Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
ESTELITA VILLAMAR, Petitioner,
- versus - BALBINO MANGAOIL, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 188661 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: April 11, 2012 |
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a
petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by Estelita Villamar (Villamar) to assail the Decision[2] rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
February 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86286, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision
is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The resolution[4]
issued by the CA on July 8, 2009 denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration to the foregoing.
The ruling[5] of
Branch 23, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela, which was affirmed by
the CA in the herein assailed decision and resolution, ordered the (1)
rescission of the contract of sale of real property entered into by Villamar and
Balbino Mangaoil (Mangaoil); and (2) return of the down payment made relative
to the said contract.
Antecedents Facts
The CA aptly summarized as follows the
facts of the case prior to the filing by Mangaoil of the complaint[6]
for rescission of contract before the RTC:
Villamar is the registered owner of a 3.6080 hectares parcel of
land [hereinafter referred as the subject property] in
1. The price of the land is ONE HUNDRED AND
EIGHTY THOUSAND (180,000.00) PESOS per hectare but only the 3.5000 hec. shall
be paid and the rest shall be given free, so that the total purchase or selling
price shall be [P]630,000.00 only;
2. ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND (185,000.00) PESOS of the total price was
already received on March 27, 1998 for payment of the loan secured by the
certificate of title covering the land in favor of the Rural Bank of Cauayan,
San Manuel Branch, San Manuel, Isabela [Rural Bank of Cauayan], in order that
the certificate of title thereof be withdrawn and released from the said bank,
and the rest shall be for the payment of the mortgag[e]s
in favor of Romeo Lacaden and Florante Parangan;
3. After
the release of the certificate of title covering the land subject-matter of
this agreement, the necessary deed of
absolute sale in favor of the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART shall be executed
and the transfer be immediately effected so that the latter can apply for a
loan from any lending institution using the corresponding certificate of title
as collateral therefor, and the proceeds of the loan, whatever be the
amount, be given to the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART;
4. Whatever
balance left from the agreed purchase price of the land subject matter hereof
after deducting the proceed of the loan and the [P]185,000.00 already received as above-mentioned, the PARTY
OF THE SECOND PART shall pay unto the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART not later than June
30, 1998 and thereafter the parties shall be released of any obligations
for and against each other; xxx
On April 1, 1998, the parties executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale whereby Villamar (then Estelita Bernabe)
transferred the subject parcel of land to Mangaoil for and in consideration of [P]150,000.00.
In a letter dated September 18, 1998, Mangaoil
informed Villamar that he was backing out from the sale agreed upon giving as
one of the reasons therefor:
3.
That the area is not yet fully cleared by incumbrances as there are tenants who
are not willing to vacate the land without giving them back the amount that
they mortgaged the land.
Mangaoil
demanded refund of his [P]185,000.00 down payment. Reiterating said demand in another letter
dated April 29, 1999, the same, however, was unheeded.[7] x x x (Citations
omitted)
On January 28, 2002, the respondent filed before the RTC a
complaint[8]
for rescission of contract against the petitioner. In the said complaint, the
respondent sought the return of P185,000.00 which he paid to the petitioner,
payment of interests thereon to be computed from March 27, 1998 until the
suit's termination, and the award of damages, costs and P20,000.00
attorney's fees. The respondent's factual allegations were as follows:
5. That as could be
gleaned the Agreement (Annex A), the plaintiff [Mangaoil] handed to the
defendant [Villamar] the sum of [P]185,000.00 to be applied as follows; [P]80,000 was for the
redemption of the land which was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Cauayan, San
Manuel Branch, San Manuel, Isabela, to enable the plaintiff to get hold of the title and register the sale x x x and [P]105,000.00 was for the redemption of the said land from
private mortgages to enable plaintiff to posses[s] and cultivate the same;
6. That although the
defendant had already long redeemed the said land from the said bank and
withdrawn TCT No. T-92958-A, she has failed and refused, despite repeated
demands, to hand over the said title to the plaintiff and still refuses and
fails to do so;
7. That, also, the plaintiff
could not physically, actually and materially posses[s] and cultivate the said
land because the private mortgage[e]s and/or present possessors refuse to
vacate the same;
x x x x
11. That on September
18, 1998, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant demanding a return of
the amount so advanced by him, but the latter ignored the same, x x x;
12. That, again, on
April 29, 1999, the plaintiff sent to the defendant another demand letter but
the latter likewise ignored the same, x x x;
13. That, finally,
the plaintiff notified the defendant by a notarial act of his desire and
intention to rescind the said contract of sale, xxx;
x x x x.[9]
(Citations omitted)
In the respondents
answer to the complaint, she averred that she had complied with her obligations
to the respondent. Specifically, she claimed having caused the release of TCT
No. T-92958-A by the Rural Bank of Cauayan and its delivery to a certain Atty.
Pedro C. Antonio (Atty. Antonio). The petitioner alleged that Atty. Antonio
was commissioned to facilitate the transfer of the said title in the respondent's
name. The petitioner likewise insisted that it was the respondent who
unceremoniously withdrew from their agreement for reasons only the latter knew.
The Ruling of the RTC
On September 9,
2005, the RTC ordered the rescission of the agreement and the deed of absolute
sale executed between the respondent and the petitioner. The petitioner was,
thus directed to return to the respondent the sum of P185,000.00
which the latter tendered as initial payment for the purchase of the subject
property. The RTC ratiocinated that:
There is no dispute that the
defendant sold the LAND to the plaintiff for [P]630,000.00 with down
payment of [P]185,000.00. There is no evidence presented if there were any
other partial payments made after the perfection of the contract of sale.
Article
1458 of the Civil Code provides:
Art.
1458. By the contract of sale[,] one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and
the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.
As
such, in a contract of sale, the obligation of the vendee to pay the price is
correlative of the obligation of the vendor to deliver the thing sold. It
created or established at the same time, out of the same course, and which
result in mutual relations of creditor and debtor between the parties.
The
claim of the plaintiff that the LAND has not been delivered to him was not
refuted by the defendant. Considering that defendant failed to deliver to him
the certificate of title and of the possession over the LAND to the plaintiff,
the contract must be rescinded pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code
which, in part, provides:
Art. 1191. The power of rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.[10]
The petitioner filed
before the CA an appeal to challenge the foregoing. She ascribed error on the
part of the RTC when the latter ruled that the agreement and deed of sale
executed by and between the parties can be rescinded as she failed to deliver
to the respondent both the subject property and the certificate of title
covering the same.
The Ruling of the CA
On February 20,
2009, the CA rendered the now assailed decision dismissing the petitioners
appeal based on the following grounds:
Burden of proof is the duty
of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the defendant if he
alleges, in his answer, an affirmative defense, which is not a denial of an
essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but is one which, if
established, will be a good defense i.e., an avoidance of the claim,
which prima facie, the plaintiff already has because of the defendant's
own admissions in the pleadings.
Defendant-appellant
Villamar's defense in this case was an affirmative defense. She did not deny
plaintiff-appellees allegation that she had an agreement with
plaintiff-appellee for the sale of the subject parcel of land. Neither did she
deny that she was obliged under the contract to deliver the certificate of
title to plaintiff-appellee immediately after said title/property was redeemed
from the bank. What she rather claims is that she already complied with her
obligation to deliver the title to plaintiff-appellee when she delivered the
same to Atty. Antonio as it was plaintiff-appellee himself who engaged the
services of said lawyer to precisely work for the immediate transfer of said
title in his name. Since, however, this affirmative defense as alleged in
defendant-appellant's answer was not admitted by plaintiff-appellee, it then
follows that it behooved the defendant-appellant to prove her averments
by preponderance of evidence.
Yet,
a careful perusal of the record shows that the defendant-appellant failed to
sufficiently prove said affirmative defense. She failed to prove that in
the first place, Atty. Antonio existed to receive the title for and in
behalf of plaintiff-appellee. Worse, the defendant-appellant failed to
prove that Atty. Antonio received said title as allegedly agreed
upon.
We
likewise sustain the RTC's finding that defendant-appellant V[i]llamar failed to deliver
possession of the subject property to plaintiff-appellee Mangaoil. As
correctly observed by the RTC - [t]he claim of the plaintiff that the land has
not been delivered to him was not refuted by the defendant. Not only that. On
cross-examination, the defendant-appellant gave Us insight on why no such
delivery could be made, viz.:
x x x x
Q: So, you were not able to deliver this
property to Mr. Mangaoil just after you redeem the property because of the
presence of these two (2) persons, is it not?
x x x
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Forcing you to file the case against
them and which according to you, you have won, is it not?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And now at present[,] you are in
actual possession of the land?
A: Yes, sir. x x x
With
the foregoing judicial admission, the RTC could not have erred in
finding that defendant-[appellant] failed to deliver the possession of the
property sold, to plaintiff-appellee.
Neither can We agree with
defendant-appellant in her argument that the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale by the parties is already equivalent to a valid and constructive
delivery of the property to plaintiff-appellee. Not only is it
doctrinally settled that in a contract of sale, the vendor is bound to
transfer the ownership of, and to deliver the thing that is the object of the
sale, the way Article 1547 of the Civil Code is worded, viz.:
Art. 1547. In a contract of sale,
unless a contrary intention appears, there is:
(1) An implied warranty on the
part of the seller that he has a right to sell the thing at the time when
the ownership is to pass, and that the buyer shall from that time have and
enjoy the legal and peaceful possession of the thing;
(2)
An implied warranty that the thing shall be free from any hidden defaults
or defects, or any change or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer.
x x x.
shows
that actual, and not mere
constructive delivery is warrantied by the seller to the buyer. (P)eaceful
possession of the thing sold can hardly be enjoyed in a mere constructive
delivery.
The
obligation of defendant-appellant Villamar to transfer ownership and deliver
possession of the subject parcel of land was her correlative obligation to plaintiff-appellee in exchange for the latter's
purchase price thereof. Thus, if she fails to comply with what is incumbent
upon her, a correlative right to rescind such contract from plaintiff-appellee
arises, pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code.[11]
x x x (Citations omitted)
The Issues
Aggrieved, the
petitioner filed before us the instant petition and submits the following
issues for resolution:
I.
WHETHER
THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER-SELLER TO DELIVER THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OVER THE
PROPERTY TO RESPONDENT-BUYER IS A BREACH OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT OF
II.
WHETHER
PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT OF
III.
WHETHER
THE EXECUTION OF A DEED OF
IV.
WHETHER
OR NOT THE CONTRACT OF
V.
WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RTC ORDERING
THE RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT OF
The Petitioner's Arguments
The petitioner avers
that the CA, in ordering the rescission of the agreement and deed of sale,
which she entered into with the respondent, on the basis of her alleged failure
to deliver the certificate of title, effectively imposed upon her an extra duty
which was neither stipulated in the contract nor required by law. She argues
that under Articles 1495[13]
and 1496[14]
of the New Civil Code (NCC), the obligation to deliver the thing sold is
complied with by a seller who executes in favor of a buyer an instrument of
sale in a public document. Citing Chua v. Court of Appeals,[15]
she claims that there is a distinction between transferring a certificate of
title in the buyer's name, on one hand, and transferring ownership over the
property sold, on the other. The latter can be accomplished by the seller's execution of an
instrument of sale in a public document. The recording of the sale with the
Registry of Deeds and the transfer of the certificate of title in the buyer's
name are necessary only to bind third parties to the transfer of ownership.[16]
The petitioner
contends that in her case, she had already complied with her obligations under
the agreement and the law when she had caused the release of TCT No. T-92958-A
from the Rural Bank of Cauayan, paid individual mortgagees Romeo Lacaden
(Lacaden) and Florante Parangan (Paranga), and executed an absolute deed of
sale in the respondent's favor. She adds that before T-92958-A can be cancelled
and a new one be issued in the respondent's favor, the latter decided to
withdraw from their agreement. She also points out that in the letters seeking
for an outright rescission of their agreement sent to her by the respondent,
not once did he demand for the delivery of TCT.
The petitioner
insists that the respondent's change of heart was due to (1) the latter's
realization of the difficulty in determining the subject property's perimeter
boundary; (2) his doubt that the property he purchased would yield harvests in
the amount he expected; and (3) the presence of mortgagees who were not willing
to give up possession without first being paid the amounts due to them. The
petitioner contends that the actual reasons for the respondent's intent to
rescind their agreement did not at all constitute a substantial breach of her
obligations.
The petitioner
stresses that under Article 1498 of the NCC, when a sale is made through a
public instrument, its execution is equivalent to the delivery of the thing
which is the contract's object, unless in the deed, the contrary appears or can
be inferred. Further, in Power Commercial and Industrial Corporation v. CA,[17]
it was ruled that the failure of a seller to eject lessees from the property he
sold and to deliver actual and physical possession, cannot be considered a
substantial breach, when such failure was not stipulated as a resolutory or
suspensive condition in the contract and when the effects and consequences of
the said failure were not specified as well. The execution of a deed of sale
operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and it already
authorizes the buyer to use the instrument as proof of ownership.[18]
The petitioner
argues that in the case at bar, the agreement and the absolute deed of sale
contains no stipulation that she was obliged to actually and physically deliver
the subject property to the respondent. The respondent fully knew Lacaden's and
Parangan's possession of the subject property. When they agreed on the sale of
the property, the respondent consciously assumed the risk of not being able to
take immediate physical possession on account of Lacaden's and Parangan's
presence therein.
The petitioner likewise laments
that the CA allegedly misappreciated the evidence offered before it when it
declared that she failed to prove the existence of Atty. Antonio. For the
record, she emphasizes that the said lawyer prepared and notarized the
agreement and deed of absolute sale which were executed between the parties. He
was also the petitioners counsel in the proceedings before the RTC. Atty.
Antonio was also the one asked by the respondent to cease the transfer of the
title over the subject property in the latter's name and to return the money he
paid in advance.
The Respondent's Contentions
In the respondent's comment,[19] he
seeks the dismissal of the instant petition. He invokes Articles 1191 and 1458 to argue that when a seller fails to transfer the
ownership and possession of a property sold, the buyer is entitled to rescind
the contract of sale. Further, he contends that the execution of a deed of
absolute sale does not necessarily amount to a valid and constructive delivery.
In Masallo v. Cesar,[20]
it was ruled that a person who does not have actual possession of real property
cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a
public document by which the title to the land is transferred. In Addison v.
Felix and Tioco,[21]
the Court was emphatic that symbolic delivery by the execution of a public
instrument is equivalent to actual delivery only when the thing sold is subject
to the control of the vendor.
Our Ruling
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
There is only a
single issue for resolution in the instant petition, to wit, whether or not the
failure of the petitioner to deliver to the respondent both the physical
possession of the subject property and the certificate of title covering the
same amount to a substantial breach of the former's obligations to the latter
constituting a valid cause to rescind the agreement and deed of sale entered
into by the parties.
We rule in the affirmative.
The RTC and the CA both found that the petitioner failed to comply
with her obligations to deliver to the respondent both the possession of the
subject property and the certificate of title covering the same.
Although Articles 1458, 1495 and 1498 of the NCC and case law do
not generally require the seller to deliver to the buyer the physical
possession of the property subject of a contract of sale and the certificate of
title covering the same, the agreement entered into by the petitioner and the
respondent provides otherwise. However, the terms of the agreement cannot be
considered as violative of law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy, hence, valid.
Article 1458 of the
NCC obliges the seller to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing to the buyer, who shall in turn pay therefor a price certain
in money or its equivalent. In addition thereto, Article 1495 of the NCC binds
the seller to warrant the thing which is the object of the sale. On the other
hand, Article 1498 of the same code provides that when the sale is made through
a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery
of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed, the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
In the case of Chua
v. Court of Appeals,[22]
which was cited by the petitioner, it was ruled that when the deed of absolute
sale is signed by the parties and notarized, then delivery of the real property
is deemed made by the seller to the buyer.[23]
The transfer of the certificate of title in the name of the buyer is not
necessary to confer ownership upon him.
In the case now
under our consideration, item nos. 2 and 3 of the agreement entered into by the
petitioner and the respondent explicitly provide:
2. ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND (P185,000.00) PESOS
of the total price was already received
on March 27, 1998 for payment of the loan secured by the certificate of title
covering the land in favor of the Rural Bank of Cauayan, San Manuel Branch, San
Manuel, Isabela, in order that the certificate of title thereof be withdrawn
and released from the said bank, and the rest shall be for the payment of
the mortgages in favor of Romeo Lacaden and Florante Parangan;
3. After the release of
the certificate of title covering the land subject-matter of this agreement, the
necessary deed of absolute sale in favor of the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART shall
be executed and the transfer be immediately effected so that the latter can
apply for a loan from any lending institution using the corresponding
certificate of title as collateral therefor, and the proceeds of the loan,
whatever be the amount, be given to the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART;[24]
(underlining supplied)
As can be gleaned
from the agreement of the contending parties, the respondent initially paid the
petitioner P185,000.00 for the latter to pay the loan obtained from the Rural
Bank of Cauayan and to cause the release from the said bank of the certificate
of title covering the subject property. The rest of the amount shall be used to
pay the mortgages over the subject property which was executed in favor of
Lacaden and Parangan. After the release of the TCT, a deed of sale shall be
executed and transfer shall be immediately effected so that the title covering
the subject property can be used as a collateral for a loan the respondent will
apply for, the proceeds of which shall be given to the petitioner.
Under Article 1306
of the NCC, the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
While Articles 1458
and 1495 of the NCC and the doctrine enunciated in the case of Chua do
not impose upon the petitioner the obligation to physically deliver to the
respondent the certificate of title covering the subject property or cause the
transfer in the latter's name of the said title, a stipulation requiring
otherwise is not prohibited by law and cannot be regarded as violative of
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Item no. 3 of the
agreement executed by the parties expressly states that transfer [shall] be
immediately effected so that the latter can apply for a loan from any lending
institution using the corresponding certificate of title as collateral therefore.
Item no. 3 is literal enough to mean that there should be physical delivery of
the TCT for how else can the respondent use it as a collateral to obtain a loan
if the title remains in the petitioners possession. We agree with the RTC and
the CA that the petitioner failed to prove that she delivered the TCT covering
the subject property to the respondent. What the petitioner attempted to
establish was that she gave the TCT to Atty. Antonio whom she alleged was
commissioned to effect the transfer of the title in the respondent's name.
Although Atty. Antonio's existence is certain as he was the petitioners
counsel in the proceedings before the RTC, there was no proof that the former
indeed received the TCT or that he was commissioned to process the transfer of
the title in the respondent's name.
It is likewise the
petitioners contention that pursuant to Article 1498 of the NCC, she had
already complied with her obligation to deliver the subject property upon her
execution of an absolute deed of sale in the respondents favor. The petitioner
avers that she did not undertake to eject the mortgagors Parangan and Lacaden,
whose presence in the premises of the subject property was known to the
respondent.
We are not
persuaded.
In the case of Power
Commercial and Industrial Corporation[25] cited by the
petitioner, the Court ruled that the failure of the seller to eject the
squatters from the property sold cannot be made a ground for rescission if the
said ejectment was not stipulated as a condition in the contract of sale, and
when in the negotiation stage, the buyer's counsel himself undertook to eject
the illegal settlers.
The circumstances
surrounding the case now under our consideration are different. In item no. 2
of the agreement, it is stated that part of the P185,000.00 initially
paid to the petitioner shall be used to pay the mortgagors, Parangan and
Lacaden. While the provision does not expressly impose upon the petitioner the
obligation to eject the said mortgagors, the undertaking is necessarily
implied. Cessation of occupancy of the subject property is logically expected
from the mortgagors upon payment by the petitioner of the amounts due to them.
We note that in the
demand letter[26]
dated September 18, 1998, which was sent by the respondent to the petitioner,
the former lamented that the area is not yet fully cleared of incumbrances as
there are tenants who are not willing to vacate the land without giving them
back the amount that they mortgaged the land. Further, in the proceedings
before the RTC conducted after the complaint for rescission was filed, the
petitioner herself testified that she won the ejectment suit against the
mortgagors only last year.[27]
The complaint was filed on September 8, 2002 or more than four years from the
execution of the parties' agreement. This means that after the lapse of a
considerable period of time from the agreement's execution, the mortgagors
remained in possession of the subject property.
Notwithstanding the absence of
stipulations in the agreement and absolute deed of sale entered into by
Villamar and Mangaoil expressly indicating the consequences of the former's
failure to deliver the physical possession of
the subject property and the certificate of title covering the same, the latter is
entitled to demand for the rescission of their contract pursuant to Article 1191 of the NCC.
We note that the
agreement entered into by the petitioner and the respondent only contains three
items specifying the parties' undertakings. In item no. 5, the parties
consented to abide with all the terms and conditions set forth in this
agreement and never violate the same.[28]
Article 1191 of the
NCC is clear that the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal
ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon
him. The respondent cannot be deprived of his right to demand for rescission
in view of the petitioners failure to abide with item nos. 2 and 3 of the
agreement. This remains true notwithstanding the absence of express
stipulations in the agreement indicating the consequences of breaches which the
parties may commit. To hold otherwise would render Article 1191 of the NCC as
useless.
Article 1498 of the NCC generally considers the execution of a
public instrument as constructive delivery by the seller to the buyer of the
property subject of a contract of sale. The case at bar, however, falls among
the exceptions to the foregoing rule since a mere presumptive and not
conclusive delivery is created as the respondent failed to take material
possession of the subject property.
Further, even if we were to assume for argument's sake that
the agreement entered into by the contending parties does not require the
delivery of the physical possession of the subject property from the mortgagors
to the respondent, still, the petitioner's claim that her execution of an
absolute deed of sale was already sufficient as it already amounted to a constructive
delivery of the thing sold which Article 1498 of the NCC allows, cannot stand.
In Philippine Suburban Development
Corporation v. The Auditor General,[29]
we held:
When the sale of real property is made in a public
instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of the thing
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot
clearly be inferred.
In
other words, there is symbolic delivery of the property subject of the sale by
the execution of the public instrument, unless from the express terms of the
instrument, or by clear inference therefrom, this was not the intention of the
parties. Such would be the case, for instance, x x x where the vendor has no control over the thing sold at
the moment of the sale, and, therefore, its material delivery could not have
been made.[30]
(Underlining supplied and citations omitted)
Stated differently, as a general rule, the execution of a
public instrument amounts to a constructive delivery of the thing subject of a contract
of sale. However, exceptions exist, among which is when
mere presumptive and not conclusive delivery is created in cases where the
buyer fails to take material possession of the subject of sale. A person who
does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive
possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument.
In the case at bar, the
RTC and the CA found that the petitioner failed to deliver to the respondent
the possession of the subject property due to the continued presence and
occupation of Parangan and Lacaden. We find no ample reason to reverse the said
findings. Considered in the light of either the agreement entered into by the
parties or the pertinent provisions of law, the petitioner failed in her
undertaking to deliver the subject property to the respondent.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the instant petition is DENIED. The February 20, 2009
Decision and July 8, 2009 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, directing the rescission of the agreement and
absolute deed of sale entered into by Estelita Villamar and Balbino Mangaoil
and the return of the down payment made for the purchase of the subject
property, are AFFIRMED. However,
pursuant to our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA,[31]
an interest of 12% per annum is imposed on the sum of P185,000.00 to be returned
to Mangaoil to be computed from the date of
finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T
T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E
R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and
the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 26-77.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring; id. at 11-22.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Supra note 6.
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 106-107.
[11]
[12]
[13] Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.
[14] Art. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
[15] 449
Phil. 25 (2003).
[16]
[17] 340
Phil. 705 (1997).
[18]
[19] Rollo, pp. 121-123.
[20] 39 Phil. 134 (1918).
[21] 38 Phil. 404 (1918).
[22] Supra note 15.
[23]
[24] Rollo, p. 108.
[25] Supra note 17.
[26] Rollo, p. 111.
[27]
[28] Supra note 24.
[29] 159
Phil. 998 (1975).
[30]
[31] G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.