Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
GARDEN OF Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, LABOR ARBITER
FELIPE T. GARDUQUE II
and HILARIA CRUZ,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No.
160278 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ. Promulgated: February 8, 2012 |
X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking nullification of the June 11, 2003 Decision[1] and October
16, 2003 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 64569, which affirmed
the December 29, 2000 Decision[3] of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC agreed with the
Labor Arbiter (
The
Facts
Respondent Cruz, on the other hand, worked at the
Garden of Memories Memorial Park as a utility worker from August 1991 until her
termination in February 1998.
On
Upon motion of
In her position paper,[5] Cruz
averred that she worked as a utility worker of P115.00 per day. As a utility worker, she was in charge,
among others, of the cleaning and maintenance of the ground facilities of the
memorial park. Sometime in February 1998, she had a misunderstanding with a
co-worker named Adoracion Requio regarding the use of a garden water hose. When
the misunderstanding came to the knowledge of Requio, the latter instructed them
to go home and not to return anymore. After three (3) days, Cruz reported for
work but she was told that she had been replaced by another worker. She
immediately reported the matter of her replacement to the personnel manager of
Cruz argued that as a regular employee of the
Cruz further claimed that as a result of her illegal
dismissal, she suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety and mental anguish.
In its Answer,[6]
In her defense, Requio prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint stating that it was Victoriana, her mother, who hired Cruz, and
she merely took over the supervision and management of the workers of the
memorial park when her mother got ill. She claimed that the ownership of the
business was never transferred to her.
Requio further stated that Cruz was not dismissed
from her employment but that she abandoned her work.[7]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondents Garden of Memories Memorial [P]ark and Life Plan, Inc. and/or
Paulina Requio are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof, the herein complainant Hilaria Cruz, the sums of ₱72,072 (₱198 x 26 days x 14 months pay), representing her eight (8) months
separation pay and six (6) months backwages; ₱42,138.46, as salary differential; ₱2,475.00, as service incentive leave pay; and ₱12,870.00 as 13th month pay, for three
(3) years, or a total sum of ₱129,555.46, plus ten percent attorneys fee.
Complainants other claims
including her prayer for damages are hereby denied for lack of concrete
evidence.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Consequently,
The Public
Respondents National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals committed
serious error, gravely abused their discretion and acted in excess of
jurisdiction when they failed to consider the provisions of Section 6 (d) of
Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997, by the Department of Labor and
Employment, and then rendered their respective erroneous rulings that:
I
PETITIONER
PAULINA REQUIO IS ENGAGED IN LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING.
II
THERE EXISTS AN
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESPONDENT CRUZ AND
III
RESPONDENT
HILARIA CRUZ DID NOT ABANDON HER WORK.
IV
THERE IS [NO] BASIS
IN GRANTING THE MONETARY AWARDS IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT CRUZ DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF A CLEAR PRONOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF HER
DISMISSAL.[11]
The petitioners aver that Requio is the employer of
Cruz as she (Requio) is a legitimate independent contractor providing
maintenance work in the memorial park such as sweeping, weeding and watering of
the lawns. They insist that there was no employer-employee relationship between
As to the issue of dismissal, the petitioners denied
the same and insist that Cruz willfully and actually abandoned her work. They
argue that Cruzs utterances HINDI KO KAILANGAN ANG TRABAHO and HINDI
KO KAILANGAN MAGTRABAHO AT HINDI KO KAILANGAN MAKI-USAP KAY PAULINA REQUIO,
manifested her belligerence and disinterest in her work and that her unexplained
absences later only showed that she had no intention of returning to work.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the
jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, not of
fact. This is in line with the well-entrenched doctrine that the Court is not a
trier of facts, and this is strictly adhered to in labor cases.[12] Factual findings of labor officials, who are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and
bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence. Particularly when passed
upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon the Court and
will not normally be disturbed.[13] This
is because it is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below; or reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses; or substitute the findings of fact of an
administrative tribunal which has expertise in its special field.[14]
In the present case, the LA, the NLRC, and the CA
are one in declaring that petitioner Requio was not a legitimate contractor.
Echoing the decision of the LA and the NLRC, the CA reasoned out that Requio
was not a licensed contractor and had no substantial capital or investment in
the form of tool, equipment and work premises, among others.
Section 106 of the Labor Code on contracting and
subcontracting provides:
Article 106. Contractor or
subcontractor. - Whenever, an employer enters into a
contract with another person for the performance of the formers work, the
employees of the contractor and of the latters subcontractor shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In
the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his
employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and
severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the
extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent
that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
The
Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the
contracting out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under
this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate
distinctions between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as
differentiations within these types of contracting and determine who among the
parties involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to
prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code.
There
is labor-only contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer
does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited
and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related
to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or
intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall
be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter
were directly employed by him.[Underscoring provided]
In
the same vein, Sections 8 and 9, DOLE Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997, state
that:
Sec. 8. Job contracting. There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met:
(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all
matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and
(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business.
Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer shall be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person:
(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials; and
(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed.
(b) Labor-only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
(c) For cases not falling under this Article, the Secretary of Labor shall determine through appropriate orders whether or not the contracting out of labor is permissible in the light of the circumstances of each case and after considering the operating needs of the employer and the rights of the workers involved. In such case, he may prescribe conditions and restrictions to insure the protection and welfare of the workers.
On the matter of labor-only contracting, Section 5
of Rule VIII-A of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides:
Section 5.
Prohibition against labor-only contracting. Labor-only
contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this purpose, labor-only contracting
shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely
recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a
principal, and any of the following elements are present:
i)
The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or
investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the
employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities related to the main business of the principal, or
ii)
The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance
of the work of the contractual employee.
X x x x
Thus, in determining the existence of an independent
contractor relationship, several factors may be considered, such as, but not
necessarily confined to, whether or not the contractor is carrying on an
independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required;
the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance
of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to
another; the employers power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of
the contractors workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply
premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and
terms of payment.[15]
On the other hand, there is labor-only contracting
where: (a) the person supplying workers to an employer does not have
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries,
work premises, among others; and (b) the workers recruited and placed by such
person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal
business of the employer.[16]
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from
the findings of the tribunals below. Both the capitalization requirement
and the power of control on the part of Requio are wanting.
Generally, the presumption is that the contractor is
a labor-only contracting unless such contractor overcomes the burden of proving
that it has the substantial capital, investment, tools and the like.[17] In
the present case, though
Furthermore, Requio was not a licensed contractor.
Her explanation that her business was a mere livelihood program akin to
a cottage industry provided by Garden of Memories as part of its contribution
to the upliftment of the underprivileged residing near the memorial park proves
that her capital investment was not substantial. Substantial capital or
investment refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case
of corporations, tools, equipment, implements, machineries, and work premises,
actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the
performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out.[19]
Obviously, Requio is a labor-only contractor.
Another determinant factor that classifies petitioner
Requio as a labor-only contractor was her failure to exercise the right to
control the performance of the work of Cruz. This can be gleaned from the
Service Contract Agreement[20] between
x x x x
NOW THEREFORE, premises considered,
the parties hereto have hereunto agreed on the following terms and conditions:
1. That the Contractor shall undertake the
maintenance of the above-mentioned works in strict compliance with and subject
to all the requirements and standards of GMMPLPI.
2. Likewise, the Contractor shall perform all
other works that may from time to time be designated by GMMPLPI thru its
authorized representatives, which work is similar in nature to the
responsibilities of a regular employee with a similar function.
3. The contract price for the labor to be
furnished or the service to be rendered shall be THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (₱35,000.00) PESOS per calendar month, payable as
follows:
(a) Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand (₱8,750.00) Pesos payable on every 7th, 15th, 23rd
and 30th of the month.
4. The period of this Contract shall be for
Three (3) months from Feb 1,
5. It is expressly recognized that this
contract was forged for the purpose of supplying the necessary maintenance work
and in no way shall the same be interpreted to have created an
employer-employee relationship.
Xxxx [Underscoring supplied]
The requirement of the law in determining the existence
of independent contractorship is that the contractor should undertake the work
on his own account, under his own responsibility, according to his own manner
and method, free from the control and direction of the employer except as to
the results thereof.[21] In
this case, however, the Service Contract Agreement clearly indicates that
Requio has no discretion to determine the means and manner by which the work
is performed. Rather, the work should be in strict compliance with, and subject
to, all requirements and standards of
Under these circumstances,
there is no doubt that Requio is engaged in labor-only contracting, and is
considered merely an agent of
Notably, Cruz was hired as a utility worker tasked
to clean, sweep and water the lawn of the memorial park. She performed
activities which were necessary or desirable to its principal trade or
business. Thus, she was a regular employee of
Moreover, the Court agrees with the findings of the tribunals
below that respondent Cruz did not abandon her work but was illegally
dismissed.
As the employer,
In this case, no such
intention to abandon her work can be discerned from the actuations of Cruz.
Neither were there overt acts which could be considered manifestations of her
desire to truly abandon her work. On the contrary, her reporting to the
personnel manager that she had been replaced and the immediate filing of the
complaint before the DOLE demonstrated a desire on her part to continue her
employment with
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
SO
ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C
A T I O N
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 133-142.
Penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Justice Rebecca De
Guia-Salvador and Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Dealco Farms, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 153192, January 30, 2009, 577
SCRA 280, 292.
[13] G & M (Phils.), Inc. v.
Cruz, 496 Phil. 119, 121 (2005).
[14] Maritime Factors, Inc. v.
Hindang, G.R. No. 151993,
[15] New Golden City Builders & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 463 Phil. 821, 829 (2003).
[16] Neri v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 97008-09,
[17] 7K Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 148490,
[18] Coca-Cola
Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Agito, G.R. No. 179546,
[19] Section 5, Rule VIII-A of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 88-89.
[21] Section 8 of Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997.
[22] San
Miguel Corporation v. MAERC Integrated Services, Inc.,
453 Phil. 543, 567 (2003).
[23] Section 2, Rule I, Book V of the
Labor Code.
[24] E, G & I Construction
Corporation v. Sato, G.R. No. 182070, February 16, 2011; Aboitiz
Haulers, Inc. Dimapatoi, G. R. No. 148619,
[25] Aboitiz Haulers, Inc. Dimapatoi, G. R. No. 148619,
[26] Hda. Dapdap v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 348 Phil. 785, 791-792 (1998).
[27] E, G & I Construction
Corporation v. Sato, supra note 24.