Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
Baguio City
FIRST
DIVISION
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ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG
CIVIC & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, INC., Petitioner, - versus - MEGAWORLD
PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC., WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL, in his capacity as
Director, NCR, and HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 175039 Present: VELASCO,
JR.,* LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, Acting Chairperson, BERSAMIN,
DEL
CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: April
18, 2012 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision[1]
dated May 16, 2006 as well as the Resolution[2]
dated October 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63439, entitled
ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC &
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION INC. vs. MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC.,
WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL in his capacity as Director, NCR, and HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES. In effect, the appellate courts issuances reversed
and set aside the Decision[3]
dated September 10, 1998 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 158 in Civil Case No. 65171.
The facts
of this case, as narrated in the assailed May 16, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
[Private respondent] MEGAWORLD was the registered
owner of a parcel of land located along Lee Street, Barangay Addition Hills,
Mandaluyong City with an area of 6,148 square meters, more or less, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12768, issued by the Register of Deeds
for Mandaluyong City.
Sometime
in 1994, [private respondent] MEGAWORLD conceptualized the construction of a
residential condominium complex on the said parcel of land called the Wack-Wack Heights Condominium
consisting of a cluster of six (6) four-storey buildings and one (1) seventeen
(17) storey tower.
[Private
respondent] MEGAWORLD thereafter secured the necessary clearances, licenses and
permits for the condominium project, including: (1) a CLV, issued on October
25, 1994, and a Development Permit, issued on November 11, 1994, both by the [public
respondent] HLURB; (2) an ECC, issued on March 15, 1995, by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (3) a Building Permit, issued on
February 3, 1995, by the Office of the Building Official of Mandaluyong City;
and (4) a Barangay Clearance dated September 29, 1994, from the office of the
Barangay Chairman of Addition Hills.
Thereafter,
construction of the condominium project began, but on June 30, 1995, the
plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 158, docketed as Civil Case No. 65171, for yo (sic) annul the Building Permit, CLV, ECC
and Development Permit granted to MEGAWORLD; to prohibit the issuance to
MEGAWORLD of Certificate of Registration and License to Sell Condominium Units;
and to permanently enjoin local and national building officials from issuing
licenses and permits to MEGAWORLD.
On
July 20, 1995, [private respondent] MEGAWORLD filed a Motion to Dismiss the
case for lack of cause of action and that jurisdiction over the case was with
the [public respondent] HLURB and not with the regular courts.
On
July 24, 1994, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by [private
respondent] MEGAWORLD.
On
August 3, 1995, [private respondent] MEGAWORLD filed its Answer.
On
November 15, 1995, pre-trial was commenced.
Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.[4]
The trial court rendered a Decision
dated September 10, 1998 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Certificate
of Locational Viability, the Development Permit and the Certificate of
Registration and License to Sell Condominium Units, all issued by defendant
Wilfredo I. Imperial, National Capital Region Director of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Boad (HLURB-NCR) are all declared void and of no effect. The
same goes for the Building Permit issued by defendant Francisco Mapalo of
Mandaluyong City. In turn, defendant Megaworld Properties and Holdings Inc. is
directed to rectify its Wack Wack Heights Project for it to conform to the
requirements of an R-2 zone of Mandaluyong City and of the Metro Manila Zoning
Ordinance 81-01.
Costs against these defendants.[5]
Private respondent appealed to the
Court of Appeals which issued the assailed May 16, 2006 Decision which reversed
and set aside the aforementioned trial court ruling, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 10,
1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, rendered
in Civil Case No. 65171 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
DISMISSING the complaint.[6]
As can be expected, petitioner
moved for reconsideration; however, the Court of Appeals denied the motion in
its assailed October 5, 2006 Resolution.
Hence, the petitioner filed the
instant petition and submitted the following issues for consideration:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION FROM THE COURTS.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND THAT THE CASE FILED BEFORE AND DECIDED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, BRANCH 158, DOES NOT FALL UNDER ANY ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS (The Court)
ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION FROM THE COURTS.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS (The Court)
ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE HLURB HAD JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS TO ANNUL
CERTIFICATES OF LOCATIONAL VIABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT PERMITS.[7]
On the other hand, private
respondent put forth the following issues in its Memorandum[8]:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IS FATALLY
DEFECTIVE FOR BEING IMPROPERLY VERIFIED.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION AND DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT
FOR PETITIONERS FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE FACTS.
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE CLV WAS IMPROPERLY AND IRREGULARLY ISSUED.
1.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HLURB HAS NO POWER TO GRANT AN EXCEPTION OR VARIANCE TO
REQUIREMENTS OF METRO MANILA COMMISSION ORDINANCE NO. 81-01.
2.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROJECT DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION
3(B), ARTICLE VII OF METRO MANILA COMMISSION ORDINANCE NO. 81-01 TO QUALIFY FOR
AN EXCEPTION OR DEVIATION.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DEVELOPMENT PERMIT WAS IMPROPERLY AND IRREGULARLY ISSUED.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PROJECT DEPRIVES THE ADJACENT PROPERTIES OF AIR.[9]
We find the petition to be without
merit.
At the outset, the parties in their
various pleadings discuss issues, although ostensibly legal, actually require
the Court to make findings of fact. It is long settled, by law and jurisprudence,
that the Court is not a trier of facts.[10]
Therefore, the only relevant issue to be
resolved in this case is whether or not the remedy sought by the petitioner in
the trial court is in violation of the legal principle of the exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
We have consistently declared that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
judicial system. The thrust of the rule
is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions
and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. The rationale for
this doctrine is obvious. It entails
lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of
justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed.[11]
In the case of Republic v. Lacap,[12]
we expounded on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him
by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a
court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution
of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.[13]
It is true that the foregoing
doctrine admits of exceptions, such that in Lacap,
we also held:
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f)
where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great
and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. x x x.[14]
Upon careful consideration of the
parties contentions, we find that none of the aforementioned exceptions exist
in the case at bar.
What is apparent, however, is that
petitioner unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available
with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before seeking recourse with
the trial court. Under the rules of the HLURB which were then in effect,
particularly Sections 4 and 6 of HLURB Resolution No. R-391, Series of 1987
(Adopting the 1987 Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board),[15]
a complaint to annul any permit issued by the HLURB may be filed before the
Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA). Therefore,
petitioners action to annul the Certificate of Locational Viability (CLV) and
the Development Permit issued by the HLURB on October 25, 1994 and November 11,
1994, respectively, in favor of private respondent for its Wack-Wack Heights
Condominium Project should have been properly filed before the HLURB instead of
the trial court.
We quote with approval the Court of
Appeals discussion of this matter:
In the case at bar,
plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies before seeking judicial intervention via a petition for annulment. The power to act as appellate body
over decisions and actions of local and regional planning and zoning bodies and
deputized official of the board was retained by the HLURB and remained
unaffected by the devolution under the Local Government Code.
Under Section 5 of Executive Order
No. 648, series of 1981, the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
later renamed as Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), pursuant to
Section 1(c) of Executive Order No. 90, series of 1986, has the power to:
f) Act as the appellate body
on decisions and actions of local and regional planning and zoning bodies of
the deputized officials of the Commission, on matters arising from the
performance of these functions.
In fact, Section 4 of E.O. No. 71
affirms the power of the HLURB to review actions of local government units on
the issuance of permits
Sec. 4. If in the course of
evaluation of application for registration and licensing of projects within its
jurisdiction, HLURB finds that a local government unit has overlooked or
mistakenly applied a certain law, rule or standard in issuing a development
permit, it shall suspend action with a corresponding advice to the local
government concerned, so as to afford it an opportunity to take appropriate
action thereon. Such return and advice must likewise be effected within a
period of thirty (30) days from receipt by HLURB of the application.
Moreover, Section 18 and 19 of HSRC
Administrative Order No. 20 provides:
Section 18. Oppossition
to Application. Opposition to application shall be considered as a
complaint, the resolution of which shall be a prerequisite to any action on the
application. Complaints and other legal processes shall be governed by the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission, and shall have the effect of suspending
the application.
Section 19. Complaints/Opposition
Filed After the Issuance of Locational Clearance. Temporary issuance of
locational permit or land transaction approval shall be acted upon by the
Office that issued the same. Such complaint shall not automatically suspend the
locational clearance, temporary use permit, development permit or land
transaction approval unless an order issued by the commission to that effect.
The appropriate provisions of the Rules of Procedure
governing hearings before the Commission shall be applied in the resolution of
said complaint as well as any motion for reconsideration that may be filed
thereto, provided that if the complaint is directed against the certificate of
zoning compliance issued by the deputized zoning administrator, the same shall
be acted upon the Commissioner in Charge for adjudication.
Under the rules of the HLURB then
prevailing at the time this case was filed, a complaint to annul any permit
issued by the HLURB may be filed before the Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA).
The decision of the HLA may be brought to the Board of Commissioners by
Petition for Certiorari and the decision of the Board of Commissioners [is]
appealable to the Office of the President.[16](Citations
omitted; emphases supplied.)
It does not escape the attention of
the Court that in its Reply, petitioner admitted that it had a pending
complaint with the HLURB involving private respondents the Development Permit,
the Certificate of Registration and License to Sell Condominium Units, aside
from complaints with the Building Official of the Municipality (now City) of
Mandaluyong and the MMDA, when it instituted its action with the trial court. As discussed earlier, a litigant cannot go
around the authority of the concerned administrative agency and directly seek
redress from the courts. Thus, when the
law provides for a remedy against a certain action of an administrative board,
body, or officer, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all
remedies provided therein. It is settled
that the non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the
Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.[17]
In view of the foregoing
discussion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the
parties.
To conclude, it is our view that
the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial
court decision and dismissing said complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated May 16, 2006
and the Resolution dated October 5, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63439 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
* Per Raffle dated March 28, 2012.
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-20; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with
Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
[2] Id. at 69-70.
[3] CA rollo, 250-274.
[4] Rollo, pp. 12-13.
[5] CA rollo, p. 274.
[6] Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[7] Id. at 384-385.
[8] Id.
at 315-365.
[9] Id.
at 323-324.
[10] General Milling Corporation v. Ramos, G.R.
No. 193723, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 256, 267.
[11] New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc.
v. Sangguniang Barangay, Barangay Sun Valley, Paraaque City, G.R. No.
156686, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 438, 463, citing Universal Robina Corporation (Corn Division) v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 506, 511.
[12] G.R.
No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255.
[13] Id.
at 265.
[14] Id. at 265-266.
[15] Section
4. Applicant and Oppositor. Any person natural or juridical, applying to the
Board for issuance of any license, permit, development and/or locational clearance
or the authority to exercise any right or privilege under any law administered
or enforced by the Board, shall be called the applicant.
Any
person claiming interest in any application filed with the Board, or in the
subject matter thereof, which is adverse to the applicant, shall be called the
oppositor.
Section
6. When Action Deemed Commenced. An action is deemed commenced upon the
filing of a verified complaint or opposition, in three copies, together with
all the supporting documents, and upon payment of the filing fees.
[16] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[17] National Electrification Administration v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 659, 665-666, citing Teotico v. Baer, G.R. No. 147464, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 279, 284.