Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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OSCAR |
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G.R. No. 173870 |
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Petitioner, |
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- versus - |
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Present: |
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GERONIMO BACOY,
Guardian and |
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representing the
children, namely: |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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MARY MARJORIE B.
MONSALUD, |
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BERSAMIN, |
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ERIC B. MONSALUD,
METZIE ANN |
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B. MONSALUD, KAREEN
B. |
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VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
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MONSALUD, LEONARDO
B. MONSALUD, JR., and
CRISTINA B. |
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MONSALUD, Respondents. |
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Promulgated: April 25, 2012 |
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D E C I S I O N
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] the registered owner of a motor
vehicle challenges the Decision[2] dated July 11, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 which held him liable for damages
to the heirs of the victims who were run over by the said vehicle.
Factual
Antecedents
At dawn on New
Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse
Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way
home from a Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot,
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No.
93-10347[3] for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13,
1997, said court declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.[4]
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias
father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor children[5] of the Monsaluds, filed
Civil Case No. 96-20219,[6] an independent civil
action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also
impleaded therein were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the
victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that
the Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because he and his wife do
not own the jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan.[8] For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a
victim himself. He alleged that Allan
and his friends[9]
stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers rented house to take it
for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle
mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans
the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall
then run but without any headlights on.[10] And implying that this was the manner by which
the vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary
evidence the statements[11] of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar) and
Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two,
who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of the accident, declared before
the investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles headlights were
off. Because of this allegation, Oscar
Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case against Allan and
his companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-10380.[12] The case was, however,
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[13]
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and
that it was the latters brother, Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed
as the driver.[14] In any event, Allans employment as conductor
was already severed before the mishap occurred on January 1, 1993 since he served
as such conductor only from the first week of December until December 14, 1992.[15] In support of this, Oscar Jr. presented as
witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio Junior Baobao
(Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of
Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to Sominot on December
31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He also believed that Crecencio started to
work as such at around December 15 or 16, 1992.[16] Cresencio, for his part, testified that he
worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and
that Rodrigo was his driver.[17] He stated that upon learning that the jeep figured
in an accident, he never bothered to verify the news. Instead,
he went to Midsalip to work there as a conductor for his brothers vehicle,
thereby terminating his employment with Oscar Jr.[18]
Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that
after a days trip, the jeep would be parked beside Rodrigos rented house[19] for the next
early-morning operation.
Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still
Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent to December 14, 1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses
Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his
fare to Allan every time he would board the jeep in going to Molave and that the
last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December 23, 1992. He also claimed that immediately before
Ruling
of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision[22] dated April 17, 2000, the
RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency of
evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr.
was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the
principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence
on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused an injury
is shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary course of things,
the accident would not have happened had there been an exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as
the registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the same through his driver
Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well
aware that the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition
key, they should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle
from being used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus concluded that
such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight constitute negligence making
the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the
same.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants Allan Maglasang and Oscar
1.
Defendant
ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in case of insolvency, for defendant
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:
a.
P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial
expenses;
b.
P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the
death of the late Emilia Monsalud;
c.
P250,000.00 moral damages for the death
of the late Leonardo Monsalud, Sr.;
d.
P250,000.00 moral damages for the death
of the late Glenda Monsalud;
e.
P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
f.
P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
g.
The
cost of this proceedings.
2.
The
dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR. and
NORMA
SO ORDERED.[23]
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration[24] contending that the
provision on vicarious liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code[25]
requires the existence of employer-employee relationship and that the employee
was acting within the scope of his employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was
his employee, he was hired not as a driver but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment
when he drove the jeep.
Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was
running without its headlights on at the time of the accident indubitably shows
that the same was stolen. He further
alleged that the jeep could not have been taken by only one person. As Rodrigo declared in Criminal Case No.
93-10380 (carnapping case), based on his experience, the jeep cannot be pushed
by only one person but by at least five people in order for it to start. This was due to the vehicles mass and the deep
canal which separates the parking area from the curved road that was obstructed
by a house.[26]
Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in
its Order[27]
dated June 21, 2000 granted the Motion for Reconsideration and absolved Oscar
Jr. from civil liability. It cited Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that for an employer to be
subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his employee, the latter should
have committed the same in the discharge of his duties. The court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this
condition is wanting in Allans case as he was not acting in the discharge of
his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep.
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the
property owner cannot be made responsible for the damages caused by his
property by reason of the criminal acts of another. It then adjudged that only Allan should bear
the consequences of his criminal acts.
Thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. is hereby
absolved from all civil liability arising from the felonious acts of convicted
accused ALLAN MAGLASANG.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[28]
Geronimo appealed.
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
In its
In resolving the case, the CA first determined the
preliminary issue of whether there was an employer-employee relationship
between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident. It ruled in the affirmative and gave more
credence to the testimonies of Geronimos witnesses than to those of Oscar
Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio.
The CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness presented by Geronimo, Faustino
never resided in Poblacion and thus
has limited knowledge of the place. His
testimony was also unreliable considering that he only rode the subject jeep
twice[30] during the last two weeks
of December 1992. As regards Cresencios
testimony, the appellate court found it puzzling why he appeared to have acted
uninterested upon learning that the jeep was the subject of an accident when it
was his bread and butter. Said court likewise
considered questionable Oscar Jr.s asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan
as conductor when Cresencio testified that he replaced a certain Sumagang Jr.[31]
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr.
liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered
owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or
death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved
Oscar Jr.s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping
case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because, given
the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied
permission to use the subject vehicle. To
support its conclusion, the CA cited the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo
and Allan were both employees assigned to the said jeep; after a days work, said
vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house where Allan also lived; the
jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said
parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the
vehicle which can be started even without the ignition key.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated
1. Civil
indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and
Glenda Monsalud in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each
or for the total amount of One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00);
2. Temperate
damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each
for the death of Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud
(collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount of Seventy-five thousand
pesos (P75,000.00);
3.
Moral
damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each for the
death of the Monsaluds or for a total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00);
4.
Exemplary
damages of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [32]
Issues
As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari
alleging that the CA erred in:
1.
x
x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; misapprehension of facts which are in conflict with the findings
of the trial court;
2.
x
x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with law and with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
3.
x
x x departing from the regular course of the judicial proceedings in the
disposition of the appeal and [in going] beyond the issues of the case.[33]
Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the
RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000 Order which was in accord with Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort
committed by an employee should have been done within the scope of his
assigned tasks for an employer to be held liable under culpa aquiliana. However,
the CA never touched upon this matter even if it was glaring that Allans driving
the subject vehicle was not within the scope of his previous employment as
conductor. Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists
that his jeep was stolen and stresses that the liability of a registered owner
of a vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, should not apply to
him. He asserts that although Allan and
his companions were not found to have committed the crime of carnapping beyond
reasonable doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly
taken by them from a well secured area.
This is considering that the vehicle was running without its headlights
on at the time of the accident, a proof that it was started without the ignition
key.
Our Ruling
Petitioners own evidence
casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by Allan and his alleged cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.
Oscar
Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the
Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen.
He highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking
area was indeed carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan
and his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking area
and the weight of the jeep.
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group
was already dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly
concluded by the CA, the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence
required was likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was unlawfully
taken.
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar
and Benjamin, declared before the police that when Allan invited them to ride
with him, he was already driving the jeep:
04. Q- On that night, on or about
A- I
went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if
there was an incident [that] happened?
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at
about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrived
driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together with Benjamin Andujar,
Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rezada and Joven Orot.[34]
x x x x
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in
the evening more or less on December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,]
Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you
know if there was an incident [that] happened?
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place,
at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrive[d]
driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together with Jemar Alarcon,
Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rizada and Joven Orot.[35]
There
were six accused in the carnapping case.
If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched by Allan who was driving the jeep,
this would mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to Rodrigos
testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be pushed by at least five
people so that it could start without the ignition key.
On direct examination,[36] Oscar Jr. was asked as to
what Rodrigo, his driver who had informed him about the accident on January 1,
1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him after the incident, viz:
Q: When
Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about the accident, what did he
carry with him if any and turned over to you?
A: The
OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of Registration) Sir.
Q: How
about the key of the vehicle?
A: It
was not turned over, Sir.[37]
Assuming
arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group,
the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the
jeeps possession. Thus, at the time
Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to expect
that the driver should have also returned the key to the operator together with
the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the
key was allegedly handed over to the police for reasons unexplained and not available
from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never presented Rodrigo as his
witness. Neither was he able to attest
on cross-examination that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or that the key
was handed over to him by Rodrigo:
Q: On
A: I
was not there. So, I do not know but he
had an affidavit to show that he turned it over to the police.
Q: What
I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of
A: I
was not there.
Q: So,
you could not testify on that, is that correct?
A: Yes
Sir, I was not there.[38]
Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the
carnapping case, thus:
Q: Now,
there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and [his] x x x co-accused x x x [n]amely: Benjamin Andojar, Dioscoro Sol,
Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and [Arniel] Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct?
A: Yes
Sir.
Q: That
case was filed by you because you alleged that on December 31, 1992, your jeep
was carnapped by Allan Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, is
that correct?
A: Yes
Sir.
Q: You
testified on the case in
A: Yes,
Sir.
Q: And
you could well remember that this representation is the counsel of the
co-accused of Allan Maglasang, is that correct?
A: Yes
Sir.
Q: And
that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that correct?
A: Yes
Sir.
Q: Even
the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is that correct
A: Yes
Sir.
Q: Because
there was no sufficient evidence to establish that the jeep was carnapped, is
that correct?
A: Yes
Sir.[39]
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not
on to support his claim that his jeep was stolen, this circumstance by itself
will not prove that it really was stolen.
The reason why the headlights were not on at the time of the accident
was not sufficiently established during the trial. Besides, the fact that the headlights were
not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition key in starting
the jeep as there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems, broken
headlights, or that they were simply turned off.
Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant
evidence to support the defense of unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to
Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen.
The evidence on record brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers.
Oscar Jr. alleges that the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for itself) should
not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well secured
area not remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, [w]here
the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary
course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient,
reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from
or was caused by the defendants want of care.[40] Res
ipsa loquitur is merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of,
the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.[41] It recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct
proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It permits the plaintiff to
present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances
to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and
thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no
negligence on his part.[42] The doctrine is based partly on the theory
that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury
either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore
compelled to allege negligence in general terms.[43]
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
1) the
accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
2) the
cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the
injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.[44]
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the
road would suddenly
be sideswiped and run
over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had
been negligent. Second, the jeep which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to
Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions
of the jeeps use, including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without
the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely
and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death
of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises
a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by
evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using
his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do
so.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the
CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan to use the
jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s
failure to provide solid proof that he ensured that the parking area is well secured
and that he had expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when
he entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep could
have been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned,
Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on matters
regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is
deemed to have been given the absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation,
including the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
The operator on record
of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or
injuries consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the
registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.
Without disputing the factual
finding of the CA that
Allan was still his
employee
at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar
Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an
employers vicarious liability for the employees fault under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code cannot apply to him.
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar
Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank,[45] the car of therein
respondent bank caused the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by
its assistant vice president. Despite
Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said
provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered
motor vehicles, i.e., that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused
the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.[46] We have already ratiocinated that:
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a
definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where
vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians
or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or
with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor
vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public
highways.[47]
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use[48] or that the subject
vehicle was stolen[49] which are valid defenses
available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps
use.
All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded
are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court concurs with the
findings of the CA and sustains the awards made. In addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[50] an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from
the time the judgment of the RTC is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve
percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this Decision until the
payment thereof.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 13-31.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 142-173; penned by Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco
Flores and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Sixto C.
Marella, Jr.
[3] Records, p. 145.
[4] As mentioned in the RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 96-20,219 dated April 17, 2000, id. at 169-170. The accused was imposed the indeterminate
penalty of 1 year of prision correccional
to 6 years of prision correccional of
imprisonment.
[5] Namely Mary Marjorie,
Eric, Metzie Ann, Kareen, Leonardo Jr., and Christian.
[6] See original complaint, records,
pp. 1-5. The complaint
was later amended to include the plaintiffs demand for loss of earning
capacity, see Amended Complaint, id. at 55-60.
[7]
a)
Reimbursement of expenses prior
to burial at P73,112.00;
b) Attorneys fees of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per
hearing;
c) Moral damages of P1,000,000.00 for the death of Emilia and
for the death of Leonardo and Glenda, P250,000.00 each;
d) Exemplary damages of P40,000.00;
e) Actual and compensatory damages of P3,016,000.00.
[8] See the Spouses del
Carmens Answer, id. at 12-13; TSN-Oscar del Carmen, Sr.,
[9] Namely Benjamin Andujar,
Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, Jemar Alarcon, and Arniel Rizada.
[10] TSN-Oscar del Carmen, Jr.,
[11] Records, pp. 149-150.
[12]
[13] As mentioned in the RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 96-20,219 dated April 17, 2000, id. at 171.
[14] TSN-Oscar del Carmen, Jr.,
[15]
[16] TSN-Faustino Sismundo,
[17] TSN-Cresencio Baobao,
[18]
[19] TSN-Oscar del Carmen Jr.,
[20] TSN-Saturnino Jumawan,
[21] TSN-Jose Navarro,
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Art. 2180. The
obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x
Employers
shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
x
x x x
[26] Records, p. 182, citing the TSN of Rodrigo Maglasang dated
October 22, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 93-10380.
[27]
[28]
[29] Supra note 2.
[30] TSN- Faustino Sismundo,
[31] TSN-Cresencio Baobao,
[32] CA rollo,
pp. 172-173.
[33] Rollo, p. 22.
[34] Sworn Statement of Jemar
Alarcon, records, p. 149.
[35] Sworn Statement of
Benjamin Andujar, id. at 150.
[36] TSN-Oscar del Carmen, Jr.,
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40] Tan v.
Jam Transit, Inc., G.R. No.
183198,
[41]
[42] Macalinao
v. Ong, 514 Phil. 127, 139
(2005).
[43]
[44] Perla
Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Spouses Sarangaya III, 510 Phil. 676, 687 (2005), citing Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 396
Phil. 87, 98 (2000).
[45] 412 Phil. 834 (2001).
[46] See also St.
Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, 426
Phil. 878, 887 (2002) citing Aguilar Sr.
v. Commercial Savings Bank, 412 Phil. 834, 841 (2001) and Erezo v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, 107 (1957).
[47] Erezo v. Jepte, 102
Phil 103, 108 (1957).
[48] Duquillo v. Bayot, 67 Phil. 131 (1939).
[49] Duavit v. Court of Appeals, 255 Phil. 470 (1989).
[50] G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78,
95-97.