Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
Kakampi and its Members, Victor
Panuelos, et al., represented by David Dayalo, Kakampi Vice President and attorney-in-fact, Petitioner, - versus - Kingspoint Express and Logistic and/or MARY Ann Co, Respondents.
|
G.R. No. 194813
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ,
SERENO,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: April
25, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Amended Decision[1]
dated March 16, 2010 and Resolution[2]
dated December 16, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106591.
Victor Pauelos (Pauelos), Bobby
Dacara (Dacara), Alson Dizon (Dizon), Saldy Dimabayao (Dimabayao), Fernando
Lupangco, Jr. (Lupangco), Sandy Pazi (Pazi), Camilo Tabarangao, Jr.
(Tabarangao), Eduardo Hizole (Hizole) and Reginald Carillo (Carillo) were the
former drivers of Kingspoint Express and Logistic (Kingspoint Express), a sole
proprietorship registered in the name of Mary Ann Co (Co) and engaged in the
business of transport of goods. They were dismissed from service on January 20,
2006 on the grounds of serious misconduct, dishonesty, loss of trust and
confidence and commission of acts inimical to the interest of Kingspoint
Express.
Prior thereto, Kingspoint Express issued
separate notices to explain to the individual petitioners on January 16, 2006,
uniformly stating that:
RE: CHARGES OF DISHONESTY
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT &
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE
Dear Mr. Dacara:
You are hereby
formally charged with DISHONESTY, SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, LOSS OF CONFIDENCE, and
acts inimical to the company, by filing with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) false, malicious, and fabricated cases against the company.
Further, your refusal to undergo drug testing is unwarranted and against
company policy.
Please submit your answer or
explanation to the foregoing charges within forty-eight (48) hours [from] receipt
hereof. Your failure to do so would mean that you waive your right to submit
your answer.
You may likewise opt for a formal
investigation with the assistance of counsel, or proceed with the investigation
as you may choose.
In the meantime, you are place[d]
under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days effective on January 16, 2006.
You are physically barred from company premises while the preventive suspension
exists[.][3]
The individual petitioners failed to
submit their written explanation within the stated period. Subsequently, Kingspoint
Express issued to them separate yet uniformly worded notices on January 20,
2006, informing them of their dismissal. Kingspoint Express expressed its
decision in this wise:
On
January 16, 2006, you were formally charged with DISHONESTY, SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
and LOSS OF CONFIDENCE and ACTS INIMICAL TO THE COMPANY based on the following
acts:
1. FABRICATION OF BASELESS MONEY CLAIMS
against the company;
2. MISLEADING FELLOW CO-WORKERS to sign
the MALICIOUS COMPLAINT FOR MONEY CLAIMS against the company;
3. REFUSAL TO UNDERGO THE COMPANYS GENERAL
DRUG TEST[;]
4. EXTORTING MONEY FROM CO-WORKERS TO FUND
ACTIVITIES THAT THEY WERE NEVER FULLY INFORMED OF;
You were given two (2) days to
respond to these charges, but you failed to do [so].[4]
In addition to the foregoing, Dacara
was dismissed for consummating his sexual relations with one of Cos household
helpers inside Cos residence thus impregnating her.[5]
A complaint for illegal dismissal was
subsequently filed, alleging that the charges against them were fabricated and
that their dismissal was prompted by Kingspoint Express aversion to their
union activities.
In a Decision[6]
dated April 23, 2007, Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos, Jr. (LA Ramos) found Dacara,
Lupangco, Pazi, Tabarangao, Hizole and Carillo illegally dismissed. On the
other hand, the complaint was dismissed insofar as Panuelos, Dizon and
Dimabayao are concerned as they were deemed not to have filed their position
papers. While the allegation of anti-unionism as the primordial motivation for
the dismissal is considered unfounded, the respondents failed to prove that the
dismissal was for a just cause. The
pertinent portion of the decision reads:
From
a perusal and examination of the pieces of evidence adduced by the respondents
in support of their defense, this Office finds the same as not being sufficient and substantial to establish the charges of
serious misconduct and breach of trust. Consider the following:
On the complainants alleged refusal to undergo the companys
general drug testing, the same is explicitly nothing but an unsubstantiated allegation, therefore,
undeserving of judicial and quasi-judicial cognizance.
On the alleged act of the complainants in extorting money from co-workers
to fund activities that they were not fully informed of as well as the alleged misleading of co-workers to sign
malicious money claims against the company, it is to be noticed that
respondents support or evidence thereto are the joint affidavit of drivers and
helpers as well as that of one Ronie Dizon. On said pieces of evidence, this
Office could not give much probative or evidentiary value and weight
thereto as said sworn statements may definitely not be said to have genuinely
emanated from the affiants (sic) drivers and helpers. To be precise, the
joint-affidavit of the drivers and helpers (annex B, respondents position
paper) obviously was tailor-made, so to speak, to conform with the
respondents position or defense in the instant case. Said joint-affidavit in
fact is couched in english, thus, tremendously lowering the probability that
the statements therein really came from the hearts and souls of the lowly-educated
drivers and helpers.
On the breach of trust allegedly
committed by Bobby Dacara with respect to the alleged act of repeatedly sneaking in the household of respondent
Mary Ann Co and thereafter impregnating one of the latters househelps, the
same is nothing but an unsubstantiated allegation and therefore, undeserving of judicial and
quasi-judicial cognizance. Jurisprudence definitely is explicit on this point
that an affirmative allegation made
by a party must duly be proven to merit acceptance (People vs. Calayca, 301
SCRA 192).[7]
On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed LA Ramos Decision
dated April 23, 2007 in its Resolution[8]
dated April 30, 2008, thus:
In
the case at bar, We are persuaded to agree with the findings of the Labor
Arbiter that the pieces of evidence adduced by the respondents in support of
their defense x x x not being sufficient and substantial to establish the
charges of serious misconduct and breach of trust (Records, p. 96).[9]
In addition, the NLRC ruled that the
respondents failed to comply with the procedural requirements of due
process. Specifically:
It is also observed that much is to
be desired insofar as the observance of the procedural due process aspect is
concerned. Firstly, there was no compliance with the due process requirement of
the law considering that the uniformly worded first notice, all dated January
16, 2006, sent by respondents-appellants to the complainants-appellees, did not
apprise them of the particular acts or omission for which their dismissal were sought.
As clearly shown by the said individual notices, each of the
complainants-appellees was merely informed that he or she is formally charged
with DISHONESTY, SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, LOSS OF CONFIDENCE and acts inimical to
the Company x x x without specifying the particular or specific acts or omissions
constituting the grounds for their dismissal.
The
purpose of the first notice is to sufficiently apprise the employee of the acts
complained of and to enable the employee to prepare his defense. In this case,
though, the said first notice did not identify the particular acts or omissions
committed by each of the complainants-appellees. The extent of their knowledge
and participation in the generally described charges were not specified in the
said first notice, hence, the complainants-appellee could not be expected to
intelligently and adequately prepare their defense. The first notice should
neither be pro-forma nor vague; that it should set out clearly what each of the
employees is being held liable for. They should be given ample opportunity to
be heard and not mere opportunity. Ample opportunity means that each of the
complainants-appellees should be specifically informed of the charges in order
to give each of them, an opportunity to refute such accusations. Since, the
said first notices are inadequate, their dismissal could not be in accordance
with due process x x x.
Secondly, there was no just or
authorized cause for the respondents-appellants to terminate the
complainants-appellees services. It is observed that the Notices of
Termination, all dated January 20, 2006, merely mentioned the ground relied
upon, to wit:
x
x x x
Placing side by side the first (1st)
notices and the Notice of Termination, We can easily notice the wide disparity
between them. In the first (1st)
notices, the alleged charges leveled against each of complainants-appellees
were couched in general terms, such as: DISHONESTY, SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, LOSS OF
CONFIDENCE and ACTS INIMICAL TO THE COMPANY, such that the
complainants-appellees could not be expected to prepare their responsive
pleadings; while the uniformly worded Notices of Termination, as earlier
quoted, the charges leveled against of (sic) them are more specific.[10]
Respondents moved for reconsideration
and in a Decision[11]
dated July 17, 2008, the NLRC reversed itself and declared the individual
petitioners legally dismissed:
Respondent
company is an entity engaged in the delivery of goods called door-to-door
business. As such, respondents are in custody of goods and moneys belonging to
customers. Thus, respondents want to ensure that their drivers are drug-free
and honest. It is undeniable that persons taking prohibited drugs tend to
commit criminal activities when they are high, as most of them are out of
their minds. Complainants are drivers and are on the road most of the time.
Thus, they must see to it that they do not cause damage to other motor vehicles
and pedestrians.
Likewise, when delivering goods and
money, it is not impossible that they could commit acts inimical to the
respondents interest, like failure to deliver the money or goods to the right
person or do a hold-up me scenario.
Thus, to guarantee
complainants-drivers safety and effective performance of their assigned tasks,
respondents ordered complainants to undergo drug testing. However, they refused
to follow the directive. Neither did they give a clear explanation for their
refusal to the respondents. This shows complainants wrongful attitude to defy
the reasonable orders which undoubtedly pertain to their duties as drivers of
the respondents. Such act is tantamount
to willful disobedience of a lawful order, a valid ground for dismissal under
the Labor Code, as amended.
Furthermore, employees who are not
complainants in this case, in a sworn statement attested to the fact that
complainants tricked them to sign papers which turned out to be a complaint for
money claims. They also accused them of abusing their trust in order to achieve
their selfish motives. Complainants even convinced them to shell out part of
their salaries without authorization and consent, as panggatos para sa
papeles, transportasyon ng abugado but said money was used for the
In their Rejoinder, respondents also
mentioned about the loss of cargoes to be delivered to Pampanga and Nueva
Ecija. Complainants failed to refute the allegations nor comment on the matter.
This led to respondents loss of trust and confidence reposed in them.
Considering that the drivers have in their possession money and goods to be
delivered, the continuance of their employment depends on the trust and
confidence in them. Undeniably, trust, once lost is hard to regain.
x
x x x
We disagree.
On January 16, 2006, respondents sent
each of the complainants a letter stating the infractions committed by them.
They directed them to explain the said infractions with a warning that failure
to do so would mean waiver of their right to submit their answer. They further
advised them to opt for a formal investigation with assistance of the counsel,
or proceed with the investigation you may choose.
However, complainants failed to
answer. Neither did they do any act to dispute the charges. They remained
silent on the infractions which a person would not normally do if he is not
guilty of the said charges. If they were
really innocent, immediately, even without any notice, they should have reacted
and did everything to dispute the charges. But they failed, despite the notice
to explain. This would lead to the
conclusion that they were guilty of the charges imputed against them. As a
consequence thereof, the complainants are considered to have waived their right
to defend themselves.[12]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied in a Resolution[13]
dated September 30, 2008.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA. In
a Decision[14]
dated July 17, 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC Decision dated July
17, 2008 and Resolution dated September 30, 2008. Thus:
Initially, this Court must determine
whether the petitioners violated the Company Policies as would warrant their
dismissal from the service. However, a painstaking review of the records of
this case negate[s] a finding of such culpability on the part of the
petitioners.
The charges of dishonesty, serious
misconduct and loss of confidence against the petitioners are nothing more than
bare allegations as neither the show cause orders nor the termination letters
specify in clear and unmistakable manner, the specific acts committed by the
petitioners as would amount to dishonesty, serious misconduct or loss of
confidence. Neither of these notices even contain any averments as to how and when
the alleged infractions were committed by the petitioners.
x x x
In this case, respondent company had
not been able to identify an act of dishonesty, serious misconduct or any
illicit act, which the petitioners may have committed in connection with their
work, except the allegation that petitioners filed false, malicious, and
fabricated cases against the company which, under the Labor Code, is not a
valid ground for termination of employment. There is even no mention of any
company policy or rule violated by any of the petitioners to warrant their
dismissal. The charges are clearly unfounded.
x
x x x
The superficial compliance with two
notices and a hearing in this case cannot be considered valid where the notices
to explain where issued four (4) days before the petitioners were terminated.
The termination was obviously hurriedly effected, as the respondent failed to
give the petitioners the avenue to contradict the charges against them either
by submission of their answer or by the conduct of an actual investigation in
order to give spirit to the requirement of due process. Petitioners were thus robbed of their rights
to explain their side, to present evidence and rebut what was presented against
them, rights ensured by the proper observance of procedural due process.[15]
Respondents
promptly filed a motion for reconsideration. Similar to the NLRC, the CA
reversed itself and retracted its earlier finding that the individual
petitioners were illegally dismissed. In its Amended Decision[16]
dated March 16, 2010, the CA concluded that the two (2) notices issued by Kingspoint
Express complied with the requirements of the law:
In the assailed Decision, We conceded that all the petitioners were actually furnished with a letter dated
16 January 2006. In each letter, petitioners were individually charged with dishonesty, serious misconduct, loss of
confidence for performing acts inimical to the company by filing with the NLRC
false, malicious and fabricated cases against the company and their refusal to
undergo drug testing. They were directed to submit an answer or
explanation within forty-eight (48) hours and were even given the option to
avail of a formal investigation with the assistance of counsel. They were
further advised that failure to submit said answer/explanation would mean
waiver on their part. Thus, when they failed to submit an explanation/Answer,
and failed to inform their employer that they wanted a formal investigation on
the matter, their employer was constrained to serve upon them on 20 January
2006, or four (4) days later, separate
notices of termination stating the offenses they committed, viz.:
x x x x
Show-cause letters/memoranda create
a burden on the employees to explain their innocence. In turn, it is from such
explanation that the employer will be obliged to prove his case in an
investigation. Since the petitioners did not explain, much less invoke their
right to investigation, it follows that they are deemed to have waived their
rights under Art. 277(b) of the Labor Code. Technically, the law on evidence
considers them to have admitted the charges against them. With such admission,
the employer is discharged from the need to prove the offenses charged. It is
well-settled that in any forum, whether judicial or administrative, a party need not prove what is admitted.[17] (Citations omitted)
The CA also held that the individual
petitioners performed acts, which constitute serious misconduct:
The
assailed Decision admits what constitutes serious
misconduct.
Here, except for Bobby Dacara, each
of the three petitioners conceded the existence of the following bases for
their dismissal: (1) complainants
refusal to undergo mandatory drug-testing; (2) creating disharmony and
distrust among the workers and misleading them to go against the employer; and
(3) losing cargo with a value of
P250,000.00 entrusted to respondent company for door-to-door delivery.
Verily, each of the aforestated grounds
independently constitute[s] serious misconduct. Each of them were (sic)
committed in relation to petitioners work. And again, the commission of said
infractions constitutes a ground to dismiss under Art. 282(a) of the Code. The
Court, therefore, gravely erred when it held that no serious misconduct was
committed by petitioners in this case.
On the other hand, in the case of
Bobby Dacara, records show that he committed breach of trust and confidence by
sneaking into the house of private respondent Co and engaging one of Cos
helpers in repeated sexual congress leading to her pregnancy. As held in
Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution[19]
dated December 16, 2010.
The lone issue for the disposition of
this Court is the validity of the individual petitioners dismissal.
It is fundamental that in order to
validly dismiss an employee, the employer is required to observe both
substantive and procedural due process the termination of employment must be
based on a just or authorized cause and the dismissal must be effected after
due notice and hearing.[20]
As to whether Kingspoint Express
complied with the substantive requirements of due process, this Court agrees
with the CA that the concerned employees refusal to submit themselves to drug
test is a just cause for their dismissal.
An
employer may terminate an employment on the ground of serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work. Willful disobedience requires the
concurrence of two elements: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been
willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2)
the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
Both elements are present in this case.
As
to the first element, that at no point did the dismissed employees deny Kingspoint
Express claim that they refused to comply with the directive for them to
submit to a drug test or, at the very least, explain their refusal gives rise
to the impression that their non-compliance is deliberate. The utter lack of
reason or justification for their insubordination indicates that it was
prompted by mere obstinacy, hence, willful and warranting of dismissal.
It
involves little difficulty to accuse Kingspoint Express of anti-unionism and
allege that this was what motivated the dismissal of the petitioners, but the
duty to prove such an accusation is altogether different. That the petitioners
failed at the level of substantiation only goes to show that their claim of
unfair labor practice is a mere subterfuge for their willful disobedience.
As to
the second element, no belabored and extensive discussion is necessary to
recognize the relevance of the subject order in the performance of their
functions as drivers of Kingspoint Express.
As the NLRC correctly pointed out, drivers are indispensable to Kingspoint
Express primary business of rendering
door-to-door delivery services. It is common knowledge that the use of dangerous
drugs has adverse effects on driving abilities that may render the dismissed
employees incapable of performing their duties to Kingspoint Express and acting against its interests, in addition to the threat they pose to the public.
The existence
of a single just cause is enough to order their dismissal and it is now
inconsequential if the other charges against them do not merit their dismissal
from service. It is therefore unnecessary to discuss whether the other acts
enumerated in the notices of termination issued by Kingspoint Express may be considered as any of the just causes.
Nonetheless,
while Kingspoint
Express had reason to sever their employment
relations, this Court finds its supposed observance of the requirements of
procedural due process pretentious. While Kingspoint Express required the dismissed employees to explain their
refusal to submit to a drug test, the two (2) days afforded to them to do so
cannot qualify as reasonable opportunity, which the Court construed in King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac[21]
as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice.
Thus, even if Kingspoint Express defective
attempt to comply with procedural due process does not negate the existence of
a just cause for their dismissal, Kingspoint Express is still liable to
indemnify the dismissed employees, with the exception of Panuelos, Dizon and
Dimabayao, who did not appeal the dismissal of their complaints, with nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision dated March 16, 2010 and Resolution dated December
16, 2010 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that respondent
Kingspoint Express and Logistic is hereby held liable for the payment of nominal damage, in the amount of P30,000.00
each to petitioners Bobby Dacara, Fernando Lupangco, Jr., Sandy Pazi, Camilo
Tabarangao, Jr., Eduardo Hizole and Reginaldo Carillo, for non-observance of
procedural due process required in terminating employment.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam
and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo,
pp. 43-55.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Supra
note 1.
[17]
[18]
[19] Supra
note 2.
[20] See
Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial
Corporation, G.R. No. 173151, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 307, 316-318 citing
Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines and Challenge
Socks Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165268, November 8, 2005,
474 SCRA 356, 363-364.
[21] G.R.
No. 166208, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 116.