Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM Petitioners, - versus - DISTINCTION PROPERTIES
DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC. Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 194024 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: April 25, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the March 17, 2010 Decision[1]
and October 7, 2010 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110013 entitled Distinction
Properties Development & Construction, Inc. v.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents:
Philip
L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered
individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium located
at
Respondent Distinction Properties
Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) is a corporation existing
under the laws of the
In February 1996, petitioner Pacifico
Lim, one of the incorporators and the then president of DPDCI, executed a Master
Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR)[3] of
Phoenix Heights Condominium, which was filed with the Registry of Deeds. As the developer, DPDCI undertook, among
others, the marketing aspect of the project, the sale of the units and the
release of flyers and brochures.
Thereafter, Phoenix Heights
Condominium Corporation (PHCC) was formally organized and
incorporated. Sometime in 2000, DPDCI
turned over to PHCC the ownership and possession of the condominium units,
except for the two saleable commercial units/spaces:
1.
G/F Level BAS
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 21030 utilized as the
PHCCs administration office, and
2.
G/F Level 4-A
covered by CCT No. PT-27396/C-136-II used as living quarters by the building
administrator.
Although used by PHCC, DPDCI was
assessed association dues for these two units.
Meanwhile, in March 1999, petitioner
Pacifico Lim, as president of DPDCI, filed an Application for Alteration of
Plan[4]
pertaining to the construction of 22 storage units in the spaces adjunct to the
parking area of the building. The application,
however, was disapproved as the proposed alteration would obstruct light and
ventilation.
In August 2004, through its Board,[5] PHCC
approved a settlement offer from DPDCI for the set-off of the latters
association dues arrears with the assignment of title over CCT Nos. 21030 and
PT-27396/C-136-II and their conversion into common areas. Thus, CCT Nos. PT-43400 and PT-43399 were
issued by the Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City in favor of PHCC in lieu of the
old titles. The said settlement between
the two corporations likewise included the reversion of the 22 storage spaces
into common areas. With the conformity of
PHCC, DPDCIs application for alteration (conversion of unconstructed 22
storage units and units GF4-A and BAS from saleable to common areas) was
granted by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).[6]
In August 2008, petitioners, as
condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint[7] before
the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of the
MDDR. The case was docketed as REM-
080508-13906. They alleged that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in their
circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be
available in the condominium and failed to perform its obligation to comply
with the MDDR.
In defense, DPDCI denied that it had breached
its promises and representations to the public concerning the facilities in the
condominium. It alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was a mere
preparatory draft and not the official one actually distributed to the public,
and that the said brochure contained a disclaimer as to the binding effect of
the supposed offers therein. Also, DPDCI
questioned the petitioners personality to sue as the action was a derivative
suit.
After due hearing, the HLURB rendered
its decision[8] in favor
of petitioners. It held as invalid the
agreement entered into between DPDCI and PHCC, as to the alteration or
conversion of the subject units into common areas, which it previously approved,
for the reason that it was not approved by the majority of the members of PHCC
as required under Section 13 of the MDDR.
It stated that DPDCIs defense, that the brochure was a mere draft, was
against human experience and a convenient excuse to avoid its obligation to
provide the facility of the project. The
HLURB further stated that the case was not a derivative suit but one which
involved contracts of sale of the respective units between the complainants and
DPDCI, hence, within its jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree), as
amended. The decretal portion of the
HLURB decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Ordering
respondent to restore/provide proper gym facilities, to restore the hallway at
the mezzanine floor.
2.
Declaring
the conversion/alteration of 22 storage units and Units GF4-A and BAS as
illegal, and consequently, and ordering respondent to continue paying the
condominium dues for these units, with interest and surcharge.
3.
Ordering the Respondent to pay
the sum of Php998,190.70, plus interests and surcharges, as condominium dues in
arrears and turnover the administration office to PHCC without any charges
pursuant to the representation of the respondent in the brochures it circulated
to the public with a corresponding credit to complainants individual shares as
members of PHCC entitled to such refund or reimbursements.
4.
Ordering the Respondent to refund
to the PHCC the amount of Php1,277,500.00, representing the cost of the deep
well, with interests and surcharges with a corresponding credit to complainants
individual shares as members of PHCC entitled to such refund or reimbursements.
5.
Ordering
the Respondent to pay the complainants moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱10,000.00
and attorneys fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00.
All other claims and counterclaims are
hereby dismissed accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[9]
Aggrieved, DPDCI filed with the CA its
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[10]
dated
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the HLURB in Case No. REM-0800508-13906 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the Complaint a quo.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[11]
The CA ruled that the HLURB had no
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners as the controversy did not
fall within the scope of the administrative agencys authority under P.D. No. 957. The HLURB not only relied heavily on the
brochures which, according to the CA, did not set out an enforceable obligation
on the part of DPDCI, but also erroneously cited Section 13 of the MDDR to
support its finding of contractual violation.
The CA held that jurisdiction over
PHCC, an indispensable party, was neither acquired nor waived by estoppel. Citing Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,[12]
it held that, in any event, the action should be dismissed because the absence
of PHCC, an indispensable party, rendered all subsequent actuations of the
court void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.
Finally,
the CA held that the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies could be
relaxed. Appeal was not a speedy and
adequate remedy as jurisdictional questions were continuously raised but ignored
by the HLURB. In the present case,
however, [t]he bottom line is that the challenged decision is one that had
been rendered in excess of jurisdiction, if not with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[13]
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration[14]
of the said decision. The motion,
however, was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
Hence,
petitioners interpose the present petition before this Court anchored on the
following
GROUNDS
(1)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HLURB HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE INSTANT CASE;
(2)
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN FINDING THAT PHCC IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY
WHICH WARRANTED THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY REASON OF IT NOT HAVING BEEN
IMPLEADED IN THE CASE;
(3)
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS LIKEWISE ERRED IN
RELAXING THE RULE ON NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BY DECLARING
THAT THE APPEAL MAY NOT BE A SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY WHEN JURISDICTIONAL
QUESTIONS WERE CONTINUOUSLY RAISED BUT IGNORED BY THE HLURB; and
(4)
THAT FINALLY, THE COURT A QUO ALSO
ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE RESPECT OR EVEN FINALITY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HLURB.[15]
Petitioners
contend that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Their complaint with the HLURB clearly
alleged and demanded specific performance upon DPDCI of the latters
contractual obligation under their individual contracts to provide a back-up
water system as part of the amenities provided for in the brochure, together
with an administration office, proper gym facilities, restoration of a hallway,
among others. They point out that the violation by DPDCI of its obligations
enumerated in the said complaint squarely put their case within the ambit of
Section 1, P.D. No. 957, as amended, enumerating the cases that are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. Likewise,
petitioners argue that the case was not a derivative suit as they were not suing
for and in behalf of PHCC. They were
suing, in their individual capacities as condominium unit buyers, their
developer for breach of contract. In
support of their view that PHCC was not an indispensable party, petitioners even
quoted the dispositive portion of the HLURB decision to show that complete
relief between or among the existing parties may be obtained without the
presence of PHCC as a party to this case.
Petitioners further argue that DPDCIs petition before the CA should
have been dismissed outright for failure to comply with Section 1, Rule XVI of
the 2004 Rules of Procedure of the HLURB providing for an appeal to the Board
of Commissioners by a party aggrieved by a decision of a regional officer.
DPDCI, in
its Comment,[16]
strongly objects to the arguments of petitioners and insists that the CA did
not err in granting its petition. It posits
that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners
because the controversies raised therein are in the nature of intra-corporate
disputes. Thus, the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the HLURB
under Section 1, P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No. 1344. According to DPDCI, petitioners sought to address
the invalidation of the corporate acts duly entered and executed by PHCC as a
corporation of which petitioners are admittedly members of, and not the acts
pertaining to their ownership of the units. Such being the case, PHCC should
have been impleaded as a party to the complaint. Its non-inclusion as an indispensable party
warrants the dismissal of the case. DPDCI
further avers that the doctrine of exhaustion is inapplicable inasmuch as the
issues raised in the petition with the CA are purely legal; that the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal; and that the procedure of the HLURB
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy and its application may
cause great and irreparable damage.
Finally, it claims that the decision of the HLURB Arbiter has not
attained finality, the same having been issued without jurisdiction.
Essentially,
the issues to be resolved are: (1)
whether
the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioners; (2)
whether PHCC is an indispensable party; and (3) whether
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in this case.
The
petition fails.
Basic
as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[17]
Thus, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases
is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or
property involved and the parties.[18]
Generally, the extent to which an
administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly,
on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.[19]
With respect to the HLURB, to determine if said agency has jurisdiction over
petitioners cause of action, an examination of the laws defining the HLURBs
jurisdiction and authority becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957,[20]
specifically Section 3, granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the "exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the real estate trade and business." Then came P.D. No. 1344[21]
expanding the jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB), as follows:
SECTION
1. In the exercise of its functions to
regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices;
(b)
Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
(c)
Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
This provision must be
read in light of the laws preamble, which explains the reasons for enactment
of the law or the contextual basis for its interpretation.[22] A statute derives its vitality from the
purpose for which it is enacted, and to construe it in a manner that disregards
or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law.[23]
P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to protect innocent subdivision lot and
condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real estate practices.[24]
The HLURB
is given a wide latitude in characterizing or categorizing acts which may
constitute unsound business practice or breach of contractual obligations in
the real estate trade. This grant of expansive
jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however, that all cases involving
subdivision lots or condominium units automatically fall under its
jurisdiction. The CA aptly quoted the
case of Christian General Assembly, Inc. v. Ignacio,[25]
wherein the Court held that:
The mere relationship
between the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and
subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB.
For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature
of the action as enumerated in
Section 1 of P.D. 1344. On this matter, we have consistently held that the
concerned administrative agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA) before
and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.[26]
[Emphases supplied]
In this case,
the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that apparently are
not cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the
reliefs sought. A perusal of the
complaint discloses that petitioners are actually seeking to nullify and invalidate
the duly constituted acts of PHCC - the April
29, 2005 Agreement[27]
entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board Resolution[28]
which authorized the acceptance of the proposed offsetting/settlement of
DPDCIs indebtedness and approval of the conversion of certain units from
saleable to common areas. All these were
approved by the HLURB. Specifically, the reliefs sought or prayers
are the following:
1.
Ordering the respondent to restore the gym to its
original location;
2.
Ordering the respondent to restore the hallway at
the second floor;
3.
Declaring the conversion/alteration of 22 storage
units and Units GF4-A and BAS as illegal, and consequently, ordering respondent
to continue paying the condominium dues for these units, with interest and
surcharge;
4.
Ordering the respondent to pay the sum of
PHP998,190.70, plus interest and surcharges, as condominium dues in arrears and
turnover the administration office to PHCC without any charges pursuant to the
representation of the respondent in the brochures it circulated to the public;
5.
Ordering the respondent to refund to the PHCC the
amount of PHP1,277,500.00, representing the cost of the deep well, with
interests and surcharges;
6.
Ordering the respondent to pay the complainants
moral/exemplary damages in the amount of PHP100,000.00; and
7.
Ordering the respondent to pay the complainant
attorneys fees in the amount of PHP100,000.00, and PHP3,000.00 for every
hearing scheduled by the Honorable Office.[29]
As it is clear that the acts being assailed
are those of PHHC, this case
cannot prosper for failure to implead the proper party, PHCC.
An indispensable party is defined as one who
has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest.[30] In the
recent case of Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU)
v. Keihin Philippines Corporation,[31]
the Court had the occasion to state that:
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties
in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead
an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is "precisely
when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even to those present." The purpose of the rules on joinder of
indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only
between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be
affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real
finality where there is want of indispensable parties.[32]
(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the case of Plasabas
v. Court of Appeals,[33] the
Court held that a final decree would necessarily affect the rights of
indispensable parties so that the Court could not proceed without their
presence. In support thereof, the Court in
Plasabas cited the following
authorities, thus:
"The
general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires
the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348) For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that
when it appears of record that there are other persons interested in the
subject matter of the litigation, who are not made parties to the action, it is
the duty of the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made either
plaintiffs or defendants. (Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). x x x Where
the petition failed to join as party defendant the person interested in
sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same should be dismissed. x x x When an indispensable
party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. (People, et al. v. Rodriguez,
et al., G.R. Nos. L-14059-62,
"Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court). The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff. (39 Amjur [sic] 885). The evident purpose of the rule is to prevent the multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation. (Palarca v. Baginsi, 38 Phil. 177, 178).
From all indications, PHCC is an
indispensable party and should have been impleaded, either as a plaintiff or as
a defendant,[34] in the
complaint filed before the HLURB as it would be directly and adversely affected
by any determination therein. To belabor
the point, the causes of action, or the acts complained of, were the acts of
PHCC as a corporate body. Note that in
the judgment rendered by the HLURB, the dispositive portion in particular, DPDCI
was ordered (1) to pay ₱998,190.70, plus interests and surcharges, as
condominium dues in arrears and turnover the administration office to PHCC; and (2) to refund to PHCC ₱1,277,500.00,
representing the cost of the deep well, with interests and surcharges. Also, the HLURB declared as illegal the agreement
regarding the conversion of the 22 storage units and Units GF4-A and BAS, to
which agreement PHCC was a party.
Evidently, the cause of action
rightfully pertains to PHCC. Petitioners cannot exercise the same except through
a derivative suit. In the complaint, however,
there was no allegation that the action was a derivative suit. In fact, in the
petition, petitioners claim that their complaint is not a derivative suit.[35] In the cited case of Chua v. Court of
Appeals,[36] the Court
ruled:
For a derivative suit to prosper, it is
required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the
corporation must allege in his
complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the
corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit. It is a condition sine qua non that the
corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation an
indispensable party, but it is
also the present rule that it must be served with process. The judgment must be
made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the
benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same
defendants for the same cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as party
because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res
adjudicata against it. (Underscoring supplied)
Without PHCC as a party, there can be
no final adjudication of the HLURBs judgment.
The CA was, thus, correct in ordering the dismissal of the case for
failure to implead an indispensable party.
To justify its finding of contractual
violation, the HLURB cited a provision in the MDDR, to wit:
Section
13. Amendment. After the corporation shall have been
created, organized and operating, this MDDR may be amended, in whole or in
part, by the affirmative vote of Unit owners constituting at least fifty one
(51%) percent of the Unit shares in the Project at a meeting duly called
pursuant to the Corporation By Laws and subject to the provisions of the
Condominium Act.
This citation, however, is misplaced
as the above-quoted provision pertains to the amendment of the MDDR. It should be stressed that petitioners are
not asking for any change or modification in the terms of the MDDR. What they are
really praying for is a declaration that the agreement regarding the alteration/conversion
is illegal. Thus, the Court sustains the
CAs finding that:
There was nothing in the records to suggest that
DPDCI sought the amendment of a part or the whole of such MDDR. The cited section is somewhat consistent only
with the principle that an amendment of a corporations Articles of
Incorporation must be assented to by the stockholders holding more than 50%
of the shares. The MDDR does not
contemplate, by such provision, that all corporate acts ought to be with the
concurrence of a majority of the unit owners.[37]
Moreover,
considering that petitioners, who are members of PHCC, are ultimately
challenging the agreement entered into by PHCC with DPDCI, they are assailing, in
effect, PHCCs acts as a body corporate.
This action, therefore, partakes the nature of an intra-corporate
controversy, the jurisdiction over which used to belong to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), but transferred to the courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC), pursuant to
Section 5b of P.D. No. 902-A,[38]
as amended by Section 5.2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799.[39]
An intra-corporate controversy is one
which "pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the State in so far as its
franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the
corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members
or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves."[40]
Based on the foregoing definition, there
is no doubt that the controversy in this case is essentially intra-corporate in
character, for being between a condominium corporation and its members-unit
owners. In the recent case of Chateau
De Baie Condominium Corporation v. Sps. Moreno,[41] an
action involving the legality of assessment dues against the condominium
owner/developer, the Court held that, the matter being an intra-corporate
dispute, the RTC had jurisdiction to hear the same pursuant to R.A. No. 8799.
As to the alleged failure to comply with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court again agrees with the position
of the CA that the circumstances prevailing in this case warranted a relaxation
of the rule.
The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of
the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of
their respective competence.[42] It has been held, however, that the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In the
case of Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap,[43] the
Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there
is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to
be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j)
where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong
public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[44]
[Underscoring supplied]
The situations (b) and (e) in the
foregoing enumeration obtain in this case.
The
challenged decision of the HLURB is patently illegal having been rendered in
excess of jurisdiction, if not with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Also, the
issue on jurisdiction is purely legal which will have to be decided ultimately by
a regular court of law. As the Court
wrote in Vigilar v. Aquino:[45]
It does not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question
of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said
question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the
administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with
them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.
The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that
would involve the interpretation and application of law.
Finally,
petitioners faulted the CA in not giving respect and even finality to the
findings of fact of the HLURB. Their
reliance on the case of Dangan v. NLRC,[46]
reiterating the well-settled principles involving decisions of administrative
agencies, deserves scant consideration as the decision of the HLURB in this
case is manifestly not supported by law and jurisprudence.
Petitioners,
therefore, cannot validly invoke DPDCIs failure to fulfill its obligation on
the basis of a plain draft leaflet which petitioners were able to obtain, specifically
Pacifico Lim, having been a president of DPDCI.
To accord petitioners the right to demand compliance with the commitment
under the said brochure is to allow them to profit by their own act. This, the Court cannot tolerate.
In sum, inasmuch as the HLURB has no
jurisdiction over petitioners complaint, the Court sustains the subject decision
of the CA that the HLURB decision is null and void ab initio. This disposition, however, is without prejudice
to any action that the parties may rightfully file in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 37-52. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
with Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda,
concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Annex D of Petition, id. at 71.
[8] Dated
[9] Rollo, pp.
193-194.
[10] Annex I of Petition, id. at 195.
[11] Rollo, p. 52.
[12] G.R.
No. 160347,
[13] Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[14] Annex B of Petition, id. at 53-67.
[15] Rollo, p. 12.
[16] Dated
[17] City
of
[18] Peralta v. De Leon, G.R. No. 187978, November 24,
2010, 636 SCRA 232, citing De los Santos v. Sarmiento, G.R. No.
154877, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRA 62, 73.
[19]Peralta v. De
[20]
Regulating the
[21] Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957.
[22] Lim v. Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 182707, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 740, 743.
[23] Luzon
Development Bank v. Enriquez,
G.R. Nos. 168646 & 168666, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 332, 337-338, citing
Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 834, 858 (2001).
[24] Id. at 350, citing Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. SLGT Holdings, Inc., G.R. Nos.
175181-175182, 175354 &175387-175388, September 14, 2007, 533 SCRA 516,
526.
[25] G.R. No. 164789,
[26] Christian
General Assembly, Inc. v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 164789,
[27] Rollo, pp. 89-91.
[28]
[29] Rollo, pp. 76-77.
[30] Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation v. Hon. Sorongon, G.R. No. 176709, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 613, 622-623, citing Moldes
v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 161955, 31 August 2005, 48 SCRA 697, 707.
[31] G.R.
No. 171115,
[32]Nagkakaisang
Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU) v. Keihin Philippines
Corporation, G.R. No. 171115, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 179, 186-187.
[33] G.R. No. 166519,
[34] Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court
[35] Rollo, p.
20
[36] 485 Phil. 644, 655-656 (2004).
[37]
[38] Reorganization of the Securities and
Exchange Commission with Additional Power and Placing the said Agency under the
Administrative Supervision of the Office of the President.
[39] The Securities Regulation Code.
[40] Yujuico
v. Quiambao, G.R. No. 168639,
[41] G.R.
No. 186271,
[42] Universal
Robina Corporation v.
[43]
G.R. No. 158253,
[44] Vigilar
v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388,
[45] G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 772, 778, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255.
[46] G.R. No. 63127-28, 212 Phil. 653
(1984).