Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
EN BANC
|
PEOPLE OF THE Petitioner, - versus - HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), IMELDA R. MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and
GILBERT C. DULAY,* Respondents. |
G.R. Nos.
153304-05 Present: CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, SERENO, REYES,
and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: February 7, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines (petitioner) assailing the decision dated
March 22, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan[1] in
Criminal Case Nos. 20345 and 20346 which granted the demurrers to evidence filed by Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado
Benitez (respondents) and Rafael
Zagala.
The Facts
The
petition stemmed from two criminal informations filed before the Sandiganbayan,
charging the respondents with the crime of malversation of public funds,
defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. The charges arose from
the transactions that the respondents participated in, in their official
capacities as Minister and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Human Settlements
(MHS) under the MHS Kabisig Program.
In Criminal Case No. 20345, respondents, together with Gilbert C.
Dulay, were charged with malversation of public funds, committed as follows:
That on or about April 6, 1984 or
sometime and/or [subsequent] thereto, in Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public
officers charged with the administration of public funds and as such,
accountable officers, Imelda R. Marcos being then the Minister of Human
Settlements, Jose Conrado Benitez being then the Deputy Minister of Human
Settlements and Gilbert C. Dulay being then [the] Assistant Manager for
Finance, Ministry of Human Settlements, while in the performance of their
official functions, taking advantage of their positions, acting in concert and
mutually helping one another thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in a series of anomalous
transactions, abstract the total amount of P57.954 Million Pesos (sic), Philippine Currency from the funds
of the Ministry of Human Settlements in the following manner: accused Conrado Benitez approved the series
of cash advances made and received by Gilbert C. Dulay, and made it appear that
the funds were transferred to the University of Life, a private foundation
represented likewise by Gilbert C. Dulay when in truth and in fact no such
funds were transferred while Imelda R. Marcos concurred in the series of such
cash advances approved by Jose Conrado Benitez and received by Gilbert C. Dulay
and in furtherance of the conspiracy, in order to camouflage the aforesaid
anomalous and irregular cash advances and withdrawals, Imelda R. Marcos
requested that the funds of the KSS Program be treated as Confidential Funds;
and as such be considered as Classified Information; and that the above-named
accused, once in possession of the said aggregate amount of P57.954
Million Pesos (sic), misappropriated
and converted the same to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice
of the government in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours][2]
In Criminal Case No. 20346, respondents together with Zagala were
charged with malversation of public funds under these allegations:
That
on or about April 6 to April 16, 1984[3]
and/or sometime or subsequent thereto, in Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers charged with the administration of public funds and as such,
accountable officers, Imelda R. Marcos being then the Minister of Human
Settlements, Jose Conrado Benitez being then the Deputy Minister of Human
Settlements[,] and Rafael Zagala being then [the] Assistant Manager for
Regional Operations and at the same time Presidential Action Officer, while in
the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their
positions, acting in concert and mutually helping one another thru manifest
partiality and evident bad faith[,] did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally, in a series of anomalous transactions, abstract from the funds
of the Ministry of Human Settlements the total amount of P40 Million
Pesos (sic), Philippine Currency, in
the following manner: Jose Conrado
Benitez approved the cash advances made by Rafael Zagala and Imelda R. Marcos
concurred in the series of cash advances approved by Jose Conrado Benitez in
favor of Rafael G. Zagala; and in furtherance of the conspiracy, Imelda R.
Marcos in order to camouflage the aforesaid anomalous and irregular cash advances,
requested that funds of the KSS Program be treated as Confidential Funds; and
as such be considered as Classified Information; and the above-named accused,
once in possession of the total amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic), misappropriated and converted the
same to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government
in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours][4]
Only
the respondents and Zagala were arraigned for the above charges to which they
pleaded not guilty; Dulay was not arraigned and remains at large. On March 15,
2000, Zagala died, leaving the respondents to answer the charges in the
criminal cases.
After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial
of the criminal cases ensued. The prosecutions chief evidence was based on the
lone testimony of Commission of Audit (COA)
Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the documentary evidence used in the audit
examination of the subject funds.[5]
The gist of COA Auditor Cortez
direct testimony was summarized by the Sandiganbaya, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 20345
[s]he was appointed
on March 31, 1986 by then COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona, Jr. to head a team of
COA auditors. Upon examination of the documents, she declared that an amount of
P100 Million Pesos (sic) from
the Office of Budget and Management was released for the KSS Project of the
Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) by virtue of an Advice of Allotment for
Calendar Year 1984. Also, an amount of P42.4 Million Pesos (sic) was separately disbursed for the
Kabisig Program of the Ministry of Human Settlements. With regard to the amount
of P100 Million Pesos (sic)
received by the MHS, P60 Million Pesos (sic) [was] disbursed through cash advances. Of the P60
Million Pesos (sic) in cash advances,
accused Zagala received P40 Million Pesos (sic) in four (4) disbursements while accused Dulay received the
remaining P20 Million Pesos (sic)
in two disbursements.
With
respect to accused Rafael Zagala, the cash advances consist of four (4)
disbursement vouchers in the amount of P5 Million Pesos (sic), P10 Million Pesos (sic), P10 Million Pesos (sic) and P15 Million Pesos (sic).
All of these vouchers are in the name of accused Zagala as claimant and
accused Benitez as approving officer and are accompanied by their corresponding
Treasury Warrants that were countersigned by accused Benitez and approved by
accused Dulay.
In
contrast, x x x a
disbursement voucher in the amount of P10 Million Pesos (sic) was drawn in favor of accused
Gilbert Dulay and approved by accused Benitez. Pursuant to this, a Treasury
Warrant was issued to the order of accused Dulay, countersigned by accused
Benitez and approved by accused Zagala. Another voucher was drawn in favor of
accused Dulay in the amount of P10 Million Pesos (sic) and approved by accused Benitez. Again, a Treasury Warrant was
issued to the order of accused Dulay in the amount of P10 Million Pesos
(sic), which was countersigned by
accused Benitez and approved by accused Zagala.
x x
x [A]ccused Marcos sent a letter
to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos requesting that the fund intended for the
KSS Project in the amount of P100 Million Pesos (sic) be deemed as Confidential Fund.
x x
x [T]he liquidation of accused
Zagalas account, which was contained in a Journal Voucher dated November 27,
1984, was without any supporting documents. Upon this discovery, witness
requested and secured a certification from the Manager of the National
Government Audit Office to the effect that the COA did not receive any document
coming from the MHS. However, this liquidation voucher which contained figures
in the total amount of P50 Million Pesos (sic), comprised the entire cash advances of accused Zagala in the
amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic)
and the P10 Million Pesos (sic)
cash advance made by accused Dulay. Since the amount of P10 Million
Pesos (sic) was already contained in
Zagalas Journal Voucher, the witness and her team of auditors tried to locate
the remaining P10 Million Pesos (sic)
and found out that accused Dulay had liquidated the same amount.[6]
(footnotes omitted)
According
to COA Auditor Cortez, Zagalas cash advances were supported by a liquidation
report and supporting documents submitted to the resident auditor even before the P100 Million Kilusang Sariling
Sikap (KSS) fund was made
confidential.[7] The
witness also testified that the COA resident auditor found no irregularity in
this liquidation report.[8]
COA Auditor Cortez stated that since
the P100 Million KSS fund was classified as confidential, the
liquidation report should have been submitted to the COA Chairman who should
have then issued a credit memo. No credit memo was ever found during the
audit examination of the MHS accounts.[9] COA Auditor Cortez admitted that she did not
verify whether the supporting documents of Zagalas cash advances were sent to
the COA Chairman.[10]
Respondent
Marcos was prosecuted because of her participation as Minister of the MHS, in
requesting that the P100 Million KSS fund be declared confidential.
Respondent Benitez was prosecuted because he was the approving officer in these
disputed transactions.
In Criminal
Case No. 20346
Regarding the Kabisig Program of the
MHS, the COA team of auditors examined the vouchers of the MHS, which upon
inspection revealed that there were at least three (3) memoranda of agreements
entered into between the MHS and University of Life (UL). With reference to the first Memorandum of
Agreement dated July 2, 1985, an amount of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic) was transferred by the MHS to the
UL to pay for the operations of the Community Mobilization Program and the
Kabisig Program of the MHS. Accused Benitez as the Deputy Minister of the MHS
and accused Dulay as Vice President of the UL were the signatories of this
agreement. Although there is no disbursement voucher in the records, it is
admitted that a Treasury Warrant was drawn in the sum of P21.6 Million
Pesos (sic). The second Memorandum of
Agreement dated July 10, 1985 provided for a fund transfer in the amount of P3.8
Million Pesos (sic) for the Human
Resources Development Plan of the MHS. Accordingly, a Disbursement Voucher
certified by accused Dulay and approved by accused Benitez was drawn in the sum
of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic).
The third Memorandum of Agreement in the sum of P17 Million Pesos (sic) was granted for the acquisition of
motor vehicles and other equipment to support the Kabisig Program of the MHS.
For that reason, a Disbursement Voucher pertaining thereto accompanied by a
Treasury Warrant was drafted.
Similarly, the witness declared that although they did not examine any of the records of the UL, the abovementioned sums were not received by the UL based on the affidavit of the UL Comptroller named Pablo Cueto. In the same way, an affidavit was executed by the UL Chief Accountant named Ernesto Jiao attesting that there is no financial transaction on record covering the purchase of motor vehicles. Again, witness Cortez admitted that they did not examine the books of the UL on this matter but only inquired about it from Mr. Jiao. The affidavit of Mr. Jiao with respect to the nonexistence of the purchases of motor vehicles was further corroborated by the affidavit of one Romeo Sison, who was the Administrative Assistant of the Property Section of the UL.
The respective treasury warrants
representing the various sums of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic), P17 Million Pesos (sic) and P3.8 Million Pesos (sic) were subsequently deposited with
the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Shaw Blvd. Branch, Mandaluyong, under
various accounts. Soon after, several checks were drawn out of these funds as
evidenced by the Photostat copies recovered by the COA auditors. In the course
of the testimony of the witness, she revealed that her team of auditors
classified said several checks into different groups in accordance with the
account numbers of the said deposits.
x
x x [T]he amount of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic), the same was intended for the
Human Resource Development Plan of the UL.
x x x [T]he aforesaid amount is not a cash
advance but rather paid as an expense account, which is charged directly as if
services have already been rendered. Hence, UL is not mandated to render
liquidation for the disbursement of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic).
The
sums of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic)
and P17 Million Pesos (sic)
were deposited under x x x the
name of the UL Special Account. Out of these deposits, the following first
sequence of withdrawals of checks[11] payable either to its order or to cash x
x x reached a total sum of P5,690,750.93
Million Pesos (sic).
The
second list of checks[12]
[which] consists of numerous [Managers] Checks
x x x
reached the amount of P18,416,062.15.
A
third set of checks allegedly consists of nine (9) ordinary checks and two (2) managers
checks in the sum of P1,971,568.00 and P4,566,712.18[,]
respectively. x x x
Moreover,
[a] witness confirmed that as regards the amount of P17 Million Pesos (sic) intended for the acquisition of
motor vehicles, P10.4 Million Pesos (sic)
was spent for the purchase of some five hundred (500) units of motorcycles
while P2.1 Million Pesos (sic)
was used to procure eight (8) brand new cars. The balance of P4.5
Million Pesos (sic) was later
refunded to the MHS. As regards the five hundred (500) units of motorcycle, the
Presidential Task Force furnished the witness documents attesting to the
transfers of some two hundred seventy-one (271) units of motorcycles from the
UL to the MHS by virtue of Deed of Assignments allegedly executed on February
17, 1986. However, of the two hundred seventy-one (271) units of motorcycle,
only one hundred ninety (190) units were covered with complete documents. With
respect to the eight (8) brand new cars, the team of auditors did not see any
registration papers. (footnotes omitted; underscorings ours)[13]
COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the
audit team did not conduct a physical inventory of these motor vehicles; it
based its report on the information given by the Presidential Task Force.[14] She emphasized that the audit team found it
highly irregular that the motor vehicles were registered in the name of
University of Life (UL) and not in
the name of MHS; and for this reason, she believed that no proper liquidation
was made of these vehicles by MHS.[15]
After
COA Auditor Cortez testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer of
evidence and rested its case.
Subsequently,
separate motions to dismiss the criminal
cases, by way of demurrers to evidence, were filed by Zagala and the
respondents on November 15, 1997, January 5, 1998 and January 28, 1998; on
January 27, 1998, the prosecution filed
a Manifestation stating that it was not opposing the demurrers to evidence.[16]
The Sandiganbayans Ruling
The Sandiganbayan granted the
demurrers to evidence and acquitted
the respondents in its assailed decision dated March 22, 2002. The dispositive portion of this decision
reads:
Wherefore, the Demurrers to Evidence are hereby granted. Accused Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez and Gilbert C. Dulay are hereby acquitted of the crime of Malversation in Criminal Case No. 20435 for insufficiency of evidence to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez and Rafael G. Zagala are likewise acquitted of the offense of Malversation in Criminal Case No. 20346 for insufficiency of evidence in proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[17]
In dismissing these criminal cases,
the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds in
the two criminal cases considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the
audit report.[18]
The Issues
The
issues for our consideration are:
1. Whether the prosecutors actions
and/or omissions in these cases effectively deprived the State of its right to
due process; and
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in granting the demurrers to evidence of the respondents.
The petitioner claims that the State
was denied due process because of the nonfeasance committed by the special
prosecutor in failing to present sufficient evidence to prove its case. It
claims that the prosecutor failed to protect the States interest in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. To support its position, petitioner cites
the case of Merciales v. Court of Appeals[19]
where the Court nullified the dismissal of the criminal cases due to the
serious nonfeasance committed by the public prosecutor.
The petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction that resulted in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the
States interest when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the presentation of additional
evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds involved
and the special prosecutors failure to oppose the demurrers to evidence.
The Courts Ruling
We do
not find the petition meritorious.
We are
called to overturn a judgment of acquittal in favor of the respondents brought
about by the dismissal,
for insufficiency of evidence, of the malversation charged in the two criminal
cases. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.[20] Notably, the proscription against double
jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not
errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence
recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;[21]
and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a partys due process rights.[22]
A judgment of acquittal sought to be
reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process
implies an invalid or otherwise void
judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of
acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and
does not have the effect of an acquittal.[23]
Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case.[24]
Accordingly,
a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence may
be done via the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, based on
the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[25] Mere allegations of grave abuse of
discretion, however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also, mere
abuse of discretion is not sufficient.[26]
On the petitioner lies the burden of demonstrating, plainly and distinctly, all facts essential to establish its right
to a writ of certiorari.[27]
In the
present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring the
presentation of additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant
traceable to the special prosecutors conduct. The special prosecutors conduct allegedly also violated the
States due process rights.
There
is grave abuse of discretion when the public respondent acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
the exercise of its judgment.[28]
An act is done without jurisdiction if the public respondent does not have the
legal power to act or where the respondent, being clothed with the power to
act, oversteps its authority as determined by law,[29]
or acts outside the contemplation of law. For the grant of the present
petition, the petitioner must prove, based on the existing records, action in
the above manner by the Sandiganbayan.
I.
States right to due process
In People v. Leviste,[30] we stressed that the State, like any
other litigant, is entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the
public prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the burden of
diligently pursuing the
criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public interest.[31]
The States right to be heard in court rests to a large extent on whether the
public prosecutor properly undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action
for the punishment of the guilty.[32]
The prosecutors role in the
administration of justice is to lay before the court, fairly and fully, every
fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist, without regard to whether
such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused and without
regard to any personal conviction or presumption on what the judge may or is
disposed to do.[33] The prosecutor owes the State, the court and
the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his
disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions
and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the courts
mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and that
the guilty may not escape unpunished.[34]
In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample
discretionary power to control the conduct of the presentation of the
prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose what evidence to
present or who to call as witness.[35]
The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in
her duty to give effective legal representation to enable the State to fully
present its case against the respondents, citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals[36]
where we considered the following factual circumstances - (1) the public
prosecutor rested the case knowing fully
well that the evidence adduced was insufficient; (2) the refusal of the
public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take the stand; (3)
the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecutions
evidence when the demurrer to evidence was
filed before it; and (4) the trial courts failure to require the presentation
of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer to evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted
in the denial of the States right to due process, attributable to the inaction
of the public prosecutor and/or the trial court.
Merciales was
followed by Valencia v. Sandiganbayan,[37]
where we recognized the violation of
the States right to due process in criminal proceedings because of sufficient
showing that the special prosecutor haphazardly
handled the prosecution. In upholding the prosecutions right to present
additional evidence under the circumstances,
These two cases, to our mind, not only show the existing
factual considerations[38]
that led to the conclusion that the public prosecutor willfully and
deliberately failed to perform his mandated duty to represent the States interest,
but stress as well that there must be sufficient facts on record supporting
this conclusion. In the absence of these supporting facts, no conclusion
similar to the Merciales and
The requirement for supporting factual premises finds
complement in the general rule founded on public policy[39]
that the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds the client. While this rule
admits of exceptions[40]
(as when the gross negligence of a counsel resulted in depriving the client of
due process), the application of the exception likewise depends on a showing of
facts on record demonstrating a clear violation of the clients due process
rights.
II.
The factual
premises cited in the petition and the issue of due process
In the
present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
There was no indication that the special
prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or
that other evidence could be secured.
For purposes of clarity, we shall address the instances cited in
the petition as alleged proof of the denial of the States due process rights,
and our reasons in finding them inadequate.
First. The petitioner bewails the alleged lack of efforts by
the special prosecutor to ascertain the last known addresses and whereabouts,
and to compel the attendance of Pablo C. Cueto, Ernesto M. Jiao and Romeo F.
Sison, UL officers who executed affidavits in connection with the alleged
anomalous fund transfers from MHS to UL.
The
special prosecutor likewise allegedly did not present the records of the UL to
show that the sums under the Memoranda of Agreement were not received by UL
(based on the affidavit of UL Comptroller Cueto) and that no financial
transactions really took place for the purchase of the motor vehicles (based on
the affidavit of UL Chief Accountant Jiao, as corroborated by the affidavit of
UL Administrative Assistant Sison).
We note
that, other than making a claim that these instances demonstrate the serious
nonfeasance by the special prosecutor, the petitioner failed to offer any
explanation showing how these instances deprived the State of due process. An
examination of the records shows that the affidavits of Cueto,[41]
Jiao and Sison surfaced early on to prove the alleged anomalous fund transfers
from MHS to UL. The records further show that during the hearing of December 5,
1995 - when the special prosecutor was
asked by the presiding judge what she intended to do with these
affidavits the special prosecutor replied that she planned to present Jiao and Cueto who were the chief accountant and
the designated comptroller, respectively, of UL.[42] The same records, however, show that, indeed,
an attempt had been made to bring these prospective witnesses to court; as
early as April 20, 1994, subpoenas had been issued to
these three individuals and these were all returned unserved because the
subjects had RESIGNED from the service sometime in 1992, and their present
whereabouts were unknown.[43]
We
consider at this point that these individuals executed their respective
affidavits on the alleged anomalous transactions between MHS and UL sometime in
1986; from that period on, and until the actual criminal prosecution started in
1994, a considerable time had elapsed bringing undesirable changes one of
which was the disappearance of these prospective witnesses.
Significantly,
no evidence exists or has been submitted showing that the special prosecutor
willfully and deliberately opted not to present these individuals. The
petitioner also failed to show that the whereabouts of these individuals could
have been located by the exercise of reasonable diligence in order to prove
that the special prosecutor had been remiss in performing her duties. We can in fact deduce from the allegations in
the petition that even at present, the petitioner has not and cannot ascertain
the whereabouts of these prospective witnesses.
Further,
the records show that the affidavits of these individuals (who denied the
transfer of the funds in the amounts of P21.6 Million, P3.8
Million and P17 Million from MHS to UL) were refuted by contrary evidence of the prosecution itself. The records indicate that the special
prosecutor presented treasury warrants and disbursement vouchers issued in the
name of UL, bearing the respective amounts for transactions between MHS and UL.[44]
The
special prosecutor admitted that the audit team failed to examine the records
of UL to support the prosecutions allegation of an anomalous fund transfer.
COA Auditor Cortez admitted, too, that the amounts (P21.6 Million and P3.8
Million) were transferred[45]
to UL[46]
and that a portion of the amount of P17 Million, i.e., P12.5 Million, was used to purchase 500 motorcycles
and eight cars, while the remaining amount of P4.5 Million was refunded
by UL to MHS.[47]
Under
these facts, and in the absence of indicators too that other persons could have
testified, we cannot give weight to the petitioners allegation that no efforts
were exerted by the special prosecutor. On the contrary, we find under the
circumstances that the special prosecutor exerted reasonable efforts to present
these individuals in court, but failed to do so for reasons beyond her control.
One of these reasons appears to be the simple lack of concrete evidence of
irregularities in the respondents handling of the MHS funds.
Second. The petitioner alleged that the special prosecutor
failed to present the resident auditor to testify on the physical inventory of the
vehicles, or to produce documents showing that an inspection was conducted on
the vehicles.
The prosecutions theory, as the
records would show, was to prove that there had been misappropriation of funds
since the motor vehicles were registered in ULs name instead of the MHS.[48]
In this regard, the special prosecutor presented COA Auditor Cortez who
testified that the audit team did not assail the existence of the motor
vehicles and she also did not dispute that the amount of P12.5 Million
(out of P17 Million) was used to purchase 500 motorcycles and eight
cars. The witness stated that the audit team was more concerned with the
documentation of the disbursements made rather than the physical liquidation
(inventory) of the funds.[49] The witness
further explained that it was the Presidential Task Force which had the duty to
keep track of the existence of the motor vehicles.[50]
She reiterated that the audit team was only questioning the registration of the
vehicles; it never doubted that the vehicles were purchased.[51]
More importantly, COA Auditor Cortez
stated that at the time the team made the audit examination in April 1986, 500
registration papers supported the purchase of these motorcycles;[52]
none of the audit team at that time found this documentation inadequate or
anomalous.[53] The
witness also stated that the Presidential Task Force gave the audit team a
folder showing that P10.4 Million was used to purchase the motorcycles
and P2.1 Million was used to purchase the cars.[54]
Checks were presented indicating the dates when the purchase of some of the
motor vehicles was made.[55] COA Auditor Cortez also testified that 270 of
these motorcycles had already been transferred by UL in the name of MHS.[56] She stated that all the documents are in
order except for the registration of the motor vehicles in the name of UL.[57]
Given
these admissions regarding the existence of the motor vehicles, the
presentation of the resident auditor who would simply testify on the physical
inventory of the motor vehicles, or that an inspection had been conducted
thereon, was unnecessary. Her
presentation in court would not materially reinforce the prosecutions case;
thus, the omission to present her did not deprive the State of due process. To repeat, the prosecutions theory of
misappropriation was not based on the fact that the funds were not used to
purchase motor vehicles, in which case, the testimony of the resident auditor
would have had material implications.
Rather, the prosecutions theory, as established by the records, shows
that the imputed misappropriation stemmed from the registration of the motor
vehicles in ULs name an administrative lapse in light of the relationship of
UL to MHS simply as an implementing agency.[58]
Third.
Despite the Sandiganbayans warning on June 7, 1996 that the various checks
covering the cash advances for P40 Million were photostatic copies,
the special prosecutor still failed to present the certified copies from the
legal custodian of these commercial documents.
The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for
failing to present the original copies of the checks drawn out of the P21.6
Million and P17 Million combination account from the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), as well as the P3.8
Million expense account with the same bank.
The presentation would have allegedly proven the misappropriation of
these amounts.[59]
Records show that instead of presenting the original
copies of these checks, the special prosecutor tried to establish, through the
testimony of COA Auditor Cortez, that these checks were photocopied from the
original checks in the possession of UCPB, which were obtained through the
assistance of the UL management.[60] Thus, while the originals of these checks
were not presented, COA Auditor Cortez testified that the photostatic copies
were furnished by the UCPB which had custody of the original checks.[61]
Further, the witness also testified that at the time she made the examination
of these documents, the entries thereon were legible.[62]
She also presented a summary schedule of the various micro film prints of the UCPB checks that she examined.[63]
At any rate, we observe that the defense never
objected[64] to the submission of the photostatic copies
of the UCPB checks as evidence, thus making the production of the originals
dispensable. This was our view in Estrada
v. Hon. Desierto[65] where we ruled that the production of
the original may be dispensed with if the opponent does not dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose would be served by
requiring its production. In such case, we ruled that secondary evidence of the content of the writing would be
received in evidence if no objection was made to its
reception.[66] We note, too, that in addition to the
defenses failure to object to the presentation of photostatic copies of the
checks, the petitioner failed to show that the presentation of the originals
would serve a useful purpose, pursuant to our ruling in Estrada.
We reiterate in this regard our earlier
observation that other than enumerating instances in the petition where the
State was allegedly deprived of due process in the principal case, no
explanation was ever offered by the petitioner on how each instance resulted in
the deprivation of the States right to due process warranting the annulment of
the presently assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
Fourth.
The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for making no effort to produce
the final audit report dated June 6, 1986, referred to in the last paragraph
of the Affidavit[67] dated
June 10, 1987 of COA Auditor Cortez.
The records show that although this final audit report
dated June 6, 1986 was not presented in court, the prosecution questioned her
on the contents of this audit report since she had a hand in its preparation. COA
Auditor Cortez directly testified on the audit teams findings and examination,
which took three hearings to complete; the cross-examination of COA Auditor
Cortez took two hearings to complete; and subsequently, the Sandiganbayan
ordered that a clarificatory hearing be held with respect to COA Auditor
Cortez testimony. In addition to her
testimony, the special prosecutor did present, too, other pieces of documentary
evidence (from which the final audit report was based) before the
Sandiganbayan.
Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to
consider the special prosecutors omission as significant in the petitioners
allegation of serious nonfeasance or misfeasance.
Fifth. The petitioner presents the special prosecutors failure to
oppose the demurrer to evidence as its last point and as basis for the
applicability of the Merciales
ruling.
The failure to oppose per se cannot be a ground for grave abuse of discretion. The real issue, to our mind, is whether the special
prosecutor had basis to act as she did. As the point-by-point presentation
above shows, the dismissal of the criminal cases cannot be attributed to any
grossly negligent handling by the special prosecutor. To begin with, the
prosecutions case suffered from lack of witnesses because, among others, of
the time that elapsed between the act charged and the start of the actual
prosecution in 1994; and from lack of sufficient preparatory investigation
conducted, resulting in insufficiency of its evidence as a whole. In sum, in
the absence of circumstances approximating the facts of Merciales and
Neither are we persuaded by the petitioners position
that the special prosecutors Manifestation of non-opposition to the demurrer
needed to be submitted to, and approved by, her superiors.[68] The petitioners argument assumes that the special
prosecutor lacked the necessary authority from her superiors when she filed her
non-opposition to the demurrers to evidence.
This starting assumption, in our view, is incorrect. The correct premise and presumption, since
the special prosecutor is a State delegate, is that she had all incidental and
necessary powers to prosecute the case in the States behalf so that her
actions as a State delegate bound the State.
We do not believe that the State can have an unbridled discretion to
disown the acts of its delegates at will unless it can clearly establish that
its agent had been grossly negligent[69]
or was guilty of collusion with the accused or other interested party,[70]
resulting in the States deprivation of its due process rights as
client-principal.
Gross negligence exists where there is want, or
absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire
absence of care. It involves a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them.[71]
As the above discussions show, the State failed to clearly establish the gross
negligence on the part of the special prosecutor (or to show or even allege
that there was collusion in the principal case between the special prosecutor
and the respondents) that resulted in depriving the petitioner of its due
process rights; and, consequently prevent the application of the rule on double
jeopardy. If at all, what the records
emphasized, as previously discussed, is the
weakness of the prosecutions evidence as a whole rather than the gross
negligence of the special prosecutor.
In these lights, we must reject the petitioners position.
III.
Grave abuse of discretion
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
Sandiganbayan is under no obligation to require the parties to present additional
evidence when a demurrer to evidence is filed.
In a criminal proceeding, the burden lies with the prosecution to prove
that the accused committed the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt, as the
constitutional presumption of innocence ordinarily stands in favor of the
accused. Whether the Sandiganbayan will intervene in the course of the
prosecution of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction, competence and discretion, provided that its actions do not
result in the impairment of the substantial rights of the accused, or of the
right of the State and of the offended party to due process of law.[72]
A discussion of the violation of the
States right to due process in the present case, however, is intimately linked
with the gross negligence or the fraudulent action of the States agent. The
absence of this circumstance in the present case cannot but have a negative
impact on how the petitioner would want the Court to view the Sandiganbayans
actuation and exercise of discretion.
The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or allow the prosecution to
present additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a motion) after a demurrer to evidence is filed. This
exercise, however, must be for good reasons and in the paramount interest of
justice.[73] As mentioned, the court may require the
presentation of further evidence if its action on the demurrer to evidence
would patently result in the denial of due process; it may also allow the
presentation of additional evidence if it is newly discovered, if it was
omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to correct the
evidence previously offered.[74]
In this case, we cannot attribute grave
abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan when it exercised restraint and did not
require the presentation of additional evidence, given the clear weakness of
the case at that point. We note that
under the obtaining circumstances, the petitioner failed to show what and how additional available
evidence could have helped and the paramount interest of justice sought to be
achieved. It does not appear that pieces
of evidence had been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or that these
pieces of evidence are intended to correct evidence previously offered. More importantly, it does not appear
that these contemplated additional pieces
of evidence (which the special prosecutor allegedly should have presented) were
ever present and available. For instance, at no point in the records did
the petitioner unequivocally state that it could present the three UL officers,
Cueto, Jiao and Sison. The petitioner also failed to demonstrate its
possession of or access to these documents (such as the final audit report) to support the prosecutions charges the
proof that the State had been deprived of due process due to the special
prosecutors alleged inaction.
IIIa. Grave abuse of discretion and the demurrers to evidence
In Criminal Case No. 20345 that charged conspiracy for
abstracting P57.59 Million out of the P100 Million KSS fund, the prosecutions
evidence showed that P60 Million of this fund was disbursed by
respondent Benitez, as approving officer, in the nature of cash advances to
Zagala (who received a total amount of P40 Million) and Dulay (who
received P20 Million).
To
prove the misappropriation, the prosecution tried to establish that there was
an irregularity in the procedure of liquidating these amounts on the basis of
COA Auditor Cortez testimony that the liquidation should have been made before
the COA Chairman (not to the resident auditor of the MHS) because these funds
were confidential.[75]
Quite evident from the prosecutions
position is that it did not dispute whether a liquidation had been made of the
whole amount of P60 Million; rather, what it disputed was the identity
of the person before whom the liquidation should have been made. Before the
directive of former President Marcos was made which declared the KSS funds (of
which the P60 Million formed part) to be confidential, the liquidation
of this amount must be made before the resident auditor of the MHS. With the issuance of the directive,
liquidation should have been made to the COA Chairman who should have then
issued a credit memo to prove proper liquidation.[76]
To justify conviction for
malversation of public funds, the prosecution has to prove that the accused
received public funds or property that they could not account for, or was not
in their possession and which they could not give a reasonable excuse for the
disappearance of such public funds or property.[77]
The prosecution failed in this task as the subject funds were liquidated and
were not shown to have been converted for personal use by the respondents.
The records reveal that the amounts
of P50 Million and P10 Million were liquidated by Zagala and Dulay,
respectively.[78] On
Zagalas part, the liquidation of P50 Million (P10 Million of
which was the cash advance given to Dulay) was made to resident auditor Flerida
V. Creencia on September 25, 1984 or
before the directive of former President Marcos (declaring the said funds
confidential) was issued on November 7, 1984.[79]
Hence, at the time the liquidation of the amount was made, the liquidation
report submitted to the resident auditor was the proper procedure of
liquidation. Respondent Benitez, for his
part, submitted Journal Voucher No. 4350208 dated November 27, 1984 stating,
among others, that as early as June 22, 1984, the supporting papers for the
liquidation of the P50 Million had already been submitted to the COA.[80]
Moreover, even if the liquidation should
have been made in compliance with the former Presidents directive, the
prosecutions evidence did not sufficiently establish the non-existence of a
credit memo. As admitted by COA Auditor Cortez, certain documents they were
looking for during the audit examination (including the credit memo) could no
longer be located after the (EDSA) revolution.[81] She further declared that she did not know if
COA Chairman Alfredo Tantingco complied with the required audit examination of
the liquidated P60 Million.[82]
In Criminal
Case No. 20346, respondents are sought to be held liable under the criminal
information for converting P40 Million (subdivided to P21.6
Million, P3.8 Million and P17
Million or a total of P42.4 Million) to their own use given that these
funds were never allegedly transferred to UL, the intended beneficiary.
Records
show that the disputed amount allegedly malversed was actually P37,757,364.57
Million because of evidence that an amount of P4.5 Million was returned
by respondent Benitez.[83] As previously mentioned, the documentary
evidence adduced reveals the existence of treasury warrants and disbursement
vouchers issued in the name of UL bearing the amounts of P21.6
Million, P3.8 Million and P17
Million.[84] Documentary evidence also exists showing that
these amounts were deposited in the UCPB and drawn afterwards by means of
checks issued for purchases intended for the Kabisig Program of the MHS.
Except
for the appropriated P17 Million, the petitioners evidence does not
sufficiently show how the amounts of P21.6 Million and P3.8
Million were converted to the personal use by the respondents. The testimony of
COA Auditor Cortez revealed that documents showing the disbursements of the
subject funds were in possession of one Flordeliz Gomez as the Records
Custodian and Secretary of UL. For
undisclosed reasons, however, COA Auditor Cortez failed to communicate with
Gomez but merely relied on the documents and checks, which the audit team
already had in its possession.[85]
This
omission, in our view, raises doubts on the completeness and accuracy of the
audit examination pertaining to the P21.6 Million and P3.8
Million funds. Such doubt was further strengthened by COA Auditor Cortez
testimony showing that P3.8 Million was listed in the books of the MHS
as a direct expense account to which UL is not required to render an accounting
or liquidation.[86] Also, she admitted that the amount of P21.6
Million was contained in a liquidation voucher submitted by Dulay, which was included
in the transmittal letter signed by the respondents to the COA and accompanied
by a performance report on the Kabisig
Program. This performance report showed that the total amount of P21.6
Million was exhausted in the Kabisig
Program.[87]
With respect to the P17
Million, evidence adduced showed that 270 units of the motorcycles have already
been transferred in the name of MHS by UL.[88]
There is also evidence that the audit team initially found nothing irregular in
the documentation of the 500 motorcycles during the audit examination conducted
in April 1986; the same goes for the eight cars purchased.
Under the circumstances, we agree
with the Sandiganbayan that registration of these vehicles in ULs name alone
did not constitute malversation in the absence of proof, based on the available
evidence, to establish that the respondents benefited from the registration of
these motor vehicles in ULs name, or that these motor vehicles were converted
by the respondents to their own personal use.[89] In the end, the prosecutions evidence tended
to prove that the subject funds were actually used for their intended purpose.
IV.
Conclusion
In dismissing this petition, we
observe that the criminal cases might have been prompted by reasons other than
injury to government interest as the primary
concern.[90] These
other reasons might have triggered the hastiness that attended the conduct of
audit examinations which resulted in evidentiary gaps in the prosecutions case
to hold the respondents liable for the crime of malversation.[91]
As matters now stand, no sufficient evidence exists to support the charges of
malversation against the respondents.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the demurrers to
evidence and, consequently, dismissed
the criminal cases against the respondents.
We take this opportunity to remind
the prosecution that this Court is as much a judge in behalf of an
accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of
the State, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.[92]
Therefore, unless the petitioner demonstrates, through evidence and records,
that its case falls within the narrow exceptions from the criminal protection
of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the
finality-of-acquittal rule.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we hereby DENY
the petition.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
no
part: TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice
|
|
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
|
MARIANO
C. Associate Justice
|
|
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
JOSE
Associate Justice
|
JOSE
CATRAL Associate Justice
|
|
MARIA Associate Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice |
ESTELA
M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Per the petition for certiorari, Gilbert C. Dulay has remained at large and has not been arraigned. Thus, he never officially became an accused.
[1] Fourth Division. Penned by Associate Justice Narciso S. Nario, and concurred in by Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Associate Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada; Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao dissented. Rollo, pp. 72-120.
[2] Id. at 7-8.
[3] Records show that the transactions for
these funds started on July 10, 1985, with the execution of the Memorandum of
Agreement for P3.8 Million.
[4] Rollo, pp. 8-9.
[5] Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, Exhibits A to BB; id. at 427-437.
[6]
[7]
[8] Ibid.
[9]
[10] Ibid.
[11] A total of nine checks: (1) Check No. 282604 dated December 27, 1985; (2) Check No. 282606 dated January 28, 1986; (3) Check No. 282607 dated January 28, 1986; (4) Check No. 282608 dated January 29, 1986; (5) Check No. 282609 dated January 31, 1986; (6) Check No. 28610 dated January 31, 1986; (7) Check No. 282612 dated February 4, 1986; (8) Check No. 282616 dated February 18, 1986; and (9) Check No. 282618 dated February 20, 1986.
[12] A total of 10 checks: (1) Managers Check No. 5280 dated January 15, 1986; (2) Managers Check No. 5281 dated January 15, 1986; (3) Managers Check No. 5283 dated January 15, 1986; (4) Managers Check No. 5284 dated January 15, 1986; (5) Managers Check No. 5363 dated January 28, 1986; (6) Managers Check No. 5422 dated January 30, 1986; (7) Managers Check No. 5468 dated January 31, 1986; (8) Managers Check No. 5548 dated February 18, 1986; (9) Managers Check No. 5549 dated February 12, 1986; and (10) Managers Check No. 5641 dated February 27, 1986.
[13] Rollo, pp. 92- 99.
[14]
[15] Ibid.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002, 379 SCRA 345, 352.
[20] People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 449.
[21] People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 185.
[22] People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, 340 SCRA 207. A court certainly acts with grave abuse of discretion if it acts in violation of the due process rights of a party; but grave abuse of discretion is not limited to violation of the right to due process.
[23] People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), supra note 20, at 460.
[24] People
v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos.
154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688.
[25] People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 393.
[26] Marcelo B. Gananden, Oscar B. Mina, Jose M. Bautista and Ernesto H. Narciso, Jr. v. Honorable Office of the Ombudsman and Robert K. Humiwat, G.R. Nos. 169359-61, June 1, 2011.
[27] Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 307. The petitioner must allege in the petition and establish facts to show that: (a) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] G.R. No. 104386, March 28, 1996, 255 SCRA 238, 250.
[31] Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165996, October 17, 2005, 473 SCRA 279, 293.
[32] Ibid.
[33] In re: The Hon. Climaco, 154 Phil. 105 (1974).
[34] People v. Esquivel, et al., 82 Phil. 453 (1948).
[35] Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 137 (2001).
[36] Supra note 19.
[37] Supra note 31, at 293.
[38] In Merciales,
the failure to call witnesses who were plainly available; in
[39] Otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the former counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned (GSIS v. Bengson Comml Bldgs., Inc., 426 Phil. 111 [ 2002]).
[40] The following are the recognized exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or (3) where the interests of justice so require (APEX Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 482 [1999]).
[41] His affidavit was not included in the petition.
[42] TSN, December 5, 1995, p. 40.
[43] Rollo, p. 10.
[44]
[45] On December 27, 1985 or the date stated in the treasury warrant.
[46] TSN, June 7, 1996, p. 21 and TSN, November 4, 1996, p. 28.
[47] TSN, February 24, 1997, pp. 9 and 17.
[48] Id. at 23 and 29.
[49] Id. at 24.
[50] Id. at 21.
[51] Id. at 29.
[52] TSN, November 4, 1996, p. 17.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Id. at 8-9.
[55] Id. at 24.
[56] TSN, February 24, 1997, p. 33.
[57] Id. at 30.
[58] Rollo, pp. 462 and 473.
[59] TSN, June 7, 1996, p. 21.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Id. at 22.
[62] Id. at 21.
[63] Id. at 23, 24, 37 and 48.
[64] Rollo, pp. 518-523.
[65] 408 Phil. 194 (2001).
[66] Id. at 231.
[67] Rollo, pp. 511-517.
[68] Id. at 27.
[69] Heirs of Atty. Jose C. Reyes v. Republic of the Philippines, 529 Phil. 510 (2006); and Callangan v. People, G.R. No. 153414, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 269.
[70] People v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 21; and Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986).
[71] Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. v. Oriental
Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 180817, June 23,
2009, 590 SCRA 675.
[72] Dimatulac v. Hon. Villon, 358 Phil. 328 (1998).
[73] Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan, 373 Phil. 460 (1999). Section 11, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure reads:
Section. 11. Order of trial.
The trial shall proceed in the following order:
x x x x
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and
sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them
to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
[74] Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), Jose L. Africa (substituted by his heirs), Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos (substituted by his heirs), Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (substituted by his heirs), G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011; and Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan, supra note 73.
[75] TSN, December 5, 1995, p. 17.
[76] Rollo, p. 102.
[77] Estrella v. Sandiganbayan, 389 Phil. 413 (2000).
[78] TSN, December 5, 1995, pp. 25-26.
[79] Rollo, p. 530.
[80] Id. at 450.
[81] TSN, November 5, 1996, p. 53.
[82]
[83] The remaining balance in the UCBP
accounts was about P142,635.43. TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 31 and 34.
[84] Rollo, pp. 465, 471, 477, 479.
[85] TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 24-26.
[86] Id. at 30.
[87] TSN, June 7, 1996, pp. 17-18.
[88] TSN, February 24, 1997, p. 33.
[89] Id. at 27.
[90] TSN, November 5, 1996, p. 44.
[91] These evidentiary gaps in the prosecutions evidence pointed to by the Sandiganbayan are: (1) the missing folders that included the findings of the audit team; (2) the unreliability of the audit team report, having relied on the affidavits of the UL officers who were not presented in court; and (3) the failure of the audit team to verify with the COA Chairman if the supporting documents from the cash advances were already in its custody.
[92] Tabuena
v. Sandiganbayan, 335 Phil. 795, 875 (1997), citing Murphy v. State, 13