Republic of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
ROLANDO SOFIO and RUFIO SOFIO, Petitioners, -versus- ALBERTO I. VALENZUELA,
GLORIA I. VALENZUELA, REMEDIOS Respondents. |
G.R. No. 157810 Present: CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: February 15, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court will not override the finality and
immutability of a judgment based only on the negligence of a partys counsel in
timely taking all the proper recourses from the judgment. To justify an
override, the counsels negligence must not only be gross but must also be
shown to have deprived the party the right to due process.
We deny this appeal via petition for review on certiorari
to assail the resolution promulgated on February 13, 2003,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) rejected the
petitioners motion to recall the entry of judgment.
Antecedents
Respondents Alberto, Gloria, Remedios, and Cesar, all
surnamed Valenzuela, are brothers and sisters. They are the co-owners of a parcel
of agricultural land designated as Lot No. 970-B and located in Barangay
Ayungon, Valladolid, Negros Occidental, containing an aggregate area of 10.0959
hectares. Alberto had been planting sugarcane in the entire property, but poor
drainage had led him to abandon his cultivation in 1978 of an .80-hectare
portion of the property. Unknown to the respondents, petitioner Rolando Sofio,[2] a son of their tenant in another lot, had obtained
permission to farm the abandoned area for free from Socorro Valenzuela, the
respondents mother who was then still managing the property. She had acceded
to the request on condition that Rolando would return the portion once the owners
needed it.[3] In succeeding years, Alberto had also left other
portions of the property uncultivated because of the low price of sugar.
Apparently, Rolando had also taken over the vacated portions to plant palay. He shared the cultivation with his
brother, co-petitioner Rufio Sofio.[4]
In 1985, respondent Gloria learned for the first time
that Rolando had been permitted by her mother to cultivate the .80 hectare portion
without paying any rentals; and that the petitioners had actually expanded
their cultivation to a total area of 1.8 hectares. After the petitioners
refused her demand for the return of the
1.8 hectares, she lodged a complaint against Rolando with the Barangay Chairman
of Ayungon, Valladolid, Negros Occidental, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO). The parties did not reach an amicable settlement.[5]
On October 14, 1985, the petitioners, along with Wilma
Sofio, their sister who had succeeded their father as the tenant of
respondents other property, informed Gloria that, being the identified tenants
under Presidential Decree No. 27, they had already paid the rentals on the portions
they were cultivating, and that they would be paying subsequent rentals to the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).[6]
Gloria replied that, except for the area that Wilma had
been cultivating as tenant in lieu of her late father, the petitioners were not
tenants of any portion of respondents lands.[7]
On July 8, 1988, emancipation patents (EPs) were
issued to Rolando and Rufio covering their respective areas of tillage.[8]
On October 5, 1990, the respondents brought in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint against
the petitioners,[9] seeking
the cancellation of the EPs, recovery of possession, and damages, alleging that
the petitioners cultivation of their land had been illegal because they had
not consented to it.[10]
On December 18, 1992, Hon. Gil A. Alegario, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Negros Occidental, ordered the
cancellation of petitioners EPs, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1.
Declaring the
Emancipation Patents issued in favor of Rolando Sofio and Rufio Sofio cancelled
on account of failure to establish a valid tenancy relationship;
2.
Ordering
defendants, their agents, representatives and other persons working for and in
their behalf to vacate all landholdings occupied by them belonging to the
complainants particularly Lot Nos. 970-A and 970-B located at Hda. Lamgam,
Brgy. Ayungon, Valladolid, Negros Occidental save for the .80 hectare portion
of the landholding situated at Lot No. 970-A, formerly tenanted by Pedro Sopio
but is now being occupied by Wilma Sopio;
3.
Ordering the defendants
to pay the complainants, jointly and severally, 2,880 cavans of palay
representing rentals in arrears from crop year 1985 to the present or its cash
equivalent computed based on the prevailing market price for each year plus 180
cavans of palay every harvest until complainants are fully restored to the
possession of the landholding;
4.
Ordering the
defendants to pay the complainants, jointly and severally, the sum of P5,000.00
as Attorneys Fees and P4,000.00 as actual litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The petitioners appealed.
On September 18, 1996, the DARAB reversed the ruling
of the PARAD, and held in favor of the petitioner, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, thus, Plaintiffs-Appellees are hereby ordered
to maintain Defendants-Appellants in the peaceful cultivation and possession of
the subject landholdings.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The DARAB concluded that a tenancy relationship
existed between the parties, because the Rice and Corn Land Tenure Survey
indicated that Rolandos tenurial right had been established in 1974; that this
finding gave rise to a presumption of the existence of a tenancy relationship between
the parties even with the absence of certificates of land transfer; that the
respondents did not discharge the burden of proof to establish that Rolando had
been merely allowed by the respondents mother to temporarily cultivate the
landholding; that there was no reason to cancel Rufios EPs because none of the
grounds for cancellation of EPs was present.[13]
The respondents elevated the DARABs decision to the
CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 42330).
On May 27, 1998, the CA granted the petition for
review; set aside the DARAB decision; and reinstated the PARAD decision.[14]
The CA decreed that the petitioners did not adduce
evidence to prove the existence of a tenancy relationship between them and the
respondents; and that the DARABs reliance on the Rice and Corn Land Tenure
Survey was unfounded, to wit:
xxx This Court however
does not find the aforesaid Rice and Corn Land Tenure Survey enough basis to
support a finding of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, the said
document being partial in favor of private respondents. As petitioners posit, a
perusal of the said survey would reveal that the information contained therein
was based solely on the declarations made by private respondent Rolando Sopio.
Furthermore,
that the Rice and Corn Land Tenure Survey was accomplished only in 1985, i.e.,
after petitioner Gloria I. Valenzuela had started to protest private
respondents possession of the subject landholdings, should have cautioned the
DARAB against blindly accepting the veracity of the contents thereof. For if as
claimed by private respondent Rolando Sopio in said survey that they have been
tenants of petitioners land since 1974, they should have accomplished the Rice
and Corn Land Tenure Survey much earlier than November 15, 1985 and should have
been issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) in accordance with PD 266.
The foregoing
circumstances thus cannot create a presumption of the existence of a tenancy
relationship, more so that no CLTs were issued to private respondents.[15]
The decision of May 27, 1998 became final and executory
on October 27, 1998 after the petitioners neither moved for reconsideration nor
appealed by certiorari to the Court.[16]
The respondents later filed an ex parte motion for execution,[17] which the PARAD
granted on November 27, 2001. The writ
of execution was issued on January 23, 2002.[18]
On February 6, 2002, the petitioners, represented by
new counsel, filed in the PARAD a motion for relief from judgment, motion for
reconsideration of the order dated November 27, 2001, and motion to recall writ
of execution dated January 23, 2002.[19] They alleged therein that they had learned of
the May 27, 1998 decision of the CA
only on December 11, 2001 through their receipt of the November 27, 2001 order
of the PARAD granting the respondents ex
parte motion for execution.
On March 19, 2002, the PARAD denied the motion for
relief from judgment for lack of merit but deferred action on the other motions.
The PARAD held that he had no authority to grant the motion for relief from
judgment due to its subject matter being a judgment of the CA, a superior
court.[20]
The petitioners then filed in the CA a motion to
recall entry of judgment with motion for leave of court to file a motion for
reconsideration.[21]
Finding the negligence of the petitioners former counsel
being matched by their own neglect (of not inquiring about the status of the
case from their former counsel and not even taking any action against said
counsel for neglecting their case), the CA denied on February 13, 2003 the
motion to recall entry of judgment.[22]
The petitioners received a copy of this resolution of February
13, 2003 on March 14, 2003.
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review
on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioners insist that the CAs denial of their
motion to recall entry of judgment denied them fair play, justice, and equity;
that pursuant to Ramos v. Court of
Appeals,[23] a final and executory judgment may be amended under
compelling circumstances; and that a compelling circumstance applicable to them
was that their former counsel, Atty. Romulo A. Deles, had been guilty of gross
negligence for not filing their appellees brief in the CA, and for not filing a
motion for reconsideration against the May 27, 1998 decision of the CA.
In assailing the May 27, 1998 decision, the
petitioners contend that: (a) the CA ignored
the DARABs findings that they had acquired tenurial rights in 1974 as borne
out by the Rice and Corn Land Tenure Survey; and (b) the case had been rendered moot and academic by the cancellation
of their EPs and their TCTs in favor of LBP. It appears that in 1991, the
petitioners mortgaged their landholdings in favor of LBP; that in 1994, during
the pendency of the case before the DARAB, LBP foreclosed the mortgage and
purchased the land in the auction sale; that on November 21, 1996, ownership of
the landholdings was consolidated in LBP,[24] and a year later, the TCTs in the names of the
petitioners were cancelled, and new TCTs were issued in the name of LBP.[25]
The petitioners pray that the resolution of February
13, 2003 by the CA be set aside; that the decision the CA promulgated on May
27, 1998 be reversed; and that the decision of the DARAB be reinstated.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
I
The Court finds no cause to disturb the decision of
the CA promulgated on May 27, 1998; and cannot undo the decision upon the
grounds cited by the petitioners, especially as the decision had long become
final and executory.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[26] This doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice to the effect that,
at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final
at some definite date set by law.[27] The reason is that litigations must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere; and it is essential for the effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final
the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Given this doctrine, courts must guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result, and must frown upon any attempt
to prolong controversies. The only exceptions to the general rule are: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable.[28] None of the exceptions obtains here.
Ramos v.
Court of Appeals,[29] which the petitioners cited to buttress their plea
for the grant of their motion to recall entry of judgment, is not pertinent. There,
the Court allowed a clarification through a nunc
pro tunc amendment of what was actually affirmed through the assailed
judgment as a logical follow through of the express or intended operational
terms of the judgment.
In this regard, we stress that a judgment nunc
pro tunc has been defined and characterized thuswise:
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and
determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the
record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the
truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to
correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to
have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply
nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been. (Wilmerding
vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126
Based on such definition and characterization, the
petitioners situation did not fall within the scope of a nunc pro tunc amendment, considering that what they were seeking
was not mere clarification, but the complete reversal in their favor of the final judgment and the reinstatement of the
DARAB decision.
II
The petitioners claim that their former counsel was
guilty of gross negligence for letting the CA decision lapse into finality by
not filing a motion for reconsideration or by not appealing in due course to
the Court.
Although the petitioners former counsel was
blameworthy for the track their case had taken, there is no question that any act performed by the counsel within the scope of his general or
implied authority is still regarded as an act of the client. In view of this,
even the negligence of the former counsel should bind them as his clients.[31] To hold otherwise would result to the untenable
situation in which every defeated party, in order to salvage his cause, would simply
claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing
the adverse judgment. There would then be no end to litigation, for every
shortcoming of the counsel could become the subject of challenge by his client
through another counsel who, if he should also be found wanting, would similarly
be disowned by the same client through yet another counsel, and so on ad infinitum.[32] This chain of laying blame could render court
proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the
mere replacement of the counsel.[33]
Nonetheless, the gross negligence of counsel alone would
not even warrant a deviation from the principle of finality of judgment, for
the client must have to show that such negligence resulted in the denial of due
process to the client. [34] When the counsels mistake is so great and so serious
that the client is prejudiced and is denied his day in court, or when the
counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of
his property without due process of law, the client is not concluded by his
counsels mistakes and the case can be reopened in order to give the client another chance to present his case.[35] As such, the test herein
is whether their former counsels negligence deprived the
petitioners of due process of law.
For one to properly claim gross negligence on the part
of his counsel, he must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear
abandonment of the clients cause. Considering that the Court has held that the
failure to file the appellants brief can qualify as simple negligence but cannot
amount to gross negligence that justifies the annulment of the proceedings,[36] the failure
to file an appellees brief may be similarly treated.
The Court has also held that the failure to file a
motion for reconsideration only amounted to simple negligence.[37] In
Pasiona v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court declared that his
counsels failure to file a motion for reconsideration did not necessarily deny
due process to a party who had the opportunity to be heard at some point of the
proceedings. The Court said:
In a number of cases
wherein the factual milieu confronted by the aggrieved party was much graver
than the one being faced by herein petitioner, the Court struck down the
argument that the aggrieved parties were denied due process of law because they
had the opportunity to be heard at some point of the proceedings even if they
had not been able to fully exhaust all the remedies available by reason of their
counsels negligence or mistake. Thus, in Dela Cruz v.
Andres, the Court held that where a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have
been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the essence
of due process. In the earlier case of Producers Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court attained finality by
reason of counsels failure to timely file a notice of appeal
but the Court still ruled that such negligence did not deprive petitioner of
due process of law. As elucidated by the
Court in said case, to wit:
The essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. xxx Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
due process.
Verily, so long as a
party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in
due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Also, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, the Court
held that:
The question is not whether
petitioner succeeded in defending its rights and interests, but simply, whether
it had the opportunity to present its side of the controversy. Verily, as petitioner
retained the services of counsel of its choice, it should, as
far as this suit is concerned, bear the consequences of its choice of a faulty
option. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the petitioners were able to participate in the
proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB, and, in fact, obtained a favorable
judgment from the DARAB. They also had a similar opportunity to ventilate their
cause in the CA. That they had not been able to avail themselves of all the
remedies open to them did not give them the justification to complain of a denial
of due process. They could not complain because they were given the
opportunity to defend their interest in due course, for it was such opportunity
to be heard that was the essence of due process.[39]
Moreover, the petitioners themselves were guilty of
being negligent for not monitoring the developments in their case. They learned about the adverse CA decision on
December 11, 2001, more than two years after the decision had become final and
executory. Had they vigilantly monitored their case, they themselves would have
sooner discovered the adverse decision and avoided their plight. It was
the petitioners duty, as the clients, to have kept in constant touch with their
former counsel if only to keep themselves abreast of the status and progress of
their case. They could not idly sit back, relax and await the outcome of the
case.[40] Such neglect
on their part fortifies our stance that they should suffer the consequence of
their former counsels negligence. Indeed, every litigant is expected to
act with prudence and diligence in prosecuting or defending his cause. Pleading
a denial of due process will not earn for the negligent litigant the sympathy
of the Court.
The other issues the petitioners raised relate to
matters that the CA decision already settled. Considering and passing upon such
issues again would undo the finality and immutability of the decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES
the petition for review; and AFFIRMS
the resolution promulgated on February 13, 2003.
The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 96-97.
[2] Sometimes spelled as Sopio.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 27-28.
[4] Id., p. 28.
[5] Id., pp. 28-29.
[6] Id., p. 29.
[7] Id., pp. 29-30.
[8] Id., p. 30.
[9] Id., pp. 101-106.
[10] Id., p. 30.
[11] Id., pp. 116-117.
[12] Id., p. 143.
[13] Id., pp. 141-142.
[14] Id., pp. 26-40
(penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice) and
Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino (now all retired).
[15] Id., p. 39.
[16] Id., p. 41.
[17] Id.,
pp. 215-220.
[18] Id., pp. 221-223.
[19] Id., pp. 224-229.
[20] Id., p. 232.
[21] Id., pp. 45-53.
[22] Id., pp. 96-97.
[23] G.R.
No. 42108,
[24]
Rollo, pp. 118-125.
[25] Id., pp. 126-133.
[26] Pea v.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383, 403.
[27] Baares II v.
Balising,
G.R. No. 132624,
[28] Union
Bank of the Philippines v. Pacific Equipment Corporation, G.R. No. 172053,
October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 573, 581.
[29] G.R.
No. 42108,
[30] Briones-Vasquez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 144882, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 482,
492; citing Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51
Phil. 862, 879-881 (1923).
[31] Multi-Trans Agency
Phils. Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 180817, June 23, 2009,
590 SCRA 675, 689-690.
[32] Camitan
v. Fidelity Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 163684, April 16, 2008, 551
SCRA 540.
[33] Juani
v. Alarcon, G.R. No. 166849,
[34] Pasiona,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
165471, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 137, 147.
[35] Juani v. Alarcon, supra, note 33.
[36] Redea
v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 146611,
[37] Supra, note 34.
[38] Id.
[39] KLT Fruits Inc. v. WSR Fruits,
Inc., G.R.
No. No. 174219,
[40] GCP-Manny
Transport Services, Inc. v. Principe, G.R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005,
474 SCRA 555, 563-564.