G.R. No. 171101 - HACIENDA LUISITA, INC., PETITIONER, V. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

 

LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION.

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

 

 

BERSAMIN, J.:

 

For resolution are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 of petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 of respondents Noel Mallari, et al.

 

HLI contends in its Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 as follows:

 

A

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION, THE DATE OF TAKING IS NOVEMBER 21, 1989, WHEN PARC APPROVED HLIs SDP IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE TIME THAT THE FWBs WERE CONSIDERED TO OWN AND POSSESS THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN HACIENDA LUISITA because:

 

1. The SDP is precisely a modality which the agrarian law gives the landowner as alternative to compulsory coverage in which case, therefore, the FWBs cannot be considered as owners and possessors of the agricultural lands at the time the SDP was approved by PARC;

 

2. The approval of the SDP cannot be akin to a Notice of Coverage in compulsory coverage or acquisition because SDP and compulsory coverage are two different modalities with independent and separate rules and mechanisms;

 

3. The Notice of Coverage of January 02, 2006 may, at the very least, be considered as the time when the FWBs can be considered to own and possess the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita because that is only the time when Hacienda Luisita was placed under compulsory acquisition in view of failure of HLI to perform certain obligations of the SDP, or SDOA;

 

4. Indeed, the immutable rule and the unbending jurisprudence is that taking takes place when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;

 

5. To insist that the taking is when the SDP was approved by PARC on November 21, 1989 and that the same be considered as the reckoning period to determine the just compensation is deprivation of landowners property without due process of law;

 

6. HLI should be entitled to payment of interest on the just compensation.

 

B

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED ITS DECISION GIVING THE FWBs THE OPTION TO REMAIN AS HLI STOCKHOLDERS OR NOT, because:

 

1. It is an exercise of a right of the FWB which the Honorable Court has declared in its Decision and even in its Resolution and that has to be respected and implemented;

 

2. Neither the Constitution nor the CARL require[s] that the FWBs should have control over the agricultural lands;

 

3. The option has not been shown to be detrimental but instead beneficial to the FWBs as found by the Honorable Court.

 

C

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALES OF THE 500-HECTARE CONVERTED LOT AND THE 80.51-HECTARE SCTEX CANNOT BE RETAINED BY HLI BUT RETURNED TO THE FWBs AS BY SUCH MANNER; HLI IS USING THE CORPORATION CODE TO AVOID ITS LIABILITY TO THE FWBs FOR THE PRICE IT RECEIVED FROM THE SALES, because

 

1. The proceeds of the sales belong to the corporation and not to either HLI/Tadeco or the FWBs, both of which are stockholders entitled to the earnings of the corporation and to the net assets upon liquidation;

 

2. To allow the return of the proceeds of the sales to FWBs is to impose all liabilities of the corporation on HLI/Tadeco which is unfair and violative of the Corporation Code.

For their part, respondents Mallari, et al. submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification that:

 

1. Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law does not provide that the FWBs who opt for stock distribution option should retain majority shareholding of the company to which the agricultural land was given.

 

2. If the November 22, 2011 decision of this Honorable Court ordering land distribution would be followed, this would cause more harm than good to the lives of those people living in the hacienda, and more particularly to the welfare of the FWBs.

 

3. On the conclusion by this Honorable Court that the operative fact doctrine is applicable to the case at bar, then FWBs who merely relied on the PARC approval should not be prejudiced by its subsequent nullification.

 

4. Those who choose land should return whatever they got from the SDOA and turn over the same to HLI for use in the operations of the company, which in turn will redound to the benefit of those who will opt to stay with the SDO.

 

5. For those who choose land, the time of taking for purposes of just compensation should be at the time HLI was dispossessed of control over the property, and that payment by of the land should be turned over to HLI for the benefit and use of the companys operations that will, in turn, redound to the benefit of FWBs who will opt to stay with the company.

 

Recommendations

 

I readily CONCUR with the Majority in subjecting to compulsory land distribution the lands of HLI affected by the discredited Stock Distribution Plan (SDP), as disposed in the resolution promulgated on November 22, 2011.

 

However, I humbly REITERATE my DISSENT on two aspects of the decision of July 5, 2011 and the resolution of November 22, 2011. I MAINTAIN that if the constitutional guarantee of just compensation is to be fulfilled with justice and fairness:

 

(a) The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), initially, and the Regional Trial Court as Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC), ultimately, should determine the reckoning date of taking as an integral component of their statutory responsibility to determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6675 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, or CARL); and

 

(b) HLI should be compensated as the landowner for the fair market value of the homelots granted to the farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) under the discredited SDP.

 

I humbly CONTEND that the Court will likely overstep its jurisdiction if it pegs the time of taking at a definite date (whether November 21, 1989, or January 2, 2006, or any other date) because it thereby pre-empts the RTC-SAC from doing so. I must NOTE that the determination of just compensation (which is always reckoned from the time of taking) is a factual matter expressly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC; and that the sua sponte pegging by the Court of the time of taking (even without the parties having properly raised and argued the matter) unduly interferes with the parties right of presentation and autonomy.

 

Submissions & Explanations

 

I

 

A

 

For a proper perspective, let me remind that the exercise by the State of its inherent power of eminent domain comes in two stages. The Court has characterized the dual stages in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[1] in the following manner:

 

There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. xxx

 

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. xxx.[2]

 

The first stage in expropriation relates to the determination of the validity of the expropriation. At this stage, the trial court resolves questions, like whether the expropriator has the power of eminent domain, whether the use of the property is public, whether the taking is necessary, and, should there be conditions precedent for the exercise of the power, whether they have been complied with. In the second stage, the trial court is called upon to determine the just compensation, taking into consideration all the factors of just compensation (including whether interest should be paid on the amount of just compensation). Rule 67 of the Rules of Court generally delineates the procedure followed in both stages. Although expropriation may be either judicial or legislative, the dual stages apply to both, for there is no point in distinguishing between judicial and legislative expropriation as far as the two stages mentioned above are concerned.[3]

 

The taking of property pursuant to the CARL is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. It is a revolutionary expropriation that covers all private agricultural lands that exceeded the maximum retention limits reserved to their owners. This the Court has fittingly pointed out in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:[4]

 

xxx [W]e do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

 

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands wherever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for a just distribution among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at last to their deliverance.

 

Its revolutionary character notwithstanding, expropriation under the CARL still goes through the two stages. Section 16 of the CARL, which provides the procedure for private agricultural land acquisition, makes this explicit enough, thus:

 

Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:

 

(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.

 

(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.

 

(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.

 

(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.

 

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

 

(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

 

For sure, the expropriation under the CARL is not an exclusively judicial process. The first stage of expropriation commences upon the issuance of the notice of coverage, and is initially dealt with administratively by the DAR pursuant to Section 50 of the CARL,[5] subject to a judicial review in accordance with Section 54 of the CARL.[6] The DAR, through the Regional Director, has jurisdiction over all agrarian law implementation cases, including protests or petitions to lift coverage.[7] In exercising jurisdiction over such cases, the Regional Director passes upon and resolves various issues, including whether the land is subject to or exempt from CARP coverage, and whether the required notices of coverage have been served on the landowners.

 

Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

 

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

 

The Constitution itself has thereby settled the requirement of public use and the necessity for the expropriation, which are the proper subjects of the first stage of expropriation proceedings. In its 1987 pronouncement in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[8] the Court declared so:

 

As earlier observed, the requirement of public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself. No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

 

 

The second stage is devoted to the determination of just compensation. This stage, as essential as the first, is always judicial in nature. According to Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay:[9]

 

The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation.

 

 

B.

 

HLI assailed the resolution of November 22, 2011 for reckoning the time of taking from November 21, 1989, the date when the PARC approved HLIs SDP, because there was yet no land transfer at that time. It insists that, at the very least, January 2, 2006, the date when the notice of coverage issued, should be considered as the time of taking.

 

In the alternative, HLI manifested its willingness to abide by my Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of November 22, 2011, whereby I respectfully recommended leaving the issue of the time of taking for the RTC-SAC to decide as an adjunct of the determination of the just compensation.

 

Respondents Noel Mallari, et al. agreed that the RTC-SAC should decide the issue of the time of taking.

 

To recall, I wrote in my Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of November 22, 2011, as follows:

 

The determination of when the taking occurred is an integral and vital part of the determination and computation of just compensation. The nature and character of land at the time of its taking are the principal criteria to determine just compensation to the landowner. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized the importance of the time of taking in fixing the amount of just compensation, thus:

 

xxx [T]he Court xxx invariably held that the time of taking is the critical date in determining lawful or just compensation. Justifying this stance, Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for the Court in Municipality of La Carlota vs. The Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, xxx the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law guarantees just compensation. It would be an injustice to him certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value of what was lost. There could be on the other hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the collection, the increment in price would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has been committed is intended precisely to avoid either contingency fraught with unfairness.

 

It is my humble submission, therefore, that the factual issue of when the taking had taken place as to the affected agricultural lands should not be separated from the determination of just compensation by DAR, Land Bank and SAC. Accordingly, I urge that the Court should leave the matter of the reckoning date to be hereafter determined by the DAR and Land Bank pursuant to Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6657.[10] Should the parties disagree thereon, the proper SAC will then resolve their disagreement as an integral part of a petition for determination of just compensation made pursuant to Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 xxx.

 

I MAINTAIN my foregoing position.

 

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property the expropriator takes from its owner. The measure for computing just compensation is not the takers gain, but the owners loss.[11] The constitutional policy underlying the requirement for the payment of just compensation is to make the landowner whole after the State has taken his property.[12] The word just intensifies the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[13] For the landowner of expropriated property to be fully compensated, the State must put him in as good a position pecuniarily as if the use of the property had not been taken away.[14] Accordingly, just compensation is principally based on the fair market value, which is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.[15]

 

The price or value of the land and its character at the time it is taken by the Government are the primordial criteria for determining just compensation.[16] Section 17 of the CARL enumerates other factors to be considered, viz:

 

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation - In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and assessments made by the government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

 

As to taking, the Court has set a number of circumstances that must be established before property is said to be taken for a public use, to wit:

 

A number of circumstances must be present in taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.[17]

 

The prescription of such number of circumstances means that compensable taking is not a simple concept easy to ascertain. Certainly, evidence from the parties is needed to concretize the concept. Thus, establishing the time of taking demands a judicial trial in which both the owner and the expropriator are afforded the fullest opportunity to prove either when the owner was actually deprived or dispossessed of the property, or when a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of the property happened, or when the owner was deprived of the ordinary use of the property. Not being a trier of facts, the Court has no capacity to render a valid finding upon the time of taking.

 

In contrast, not only is the RTC-SAC a trier of facts but it is also vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction to receive the parties evidence on the valuation of the affected property pursuant to Section 57 of the CARL, viz:

 

 

 

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.

 

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.

 

 

Original jurisdiction means jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass judgment upon the law and facts,[18] and concerns the right to hear a cause and to make an original determination of the issues from the evidence as submitted directly by the witnesses, or of the law as presented, uninfluenced or unconcerned by any prior determination, or the action of any other court juridically determining the same controversy.[19] Needless to point out, that jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC is also exclusive of all other courts, including this Court.

 

Although November 21, 1989 was the date when the affected landholdings of HLI came under the SDP, I see no practical justification why the Court should peg that date as the time of taking. As I see it, HLI/TADECO as landowner was not deprived of its property on that date. Nor was its property destroyed or materially impaired then. Instead, what occurred on that date was the fusion of HLI/TADECO as owner, on the one hand, and the FWBs as the tenant-farmers, on the other hand, into one corporate entity in relation to the land subject of the SDP, a fusion that did not result into or cause the deprivation of HLI of its land.

 

It is significant that the parties did not raise the time of taking as an issue in their pleadings. The petition for certiorari and prohibition assailed only the PARCs revocation of the SDP and the resulting placement of the lands subject of the SDP under compulsory land acquisition of the CARP on the ground that the PARC had no authority to revoke the SDP. Consequently, the time of taking was neither relevant to the objective of the petition, nor necessary to the determination of the issues the petition raised. In fact, the decision promulgated on July 5, 2011 itself expressly limited the issues only to: (1) matters of standing; (2) the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657; (3) the jurisdiction of PARC to recall or revoke HLI's SDP; (4) the validity or propriety of such recall or revocatory action; and (5) corollary to (4), the validity of the terms and conditions of the SDP, as embodied in the SDOA, with none of the stated issues involving the time of taking. The first time that the time of taking surfaced was when the July 5, 2011 decision pegged it on November 29, 1989. As such, the Court overstepped its adjudicative boundaries by pegging the taking at a definite date (whether November 21, 1989, or January 2, 2006, or any other date) even without the parties presenting the matter here.

 

With all due respect to my distinguished colleagues in the Majority, I state that the Court unduly interfered with the right of the parties to present the issues they desired to bring for the Courts consideration and resolution. As a rule, the Court should not create issues sua sponte but should decide only the issues presented by the parties. This rule adheres to the principle of party presentation, which fully complements the role of the Judiciary as the neutral arbiter of disputes, a role that is vital to the adversarial system.

 

Greenlaw v. United States,[20] a 2008 ruling of the United States Supreme Court, explained the principle of party presentation or litigants autonomy in the following terms, to wit:

 

In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present. To the

 

 

extent courts have approved departures from the party presentation principle in criminal cases, the justification has usually been to protect a pro se litigants rights. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 381-383 (2003). But as a general rule, [o]ur adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief." Id., at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As cogently explained:

 

[Courts] do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases to come to us, and when they do we normally decide only questions presented by the parties. Counsel almost always know a great deal more about their cases than we do, and this must be particularly true of counsel for the United States, the richest, most powerful, and best represented litigant to appear before us. United States v. Samuels, 808 F. 2d 1298, 1301 (CA8 1987) (R. Arnold, J., concurring in denial of rehg en banc).

 

The grave danger posed by the sua sponte creation and decision of issues by the trial and appellate courts without the prior knowledge of the parties is to cause injustice itself. Were we to address these unbriefed issues, an appellate tribunal in the State of Illinois observed, we would be forced to speculate as to the arguments that the parties might have presented had these issues been properly raised before this court. To engage in such speculation would only cause further injustice; thus, we refrain from addressing these issues sua sponte.[21] Such injustice may extend outside of the parties themselves, as warned in United Shoe Workers of America, Local 132 v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Board,[22] viz:

 

Courts do not decline to decide questions which are not before them because they are not willing to assume responsibility for the decision. When a court decides a question not before it, its decision may and very probably will affect the rights of parties who have never had their day in court. The question may, as Chief Justice Winslow said, arise under circumstances that cannot be foreseen which may throw much additional light upon the question. Long experience has demonstrated that questions which affect the rights of citizens should not be determined upon hypothetical and suppositious cases.

 

Instances admittedly happen when courts are allowed to step in and raise issues sua sponte.[23] The most common instance is when a court decides whether or not it has jurisdiction over a case before it.[24] Also, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court has been relatively flexible in resolving unassigned issues everytime it has found doing so necessary to arrive at a just decision.[25] However, limitations on such instances should be set in order to preserve the courts neutrality and to respect the litigants autonomy, particularly: (a) when necessary to avoid issuing decisions containing erroneous statements of the law, such as when the parties misrepresent the law and ask the court to decide a case on such ground; (b) when necessary to maintain control over how the court would want to interpret the law; and (c) when necessary to give voice to legislative enactments disfavored or ignored by the parties.[26]

 

None of the limitations obtains here. The time of taking is an issue peripheral to and outside of the claims the parties extensively argued in this case. That the parties did not see fit to present the issue is concrete testimony to their consensus that the issue was not appropriate to be decided here and now, or that it might be better dealt with by and presented to the trial court. Consequently, the Court must itself exercise self-restraint and resist the temptation to deal with and pass upon the issue, because:

 

xxx a court has no reason to raise issues that are tangential to or distinct from the claims that the parties have asked the court to decide, because in these cases its opinion will not mislead other or create flawed precedent. xxx Moreover, questions that are truly independent from those that the parties have already briefed and argued would likely require the development of facts not already in the record, which is unfair to litigants who are beyond the discovery stage thus providing good reason for courts to ignore those issues as well.[27]

 

Moreover, I disagree that the desire to avoid delaying the distribution of the land can justify deciding now the time of taking. Haste on that basis may unduly sacrifice the constitutional right of HLI to the fair and prompt determination of its just compensation. We have to bear in mind that the taking of land for the CARP, albeit revolutionary, should not be done by sacrificing the constitutional right to the fair and prompt determination of just compensation for HLI as the landowner because it was as entitled as the FWBs to the protection of the Constitution and the agrarian reform laws.[28] On the other hand, having the RTC-SAC determine the time of taking, far from being a cause for delay, may actually expedite the proceedings, because the RTC-SAC can resort to the aid of extrajudicial and judicial mediation, as well as to other procedures heretofore effectively used by the trial courts to expedite, including pre-trial and discovery, with the end in view of quickening the all-important determination of just compensation. In this regard, all the possibilities of expediting the process should be encouraged, because just compensation that results from the agreement and consent of the stakeholders of land reform will be no less just and full.

 

Given the foregoing, the time of taking, as a factor in determining just compensation, should be fully heard during the second stage of the expropriation proceedings and settled initially by the DAR and Land Bank, and subsequently by the RTC-SAC, not by the Court in these proceedings that commenced from an administrative decision that was an incident during the first stage of the expropriation.

 

 

 

 

II

 

The Majority now rules that the Government shall pay to HLI the just compensation for the 240-square-meter homelots distributed to the FWBs pursuant to the provisions of the discredited SDP.

 

I welcome the ruling, because the Majority now adopts my humble view.

 

Verily, the giving of the homelots as among the benefits acquired by the FWBs under the SDP should not be disturbed, that is, the FWBs should not be obliged to return the homelots thus received. To oust the FWBs from their homelots would displace them from the premises they had enjoyed for two decades, more or less, building thereon the homes for their families. Their displacement would be unjust. Yet, the homelots were distributed to the FWBs because of the SDP. Upon the revocation of the SDP, HLI lost the only enforceable justification for distributing the homelots to the FWBs. Simple justice demands, therefore, that HLI be justly compensated for the market value of the homelots. Indeed, while the emancipation of the FWBs from the bondage of the soil is the primordial objective of the CARP, vigilance for the rights of the landowner is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of the property owner, who under our Constitution and laws is also entitled to protection.[29]

 

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT HLIs Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification of Noel Mallari, et al. in accordance with the foregoing.

 

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice



[1] G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576.

[2] Id., pp. 583-584.

[3] Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000, 334 SCRA 320, 330.

[4] G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 385-386.

[5] Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

x x x

Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory.

[6] Section 54. Certiorari. Any decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a copy thereof.

The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence.

[7] DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series of 2003 (Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases).

[8] Supra, note 4, at p. 378.

[9] No. L-59603, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 305, 316.

[10] Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as just compensation for the land.

[11] National Power Corporation v. Maruhom, G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 198, 210.

[12] State By and Through Dept. of Highways of State of Mont. v. McGuckin, 242 Mont. 81, 788 P.2d 926 (1990).

[13] National Power Corporation v. Maruhom, G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 198, 210.

[14] South Carolina Department of Transportation v. Faulkenberry, 522 S.E.2d 822 (1999).

[15] National Power Corporation v. Co, G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 234, 240.

[16] National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, No. L-56378, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 665, 673.

[17] National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113194, March 11, 1996, 254 SCRA 577, 590.

[18] Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 166833, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 410, 416.

[19] State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941).

[20] 554 U.S. 237, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399, 76 BNA USLW 4533 (June 23, 2008).

[21] People v. Rodriguez, 336 Ill.App.3d 1, 782 N.E.2d 718, 270 Ill. Dec. 159 (2003).

[22] 227 Wis. 569, 279 N.W. 37, 2 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 883, 1 Lab. Cas. P 18, 132 (1938).

[23] See People v. Villarico, Sr., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 43, which held that the absence of specific assignments of error does not inhibit the sua sponte rectification of the omission to grant civil liability and damages to the victim, for the grant of all the proper kinds and amounts of civil liability to the victim or his heirs is a matter of law and judicial policy not dependent upon or controlled by an assignment of error; Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006,495 SCRA 301, which declared that courts may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it; People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555, wherein the Court held that courts may apply the precept of retroactivity of penal laws that is favorable to the accused even if the accused has not invoked it; Republic v. Feliciano, No. L-70853, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 424, which declared that the defense of immunity from suit may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.

[24] Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission, No. L-68544, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 211.

[25] Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, G.R. No. 150092, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 201, 209.

[26] Frost, A., Limits of Advocacy, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 59:44, pp. 509-511 (2009).

[27] Id., pp. 509-510.

[28] Land Bank v. Chico, G.R. No. 168453, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 226, 245.

[29] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 149, 161.