Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO ESPINEDA
and DAISY ALIADO MANAOIS, represented in this act by their Attorney-in-Fact, MA. WILHELMINA E. TOBIAS, Petitioners, - versus
REPUBLIC OF THE
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 193443
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: April 16, 2012 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This
is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Decision[1] dated
July 6, 2009 and Resolution[2]
dated August 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
88995. The facts leading to its filing
are as follows:
On
June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naic,
After
trial and hearing, the RTC issued a Decision on July 29, 2006, granting the petitioners
application, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of general default, decrees and adjudges Lot No. 9972 consisting of 6,920 square meters, Cad. 459-D, Indang Cadastre and its technical description as herein above-described situated in Brgy. Bancod, Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. 1529, as it is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the names of Jean Tan, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Room 54 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila; Roseller C. Anaci[n]to, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Moncario Villag[e], Ampid-1, San Mateo, Rizal; Carlo Loilo Espineda, of legal age, Filipino, with postal address at Cluster F. Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal and Daisy Aliado Manaois, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Panghulo Road, Malabon, Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the Administrator, Land Registration Authority.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The CA gave due course to the appeal
filed by the Republic of the
We now determine if appellees have the right
to register their title on such land despite the fact that their possession
commenced only after 12 June 1945. Records show that the appellees possession
over the subject property can be reckoned only from 21 June 1983, the date when
according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable. From
said date up to the filing of the application for registration of title over
the subject property on 14 June 2001, only eighteen (18) years had lapsed. Thus,
appellees possession of the subject property fell short of the requirement of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.
Moreover,
there was no adequate evidence which would show that appellees and their
predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject land as to
indicate possession in the concept of owner.
The testimonies of appellees witnesses regarding actual possession are
belied by the absence of evidence on actual use of or improvements on the
subject property. Appellees presented only various tax declarations to prove
possession. However, except for the Certification, showing payment of tax due
on tax declaration for the year 2003, there are no other evidence showing that
all the taxes due corresponding to the rest of the tax declarations were in
fact paid by appellees or their predecessors-in-interest.
In
sum, appellees were unable to prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which
possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in
the concept of an owner. Appellees
failed to discharge their duty of substantiating possession and title to the
subject land.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated 29 July
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic,
SO ORDERED.[6]
(citation omitted)
The
petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its
August 12, 2010 Resolution.[7]
The
petitioners question the conclusion arrived at by the CA, alleging that the
evidence they presented prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30
years. The petitioners claim that the following sufficed to demonstrate that
they acquired title over the subject property by prescription:
a.
the testimony of
their attorney-in-fact, Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias, stating that:
i.
the petitioners
have been in actual, notorious and open possession of the subject property
since the time they purchased the same in 1996;
ii.
the petitioners
have regularly paid the taxes due on the subject property;
iii.
the petitioners
predecessors-in-interest, Victorio Garcia, Felipe Gatdula and Gregonio Gatdula,
had been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years and had
religiously paid the taxes due thereon; and
iv.
the subject
property is agricultural, alienable and disposable;
b.
the testimony of
the caretaker of the subject property, Margarito Pena, stating that:
i.
he resides near
the subject property;
ii.
he witnessed the
execution of the deed of sale that petitioners entered into with Gregonio
Gatdula; and
iii.
the petitioners
and predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property
for more than 30 years;
c.
the testimony of
Ferdinand Encarnacion, a clerk in the Docket Division of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), stating that:
i.
no opposition to the
petitioners application was filed before the LRA;
ii.
an examiner of
the LRA found nothing wrong with the petitioners application; and
iii.
no title covering
the subject property was previously issued;
d.
Tax Declaration
Nos. 2935, 2405 and 1823 for the years 1961, 1967 and 1974 in the name of
Victorio Garcia;[8]
e.
Tax Declaration
Nos. 1534 and 3850 for the years 1980 and 1985 in the name of Felipe Gatdula;[9]
f.
Tax Declaration
Nos. 22453-A and 2925 for the years 1991 and 1994 in the name of Gregonio
Gatdula;[10]
g.
Tax Declaration
Nos. 21956-A, 22096-A, 22097-A and 97-05078 in the name of the petitioners;[11]
h.
Resolution No.
69, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Indang,
i.
DARCO Conversion
Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform on July 13, 2000, which converted several parcels of land,
including the subject property, from agricultural to residential/commercial;[13]
j.
Certification
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
CALABARZON dated October 29, 2002, stating that the subject area falls within
the Alienable and Disposable Land Project No. 13-A of Indang, Cavite per LC Map
3091 certified on June 21, 1983.[14]
Issue
This Court is faced with the lone
issue of whether the petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the
benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
Our Ruling
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act governs the classification and disposition of
lands forming part of the public domain. Section 11 thereof provides that one
of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Section 48 thereof enumerates
those who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over
an alienable and disposable public land.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D.
No. 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, is a
codification of all the laws relative to the registration of property and
Section 14 thereof specifies those who are qualified to register their
incomplete title over an alienable and disposable public land under the Torrens
system. Particularly:
Section
14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their authorized representatives:
(1) Those
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those
who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right
of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
As
this Court clarified in Heirs of Malabanan
v. Republic of the Philippines,[15] and
Republic of the Philippines v. East
Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,[16]
Section 14(1) covers alienable and disposable lands while Section 14(2)
covers private property. Thus, for ones possession and occupation of an
alienable and disposable public land to give rise to an imperfect title, the
same should have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. On the other, for one
to claim that his possession and occupation of private property has ripened to
imperfect title, the same should have been for the prescriptive period provided
under the Civil Code. Without need for an extensive extrapolation, the private
property contemplated in Section 14(2) is patrimonial property as defined in
Article 421 in relation to Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code.
Going
further, it was explained in Heirs of
Malabanan and
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property
of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property
may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth are public
dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted
by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
In
other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up
acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of
the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of
possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot
be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.[17]
The
petitioners application is obviously anchored on Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529 as they do not claim to have possessed, by themselves or their
predecessors-in-interest, the subject property since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. That it was thru prescription
that they had acquired an imperfect title over the subject property is the
foundation upon which the petitioners rest their application.
Unfortunately,
this Court finds the evidence presented by the petitioners to be wanting. The petitioners
failed to demonstrate that they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed
the property in the requisite manner, which this Court explained as follows:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.[18]
Tax
declarations per se do not qualify as
competent evidence of actual possession for purposes of prescription. More so,
if the payment of the taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and
random such as in this case. Indeed, how
can the petitioners claim of possession for the entire prescriptive period be
ascribed any ounce of credibility when taxes were paid only on eleven (11)
occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to 2001? In Wee v. Republic of the Philippines,[19] this
Court stated that:
It bears stressing that petitioner presented
only five tax declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for
a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic
assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other
competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish either
possession or declarants right to registration of title.[20]
(emphasis supplied and citation omitted)
In
While
there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by testimonial evidence,
the same is futile and frivolous. The testimonies of Margarito Pena and Ma.
Wilhelmina Tobias do not merit consideration and do not make up for the
inherent inadequacy of the eleven (11) tax declarations submitted by the
petitioners. Such witnesses did not state what specific acts of ownership or
dominion were performed by the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest and
simply made that general assertion that the latter possessed and occupied the
subject property for more than thirty (30) years, which, by all means, is a mere
conclusion of law. The RTC should have tackled evidence of such nature with a
disposition to incredulity, if not with an outright rejection.
Furthermore,
the petitioners application was filed after only (1) year from the time the
subject property may be considered patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No.
040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued by the DAR only on July 13,
2000, which means that the counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period
for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can
only start from such date. Before the property was declared patrimonial by
virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by prescription. This is
clear from the pronouncements of this Court in Heirs of Malabanan quoted above and in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo,[22]
which states:
On this
basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration
because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even
exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it
is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section
14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly
declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial.[23]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The July 6, 2009 Decision
and August 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justices Mariano
C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla,
concurring; rollo, pp. 52-65.
[2] Penned
by Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon
and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring; id. at 66-68.
[3] LRC Case No. NC-2001-1205.
[4] Rollo, p. 53.
[5]
[6]
[7] Supra note 2.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
[16] G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012.
[17] Supra
note at 16.
[18] Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 391 SCRA 411, 404.
[19] G.R. No. 177384, December 8, 2009, 608 SCRA 72
[20]
[21] Supra note at 16.
[22] G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011.
[23]