Promulgated:
April 24, 2012
The appointment of respondent Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) is clearly unconstitutional.
Villars appointment as Chairman is a reappointment
prohibited by the Constitution
Prior to his appointment as COA Chairman, Villar was a COA Commissioner serving the fourth year of his seven-year term. Villars promotional appointment as Chairman on 18 April 2004 constituted a reappointment prohibited by the Constitution since it actually required another appointment by the President to a different office, another confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to that other office, and another oath of office to that other office. When Villar accepted the appointment as Chairman, he necessarily had to resign beforehand as Commissioner. In short, Villar resigned as Commissioner, and then accepted a new appointment as Chairman, his second appointment to the COA.
It is indisputable that the office of the Chairman is a different office from the office of a Commissioner. The Chairman has a salary grade higher than that of a Commissioner, and is the presiding officer of the Commission while a Commissioner is not. The Chairman is specifically authorized by the Constitution to re-align savings of the Commission,1 while a Commissioner has no such authority. The Chairman is the head of the Commission, while a Commissioner is not,2 in the same manner that the Chief Justice is the head of the Judiciary while an Associate Justice is not.
Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution states:
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
The words without reappointment appear twice in Section 1(2) of Article IX-D, the first time in the first sentence and the second time in the second sentence.
The counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution uses the phrase may not be reappointed and the phrase appears only once. Section 1, Article XI of the 1935 Constitution provides:
Section 1. There shall be a General Auditing Office under the direction and control of an Auditor General, who shall hold office for a term of ten years and may not be reappointed. The Auditor General shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, and shall receive an annual compensation to be fixed by law which shall not be diminished during his continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Auditor General shall receive an annual compensation of twelve thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, while the first sentence of Section 1, Article XI of the 1935 Constitution contains the words may not be reappointed, the succeeding sentences do not. In contrast, the words without reappointment appears in the first and second sentences of Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This difference is pivotal in the resolution of the present case.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately disallowed a situation where, in the words of Commissioner Vicente Foz, the appointee serves only for less than seven years, (and) would be entitled to reappointment, which was the case of Visarra v. Miraflor,3 to the effect that x x x in cases where the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would be entitled to reappointment. To specifically implement the rejection of the Visarra ruling, the framers intentionally added the words without reappointment in the second sentence of Section 1(2), even though the same words already appear in the first sentence of the same Section. This is the reason why the words without reappointment appear twice in Section 1(2). Thus, the 1987 Constitution has an additional safety valve compared to the 1935 Constitution.
The following exchange, during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, between Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice of this Court) and Commissioner Vicente Foz, bears out the rejection of the Visarra ruling, in particular the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista:
MR. DAVIDE: I propose another perfecting amendment on line 29, Section 2 (2). It consists in the deletion of the comma (,) after years and the words without reappointment.
MR. FOZ: In other words, the Gentleman is going to allow reappointment in this case.
MR. DAVIDE: No, because on line 25 there is already the phrase without reappointment.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but in the past, that was a source of controversy. That was one of the points raised in one of the controversies in the Supreme Court.
MR. DAVIDE: There would be no area of controversy because it is very clear.
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years without reappointment.
So, it would even apply to the first set of three commissioners.
MR. FOZ: But there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in the case of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies only when the term or the tenure is for seven years. But in cases where the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying words without reappointment in the case of these appointees, then it is possible that an interpretation could be made later on that in their case, they can still be reappointed to serve for a total of seven years.
Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it very clear that even in the case of those first appointed under this Constitution, no reappointment can be had.
MR. DAVIDE: Can it not be done by a mere interpretation because it would really appear to be repetitious? The wording itself on the first set of commissioners would clearly indicate that their term is really for seven years, but their tenure is staggered. So, we have to distinguish between term and tenure because the general term is really seven years. But of the first three to be appointed, the tenure of one is seven; the tenure of the second is five; and the tenure of the third is three. But technically, the term for which they are appointed is seven years.
MR. FOZ: The Committee regrets to say that we cannot accept the amendment.
MR. DAVIDE: May I submit it to a vote, Mr. Presiding Officer.
VOTING
x x x
The results show 2 votes in favor and 21 against[;] the amendment is lost.4 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution added the words without reappointment in the second sentence of Section 1(2) of Article IX-D precisely to overturn Visarra, in particular the concurring opinion of Justice Bautista. The foregoing exchange between Commissioners Davide and Foz clearly proves that the framers specifically added the words without reappointment twice precisely to foreclose the possibility of an appointee, who has served for less than seven years, being reappointed to complete a seven-year term.
This Court can no longer resurrect Visarra because the 1987 Constitution itself has rejected Visarra, particularly, in the words of Commissioner Foz, the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista. In his concurring opinion, Justice Bautista concluded that the appointment of Associate Commissioner Garcia to Chairman of the Commission is valid. This Court has no power to undo what the framers have so clearly written in the Constitution. To repeat, the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the Visarra ruling, in particular the concurring opinion of Justice Bautista, and instead adopted the dissenting opinions of Justices Roberto Concepcion and JBL Reyes.
Moreover, the framers of the 1987 Constitution emphatically made it clear that the words without reappointment apply to a promotional appointment, or a situation where a commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman. The following exchange among Commissioners Felicitas Aquino, Christian Monsod, and Foz clearly established this:
MS. AQUINO: Thank you.
In the same paragraph, I would propose an amendment by addition on page 2, line 31 between the period (.) after the word predecessor and the sentence which begins with In no case, THE APPOINTEE SHALL IN NO CASE SERVE AN AGGREGATE PERIOD OF MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS. I was thinking that this may approximate the situation wherein a commissioner is first appointed as an ordinary commissioner and later on appointed as chairman. I am willing to withdraw that amendment if there is an implicit intention to prohibit a term that in the aggregate will exceed more than seven years.
MR. MONSOD: If the Gentleman will read the whole Article, she will notice that there is no reappointment of any kind and, therefore, as a whole there is no way that somebody can serve for more than seven years. The purpose of the last sentence is to make sure that this does not happen by including in the appointment both temporary and acting capacities.
MS. AQUINO: Yes. Reappointment is fine; that is accounted for. But I was thinking of a situation wherein a commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman. But if this provision is intended to cover that kind of situation, then I am willing to withdraw my amendment.
MR. MONSOD: It is covered.
MR. FOZ: There is a provision on line 29 precisely to cover that situation. It states: Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In other words, if there is upgrading of position from commissioner to chairman, the appointee can only serve the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
MS. AQUINO: But we have to very specific about it; the provision does not still account for that kind of situation because in effect, it might even shorten the term because he serves only the unexpired portion of the vacant position.
MR. FOZ: He takes it at his own risk. He knows that he will only serve the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
MS. AQUINO: Regardless of that, my question is: Will this provision likewise apply to that kind of situation? In other words, I am only asking for an assurance that the safety valve applies to this situation.
MR. FOZ: The provision does take care of that situation.5 (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
Commissioner Monsod, in reply to Commissioner Aquinos query whether a commissioner x x x first appointed as an ordinary commissioner and later appointed as chairman is covered by the prohibition on reappointment, answered that there is no reappointment of any kind. When Commissioner Aquino specifically pointed to the situation where a commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman, Commissioner Monsod replied that it is covered, meaning that such upgrading is prohibited. When Commissioner Aquino still persisted in her line of inquiry on whether the prohibition on reappointment applied to that kind of situation where a commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman, Commissioner Foz, after a fuzzy initial response, finally answered that the provision does take care of that situation.
In contrast, the ponencia of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concludes that a promotion, albeit entailing a second appointment, involves a different office and hence not, in the strict legal viewpoint, a reappointment. This is grave and egregious error.
The ponencia insists that Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution does not preclude the promotional appointment of a commissioner to chairman, provided the appointees tenure in office does not exceed 7 years in all, citing the same deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted above. This is misleading. Commissioner Aquinos full statement reads:
MS. AQUINO: Yes. Reappointment is fine; that is accounted for. But I was thinking of a situation wherein a commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman. But if this provision is intended to cover that kind of situation, then I am willing to withdraw my amendment.6 (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
Obviously, Commissioner Aquino wanted it clarified whether the situation where a commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman is covered by the provision prohibiting reappointment, and to which Commissioner Monsod categorically stated, It is covered.
Subsequent to the exchange among Commissioners Monsod, Aquino and Foz,7 the Constitutional Commission again deliberated on the same issue when the framers discussed and voted whether the words without reappointment should be added in the second sentence of Section 1(2) of Article IX-D. Thus, whatever doubts remained on whether promotional appointments are prohibited were removed completely when the framers voted to add the words without reappointment in the second sentence of Section 1(2) to reject specifically the Visarra ruling, in particular the concurring opinion of Justice Bautista, which stated that the appointment of a Commissioner to Chairman of a Commission is valid.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended to forbid reappointment of any kind, including specifically a situation where, in the words of Commissioner Aquino, a commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman.
To allow the promotional appointment of Villar from Commissioner to Chairman is to put Villar in a far better, and uniquely privileged, position compared to the first two Commissioners who were barred from being promoted from Commissioners to Chairman. The second sentence of Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution provides, Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Thus, the first Commissioner with a term of five years, and the second Commissioner with a term of three years, could not be promoted to Chairman because of the words without reappointment. Indeed, the first two Commissioners could not even be reappointed as mere Commissioners, making their reappointment as Chairman an even greater constitutional anomaly. The first two Commissioners have the same rank and privileges as Commissioner Villar. Logically, and as clearly and emphatically intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, the same words without reappointment should bar the promotional appointment of Villar, as well as all future promotional appointments of Commissioners to Chairman.
On the other hand, the minority, through the dissent of Justice Jose C. Mendoza, claims that the second without reappointment in Section 1(2) of Article XI-D does nothing more than limit the terms of the first batch of appointees to the COA. This is an absurd reading of the constitutional provision. There is no evidence whatsoever of the intent to make such a distinction in the status of the first appointees and the subsequent appointees. Moreover, this claim is belied by the exchange between Commissioners Davide and Foz. To quote again:
MR. DAVIDE: There would be no area of controversy because it is very clear:
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years without reappointment.
So, it would even apply to the first set of three commissioners.
MR. FOZ: But there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in the case of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies only when the term or the tenure is for seven years. But in cases where the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying words without reappointment in the case of these appointees, then it is possible that an interpretation could be made later on that in their case, they can still be reappointed to serve for a total of seven years.
Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it very clear that even in the case of those first appointed under this Constitution, no reappointment can be had.8 (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
Commissioners Davide and Foz both used the word even to emphasize that the words without reappointment apply to all the chairmen and commissioners to be appointed by the President, including even the first set of three commissioners. That was the clear import of their discussion.
Justice JBL Reyes Dissenting Opinion in Visarra further elucidated how Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution, on the terms of office of the members of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), should be interpreted. Justice Reyes explained:
It is clear from the provisions above-quoted that, being, acutely conscious of the crucial importance of the functions of the Commission on Elections to candidates for elective positions, and aware of the consequent pressures and influences that would be brought to bear upon the Commissioners, the framers of this part of the Constitution sought as much as possible to shield the Commission members from any force or influence that might affect them in the discharge of their duties. To this end, the Constitution not only disqualified the Commissioners from holding outside interests that might be affected by their official functions (section 3); it expressly protected the Commissioners against danger of possible retaliation by (a) giving them a fixed term of nine (9) years, not terminable except by impeachment, and by (b) prohibiting any diminution of their salaries during their term of office. The Constitution went even further: cognizant that human conduct may be influenced not only by fear of vindictiveness but also, and even more subtly and powerfully, by prospects of advancement, our fundamental law has likewise provided that members of the Commission on Elections (c) may not be reappointed, and that (d) their salaries may not be increased during their terms. The plain purpose of all these safeguards is that the Commissioners, once appointed and confirmed, should be free to act as their conscience demands, without fear of retaliation or hope of reward; that they should never feel the inducement of either the stick or the carrot. For only the man who has nothing to fear, and nothing to expect, can be considered truly independent.
Upon these premises, the promotion of Dr. Gaudencio Garcia from Associate Commissioner to Chairman of the Commission, with the attendant higher compensation and pre-requisites, violated the Constitutional prohibition against both reappointment and salary increase. If, by express mandate of the fundamental charter, a Commissioner cannot be validly reappointed, not even to the same position that he has occupied, I can see no excuse for holding that he may validly be appointed again to a higher position within the Commission. It is undeniable that a promotion involves a second appointment, i.e., a reappointment that is expressly forbidden by the Constitution.
And if the legislature may not lawfully increase the Commissioners salaries during their terms of office, by express constitutional inhibition, how in the name of good sense may the Chief Executive grant such an increase to an Associate Commissioner via a promotional appointment to the Chairmanship?
x x x
Finally, in the Republic vs. Imperial case, upon which the majority opinion places so much reliance, this very Court expressly reiterated that the intention of the Constitution in staggering the terms of the Commissioners on Elections, so that one expires every three years, was that no President could appoint more than one Commissioner[.]
x x x
By sanctioning promotion of one Associate Commissioner to the Chairmanship, the majority decision enables the President to appoint more Commissioners (the one promoted and the replacement for the latter) at one time whenever a chairman fails to complete his own term. This despite the avowed intention of the constitutional plan of staggered terms, so that no President should appoint more than one Commissioner, unless unavoidable.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the framers of the 1987 Constitution adopted the dissenting opinions in Visarra, Villars promotion from Commissioner to Chairman is clearly a reappointment expressly prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.
The prohibition must apply to all kinds of reappointment if we are to honor the purpose behind the prohibition. The purpose is to ensure and preserve the independence of the COA and its members. The members of the independent constitutional commissions, in the wise words of Justice JBL Reyes
x x x should be free to act as their conscience demands, without fear of retaliation or hope of reward; that they should never feel the inducement of either the stick or the carrot. For only the man who has nothing to fear, and nothing to expect, can be considered truly independent.10 (Emphasis supplied)
A COA member, like members of the other independent constitutional commissions, may no longer act with independence if he or she can be rewarded with a promotion or reappointment, for he or she will likely do the bidding of the appointing power in the expectation of being promoted or reappointed. This Court has a sacred duty to safeguard the independence of the constitutional commissions, not make them subservient to the appointing power by adopting a view that is grossly and manifestly contrary to the letter and intent of the Constitution.
The minority likewise points out that after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, then President Corazon C. Aquino promoted then Commissioner Eufemio Domingo to Chairman, after Chairman Teofisto Guingona resigned to run for a Senate seat.
Commissioner Domingo was appointed as one of the first commissioners under the 1987 Constitution, with an original term of three years. When then Chairman Guingona resigned, he left a portion of his seven-year term. President Aquino then appointed Commissioner Domingo as Chairman to serve the unexpired portion of Guingonas term. Domingo, however, did not complete his term, and served less than seven years in the COA both as Commissioner and Chairman. In 1993, Pascacio Banaria was appointed to replace Domingo, and served as Chairman until 2 February 1994.
Domingos appointment was never questioned before this Court and thus, the Court could not have made a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of Domingos appointment. What is now under consideration before this Court is the appointment of Villar, and thus, the Court cannot evade its duty to make the proper ruling, based on the letter and intent of the Constitution. Suffice it to say that Domingos promotional appointment does not in any way constitute binding precedent.
The Court already had occasion to explain the prohibition on reappointments to the independent constitutional commissions under the 1987 Constitution. In Matibag v. Benipayo,11 the Court explained:
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that [t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment. x x x There are four situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. x x x12 (Emphasis supplied)
Villars appointment falls under both the second and fourth situations. In order for him to take the position of Chairman, Villar had to cut short his seven-year term, which means Villar resigned as Commissioner. After such resignation, Villar could no longer be reappointed to the COA, either as Commissioner or Chairman. First, Villars promotional appointment as Chairman falls under the second situation since Villar had to resign as Commissioner to be appointed Chairman to fill a vacancy arising from the expiration of the term of Chairman Carague. Second, Villar was given a term of only three years as Chairman, instead of the mandatory seven years, to avoid exceeding the maximum term of seven years. However, the term of office is fixed by the Constitution at seven years, and the President has no power to shorten this term because that would mean amending the Constitution. Thus, the promotional appointment of Villar as Chairman to a three-year term is, in itself, unconstitutional for violating the mandatory seven-year fixed term, apart from the prohibition on reappointment. On the other hand, had Villars term as Chairman been made seven years, it would have also been unconstitutional since his total term would then exceed seven years. Thus, whether the upgrading of a Commissioner to Chairman is for a seven-year term or less, such upgrading would be unconstitutional, whatever is the term.
Villars promotional appointment as Chairman for the unexpired portion of his own term as Commissioner also falls under the fourth situation, similar to the situation of the first Commissioners appointed to the COA who served for less than seven years but could not be promoted as Chairman or reappointed as Commissioners. In fact, the words without reappointment were specifically added in Section 1(2) of Article IX-D precisely to prohibit a situation where a commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman. The words without reappointment in the second sentence of Section 1(2) were the additional safety valve that the framers of the 1987 Constitution incorporated in the Constitution to prevent promotional appointments like that of Villar.
Moreover, to allow Villar to carry his unexpired term as Commissioner to his term as Chairman means crossing the lines of succession. This is also unconstitutional because it disrupts the rotational scheme of succession mandated in the Constitution.
The Court has already declared that the words without reappointment, which appear twice in Section 1(2) of Article IX-D, were precisely incorporated to prohibit any reappointment of any kind.As the Court held in Matibag:
The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of office as COMELEC member whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for an unexpired term of any length of time can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC.
x x x [T]he phrase without reappointment appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind.
x x x
The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years. x x x
Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment of any kind. On the other hand, the prohibition on temporary or acting appointments is intended to prevent any circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that may result in an appointees total term of office exceeding seven years. The evils sought to be avoided by the twin prohibitions are very specific reappointment of any kind and exceeding ones term in office beyond the maximum period of seven years.13 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, there is no doubt whatsoever that the prohibition in Section 1(2) of Article IX-D applies to any reappointment of any kind, including promotional appointments from Commissioner to Chairman.
The terms of office of the Chairman and Commissioners are for a fixed term of seven years without reappointment.
The Constitution states, The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. The Constitution uses the word shall, which makes it mandatory for the President to appoint to a fixed term of seven years. The only exception is an appointment to a vacancy caused by death, resignation, or impeachment. In such exceptional causes, however, the Constitution directs that the appointment shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. The President cannot give the appointee a term that is more, or less, than the unexpired term of the predecessor. Thus, whether the appointment arises from a regular vacancy or from an exceptional cause, the President has no discretion to shorten or lengthen the appointees term because the term is fixed by the Constitution. The President must appoint to a full term of seven years to fill a vacancy from an expired term, or to the full unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor who vacated the office for an exceptional cause.
The ponencia posits that a seven-year appointment is not constitutionally feasible for Villar because Villar had already served as COA Commissioner for four years prior to his appointment as Chairman. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, giving Villar a seven-year term would violate the term of office prescribed in Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the Constitution. The ponencia contends, however, that far from prohibiting reappointment of any kind, the 1987 Constitution allows a promotional appointment, but subject to defined parameters.
The ponencia maintains that a promotion from Commissioner to Chairman is not per se unconstitutional. The ponencia argues that the ban on reappointment applies only to a new appointment to the same position. On the other hand, a promotional appointment is disallowed only if the new appointment will lead to a tenure of more than seven years because no term or tenure can exceed seven years. The ponencia asserts that [a]ppointment to the position of [C]hairman extended to a former [C]ommissioner is allowed and is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided the aggregate period of the two (2) appointments will not exceed seven (7) years.
Under the ponencias view, the words without reappointment, which appear twice in Section 1(2) of Article IX-D, apply only to a reappointment to the same position. Thus, the ban on reappointment applies only to the following situations: (1) a Commissioner is reappointed as Commissioner; and (2) a Chairman is reappointed as Chairman.
Conversely, according to the ponencia, the words without reappointment do not apply to the following situations: (1) a Chairman who has served for less than seven years is reappointed as Commissioner if his total term does not exceed seven years; and (2) a Commissioner who has served for less than seven years is reappointed as Chairman if his total term does not exceed seven years.
The error in the ponencias view is basic and quite obvious for three reasons. First, the constitutional ban on reappointment, expressed in the words without reappointment, does not distinguish between appointments to the same or different positions. There are only two possible positions that of Commissioner and Chairman. The words without reappointment have no conditions, distinctions or qualifications that limit the ban on reappointments only to the same position. When the framers twice used the plain, simple and unconditional words without reappointment, they meant exactly what the words mean no reappointment. When the people ratified the Constitution, they naturally and logically understood the plain, simple and unconditional words without reappointment to mean no reappointment.
Second, the rationale for the ban on reappointment applies to reappointments to the same or different positions because the intention is to safeguard the independence of the Commission and all of its Members. There is even greater reason to ban promotional appointments from Commissioner to Chairman to prevent Commissioners from kowtowing to the appointing power in the hope of being promoted to Chairman. It is more likely that a Commissioner would want to be promoted to Chairman than to be reappointed to the same position as Commissioner.
Third, the framers of the Constitution repeated the words without reappointment in the second sentence of Section 1(2) of Article IX-D precisely to prohibit promotional appointments from Commissioner to Chairman. The framers expressly rejected Visarra, in particular the concurring opinion of Justice Bautista, which construed the counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution as allowing promotional appointments. For the Court to now allow promotional appointments is to utterly disregard the clear language of the Constitution, grossly ignore the clear intent of the framers, and wantonly rewrite the Constitution in the process destroying the independence of the constitutional commissions.
To repeat, the Constitution prohibits reappointment of any kind, including the promotional appointment of a Commissioner to the position of Chairman. Whether the promoted Commissioners term will or will not exceed seven years, or will be exactly seven years, is irrelevant. The constitutional prohibition on any kind of reappointment still applies to any promotional appointment.
The appointment or designation to the COA
in a temporary or acting capacity is prohibited.
Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the Constitution expressly prohibits appointments or designations in a temporary or acting capacity. The last sentence of Section 1(2) states: In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Yet, after COA Chairman Guillermo Caragues (Chairman Carague) term of office expired, Villar was appointed as acting chairman from 4 February 2008 to 4 April 2008, in violation of this express constitutional prohibition. Clearly, Villars designation as temporary or acting COA Chairman was unconstitutional. This Court must declare such appointment unconstitutional to prevent a recurrence of temporary or acting appointments to the independent constitutional commissions.
Term versus Tenure
On several occasions, the Court had clarified the distinction between term and tenure. The term of office is the period when an elected officer or appointee is entitled to perform the functions of the office and enjoy its privileges and emoluments.14 The term is fixed by statute and it does not change simply because the office may have become vacant for some time, or because the incumbent holds over in office beyond the end of the term due to the fact that a successor has not been elected and has failed to qualify.15 In the case of the independent constitutional commissions, the Constitution not only fixes the terms of office but also staggers the terms of office with a fixed common starting date, which is the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution.16
On the other hand, tenure is the period during which the incumbent actually holds the office. In length of time, tenure may be as long as, or longer or shorter than, the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.17 The phrase actually holds office means the discharge of the duties of the office after due appointment and qualification.18
The term of office of the Chairman and Commissioners of the COA is fixed by the Constitution at seven years, except for the first appointees. Villar was appointed Commissioner for a term of seven years, but served only four years, which is his actual tenure. His four-year tenure as Commissioner cannot be tacked on to the term of office of Chairman for two reasons: first, it will give him a tenure of more than seven years, and second, crossing from one line of succession to another is prohibited.
This Court cannot also uphold Villars appointment as Chairman for a term of three years because the Constitution specifically says that the term of office shall be seven years if the predecessors term has expired, as in the case of Villars predecessor, Chairman Carague. If the appointee is replacing a predecessor with an unexpired term, as in the case of Villars successor, Commissioner Evelyn San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura), then the appointees term of office shall be such unexpired term.
The President has no power to appoint a Chairman for less than a seven-year term in place of a predecessor whose full term has expired. To repeat, the Constitution expressly mandates that the Chairman shall be appointed by the President x x x for a term of seven years x x x. Thus, apart from the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, Villars appointment as Chairman for a three-year term is in itself unconstitutional for violation of the mandated fixed seven-year term prescribed by the Constitution.
To this, the ponencia agrees:
[T]he promotional appointment of Villar ending on February 2, 2011 constitutes [an] infringement of Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, hence, void because the President is only authorized to appoint the new chairman to a full term of seven (7) years when the vacancy is created by the expiration of the term of the predecessor.
Rationale behind the staggering of terms
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, explained the rationale for the staggering of terms of members of the three independent constitutional commissions:
In prescribing that the term of each Commissioner shall be seven years but that of the Commissioners first appointed, three shall hold office for seven years, three for five years, and the last three for three years, the result achieved is that at any one time only three Commissioners (of the three independent constitutional commissions) retire together. Continuity in the body is thus achieved. Moreover, it makes it unlikely that all the Commissioners at any one time are appointees of the same President.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Under the staggering of terms, there will be a vacancy in the COA only once every two years arising from the expiration of terms of office. No two vacancies will occur at the same time arising from the expiration of terms.
There are two reasons for staggering the terms of office of the members of the constitutional commissions. First is to ensure the continuity of the body. For the COA, this means that at any given time, there will always be at least two members barring death, resignation, or impeachment in the meantime discharging the functions of the COA.
Second, staggering of terms ensures that the same President will not appoint all the three members of the COA, unless the unexpected happens i.e., when vacancies arise out of death, resignation, or impeachment. This is necessary to safeguard the independence of the COA. This staggering of terms mandated by the Constitution must be observed by the President as the appointing authority. It is the duty of this Court to ensure that this constitutional mandate is followed.
Villars appointment as Chairman violates
the staggering of terms mandated by the Constitution.
Villar insists that, since he is replacing Carague who has served his full seven-year term, he (Villar) must also be given a full seven-year term despite his four-year tenure as Commissioner. Villar justifies his stance by claiming that his appointment as Chairman is to a totally different and distinct office.
This is outright error without any basis under the Constitution, law or jurisprudence. The Court cannot uphold Villars appointment as Chairman without wreaking havoc on the constitutionally mandated staggering of terms or rotational system in the terms of office of the Chairman and Commissioners of the COA.
In Republic v. Imperial,20 the Court held that the staggering of terms, taken together with the prescribed term of office,21 without reappointment, evidences a deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the commission, by having subsequent members appointable only once every three years.22
The term of former Chairman Carague was from 2 February 2001 to 2 February 2008. Since Chairman Carague served his full seven-year term, whoever was appointed to replace him should have been given a full seven-year term, or from 2 February 2008 until 2 February 2015. However, since Villar was already a Commissioner for four years, he could not be given a full seven-year term because then he would serve the COA for more than seven years. Thus, Villar was given a term of only three years as Chairman, with the justification that Villar carried with him his seven-year term as Commissioner.
The minority views Villars appointment thus:
[I]n 2008, Chairman Caragues term expired. Again, either Commissioner may be promoted or upgraded to the position of chairman with the condition that they would only serve his or her remaining term. And this is exactly what happened to Commissioner Villar when President Arroyo promoted him as chairman. This time, an outsider to be appointed should have a full seven-year term because he or she was not filling in an unexpired term of a member but was in fact replacing one whose term had expired. By this scheme, San Buenaventura would not have been appointed to the unexpired portion of then Commissioner Villar[s term] as the latter carried with him his seven-year term. San Buenaventura or any outsider should have been appointed to a full seven-year term. (Emphasis supplied)
The minority insists that in the case of San Buenaventura, she should have been considered a replacement of [Chairman] Carague and should have been appointed for a term of seven years. The minority rationalizes that San Buenaventura replaced Chairman Carague, not Villar, because at that time Villar was still a commissioner, albeit a chairman.
It is undeniable that Villar resigned as Commissioner on the fourth year of his seven-year term before his term expired. It is also undeniable that San Buenaventura was appointed Commissioner to replace Villar for the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner. It is further undeniable that Villar was appointed Chairman to replace Chairman Carague whose term had expired.
To appoint San Buenaventura as Commissioner with the seven-year term of the Chairman, instead of the unexpired term of her predecessor Villar, is to cross the lines of succession. The minoritys view would have the lines of succession crossed twice the first, when Villar carried with him his seven-year term, and the second, when San Buenaventura should have been given a full seven-year term for actually replacing an expired term of Chairman G. Carague. To hold that San Buenaventura replaced Chairman Carague because Villar was still a member, albeit a chairman is to hold that Villar held simultaneously two positions that of Commissioner and Chairman, in itself a constitutionally anomalous situation. And if indeed Villar held both positions simultaneously, then there would have been no vacancy and San Buenaventura could not have been appointed to replace Villar as Commissioner. The minority is caught in a tangled web of ridiculous self-contradictions and inconsistencies.
The minority further holds that the appointment of San Buenaventura to serve up to 2 February 2011 only disrupted the rotational cycle. On the contrary, appointing San Buenaventura to a full term of seven-years or up to 2 February 2015 would mean that her term would expire simultaneously with the expiration of the term of the Chairman on 2 February 2015. This would disrupt the constitutional rotation cycle of one vacancy every two years, with no two vacancies occurring at the same time.
With Villars resignation as Commissioner and appointment as Chairman, the only vacancy left, with its corresponding unexpired term, was for the office of Commissioner vacated by Villar. Hence, San Buenaventura was appointed Commissioner in place of the resigned Villar. When Villar resigned as Commissioner, the third sentence of Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the Constitution applied that appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
Thus, San Buenaventura merely assumed the unexpired term of the resigned Villar. Giving San Buenaventura the seven-year term of the vacancy arising from the expiration of Chairman Caragues term is crossing the lines of succession, which even the minority agrees is prohibited by the Constitution.
The fact is the full seven-year term applies to whoever replaces Chairman Carague because he or she will not be filling an unexpired term but will be replacing one whose term has expired. Apart from the prohibition on reappointment, another reason why no incumbent Commissioner could be promoted to Chairman to replace Chairman Carague, whose term had expired, is that whoever is appointed must be given a full seven-year term as fixed by express command of the Constitution. A promotional appointment of an incumbent Commissioner to succeed Chairman Carague will automatically make the appointees term exceed seven years. The President has no discretion to give the appointee a shorter term to avoid breaching the maximum seven-year term. The term of office is fixed by the Constitution, not by the President.
To allow Villar to take the position of Chairman without exceeding the maximum seven-year term, the minority had to justify that Villar brought with him his term of office as Commissioner into his term as Chairman. However, Villar could not have carried with him his seven-year term as Commissioner because there must be no crossing of lines as expressed in the constitutional provision that appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. The remainder of Villars term was actually left in his line of succession as Commissioner and, in fact, given to a new Commissioner, San Buenaventura. There is no denying that Villars appointment as Chairman crossed the lines of succession, disrupted the rotational scheme, and breached the prohibition on reappointment, a prohibition that clearly includes promotional appointments. Hence, Villars appointment as Chairman with a term of three years has no legal basis at all.
The minority brushes aside the stark fact that promotion disturbs the staggering of terms or rotational scheme of appointment. If a Commissioner, who has already served part of his or her seven-year term, is appointed Chairman and brings with him or her the remainder of his or her term as Commissioner, the regular rotational scheme of appointment is immediately thrown into chaos.
As this case clearly shows, the rotational scheme of appointment is an integral element of the constitutionally mandated structure of the Constitutional Commissions. To ignore it is to invite exactly the kind of problems posed in this case.
To illustrate, the lines of succession and terms of office of the Chairman and Commissioners of the COA which have been observed since 2 February 1987 until Villars appointment in 2008 are as follows:
|
Chairman |
Commissioner I |
Commissioner II |
|
February 2, 1987 to February 2, 1994 (7-year original term) |
February 2, 1987 to February 2, 1992 (5-year original term) |
February 2, 1987 to February 2, 1990 (3-year original term) |
|
February 2, 1994 to February 2, 2001 |
February 2, 1992 to February 2, 1999 |
February 2, 1990 to February 2, 1997 |
|
February 2, 2001 to February 2, 2008 |
February 2, 1999 to February 2, 2006 |
February 2, 1997 to February 2, 2004 |
|
February 2, 2008 to February 2, 2015 |
February 2, 2006 to February 2, 2013 |
February 2, 2004 to February 2, 2011 |
As shown above, every two years a single vacancy arises due to the expiration of the term of office of a COA member. No two such vacancies occur at the same time.
However, with Villars appointment, what actually happened is this:
|
Chairman |
Commissioner I |
Commissioner II |
|
Teofisto Guingona23/Eufemio Domingo24/Pascacio Banaria25 February 2, 1987 to February 2, 1994 (7-year original term)26 |
Bartolome Fernandez February 2, 1987 to February 2, 1992 (5-year original term) |
Eufemio Domingo27/Alberto Cruz February 2, 1987 to February 2, 1990 (3-year original term) |
|
Celso Gangan28 February 2, 1994 to February 2, 2001 |
Sofronio Ursal February 2, 1992 to February 2, 1999 |
Rogelio Espiritu February 2, 1990 to February 2, 1997 |
|
Guillermo Carague February 2, 2001 to February 2, 2008 |
Emmanuel Dalman February 2, 1999 to February 2, 2006 |
Raul Flores February 2, 1997 to February 2, 2004 |
|
Villar February 2, 2008 to February 2, 2011 |
Juanito Espino February 2, 2006 to February 2, 2013 |
Villar February 2, 2004 to February 2, 2008 San Buenaventura February 2, 2008 to February 2, 2011 |
|
Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan29 February 2, 2011 to February 2, 2015 |
February 2, 2013 to February 2, 2020 |
Heidi Mendoza30 February 2, 2011 to February 2, 2018 |
Immediately apparent is the occurrence of two vacancies at the same time, namely, the expiration of San Buenaventuras term on 2 February 2011 and the expiration of Villars term also on the same date. This is contrary to the staggering of terms where only one vacancy occurs every two years as a result of the expiration of the terms of office.
Likewise immediately apparent is the fact that incumbent COA Chairman Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan an outsider, or one without any prior term within the COA is given a term of office of only four years. This is contrary to Section 1(2) of Article IX-D, which states that the Chairman and Commissioners of the COA shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years. The incumbent Chairs abbreviated term, however, is the result of Villars reappointment as Chairman, for if incumbent Chairman Pulido-Tan is given a full seven-year term as prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, her term would end at the same time as Commissioner Mendoza and the staggering of terms or rotational scheme of succession would be disrupted again.
The disruptive effect of Villars appointment is making itself obvious it forced the incumbent President to appoint a new Chairman to a term shorter than that mandated by the Constitution, if only to restore things in their proper rotational scheme. Even the minority concedes that the incumbent President has brought sanity and order to the otherwise disruptive appointments made by the former appointing power in the case of Villar and San Buenaventura. Moreover, Villars promotion as Chairman and San Buenaventuras appointment as Commissioner, with their terms ending on the same date, further disrupted the constitutional scheme of staggering the members terms of office.
In every case that a Commissioner of the COA or of any of the other constitutional commissions for that matter is promoted to Chairman and brings with him or her the unexpired portion of his or her term, the same disruption in the constitutional rotation scheme will happen. This was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution, and this is not what the clear language of the 1987 Constitution mandates.
The only way to prevent another insane, disorderly and disruptive appointment from happening again is to affirm that a promotion from Commissioner to Chairman is expressly prohibited by the 1987 Constitution, as clearly intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, and as specifically written in Section 1(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution added the words without reappointment twice in Section 1(2) of Article IX-D precisely to remove any doubt whatsoever that the prohibition applies to any reappointment of any kind, categorically rejecting the Visarra ruling, in particular the concurring opinion of Justice Bautista, that allowed a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman.
What then do we make of Villars promotional appointment to a three-year term as COA Chairman? To stress the obvious, it is nothing but a blatant, barefaced violation of the 1987 Constitution that must be frankly characterized for what it is grossly and manifestly unconstitutional.
The ponencia posits:
[A]ppointment to the COA, by express constitutional fiat, shall be for a term of seven (7) years, save when the appointment is to fill up a vacancy for the corresponding unserved term of an outgoing commissioner. x x x Should the vacancy arise out of the expiration of the term of the incumbent, then there is technically no unexpired portion to speak of. The vacancy is for a fresh 7-year term and, ergo, the appointment thereto shall in all instances be for seven (7) years.
Further, the ponencia asserts:
The word reappointment means a second appointment to one and the same office; and Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-D of the 1987 Constitution and similar provisions does not peremptorily prohibit the promotional appointment of a commissioner to chairman, provided the new appointees tenure in both capacities does not exceed seven (7) years in all.
Following the ponencias assertions, a Commissioner, with two years left to serve in the COA, can be promoted to Chairman to fill an unexpired portion of three years, following the death, resignation or impeachment of the Chairman. This appointment, according to the ponencia, will not violate the constitutional prohibition because the promoted member will not be serving more than seven years in the COA.
There are, however, fundamental errors in the ponencias premise.
First, as already previously discussed, a promotion is a reappointment prohibited by the Constitution. The ban on reappointment applies to any kind of appointment, including a promotional appointment.
Second, a promotional appointment violates the constitutional directive that all appointments shall be for a full seven-year term, except when the appointee is filling the unexpired term of a member who died, resigned or was impeached.
Third, there will be a disruption of the rotational scheme of succession if a promotional appointment is issued to fill an unexpired term of a Chairman.
To illustrate, a Commissioner, who has served two years, is promoted to Chairman upon the resignation of the Chairman who served only for one year. The new Chairman will serve a full seven-year term, counted from the time he was appointed as Commissioner. This means that the new Chairman will be appointed as Chairman for only five years; otherwise, he will serve for more than seven years. After he has served for seven years, the Chairman will mandatorily retire from the Commission. When he retires, he will leave one year in the Chairmans term of office, based on the dates set under the rotational scheme of succession, which is fixed starting on the date of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. In order not to disturb the rotational scheme of succession, any appointment to replace the retired Chairman must be for only one year. However, such appointment will violate the constitutional provision that the Chairman x x x shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years x x x when the term of the predecessor has expired. In short, since the term of the retired Chairman has already expired, he leaves no unexpired term of his own since he served for seven years, and
his successor must be given a full seven-year term. However, appointing a successor for a term of seven years will disturb the rotational scheme of succession. Either way, there will be a violation of the requirement that upon the expiration of a predecessors term the appointment of a successor shall be for a full term of seven years, or a violation of the rotational scheme of succession as envisioned in the Constitution.
To repeat, any appointment of more than the unexpired term will immediately disturb the rotational scheme of succession and violate the Constitution. Similarly, any appointment of less than seven years since the predecessors term has already expired will violate the constitutional requirement that the appointment shall be for a full seven-year term if the predecessor has fully served his seven-year term.
Finally, the minority posits so-called guidelines for future appointments in the Constitutional Commissions to maintain the rotational scheme of succession as mandated by the Constitution. The minority prescribes, among others, that commissioners may be promoted or upgraded to the position of chairman, but they must maintain or keep their original seven-year term with them. This guideline, however, ipso facto destroys the rotational scheme of succession. One needs only to reexamine the facts of this case to find a crystal clear illustration of how the guidelines that the minority prescribes, in fact, contradict the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
When Commissioner Villar was promoted as Chairman, and carried with him the remainder of his original seven-year term as argued by the minority, there was immediate disruption to the rotational scheme of
succession. Since he could not be given a full seven-year term, as was proper since he was succeeding a Chairman whose term had expired, his term as Chairman would end in the middle of the term mandated by the rotational scheme of succession under the Constitution. Hence, whoever is appointed to succeed Villar will also be appointed in the middle of the mandated term. If Villars successor is given a full seven-year term, his or her term will cut into the next successors term, and the same cycle will continue ad infinitum, until the whole scheme of rotational succession in the Chairmans line is entirely lost.
The dates when the terms of office start and end never change, even when an appointment is made in mid-term. This is the reason why someone appointed to replace a Chairman or Commissioner, who leaves office before the end of the term, can only be appointed to the remainder of that term known as the unexpired portion of the term to preserve the rotational cycle of succession. Neither the President nor this Court can change these dates.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the bible of this Court. Every member of this Court has taken an oath to defend and protect the Constitution. This Court must apply and interpret the Constitution faithfully without fear or favor. This Court must not twist or distort the letter and intent of the Constitution to favor anyone, for the Constitution is larger and far more important than any party, personality, group or institution in this country. The safeguards to ensure the independence of the constitutional commissions, as designed and written in the Constitution, are vital to the survival of our democracy and the development of our nation. It is the sacred duty of this Court to preserve and maintain these safeguards.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Reynaldo A. Villars appointment as Acting Chairman, and as Chairman, of the Commission on Audit, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
1 Section 24(5), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
2 Id.
3The 1963 case of Visarra v. Miraflor (118 Phil. 1) was decided under the 1935 Constitution, specifically, Section 1, Article X:
Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other Members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office for nine years, another for six years, and the third for three years. The Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on Elections may be removed from office only by impeachment in the manner provided in this Constitution.
The Court upheld the appointment of then incumbent Commission on Elections (Comelec) Commissioner Gaudencio Garcia to succeed Chairman Jose P. Carag, whose nine-year term had expired. Justice Angelo Bautista in his concurring opinion wrote:
[T]o hold that the promotion of an Associate Commissioner to Chairman is banned by the Constitution merely by judicial fiat would be to relegate a member forever to his position as such without hope of enjoying the privileges incident to the chairmanship while giving a premium to an outsider who may be less deserving except probably his political ascendancy because of his lack of experience on the mechanics of that delicate and important position x x x its effect is to stimulate hard work, greater zeal and increased efficiency for a member in the hope that his efforts would someday be regarded with a promotion. The contrary would relegate him to apathy, indifference, hopelessness and inaction. It is never a good policy to stultify ones legitimate ambition to betterment and progress.
4Record of Proceedings and Debate of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 591.
5Record of Proceedings and Debate of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 586.
6Id.
7This took place on the Constitutional Commissions 15 July 1986 session. At that same session, but subsequent to the discussion among Commissioners Monsod, Aquino, and Foz, was the discussion on Commissioner Davides proposal for a perfecting amendment to line 29, Section 2 (2), cited previously. (Record of Proceedings and Debate of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, pp. 586 and 591.) Taken together, these discussions show the deliberate intent of the framers of the Constitution to prohibit reappointments of any kind, including promotions from Commissioner to Chairman.
8Supra note 4.
9 Supra note 3 at 34-38.
10 Supra note 3 at 35.
11429 Phil. 554 (2002).
12Id. at 596.
13Id. at 597, 598, 600.
14Casibang v. Aquino, 181 Phil. 181, 190 (1979).
15Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Africa, G.R. No. 151969, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 202, 210.
16Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, 401 Phil. 77, 88-89 (2000).
17Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 22 (1946).
18See the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Roberto Concepcion in Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364, 385 (1956).
19Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 929.
2096 Phil. 770 (1955).
21Seven years under the 1987 Constitution, nine years under the 1935 Constitution.
22Republic v. Imperial, supra.
23Guingona was appointed COA Chairman on 10 March 1986, prior to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and served in that capacity until March 1987.
24Appointed COA Chairman in March 1987 and served in that capacity until April 1993.
25Appointed COA Chairman in April 1993 and served in that capacity until February 1994.
26The Court explained in the case of Gaminde v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 140335, 13 December 2000) that the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms and therefore, the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
27Domingo was appointed COA Commissioner in April 1986 and served in that capacity until he was appointed Chairman in March 1987.
28Gangan was appointed Chairman on 3 February 1994.
29Per the Official Gazette, Ma. Gracia M. Pulido-Tan was appointed COA Chairperson on 10 June 2011, for a term expiring on 02 February 2015 <http://www.gov.ph/2011/06/10/appointments-and-designations-june-10-2011/> (visited 22 July 2011)
30Per the Official Gazette, Heidi L. Mendoza was appointed COA Commissioner on 10 June 2011, for a term expiring on 02 February 2018 <http://www.gov.ph/2011/06/10/appointments-and-designations-june-10-2011/> (visited 22 July 2011)