EN BANC

 

CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. (in his former capacity as Executive Director of the Cooperative Development Authority),

Petitioner,

 

 

 

 

 

- versus

 

 

 

 

 

 

GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE (in his official capacity as Chairman of the

G.R. No. 157838

 

Present:

 

CORONA, C.J.,*

CARPIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,**

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,

SERENO,

REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT), RAUL C. FLORES, CELSO D. GANGAN, SOFRONIO B. URSAL and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

Respondents.

 

Promulgated:

 

February 7, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

 

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

 

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision[1] dated March 8, 2011 affirming COA Decision Nos. 98-424 and 2003-061 dated October 21, 1998 and March 18, 2003, respectively. We upheld the COAs ruling that petitioner is personally and solidarily liable for the amount of P881,819.00 under Notice of Disallowance No. 93-0016-101.

In compliance with our Resolution dated February 8, 2011, counsel for petitioner filed a Notice, Manifestation and Apology confirming the demise of petitioner on June 24, 2010 and explaining the reason for the delay in informing this Court.

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners counsel, son of petitioner, is anchored on the following grounds:

1) There is no finding of fact in this Courts decision which supports the serious finding that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the DAP-TEC to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system intended to favor one of the bidders;

2) Assuming without admitting there was an attempt to alter the results of the bidding, petitioner was not directly responsible for it since it was a certain Rey Evangelista whose act in itself did not constitute bad faith as to be interpreted as deliberately favoring TETRA;

3) The mere fact that petitioner was the signatory in the vouchers and other documents for the processing of the purchase after the winning bidder had been chosen does not by itself constitute bad faith, malice or negligence. His participation as final recommending/approving authority in the said purchase was merely ministerial;

4) Records of this case show that the COA decisions did not hold petitioner solely liable for the disallowed amount of P881,819.00; there were others adjudged solidarily liable with petitioner for the reimbursement of said amount;

5) The decision in Arriola v. Commission on Audit[2] should have been applied in this case. The TSO canvass coupled with confirmatory telephone canvass should be re-examined given the admission made by the COA Auditor in her 1st Indorsement dated June 6, 1994 and as held in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno; and

6) The Court should consider the bases of comparison which is made against a clone generic brand (and its reference price values), in light of compliance with intellectual property laws on software piracy and hardware imitations.[3]

On September 15, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment reiterating its position that petitioner should not have been made liable for the disallowed amount since there was no substantial evidence of his direct responsibility. It contends that the decision should not have ordered petitioner to reimburse the disallowed amount on account of overpricing of purchased equipment because he did not have any participation in the bidding that was conducted by the PBAC, nor did he have any participation in influencing Mr. A. Quintos, Jr., the DAP-TEC evaluator, to change the evaluation results. As to the acts cited by the COA in holding petitioner liable for the disallowed amount, these cannot be the clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence required by law to hold public officers liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties. There was no contrary evidence presented by the COA to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. The OSG also cites the discussion in the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno that the standards set in Arriola should have been observed by the COA, i.e., it should have compared the same brand of equipment (with the same features and specifications) with the items CDA purchased to determine if there was indeed overpricing.

Respondents filed their Comment asserting that the arguments raised by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration do not warrant reversal of the decision rendered by this Court. They point out that the bad faith of petitioner was satisfactorily established when he prevailed upon DAP-TEC to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the bidders computer units. As to the contention that petitioners act of signing the documents for the processing of the purchase was merely a ministerial function, respondents noted that the Certification in the Disbursement Voucher for the payment of the computer states that Expenses necessary, lawful and incurred under my direct supervision. Such certification definitely involves the exercise of discretion and is not a ministerial act. Petitioner recommended to the Chairman of the Board of Administrators of CDA the award of the contract to TETRA upon evaluation by the PBAC which he reconstituted. He cannot therefore escape liability for the disallowed amount together with the other liable parties, namely: Mr. Edwin Canonizado, PBAC Chairman, Ms. Ma. Luz Aggabao, PBAC Vice-Chairman, and PBAC Members Ms. Sylvia Posadas, Ma. Erlinda Dailisan, Mr. Leonilo Cedicol, Ms. Amelia Torrente (IT Consultant) and CDA Board Chairman Ms. Edna E. Aberilla. As to the argument that the COA-TSO canvass was not accurate as it compared generic computers with the computers offered by TETRA, respondent pointed out that aside from having already been passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered, the report submitted by said office disclosed that certain specifications of the reference computers were either similar or better than those of the Trigem brand offered by TETRA at a much lower price. COA Auditor Rubico had allowed a 15% mark up on the prices of the items canvassed by COA-TSO, but still the actual purchase prices were way above the maximum allowable COA reference prices, hence, the disallowance was proper.

We find that the arguments raised in the motion have been adequately discussed and passed upon in our Decision dated March 8, 2011. There are, however, two significant issues that need to be clarified: first, whether the COA violated its own rules and jurisprudence in the determination of overpricing; second, whether petitioner may be ordered to reimburse the disallowed amount in the purchase of the subject computers.

 

There was no violation of COA rules

 

In Arriola v. COA,[4] this Court ruled that the disallowance made by the COA was not sufficiently supported by evidence, as it was based on undocumented claims. The documents that were used as basis of the COA Decision were not shown to petitioners therein despite their repeated demands to see them; they were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited suppliers. Absent due process and evidence to support COAs disallowance, COAs ruling on petitioners liability has no basis.

Reiterating the above declaration, National Center for Mental Health Management v. COA,[5] likewise ruled that price findings reflected in a report are not, in the absence of the actual canvass sheets and/or price quotations from identified suppliers, valid bases for outright disallowance of agency disbursements for government projects.

The aforesaid jurisprudence became the basis of COA Memorandum No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997 which contained guidelines on evidence to support audit findings of over-pricing. In the interest of fairness, transparency and due process, it was provided that copies of the documents establishing the audit findings of over-pricing are to be made available to the management of the audited agency.

The memorandum laid down the following specific guidelines:

3.1 When the price/prices of a transaction under audit is found beyond the allowable ten percent (10%) above the prices indicated in reference price lists referred to in pa[r]. 2.1 as market price indicators, the auditor shall secure additional evidence to firm-up the initial audit finding to a reliable degree of certainty.

3.2 To firm-up the findings to a reliable degree of certainty, initial findings of over-pricing based on market price indicators mentioned in pa[r]. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheets and/or price quotations indicating:

a) the identities/names of the suppliers or sellers;

b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the requirements of the procuring agency;

c) the specifications of the items which should match those involved in the finding of over-pricing; and

d) the purchase/contract terms and conditions which should be the same as those of the questioned transaction.

x x x x (Italics supplied.)

Contrary to the thrust of Justice Serenos dissent, the lack of compliance with the above guidelines did not invalidate the audit report for violation of the CDAs right to due process. We categorically ruled in Nava v. Palattao[6] that neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum No. 97-012 can be given any retroactive effect. Thus, although Arriola was already promulgated at the time, it is not correct to say that the COA in this case violated the afore-quoted guidelines which have not yet been issued at the time the audit was conducted in 1993.

As to COA Resolution No. 90-43 dated September 10, 1990, while indeed it authorized the disclosure or identification of the sources of data gathered by the Price Evaluation Division-TSO in the conduct of its data gathering and price monitoring activities, perusal of this resolution failed to indicate that the disclosure of the names and identities of suppliers who provided the data during price monitoring activities of the TSO formed part of the evidentiary process in audit findings of overpricing and not merely to guide the agencies on where to procure their supplies. COA Resolution No. 90-43 reads as follows:

WHEREAS, it inheres in its constitutional mandate for this Commission to assist in the development efforts of government by providing audit services with a view to avoiding loss and wastage of public funds and property;

WHEREAS, in pursuance of such mandate, the determination of the reasonableness of price is an essential aspect of the audit of procurement in goods and services;

WHEREAS, towards that end, the Price Evaluation Division (PED) of the Technical Services Office (TSO), this commission, provides the Auditors with reference values which are obtained thru a valid canvass in the open market;

WHEREAS, the price findings of the TSO that result from such audit determination of price reasonableness at times adversely affect auditees who would request TSO to disclose or identify the sources of these price quotations set by PED so that they can procure their supply needs from said sources;

WHEREAS, this Commission is cognizant of the national policy of transparency in government operations;

WHEREAS, this Commission perceives no legal impediment to the disclosure or identification of the sources of price data which will ensure economy, efficiency and effectiveness in government procurement;

NOW, THEREFORE, in keeping with the national policy of transparency, the commission Proper has resolved, as it does hereby resolve, to authorize the disclosure or identification of the sources of data gathered by the Price Evaluation Division, TSO in the conduct of its data gathering and monitoring activities;

Be it further resolved that in order to carry out such policy of disclosure, the Price Monitor Bulletin, a COA publication, contain not only specific items and prices of goods and services but also the names and identities of responsive suppliers who provided the data during the canvass conducted by the PED, TSO. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

 

Accordingly, COA Memorandum No. 97-012 was issued on March 31, 1997 in view of the Commissions recognition that [t]here is a need to clarify the role and status of a price reference data, such as those produced by the Technical Services Office, in the audit evidence process with respect to findings of overpricing. It is therefore improper to apply this regulation to the post-audit conducted in the year 1993 on the subject transaction.

 

Further, it must be noted that petitioner in requesting reconsideration of the audit disallowance, did not make a demand for the production of actual canvass sheets. Neither did he question the correctness of the reference values used by the TSO. Petitioner only pointed out that the date of canvass conducted by the TSO does not coincide with the date of purchase. To this the COA-TSO countered that there was no showing that the foreign exchange rate changed during the latter part of 1992 that would have significantly increased the prices of computers. Petitioner nonetheless assailed the price comparison of the branded computers purchased by the CDA with non-branded computers, which the dissent now deems as a right of preference or an exercise of discretion on the part of CDA.

 

COA Upheld the Auditors

Position that Brand is

Irrelevant on the Basis

of Findings of its

Technical Personnel

 

The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis.[7] For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.[8] As such, CDAs decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use, including computers and its accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures. Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its equipment have to conform to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items purchased.

The dissent points out that COA Circular No. 85-55-A itself provides that in determining whether the price is excessive, the brand of products may be considered, thus:

D Brand of Products

 

Products of recognized brands coming from countries known for producing such quality products are relatively expensive.

 

Ex. - Solingen scissors and the like which are made in Germany are more expensive than scissors which do not carry such brand and are not made in Germany.

In this case, however, brand information was found by the COAs TSO Director, and also the Information Technology Center (ITC) Director Marieta SF. Acorda as irrelevant to the determination of the reasonableness of the price of the computers purchased by CDA from Tetra.

Director Jorge H.L. Perez of the TSO in his Memorandum dated April 24, 1995 addressed to the Legal Office Director of the COA explained their position as follows:

x x x x

1. On the allegation that Trigem and Genesis computers are not comparable since it is like comparing apples with oranges As a general rule/procedure, verification by TSO of the price of an item requires comparison with the same/similar classification/group of items. The items would then have the same specifications unless stated otherwise in the price findings of the Office. In this case, the reference values are in accordance with the specifications but exclusive of the branded information, since this was not stated in the P.O./Invoice, which was used as basis of canvass. Since Trigem and Genesis are both computers of the same general characteristics/attributes, the branded and non-branded labels propounded by the supplier is of scant consideration.

As regards the UPS, the enumerated advantages of the delivered items are the same advantages that can be generated from a UPS of the same specifications and standard features. In this case, the reference value pertains to a UPS with the same capacity, input, output, battery packed and back-up time, except for the brand.

x x x x[9] (Underscoring supplied.)

On her part, COA Auditor Luzviminda V. Rubico maintained that what is important is that the specifications and functions of Genesis and Trigem computers are similar. She pointed out that if the comparison of the prices for the disallowances issued was erroneous because what was compared was Genesis brand [versus] Trigem, then the bidding conducted by CDA would not be acceptable since in the Abstract of Bids, prices were not based on similar brands.

Director Acorda of the COA ITC likewise expressed a similar view when asked for comment regarding the penalty points imposed by the CDA after the result of the DAP technical evaluation initially showed that Tetra was ranked lowest. Thus, she explained in her December 9, 1996 memorandum addressed to COA Legal Counsel Director Habitan:

1. On the first issue - we observed that no additional computer features were introduced in CDAs grading system, rather the bidders were penalized for non-compliance with technical specifications fixed by CDA.

On CDAs representation with the Development Academy of the Philippines Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP Committee) and based on the grading system devised by the former, the DAP Committee agreed to impose penalties for non-compliance of the bids with the technical specifications. Hereunder are their reasons for the penalties and our comments thereto:

1.1 Columbia Computer Center (Columbia) and MicroCircuits Corporation (MCC) were penalized because the microprocessor of the computer hardware they delivered for evaluation were AMD and not Intel as required in the technical specification.

AMD and Intel are both microprocessor brands. It rarely malfunctions. Hence, the difference in brands, as in this case, will not affect the efficiency of the computers performance. However, Intel microprocessors are more expensive and are manufactured by Intel Corporation which pioneered the production of microprocessors for personal computers.

1.2 Columbia was penalized because the ROM BIOSes of the computer hardware they delivered were AcerBios, a deviation from the technical specifications which required ROM BIOSes licensed by IBM. AMI, Phoenix or Awards.

This will not affect the efficiency of the computers performance. What is important is that these ROM BIOSes are legal or licensed.

1.3 Columbia was again penalized because the casing of the computer they delivered for evaluation in the Tower 386DX category has a desktop casing and not tower casing as provided in the technical specifications.

Casings do not affect the efficiency of the computers performance but may affect office furniture requirements such as the design of the computer tables.

1.4 Tetra Corporation (Tetra) was penalized because the RAM of the Notebook it delivered for evaluation was only 640K instead of 2M (expandable).

We agree that RAM capacity will affect the efficiency of the computers performance.

2. On the second issue - the Benchmark testing conducted by the DAP Committee in which Tetra got the lowest score in terms of Technical Evaluation is not a sufficient basis for us to determine whether or not Trigem computers are inferior to the computer brands offered by the other bidders.

In Benchmark Testing, weights are allocated to the different technical features of a computer. The computers are then evaluated/appraised using diagnostic software and ranked in accordance with the results of such evaluation/appraisal. The resulting ranking merely suggests which computer best the appraisals. (Underscoring supplied.)

In the light of the foregoing consistent stand of its own technical personnel having expertise in computer technology, the COA upheld the auditors finding that brand was irrelevant to determining the reasonableness of the price at which CDA purchased the subject computers. It is not for this Court, as the dissent attempts, to make assertions to the contrary, i.e., that the brand preferred by CDA was superior to another brand or generic computer having similar specifications/functions and to which the price of the branded computer was compared by respondents. Whether a particular brand of computer or microprocessor is of superior quality is not subject to judicial notice. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them.[10]

The dissent also asserted that it is unfair to compare Tetras proposed Trigem computers to a computer clone that was not even qualified to be bidded on or was not subjected to the same hardware benchmark testing. But as COA ITC Director Acorda had explained in her December 9, 1996 memorandum, such Benchmark Testing conducted by the DAP-TEC is not a sufficient basis for them to determine whether or not Trigem computers are inferior to the computer brands offered by the other bidders.

 

COAs observation that

CDA should have been

entitled to volume discount

was valid

 

Under COA Circular No. 85-55-A, the price is deemed excessive if the discounts allowed in bulk purchases is not reflected in the price offered or in the award or in the purchase/payment documents. This implies that bulk purchases are expected to be accompanied by discounts that should have resulted in lowering the price of items, which is contrary to the dissents stance that the supplier TETRA was not legally obligated to give such discount to CDA. COA noted that CDA should have been entitled to volume discount from the supplying dealer considering the number of units it procured from them. Instead of explaining why there was no volume discount at all reflected in the bid or purchase/payment documents, petitioner claimed that other buyers even bought the same computers at higher prices from Tetra. However, when the sales invoices issued to other companies were examined by the COA, it was found that only one unit was procured by each. Hence, it was not pure conjecture on the part of COA to take into consideration the absence of volume discount. Whether or not the other bidders actually committed to give volume discount is beside the point, as the subject of post-audit was the reasonableness of the price already paid to Tetra by CDA.

 

No grave abuse of discretion

committed by COA in holding

petitioner personally and

solidarily liable for the

overpricing of the

computers procured by CDA

Pursuant to Section 103 of P.D. No. 1445 and Section 19 of the Manual on the Certificates of Settlement of Balances, petitioner was found liable for the audit disallowances totaling P881,819.00 representing the overprice of the computers purchased by CDA. Petitioners participation in the transaction was not limited to his signature/approval of the purchase as recommended by the PBAC.

As pointed out in our Decision, records showed it was petitioner who ordered the reconstitution of the PBAC which nullified the previous bidding conducted in December 1991. He further secured the services of the DAP-TEC for technical evaluation and signed the agreement for the said technical assistance when it is already the duty of the PBAC Chairman. Notwithstanding petitioners claim that it was part of his duties as Executive Director to [sign] outgoing communications/letters except letters addressed to Heads of [Office], Congressmen, Senators and to the Office of the President,[11] the fact remains that the services of DAP-TEC for P15,000.00 fee were availed of at his instance. As it turned out, the DAP-TEC came out with two different technical evaluation reports, the second having been antedated but also signed by DAP-TEC Director Minerva Mecina who admitted it was her signature in both documents but claimed she was unaware that she had signed two different documents. The discrepancies in the two reports (in the first impartial result, Tetra got the lowest ranking but in the second result made after CDA ordered certain changes in the grading system, Tetra eventually won) was found by Auditor Rubico to be irregular and indicative of bad faith.

The dissent assails such alleged instances of manipulation mentioned by Auditor Rubico as belatedly raised and contends that the November 23, 1995 letter of the DAP-TEC technician failed to show that Mr. Rey Evangelista (staff of the PBAC Chairman) went to DAP-TEC on instructions by the petitioner. These circumstances surrounding the issuance of the DAP-TEC technical evaluation results were additionally mentioned by Auditor Rubico to the respondents so that the latter may be apprised that the members of the PBAC, including petitioner, could not have been unaware of efforts to influence the outcome of the technical evaluation, and not as ground per se of the disallowance. Hence, there was nothing anomalous in the fact that Auditor Rubico only disclosed these additional findings in the course of her audit to the Commissions Legal Counsel and other COA officials when she was asked to comment on the appeal/request for reconsideration made by CDA from the notice of disallowance.

It is to be noted that petitioner never denied there were two different results of DAP-TEC technical evaluation. To refute the imputation of irregularity, petitioner submitted a certification from the incumbent CDA Executive Director that as per inventory, only fourteen out of the subject forty-four Trigem computers have become unserviceable, which he said vindicated their choice of branded computers. Thus, the supposedly fraudulent imposition of penalties in the DAP-TEC second report during the physical testing of the computer hardware, construed as manipulative endeavor by the COA Auditor, is now moot and academic. But as already explained in our Decision, the continued serviceability of the purchased items did not justify the overpricing nor render moot the disallowances based on post-audit examination of the pertinent bid and purchase documents.

Finally, we find no merit in the assertion that in ordering the petitioner to reimburse the disallowed amount, this Court misapplied the solidary nature of the liability determined by the COA for petitioner and the other members of the PBAC. We have categorically stated that the Court upholds the COAs ruling that petitioner is personally and solidarily liable for the overpricing in the computers purchased by CDA. The directive for the payment of the amount of disallowance finally determined by the COA did not change the nature of the obligation as solidary because the demand thus made upon petitioner did not foreclose his right as solidary debtor to proceed against his co-debtors/obligors, in this case the members of the PBAC charged under Notice of Disallowance No. 93-0016-101, for their share in the total amount of disallowance.[12]

Petitioner is therefore liable to restitute the P881,819.00 to the Government without prejudice, however, to his right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable with him.[13]

We stress anew that it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.[14] Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence,[15] and the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.[16]

There being no grave abuse of discretion in the findings and conclusions of the COA in this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from these long-settled rules.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

No further pleadings shall be entertained.

Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

SO ORDERED.

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 


WE CONCUR:

(No Part)

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

(On leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 



* No part.

** On leave.

[1] G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 679.

[2] G.R. No. 90364, September 30, 1991, 202 SCRA 147.

[3] Rollo, pp. 375-382.

[4] Id.

[5] G.R. No. 114864, December 6, 1996, 265 SCRA 390, 400.

[6] G.R. No. 160211, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 745, 763-764.

[7] Section 2(1), Article IX(D), 1987 Constitution.

[8] Section 2(2), id.

[9] COA records.

[10] People v. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96, October 12, 2000, 342 SCRA 704, 716, citing 31 C.J.S. 509.

[11] Rollo, pp. 277, 306.

[12] See Civil Code, Art. 1217. The article provides:

ART. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.

 

He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.

 

When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each. (Emphasis supplied.)

[13] Frias, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 171437, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 654, 666.

[14] Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 471, 489, citing Cuerdo v. Commission on Audit, No. L-84592, October 27, 1988, 166 SCRA 657, 661 further citing Tagum Doctors Enterprises v. Apsay, No. L-81188, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 154, 155-156.

[15] Laysa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 128134, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 520, 526.

[16] Sanchez v. Commission on Audit, supra note 14.