the said farmer-beneficiaries were deemed
owners of the agricultural land awarded to them as of October 21, 1972
under PD 27 and subsequently deemed full
owners under EO 228, the logical conclusion is clear and simple: the
township reservation established under Proclamation 1637 must yield and
recognize the deemed ownership rights bestowed on the farmer-beneficiaries
under PD 27. Another way of looking at the situation is that these
farmer-beneficiaries are subrogated in the place of Doronilla and eventual
transferee Araneta.
To Us, the private rights referred to
in Proclamation 1637 means those of the farmer-beneficiaries who were issued
the 75 CLTs. As to them, farm lots are EXCLUDED
from the coverage of Proclamation 1637 and are governed by PD 27 and
subsequently RA 6657.
With
respect to the 912 farmer-beneficiaries
who were issued around 1,200 EPs as a result of the DAR Notice of Acquisition dated December 12, 1989, We are
constrained to affirm the CA ruling invalidating the individual lot awarded to
them. Obviously, they are not rice/corn land tenant-farmers contemplated in PD
27. They do not possess the rights flowing from the phrase deemed owner as of
October 21, 1972. In this regard, the Court notes only too distinctly that Doronilla
no less only named some 79 individuals as coming close to being legitimate PD
27 tenant-farmers of
The issue of whether such lands of the Lungsod Silangan Townsite are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the Supreme Court categorically declared, viz:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial agreement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as agricultural lands. These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snails pace. x x x
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined agricultural land; thus
x x x Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to June 15, 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use..
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform noted in an Opinion that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes to be developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing agency, are not deemed agricultural lands within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. Not being deemed agricultural lands, they are outside the coverage of CARL.[42]
Summarizing,
the farmer-beneficiaries who were given the 75 CLTs prior to the issuance of
Proclamation 1283, as amended by Proclamation 1637, are deemed full owners of
the lots covered by 75 CLTs vis--vis the real registered owner. The farmer-beneficiaries have private rights
over said lots as they were deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS
Townsite reservation or at least are subrogated to the rights of the registered
lot owner. Those farmer-beneficiaries
who were issued CLTs or EPs after June 21, 1974 when Proclamation 1283, as
amended, became effective do not acquire rights over the lots they were
claiming under PD 27 or RA 6657, because the lots have already been
reclassified as residential and are beyond the compulsory coverage for agrarian
reform under RA 6657. Perforce, the said
CLTs or EPs issued after June 21, 1974 have to be annulled and invalidated for
want of legal basis, since the lots in question are no longer subject to
agrarian reform due to the reclassification of the erstwhile Doronilla estate
to non-agricultural purposes.
Power of Reclassification of Land
Petitioners
DAR and Land Bank ascribe error on the CA in giving Proclamation 1637, an
administrative issuance, preference and weight over PD 27, a law. As argued, it is basic that, in the hierarchy
of issuances, a law has greater weight than and takes precedence over a mere
administrative issuance.
Petitioners
contention may be accorded some measure of plausibility, except for the fact
that it ignores a basic legal principle: that the power to classify or
reclassify lands is essentially an executive prerogative,[43] albeit
local government units, thru zoning ordinances, may, subject to certain
conditions, very well effect reclassification of land use within their
respective territorial jurisdiction.[44] Reclassification decrees issued by the
executive department, through its appropriate agencies, carry the same force
and effect as any statute. As it were,
PD 27 and Proclamation 1637 are both presidential issuances, each forming, by
virtue of Sec. 3(2), Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, a part of the law
of the land. Sec. 3(2), Art. XVII of the
1973 Constitution provides that:
[A]ll proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and
effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this
Constitution unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or unless expressly or impliedly
modified or repealed by the regular Batasang
Pambansa. (Emphasis supplied.)
While
not determinative of the outcome of this dispute, the Court has, in Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
(ARBA) v. Nicolas,[45]
held that the principles enunciated in Natalia
Realty, Inc. hold sway regardless of what non-agricultural use to which an
agricultural land is converted. ARBA,
in fine, declares that the Natalia Realty, Inc. ruling is not confined
solely to agricultural lands located within the townsite reservations; it is
also applicable to other agricultural lands converted to non-agricultural uses
prior to the effectivity of the CARL. The
land classifying medium that ARBA teaches
is not limited solely to a proclamation, but may also involve a city ordinance.
Jurisdiction of DAR and its Adjudicating Arm
The
DARAB has been created and designed to exercise the DARs adjudicating
functions.[46] And just like any quasi-judicial body, DARAB
derives its jurisdiction from law, specifically RA 6657, which invested it with
adjudicatory powers over agrarian reform disputes[47]
and matters related to the implementation of CARL. We need not belabor that DARABs jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the Doronilla property, cannot be conferred by the
main parties, let alone the intervening farmer-beneficiaries claiming to have
vested rights under PD 27. As earlier
discussed, the process of land reform covering the 1,266 hectares of the Araneta
estate was not completed prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1637. So the
intervenors, with the exception of the 79 tenant-beneficiaries who were granted
CLTs, failed to acquire private rights of ownership under PD 27 before the
effective conversion of the Doronilla property to non-agricultural uses. Hence, the Doronilla property, being outside
of CARP coverage, is also beyond DARABs jurisdiction.
The
OSGs withdrawal of the expropriation suit on September 9, 1987 did not, as
Land Bank posits, automatically restore the Doronilla property to its original
classification nor did it grant DAR or DARAB the power or jurisdiction to order
the compulsory acquisition of the property and to place it under CARP. And, as the CA aptly noted, the DOJ Secretary,
through Opinion No. 181,[48]
even advised the DAR Secretary that lands covered by Proclamation 1637, having
been reserved for townsite purposes, are not deemed agricultural lands within the meaning and intent of Sec. 3(c) of RA
6657 and, hence, outside the coverage of CARL.[49] The Secretary of Justice further stated that
RA 6657 did not supersede or repeal Proclamations 1283 and 1637 and they remain
operative until now; their being townsite reservations still remain valid and
subsisting. To clarify, a DOJ opinion
carries only a persuasive weight upon the courts. However since this Court, in Natalia Realty, Inc., cited with
approval DOJ Opinion No. 181, such citation carries weight and importance as
jurisprudence. Be that as it may, We
recognize and apply the principles found in Natalia
Realty, Inc. regarding the character of the Doronilla property being
converted to a townsite and, thus, non-agricultural in character.
Worth
mentioning at this juncture is the fact that DAR itself issued administrative
circulars governing lands exempted from CARP.
For instance, Administrative No. (AO) 3, Series of 1996, declares in its
policy statement what categories of lands are outside CARP coverage and
unequivocally states that properties not covered by CARP shall be reconveyed to
the original transferors or owners.
Significantly, AO 3 defines lands not so covered as property determined to be exempted from
CARP coverage pursuant to [DOJ] Opinion Nos. 44 and 181 and where Presidential Proclamation has been
issued declaring the subject property for certain uses other than agricultural. Said policy of the DAR, as explained in the
CA Decision,[50] should
be applied and upheld in cases where the DAR had erroneously ordered the
compulsory acquisition of the lands found outside CARP coverage. This is true with the case at bar due to the
fact that Proclamation 1283, as amended by Proclamation 1637, had effectively
reclassified respondents land as residential.
To
address erroneous compulsory coverage or acquisition of non-agricultural lands
or agricultural lands subject of retention, especially where Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) or EPs have been generated, the said AO itself
provides the mechanism/remedy for the reconveyance of lots thus covered or
acquired, viz:
1.
The
Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs)
already generated for landholdings to be reconveyed shall have to be cancelled
first pursuant to Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994 prior to the
actual reconveyance. The cancellation shall either be through administrative
proceedings in cases where the EP/CLOA has not yet been registered with the ROD
or through quasi-judicial proceedings in cases where the said EP/CLOA has
already been registered.[51]
Given the foregoing perspective, private
petitioners lament about the injustice done to them due to the cancellation of
their EPs or CLOAs, as the case may be, is specious at best, for those EPs or
CLOAs were generated or granted based on the invalid order by DAR for the
inclusion of the bulk of the Doronilla property under PD 27 and CARP.
With Respect to Petitioners-Intervenors Duran, et al.
In their petition for intervention
filed before Us on December 17, 2009, Duran, et al. claim that Atty. Lara, the
counsel who won their case before the DARAB, passed away on March 6, 1995.[52] They bemoan the fact that due to his death, which
was unbeknownst to them at that time, they were not able to receive a copy of,
thus are not bound by, the CA Decision dated September 19, 2003. They blame Araneta for this unfortunate
incident, alleging, [S]ix years after Atty. Lara died, the Estate of J. Amado
Araneta x x x filed a Petition for Review [of the DARABs decision] before the
Court of Appeals. x x x The Araneta estate faked and feigned the service of its
Petition upon Atty. Lara and the farmers by registered mail with the Explanation unavailability of messenger. [53] On the basis of the foregoing premises, Duran,
et al. pray to be allowed to intervene in the instant case and admit their petition
for review.
In its Comment (with motion to
exclude) on intervenors petition for review, Araneta stated the observation
that if a handling lawyer dies, it is the that lawyers client who is in the better
position to know about the formers death, not his adversary or the court.
Assuming that court notices and pleadings continued to be sent and delivered to
Atty. Lara even after his death, at his given address, the comment added, it
was intervenors fault.[54] And in support of the motion to exclude,
Araneta draws attention to the rule governing how intervention is done, i.e., via
a motion with a pleading-in- intervention attached to it. Exclusion is also
sought on the ground that the petition includes individuals who are long dead
and parties who are not parties below.
We resolve to deny due course to the plea
for intervention of Duran, et al.
As the records would show, the DARAB
promulgated its Decision on February 7, 2001 or six (6) years after Atty. Lara died. Yet, intervening petitioners opted to make an
issue only with respect about their inability, due to Atty. Laras death, to
receive the adverse CA Decision, but curiously not about the DARAB judgment
favorable to them. Noticeably, in the instant petition, they only focused on
questioning what they termed as the malicious failure of the Estate of
Araneta to individually inform them of the filing of its petition for review
with the CA. Nowhere can it be gleaned that
they are questioning the failure of the CA and the DARAB to send copies of
their respective decisions to them. Thus,
the Court is at a loss to understand how Duran, et al. can insinuate malice on
the part of the Estate of Aranetas for its alleged failure to provide them
with a copy of the CA decision and yet not have any problem with respect to the
DARAB decision which they also failed to personally receive due to their
counsels demise.
While the fault clearly lies with Duran,
et al. themselves, they found it convenient to point fingers. To be sure, they were remiss in their duty of
coordinating with their counsel on the progress of their pending case. The constant communication link needed to be
established between diligent clients and their attorney did not obtain in this
case. It is not surprising, therefore,
that Duran and his group only filed their instant petition 14 years after the
death of their counsel, Atty. Lara. Parties cannot blame their counsel for
negligence when they themselves were guilty of neglect.[55] Relief cannot be granted to parties who seek
to be relieved from the effects of a judgment when the loss of the remedy was
due to their own negligence.[56] Equity serves the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights.[57] Duran,
et al., as are expected of prudent men concerned with their ordinary affairs, should
have had periodically touched base at least to be apprised with the status of
their case. Judiciousness in this regard
would have alerted them about their counsels death, thus enabling them to take
the necessary steps to protect their claimed right and interest in the case.
As Araneta aptly suggested in its Comment
on the petition for review-in-intervention, it is Duran, et al., as clients, not
the court or their adversary, who are in a better position or at least expected
to know about their lawyers death due to the nature of a client-lawyer relationship. And knowing, fair play demands that the
client accordingly advises the court and the adverse party about the fact of death. It is not for the appellate court or respondent
Araneta to inquire why service of court processes or pleadings seemingly
remained unacted by Atty. De Lara and/or his clients.
The long inaction of Duran, et al. to
assert their rights over the subject case should be brought to bear against
them. Thus, We held in Esmaquel v. Coprada:[58]
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances, with the question of laches addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice.
There
can be little quibble about Duran, et al. being guilty of laches. They failed and neglected to keep track of
their case with their lawyer for 14 long years. As discussed above, Atty. Lara
died even prior to the promulgation of the DARAB Decision. Even then, they failed to notify the DARAB
and the other parties of the case regarding the demise of Atty. Lara and even a
change of counsel. It certainly strains
credulity to think that literally no one, among those constituting the petitioning-intervenors,
had the characteristic good sense of following up the case with their legal
counsel. Only now, 14 years after, did some think of fighting
for the right they slept on. Thus, as to
them, the CA Decision is deemed final and executory based on the principle of
laches.
Agrarian reform finds context in
social justice in tandem with the police power of the State. But social justice
itself is not merely granted to the marginalized and the underprivileged. But while the concept of social justice is
intended to favor those who have less in life, it should never be taken as a
toll to justify let alone commit an injustice.
To borrow from Justice Isagani A. Cruz:
[S]ocial justiceor
any justice for that matteris for the deserving whether he be a millionaire
in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel.
It is true that, in a case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to
tilt the balance in favor of the poor simply because they are poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor
simply because they are poor, or to eject the rich simply because they are rich,
for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the
mandate of the law.[59]
At
any rate, all is not lost on the part of Duran and the other petitioners-intervenors.
In the event that they belong to the
group of 75 PD 27 tenant-farmers who, as earlier adverted, were awarded individual
CLT covering parcels of lands described in the CLT, then it is just but fair
and in keeping with the imperatives of social justice that their rights to the covered
lots should be recognized and respected.
To the 912 holders of EPs, this
decision might be a big let down. But then the facts and applicable laws and
jurisprudence call for this disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
partly DENIED. The CA Decision dated
September 19, 2003, as effectively reiterated in its Resolution of January 22,
2004 and April 2, 2004, is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the 75 CLTs issued prior to the effectivity of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974 are declared legal and
valid. The other CLTs, EPs, CLOAs issued
by DAR involving the subject property are hereby CANCELED and NULLIFIED.
The
Land Bank and DAR are hereby ordered to COMPUTE
the just compensation of the land subject of the 75 CLTs and PAY the just compensation to the Estate
of J. Amado Araneta.
No
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE
CATRAL
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I
O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Represented by then Secretary Roberto M. Pagdanganan and then Officer-in-Charge Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce, now Virgilio R. De Los Reyes.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), pp. 73-89. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
[3]
[4] x x x Reserving [a Parcel of
Land], Together with the Adjacent Parcel of Land of the Public Domain, for
Townsite Purposes Under the Provisions of Chapter XI of the
[5] Amending
Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which Established the Townsite
Reservation in the Municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal
x x x by Increasing the Area and Revising the Technical Description of the Land
Embraced therein x x x, April 18, 1977.
[6] Atty. Lara passed away on March 6,
1995, rollo (G.R. No. 190456), p. 4.
[7] Rollo (G.R.
No. 161830), p. 687.
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), p. 74.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 161830), p. 292.
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), p. 353.
[13] Referred to also as the CARP law.
[14] Rollo (G.R. No. 161797), pp. 496-497.
[15]
In part DOJ Opinion No. 181 reads: 2. As regards the second query, neither
Proclamation No. 1283 nor Proclamation No, 1637, has been expressly repealed by
R.A. No. 6657. Thus any allegation that the Proclamations have been superseded
by R.A. 6657 must perforce be premised upon an inconsistency between them. But
we do not see any repugnancy x x x. Administrative Order No. 61, series of 1990
of the [DAR] (Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private
Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses) provides that said rules do not
cover lands previously classified in town plans and zoning ordinances x x x. Since the lands covered by
the two Proclamations in question have been reserved for townsite purposes x x
x the same are not deemed aricultural lands within the meaning and intent of
Section 3(c) of R.A. 6657 and are beyond the purview of A.O. No. 61. Records, Vol. 1, p. 164.
[16] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), pp. 494-495.
[17]
[18] Records, Vol. 1, p. 39.
[19] Rollo (G.R. No. 161830), p. 189.
[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), pp. 272-282.
[21]
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 161830), pp. 177-195.
[23]
[24] G.R. No. 103302, August 12, 1993, 225 SCRA 278.
[25] G.R. No. 139083, August 30, 2001, 364 SCRA 110.
[26] Declaring
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), p. 32.
[28] Rollo (G.R. No. 161830), p. 15.
[29] Rollo (G.R.
No. 190456), p. 21.
[30] Annex E of Answer submitted by the Intervenors thru Barangay Chairwoman Anastacia S. Ferrer, Mascap, Rodriguez, Rizal, original records (DARAB Case No. 4176, Vol. 3).
[31] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), p. 74.
[32] Supra note 24, at 282-284.
[33] Sec. 7 of RA 6657 provides that the
acquisition and distribution of rice and corn lands under PD 27 shall be a
priority in the plan and program of the DAR.
[34] G.R. No. 128557, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 629, 641.
[35] DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, prescribing the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural lands to Non-Agricultural Uses.
[36] Supra note 24, at 282.
[37] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), p. 84.
[38]
[39] G.R.
No. 60269, September 13, 1991, 201 SCRA 536, 540.
[40]
[41] The Land Bank, under PD 251 dated July 21, 1973, has assumed the task of financing land reform by paying the old owners and reimbursing itself by collecting from the tenant-owners.
[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), pp. 83-84;
citing Natalia Realty, Inc., supra note 24, at 282-284.
[43] Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals, No. L-37995, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 351, 357.
[44] Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 111387 & 127497, June 8, 2004,
431 SCRA 165, 186-187.
[45] G.R. No. 168394, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 540, 553-554.
[46] Vda. De Tangub v. Court of Appeals, UDK No. 9864, December 3, 1990, 191 SCRA 885, 890.
[47] Padunan v. DARAB, G.R. No. 132163,
January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 196, 204.
[48] By then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon.
[49] Opinion No. 181 was also cited favorably in the Natalia Realty Realty, Inc. regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the DAR over the subject property.
[50] Rollo (G.R. No. 161796), pp. 88-89.
[51] AO 3, paragraph 3(II).
[52] Certificate
of Death, rollo (G.R. No. 190456), p. 128.
[53]
[54]
[55] Amatorio v. People, G.R. No. 150453, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA
445, 455.
[56] Ampo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169091, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 562, 568.
[57]
[58] G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010,
638 SCRA 428, 439.
[59] G.R.
No. 86186, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 608, 616; cited in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118712 & 118745, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 149, 151.