Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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DANIEL M. ISON, |
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G.R. No. 173951 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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BERSAMIN, |
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Crewserve, Inc., |
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Antonio Galvez, Jr., and |
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VILLARAMA, JJ. |
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Marlow Navigation Co., |
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Ltd., |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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April 16, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
While the
provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) are liberally construed in favor the well-being
of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW), claims for compensation which hinge on
surmises must still be denied, as in this case.
By this Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1]
petitioner Daniel M. Ison assails the Decision[2]
dated February 17, 2006 and Resolution[3]
dated August 1, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89112,
which reversed and set aside the Decisions dated February 26, 2004[4]
and August 24, 2004[5]
and the Resolution[6]
dated February 28, 2005 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and
consequently dismissed petitioners claim for disability benefits against
respondents Crewserve, Inc., Antonio Galvez, Jr. (in his capacity as President
of Crewserve, Inc.) and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
Factual
Antecedents
On July 21, 1999, a Contract of
Employment[7]
was entered into by and between petitioner and respondents whereby the former
agreed to work as Cook A for the latter on board M.V. Stadt Kiel for a
period of 12 months at a basic monthly salary of US$550.00. Said contract was
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
After his
pre-employment medical examination, petitioner boarded the vessel in November
1999. During the course of his employment, however, petitioner experienced
chest pains and leg cramps. Thus, when
the vessel reached
Upon repatriation,
petitioner was referred to respondents physician at El Roi Diagnostic Center
for a medical examination and was diagnosed to be suffering from enlargement of
the heart and hypertension. For two
months, he underwent a series of treatment at respondents expense. On August 25, 2000, petitioner was declared
fit to return to work since the diagnosis of the company-designated physician
already showed controlled hypertension with the concomitant advice, however, of
continuous medication for life.[9]
Petitioner thereafter executed on September 8, 2000, a release and quitclaim[10]
in favor of respondents wherein he acknowledged receipt of US$1,136.67 corresponding
to his sickness allowance, thereby releasing his employer from future claims
and actions.
Proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter
Despite the execution of the
aforesaid release and quitclaim, petitioner, on November 7, 2001, filed a
complaint[11] against
respondents before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC to claim full disability
benefits amounting to US$60,000.00 pursuant to the POEA-SEC; moral and
exemplary damages for P1,000,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively;
and, 25% attorneys fees. Petitioner
claimed that his illness continued to worsen despite the fit to work assessment
of the company-designated physician, rendering him unfit for sea service and
entitling him to total and permanent disability compensation. To support this, petitioner
presented: 1) a medical certificate[12]
dated January 11, 2001 issued by Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), whose
evaluation revealed that petitioner was suffering from hypertensive
cardiovascular disease, concentric left ventricular hypertrophy, lateral wall
ischemic and who suggested a Grade V impediment rating; and 2) a medical
certificate[13]
dated June 16, 2001 issued by Dr. Jocelyn Myra R. Caja (Dr. Caja), who
recommended close monitoring of petitioners medical condition and limitation
of his daily activities. Dr. Caja, in the same certification, also gave
petitioner a disability rating of Grade 3 and declared him unfit to work.
Respondents, on the other hand,
argued that petitioner is not entitled to any disability compensation as he was
declared fit to return to work as a seaman on
In a Decision[14]
dated January 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of petitioner
considering that the certifications he presented do not outweigh the company-designated
physicians fit to work assessment. According to the Labor Arbiter, the
certifications of disability issued by petitioners physicians were made long
after he was declared fit to work and were based only on petitioners single
consultation with each of them. In
contrast, respondents dutifully complied with their obligations under the
employment contract by providing petitioner with medical assistance at the
foreign port, repatriating him at their expense, providing him with medical
examination and treatment, paying his sickness allowance, and assessing him to
be fit to return to work. The claims for damages and attorneys fees were also
denied.
Proceedings
before the National Labor Relations Commission
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC through
a Decision[15] dated
February 26, 2004 reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiters ruling. The NLRC
disregarded the certification of fitness to work issued by the
company-designated physician since it found petitioners subsequent
consultations with Drs. Vicaldo and Caja as proof of the severity of petitioners
illness. The NLRC went on to declare that petitioners poor health condition,
which required close monitoring and continuous medication, resulted to the
impairment of his earning capacity thereby entitling him to disability benefits. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the appeal, the
Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[16]
Not satisfied
with the amount of the award, petitioner sought reconsideration averring that
he is entitled to a total and permanent disability compensation in the amount
of US$60,000.00 or at least US$39,180.00, which is equivalent to the disability
grading of 3 as certified by Dr. Caja.
He also reiterated his prayer for damages and attorneys fees.
On August 24,
2004, the NLRC issued another Decision[17]
wherein it modified its earlier ruling by granting petitioner the amount
corresponding to Grade 3 disability rating based on the certification issued by
Dr. Caja. He was likewise awarded 5%
attorneys fees but not damages since bad faith is lacking on the part of
respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Our Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[18]
This time, it
was respondents turn to move for reconsideration but same was denied by the
NLRC for lack of merit in its Resolution[19]
dated February 28, 2005.
Proceedings
before the Court of Appeals
In their Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Preliminary Injunction[20]
before the CA, respondents averred that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting petitioner disability benefits. They argued that the
NLRC should not have relied on the certification of Dr. Caja as her evaluation was
based solely on hearsay, it being unsupported by any examination done on
petitioner. Also, since all medical tests and examinations were done by the
company-designated physician, petitioners physicians were not privies to his
case from the beginning. Thus, both Drs.
Vicaldo and Cajas findings were not adequate evidence of petitioners loss of earning
capacity due to ailment contracted during employment.
In a Resolution[21]
dated July 4, 2005, the CA issued a TRO enjoining the NLRC from enforcing the
following issuances: a) NLRC Decision dated February 26, 2004; b) NLRC Decision
dated August 24, 2004; c) NLRC Resolution dated February 28, 2005; and d) Writ
of Execution issued by the Labor Arbiter on May 31, 2005 in NLRC NCR OFW
01-11-2316-00. Thereafter, on September 28, 2005, a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued upon respondents posting of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00.
The CA then rendered its Decision[22]
on
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decisions dated February 26, 2004, and August 24, 2004,
and the Resolution dated February 28, 2005 issued by the NLRC in NCR CA No.
034945-03 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
dated
SO ORDERED.[23]
Petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration[24]
but same was denied by the CA in a Resolution[25]
dated August 1, 2006.
Hence, this present petition.
Issues
Petitioner anchors his petition on
the following assignment of errors:
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS DO NOT CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A
MISAPPRECIATION AND/OR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED
TO NOTICE CERTAIN RELEVANT POINTS WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT
CONCLUSION.
A.
THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD SHOWS THAT MR. ISON IS ENTITLED TO AT LEAST A GRADE 3 DISABILITY OR
US$39,180.00
B.
THE COURT A
QUO FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD VIS--VIS SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS THAT THE PETITIONER IS PERMANENTLY DISABLED (PTC DOCTRINE,
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A
FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION AND/OR SURMISE AND THE INFERENCES MADE WERE
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN. IT IS NOT BASED ON THE POEA CONRACT VIS--VIS DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT.[26]
Petitioner asserts
that the CA erred in failing to give evidentiary value to the medical report of
his physician, Dr. Caja, arguing that the provisions of the POEA-SEC and the
numerous rulings of this Court have established that the determination of the
disability of a seaman is not limited to the company-designated physician.
Petitioner also avers that the quitclaim
signed by him refers merely to his acceptance of the sickness allowance and
minor benefits and does not effectively bar him from filing a complaint to
recover disability benefits.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
The medical reports of
petitioners physicians do not deserve any credence as against the fit to work
assessment of the company-designated physician
Citing several jurisprudence, petitioner
argues that the determination of disability rating is not left to the sole
discretion of the company-designated physician. Hence, according to him, the
two medical reports issued by his physicians may be admitted as proof that he
is still suffering from the illness that brought about his repatriation and
that same should be made the basis for his claim for total and permanent
disability in the amount of $60,000.00 or at least $39,180.00, corresponding to
Grade 3 disability rate in accordance with the POEA-SEC.
It is worthy to note that when
petitioner executed an employment contract with respondents on July 21, 1999,
it was the 1996 POEA-SEC, based on POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96,[27]
that was applied, deemed written in and appended to his employment contract. Section 20(B) thereof states:
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x x
2.
If the injury
or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the
employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental,
surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer
is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still
requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so
provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the
degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated
physician.
3.
Upon sign-off
from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated
physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120)
days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit
himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer
to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
x x x x
From the foregoing provision, it is
explicit and clear that for purposes of determining the seafarers degree of
disability, it is the company-designated physician who must proclaim that he
sustained a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either
injury or illness, during the term of his employment. This was the ruling in Panganiban v. Tara
Trading Shipmanagement, Inc,[28]
where it was held that there being no ambiguity in the wordings of the Standard
Employment Contract that the only qualification prescribed for the physician
entrusted with the task of assessing the disability is that he be company-designated, the literal meaning of the same shall thus
control.
In Seagull
Maritime Corp. v. Dee,[29]
however, a case involving an employment contract entered into in 1999 as in
this case, we have held that resort to prognosis of other physicians may be
allowed especially so if there are serious doubts on the evaluation made by the
company-designated physician. The same
ruling was applied in Abante v. KJGS Fleet Management Manila[30]
in that the seafarer was given an option to seek a second opinion from his
preferred physician notwithstanding the fact that it was the POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 05-96 which governed the parties contract of employment. Hence, while it is the company-designated
physician who must declare that the seaman suffers a permanent disability
during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to seek a
second opinion, hence the Contract recognizes the prerogative of the seafarer
to request a second opinion and, for this purpose, to consult a physician of
his choice.[31]
The case of Maunlad Transport,
Inc. v. Manigo, Jr.[32] has also
reiterated the prerogative of a seafarer to request for a second opinion with
the qualification that the physicians report shall still be evaluated
according to its inherent merit for the Courts consideration, viz:
All told, the rule is that
under Section 20-B(3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is mandatory for a claimant to
be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his
repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing
of a claim for disability benefits. However, in submitting himself to
examination by the company-designated physician, a claimant does not
automatically bind himself to the medical report issued by the
company-designated physician; neither are the labor tribunals and the courts
bound by said medical report. Its inherent merit will be weighed and duly
considered. Moreover, the claimant may dispute the medical report issued by the
company-designated physician by seasonably consulting another physician. The
medical report issued by said physician will also be evaluated by the labor
tribunal and the court based on its inherent merits. (Emphasis in the original.)
These being said, the Court shall
thus evaluate the findings of petitioners physicians viś-a-viś the findings
of the company-designated physician.
As can be
recalled, after two months of treatment from date of repatriation, petitioner
was declared fit to return to work on August 25, 2000 by the company-designated
physician. Said physician certified that
with proper medication, petitioners hypertension appears to be controlled and
that discontinuance of such medication may cause his blood pressure to again shoot
up. As such, she recommended for
petitioner to continue taking his medicines and to observe a low fat, low salt
diet. However, after about five months
or on January 11, 2001, petitioner consulted Dr. Vicaldo, a private physician at
the Philippine Heart Center, who made the following findings: Hypertensive
cardiovascular disease, concentric left ventricular hypertrophy, lateral wall
ischemic and impediment Grade V (58-96%). Another five months have passed or on
June 16, 2001, petitioner again sought the medical advice of another private
physician, Dr. Caja, who issued a medical report which reads:
June
16, 2001
To whom it may concern,
This
is regarding Mr. Daniel M. Ison, 57y/o, seaman from Cainta, Rizal.
June 2000 when patient started to experience chest
pain while on board the ship. He was then done ECG and chest x-ray which
revealed S-t segment depression and t wave inversion. He was then repatriated
where further work-up was done. 2D ECHO done showed mild aortic regurgitation
and mitral regurgitation. He was then prescribed Isopten, Adalat, and Cardinel.
He was then diagnosed to have hypertensive cardiovascular disease, ischemic
heart disease, concentric left ventricular hypertrophy. His BP then fluctuates
from systolic of 140-150. He claims that if his BP went down to less than 130,
he feels bad. Recently, he complains of occasional chest heaviness with easy
fatigability and dyspnea on exertion. He has been having poor compliance with
his medications. His recent BP is 190/110 and so continuation of his previous
medications was advised. Addition of Neobloc 50mg TID and Approvel 150mg OD was
given. Precaution on correct diet and proper lifestyle was recommended.
The
patients clinical condition needs close monitoring and limitation to the daily
activities. Thus, rendering him unfit for work.
DISABILITY
RATING: GRADE 3
Respectfully
yours,
(Signed)
Jocelyn
Medical Specialist
Lic. no.: 076484[33]
Based on the said
medical reports of petitioners physicians, the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiters ruling and granted petitioner disability compensation. However, on appeal, the CA disregarded said
physicians medical findings and instead upheld the one made by the
company-designated physician.
We hold that the
CA is correct in ruling thus. The company-designated physician has cleared
petitioner for employment resumption after two months of continuous treatment
and after medication has successfully controlled his hypertension. As aptly held by the CA, the extensive medical
attention given by the company-designated physician to petitioner enabled the
former to acquire a detailed knowledge and familiarity of petitioners medical
condition. This enabled the
company-designated physician to arrive at a more accurate prognosis of
petitioners disability as compared to other physicians not privy to
petitioners case from the beginning. It
has been held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual
medical condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and
actually treated the seamans illness, is more qualified to assess the seamans
disability.[34]
On the other
hand, the medical reports of Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Caja were issued after petitioner
consulted each of them only once.
Clearly, said physicians did not have the chance to closely monitor
petitioners illness. Moreover, Dr.
Vicaldos evaluation of petitioners illness was unsupported by any proof or
basis. While he diagnosed petitioner to
be suffering from Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Concentric Left
Ventricular Hypertrophy, Lateral Wall Ischemic and suggested an Impediment
Grade V (58-96%), no justification for such assessment was provided for in the
medical certificate he issued. Similarly,
Dr. Cajas medical report contained no supporting proof but was rather based on
the findings of past examinations done by the company-designated physician, as
well as on the statements supplied to her by the petitioner. In Coastal
Safety Marine Services Inc. v. Esguerra,[35]
this Court brushed aside the medical certifications upon which the seaman
therein anchored his claim for disability benefits for being unsupported by
diagnostic tests and procedures as would effectively dispute the results of the
medical examination earlier made upon him in a foreign clinic referred by his
employer.
Likewise significant
is the fact that it took petitioner more than a year before disputing the
declaration of fitness to work by the company-designated physician. Petitioner filed a claim for disability benefit
on the basis of Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Cajas medical certifications which were
issued after five and 10 months, respectively, from the company-designated
physicians declaration of fit to work. Unfortunately, apart from the reasons
already stated, these certifications could not be given any credence as
petitioners health condition could have changed during the interim period due
to different factors such as petitioners poor compliance with his medications
as in fact mentioned by Dr. Caja in the medical certificate she issued. As
such, the said medical certifications cannot effectively controvert the fit to
work assessment earlier made. The Court
has previously rejected a medical report by a physician on this ground in Cadornigara
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[36] wherein it was
ruled that:
x x x. It is noted that petitioner took six months
before disputing the finding of Dr. Cruz by filing a complaint for disability
benefits. Worse, in his complaint, petitioner averred that he continued to
undergo therapy and medication even after Dr. Cruz certified him fit to work.
Yet, petitioner did not secure from the doctors who administered such therapy
and medication a certification that would contradict that of Dr. Cruz. Rather,
he waited another month to manifest to the LA that he be examined by a
government doctor. Such request is not reasonable. As we observed in Sarocam
v. Interorient Maritime Ent. Inc., it makes no sense to compare the
certification of a company-designated physician with that of an employee-appointed
physician if the former is dated seven to eight months earlier than the latter
-- there would be no basis for comparison at all.
Furthermore,
petitioner voluntarily executed a release and quitclaim in respondents favor
right after the assessment of the company-designated physician and receipt of
his sickness allowance. Indeed, quitclaims executed by employees are commonly
frowned upon as being contrary to public policy. But where the person making the waiver has
done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration
for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking.[37]
Contrary to petitioners contention, the
amount of US$1,136.67 he received is reasonable enough to cover his sickness
allowance for two months of treatment under the care of respondents physician.
We, therefore, find no reason to invalidate the quitclaim.
In sum, we hold
that the CA did not err in denying petitioners claim for disability
compensation as no adequate and credible evidence was submitted to show
entitlement to the same. As we have consistently held, awards for compensation
cannot be made to rest on mere speculations and presumptions.[38]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February
17, 2006 and Resolution dated August 1, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 89112 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T
I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 26-51.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 238-248; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court).
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] See Work Status Report dated June 8, 2000, id. at 86.
[9]
[10] See Discharge Receipt and Release of Claims dated September 8, 2000, id. at 109.
[11] Docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No.
OFW-01-11-2316-00.
[12] CA rollo, p. 108.
[13]
[14]
[15] Supra note 4.
[16] CA rollo, p. 43.
[17] Supra note 5.
[18] CA rollo, p. 48.
[19] Supra note 6.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 2-37.
[21]
[22] Supra note 2.
[23] CA rollo, p. 248.
[24]
[25] Supra note 3.
[26] Rollo, p. 34.
[27] Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-going Vessels (which provides for the minimum requirements for Filipino seafarers overseas employment).
[28] G.R. No. 187032, October 18, 2010, 633 SCRA 353, 367-368, citing German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 403 Phil. 572, 588 (2001).
[29] G.R. No. 165156,
[30] G.R. No. 182430, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 734, 738-740.
[31] NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. v. Talavera, G.R. No. 175894, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 183, 193.
[32] G.R. No. 161416,
[33] Supra note 13.
[34] Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334, 347-348; Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 179802, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 239, 251; Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc., G.R. No. 167813, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 502, 513.
[35] G.R. No. 185352,
[36] G.R. No. 158073, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 363, 374.
[37] Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc. v. Dimayuga, G.R. No. 177705, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 648, 656.
[38] Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 184722, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 529, 546.