G.R. No. 171101 - HACIENDA
LUISITA, INC., PETITIONER, V. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
LUISITA
INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,
PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For
resolution are the Motion to Clarify and
Reconsider Resolution of
HLI contends in its Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution
of
A
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN
DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION, THE DATE OF TAKING IS NOVEMBER 21, 1989,
WHEN PARC APPROVED HLIs SDP IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE TIME THAT
THE FWBs WERE CONSIDERED TO OWN AND POSSESS THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN HACIENDA
LUISITA because:
1. The SDP is precisely a
modality which the agrarian law gives the landowner as alternative to
compulsory coverage in which case, therefore, the FWBs cannot be considered as
owners and possessors of the agricultural lands at the time the SDP was
approved by PARC;
2. The approval of the SDP cannot
be akin to a Notice of Coverage in compulsory coverage or acquisition because
SDP and compulsory coverage are two different
modalities with independent and separate rules and mechanisms;
3. The Notice of Coverage of January 02, 2006 may, at the very
least, be considered as the time when the FWBs can be considered to own and
possess the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita because that is only the
time when Hacienda Luisita was placed under compulsory acquisition in view of failure of HLI to perform certain
obligations of the SDP, or SDOA;
4. Indeed, the immutable rule and
the unbending jurisprudence is that taking takes place when the owner is
actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;
5. To insist that the taking is
when the SDP was approved by PARC on November 21, 1989 and that the same be
considered as the reckoning period to determine the just compensation is
deprivation of landowners property without due process of law;
6. HLI should be entitled to
payment of interest on the just compensation.
B
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED ITS
DECISION GIVING THE FWBs THE OPTION TO REMAIN AS HLI STOCKHOLDERS OR NOT, because:
1. It is an exercise of a right
of the FWB which the Honorable Court has declared in its Decision and even in
its Resolution and that has to be respected and implemented;
2. Neither the Constitution nor
the CARL require[s] that the FWBs should have control over the agricultural
lands;
3. The option has not been shown
to be detrimental but instead beneficial to the FWBs as found by the Honorable
Court.
C
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROCEEDS
FROM THE SALES OF THE 500-HECTARE CONVERTED LOT AND THE 80.51-HECTARE SCTEX
CANNOT BE RETAINED BY HLI BUT RETURNED TO THE FWBs AS BY SUCH MANNER; HLI IS
USING THE CORPORATION CODE TO AVOID ITS LIABILITY TO THE FWBs FOR THE PRICE IT
RECEIVED FROM THE SALES, because
1. The proceeds of the sales belong to the
corporation and not to either HLI/Tadeco or the FWBs, both of which are
stockholders entitled to the earnings of the corporation and to the net assets
upon liquidation;
2. To allow the return of the proceeds of the
sales to FWBs is to impose all liabilities of the corporation on HLI/Tadeco
which is unfair and violative of the Corporation Code.
For their part, respondents Mallari, et al. submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification
that:
1.
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law does not
provide that the FWBs who opt for stock distribution option should retain
majority shareholding of the company to which the agricultural land was given.
2.
If the
3.
On the conclusion by this Honorable Court that the operative fact
doctrine is applicable to the case at bar, then FWBs who merely relied on the
PARC approval should not be prejudiced by its subsequent nullification.
4.
Those who choose land should return whatever they got from the SDOA and
turn over the same to HLI for use in the operations of the company, which in
turn will redound to the benefit of those who will opt to stay with the SDO.
5.
For those who choose land, the time of taking for purposes of just
compensation should be at the time HLI was dispossessed of control over the
property, and that payment by of the land should be turned over to HLI for the
benefit and use of the companys operations that will, in turn, redound to the
benefit of FWBs who will opt to stay with the company.
Recommendations
I
readily CONCUR with the Majority in
subjecting to compulsory land distribution the lands of HLI affected by the
discredited Stock Distribution Plan (SDP), as disposed in the resolution
promulgated on November 22, 2011.
However,
I humbly REITERATE my
DISSENT on two aspects of the
decision of July 5, 2011 and the resolution of November 22, 2011. I MAINTAIN that if the constitutional
guarantee of just compensation is to be fulfilled with justice and fairness:
(a) The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
and Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), initially, and the Regional Trial Court as Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC),
ultimately, should determine the
reckoning date of taking as an integral component of their statutory responsibility
to determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6675 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
or CARL); and
(b) HLI should be compensated as the
landowner for the fair market value of the homelots granted to the farmworker-beneficiaries
(FWBs) under the discredited SDP.
I humbly CONTEND that the Court will likely
overstep its jurisdiction if it pegs the time of taking at a definite date
(whether November 21, 1989, or January 2, 2006, or any other date) because it
thereby pre-empts the RTC-SAC from doing so. I must NOTE that the determination of just compensation (which is always
reckoned from the time of taking) is a factual matter expressly within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC; and that the sua sponte pegging by the Court of the
time of taking (even without the parties having properly raised and argued the
matter) unduly interferes with the parties right of presentation and autonomy.
Submissions
& Explanations
I
A
For
a proper perspective, let me remind that the exercise by the State of its
inherent power of eminent domain comes in two stages. The Court has
characterized the dual stages in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[1] in the following manner:
There are two (2) stages in every action of
expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority
of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
xxx
The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken. xxx.[2]
The
first stage in expropriation relates to the determination of the validity of
the expropriation. At this stage, the trial court resolves questions, like
whether the expropriator has the power of eminent domain, whether the use of
the property is public, whether the taking is necessary, and, should there be
conditions precedent for the exercise of the power, whether they have been
complied with. In the second stage, the trial
court is called upon to determine the just compensation, taking into
consideration all the factors of just compensation (including whether interest
should be paid on the amount of just compensation). Rule 67 of the Rules of Court generally delineates the
procedure followed in both stages. Although expropriation may be either
judicial or legislative, the dual stages apply to both, for there is no point
in distinguishing between judicial and legislative expropriation
as far as the two stages mentioned above are concerned.[3]
The
taking of property pursuant to the CARL is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. It is a revolutionary expropriation that covers all private
agricultural lands that exceeded the maximum retention limits reserved to their
owners. This the Court has fittingly pointed out in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform:[4]
xxx [W]e do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific
property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its
owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary
kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands wherever
found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention
limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the
benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the
population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society,
from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole
territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future,
which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the
present generation of Filipinos. Generations
yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully
only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to
them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained
this revolution in the farms, calling for a just distribution among the
farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can
now become the key at last to their deliverance.
Its
revolutionary character notwithstanding, expropriation under the CARL still goes
through the two stages. Section 16 of the CARL, which provides the procedure
for private agricultural land acquisition, makes this explicit enough, thus:
Section 16. Procedure
for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private
lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having
identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send
its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal
building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said
notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in
accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent
provisions hereof.
(b) Within
thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal
delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative
shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the
landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the
purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the
Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.
(d) In case of
rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensation of the land by requiring the
landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed
submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days
after it is submitted for decision.
(e) Upon receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
(f) Any party
who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
For
sure, the expropriation under the CARL is not an exclusively judicial process. The
first stage of expropriation commences upon the issuance of the notice of
coverage, and is initially dealt with administratively by the DAR
pursuant to Section 50 of the CARL,[5] subject to a judicial review in accordance with Section
54 of the CARL.[6] The DAR, through the Regional Director, has
jurisdiction over all agrarian law implementation
cases, including protests or petitions to lift coverage.[7]
In exercising jurisdiction over such cases, the
Regional Director passes upon and resolves various issues, including whether
the land is subject to or exempt from CARP coverage, and whether the required
notices of coverage have been served on the landowners.
Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 4. The State shall,
by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share
of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake
the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment
of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
The Constitution itself has thereby settled the
requirement of public use and the necessity for the expropriation, which are
the proper subjects of the first stage of expropriation proceedings. In its
1987 pronouncement in Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[8] the Court declared so:
As earlier observed, the requirement of public use has
already been settled for us by the Constitution itself. No less than the 1987
Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural
lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum
retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A.
No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the
State adopt the necessary measures to encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to
own directly or collectively the lands they till. That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second stage is devoted to the determination of
just compensation. This stage, as essential as the first, is
always judicial in nature. According to Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay:[9]
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
The executive department or legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much
less can the courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation.
B.
HLI
assailed the resolution of November 22, 2011 for reckoning the time of taking
from November 21, 1989, the date when the PARC approved HLIs SDP, because
there was yet no land transfer at that time. It insists that, at the very least,
In
the alternative, HLI manifested its willingness to abide by my Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of
November 22, 2011, whereby I respectfully recommended leaving the issue of the
time of taking for the RTC-SAC to decide as an adjunct of the determination of
the just compensation.
Respondents
Noel Mallari, et al. agreed that the
RTC-SAC should decide the issue of the time of taking.
To
recall, I wrote in my Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion of November 22, 2011, as follows:
The determination of when the taking occurred is an
integral and vital part of the determination and computation of just
compensation. The nature and character of land at the time of its taking are the principal criteria to determine
just compensation to the landowner. In National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized the importance
of the time of taking in fixing the amount of just compensation, thus:
xxx
[T]he Court xxx invariably held that the
time of taking is the critical date in determining lawful or just
compensation. Justifying this stance, Mr. Justice (later
Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for the Court in Municipality of
La Carlota vs. The Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, xxx
the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to
according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as
of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He
had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be despoiled of such a
right. No less than the fundamental law guarantees just compensation. It would be an injustice to him certainly if from
such a period, he could not recover the value of what was lost. There could be
on the other hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the
collection, the increment in price would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to
which this Court has been committed is intended precisely to avoid either
contingency fraught with unfairness.
It is my humble submission, therefore, that the factual issue of when the
taking had taken place as to the affected agricultural lands should not be
separated from the determination of just compensation by DAR, Land Bank and
SAC. Accordingly, I urge that the Court should leave the matter of the
reckoning date to be hereafter determined by the DAR and Land Bank pursuant to
Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6657.[10]
Should the parties disagree thereon, the proper SAC will then resolve their
disagreement as an integral part of a petition for determination of just
compensation made pursuant to Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 xxx.
I MAINTAIN my
foregoing position.
Just
compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property
the expropriator takes from its owner. The measure for computing just
compensation is not the takers gain, but the owners loss.[11]
The constitutional policy underlying the requirement for the payment of just
compensation is to make the landowner whole after the State has taken his
property.[12]
The word just intensifies the word compensation
to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[13]
For
the landowner of expropriated property to be fully compensated, the State must
put him in as good a position pecuniarily as if the use of the property had not
been taken away.[14]
Accordingly, just compensation is
principally based on the fair market value, which is that sum of money which a
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
therefore.[15]
The
price or value of the land and its character at the time it is taken by the Government are the primordial
criteria for determining just compensation.[16] Section 17 of the CARL
enumerates other factors to be considered, viz:
Section 17. Determination
of Just Compensation - In determining
just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and assessments made by the government assessors shall be considered. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and
by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
As
to taking, the Court has set a number of circumstances that must be established
before property is said to be taken for a public use, to wit:
A number of circumstances must be present in taking
of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a
private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than
a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.[17]
The prescription of such
number of circumstances means that compensable
taking is not a simple concept easy to ascertain. Certainly, evidence from
the parties is needed to concretize the concept. Thus, establishing the
time of taking demands a judicial trial in which both the owner and the
expropriator are afforded the fullest opportunity to prove either when
the owner was actually deprived
or dispossessed of the property, or when a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of the property happened, or when the owner was
deprived of the ordinary use of the property.
Not being a trier of facts, the Court has no capacity to render a valid finding
upon the time of taking.
In contrast, not only is the RTC-SAC a trier of facts
but it is also vested with the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to receive
the parties evidence on the valuation of the affected property
pursuant to Section 57 of the CARL, viz:
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all
appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.
Original
jurisdiction means
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass
judgment upon the law and facts,[18]
and
concerns the right
to hear a cause and to make an original determination of the issues from the
evidence as submitted directly by the witnesses, or of the law as presented, uninfluenced or unconcerned by any prior
determination, or the action of any other court juridically determining the
same controversy.[19] Needless to point out, that jurisdiction of the
RTC-SAC is also exclusive of all other
courts, including this Court.
Although November 21,
1989 was the date when the affected landholdings of HLI came under the SDP, I
see no practical justification why the Court should peg that date as the time
of taking. As I see it, HLI/TADECO as landowner was not deprived of its
property on that date. Nor was its property destroyed or materially impaired
then. Instead, what occurred on that
date was the fusion of HLI/TADECO as owner, on the one hand, and the FWBs as
the tenant-farmers, on the other hand, into one corporate entity in relation to
the land subject of the SDP, a fusion that did not result into or cause the
deprivation of HLI of its land.
It is
significant that the parties did not raise the time of taking as an issue in
their pleadings. The petition for certiorari and prohibition assailed only the PARCs revocation of
the SDP and the resulting placement of the lands subject of the SDP under
compulsory land acquisition of the CARP on the ground that the PARC had no authority
to revoke the SDP. Consequently, the time of taking was neither relevant to the
objective of the petition, nor necessary to the determination of the issues the
petition raised. In fact, the decision promulgated on July 5, 2011 itself expressly
limited the issues only to: (1)
matters of standing; (2) the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657; (3) the
jurisdiction of PARC to recall or revoke HLI's SDP; (4) the validity or
propriety of such recall or revocatory action; and (5) corollary to (4), the
validity of the terms and conditions of the SDP, as embodied in the SDOA, with
none of the stated issues involving the time of taking. The first time that the time of taking surfaced
was when the July 5, 2011 decision pegged it on November 29, 1989. As
such, the Court overstepped its adjudicative
boundaries by pegging the taking at a definite date (whether November 21, 1989,
or January 2, 2006, or any other date) even without the parties presenting the
matter here.
With
all due respect to my distinguished colleagues in the Majority, I state that the
Court unduly interfered with the right of the parties to present the issues
they desired to bring for the Courts consideration and resolution. As a rule,
the Court should not create issues sua
sponte but should decide only the issues presented by the parties. This
rule adheres to the principle of party presentation, which fully complements
the role of the Judiciary as the neutral arbiter of disputes, a role that is
vital to the adversarial system.
Greenlaw v. United States,[20]
a
2008 ruling of the United States Supreme Court, explained the principle of
party presentation or litigants autonomy in the following terms, to wit:
In our adversary system, in both civil
and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the
principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the
issues for decision and assign to courts the role of
neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present. To the
extent courts have approved departures from the party presentation
principle in criminal cases, the justification has usually been to protect a pro
se litigants rights. See Castro v.
[Courts] do not, or should not, sally
forth each day looking for wrongs to right. We wait for cases to come to us,
and when they do we normally decide only questions presented by the parties.
Counsel almost always know a great deal more about their cases than we do, and
this must be particularly true of counsel for the
The grave danger posed by the sua sponte creation and decision of
issues by the trial and appellate courts without the prior knowledge of the
parties is to cause injustice itself. Were we to address these unbriefed
issues, an appellate tribunal in the State of Illinois observed, we would be
forced to speculate as to the arguments that the parties might have presented
had these issues been properly raised before this court. To engage in such
speculation would only cause further injustice; thus, we refrain from
addressing these issues sua sponte.[21] Such injustice may extend outside of the parties
themselves, as warned in United Shoe Workers of America, Local 132 v.
Courts do not decline to decide questions which are
not before them because they are not willing to assume responsibility for the
decision. When a court decides a question not before it, its decision may and
very probably will affect the rights of parties who have never had their day in
court. The question may, as Chief Justice Winslow said, arise under
circumstances that cannot be foreseen which may throw much additional light
upon the question. Long experience has demonstrated that questions which affect
the rights of citizens should not be determined upon hypothetical and suppositious
cases.
Instances
admittedly happen when courts are allowed to step in and raise issues sua sponte.[23]
The most common instance is when a court decides whether or not it has
jurisdiction over a case before it.[24]
Also, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court has been
relatively flexible in resolving unassigned issues everytime it has found doing
so necessary to arrive at a just decision.[25]
However,
limitations on such instances should be set in order to preserve the courts
neutrality and to respect the litigants autonomy, particularly: (a) when necessary to avoid issuing
decisions containing erroneous statements of the law, such as when the parties
misrepresent the law and ask the court to decide a case on such ground; (b) when necessary to maintain control
over how the court would want to interpret the law; and (c) when necessary to give voice to legislative enactments
disfavored or ignored by the parties.[26]
None
of the limitations obtains here. The time of taking is an issue peripheral to and
outside of the claims the parties extensively argued in this case. That the
parties did not see fit to present the issue is concrete testimony to their
consensus that the issue was not appropriate to be decided here and now, or
that it might be better dealt with by and presented to the trial court. Consequently,
the Court must itself exercise self-restraint and resist the temptation to deal
with and pass upon the issue, because:
xxx a court has no reason to raise issues that are
tangential to or distinct from the claims that the parties have asked the court
to decide, because in these cases its opinion will not mislead other or create
flawed precedent. xxx Moreover, questions that are truly independent from those
that the parties have already briefed and argued would likely require the
development of facts not already in the record, which is unfair to litigants
who are beyond the discovery stage thus providing good reason for courts to
ignore those issues as well.[27]
Moreover,
I disagree that the desire to avoid delaying the distribution of the land can
justify deciding now the time of taking. Haste on that basis may unduly sacrifice
the constitutional right of HLI to the fair and prompt determination of its
just compensation. We have to bear in mind that the taking of land for the
CARP, albeit revolutionary, should not be done by sacrificing the
constitutional right to the fair and prompt determination of just compensation
for HLI as the landowner because it was as entitled as the FWBs to the
protection of the Constitution and the agrarian reform laws.[28]
On the other hand, having the
RTC-SAC determine the time of taking, far from being a cause for delay, may
actually expedite the proceedings, because the RTC-SAC can resort to the aid of
extrajudicial and judicial mediation, as well as to other procedures heretofore
effectively used by the trial courts to expedite, including pre-trial and
discovery, with the end in view of quickening the all-important determination
of just compensation. In this regard, all the possibilities of expediting the
process should be encouraged, because just compensation that results from the
agreement and consent of the stakeholders of land reform will be no less just
and full.
Given
the foregoing, the time of taking, as a factor in determining just
compensation, should be fully heard during the second stage of the
expropriation proceedings and settled initially by the DAR and Land Bank, and
subsequently by the RTC-SAC, not by the Court in these proceedings that
commenced from an administrative decision that was an incident during the first
stage of the expropriation.
II
The
Majority now rules that the Government shall pay to HLI the just compensation
for the 240-square-meter homelots distributed to the FWBs pursuant to the
provisions of the discredited SDP.
I welcome the ruling, because the Majority now adopts
my humble view.
Verily,
the giving of the homelots as among the benefits acquired by the FWBs under the
SDP should not be disturbed, that is,
the FWBs should not be obliged to return the homelots thus received. To oust
the FWBs from their homelots would displace them from the premises they had
enjoyed for two decades, more or less, building thereon the homes for their
families. Their displacement would be unjust. Yet, the homelots were distributed
to the FWBs because of the SDP. Upon the revocation of the SDP, HLI lost the
only enforceable justification for distributing the homelots to the FWBs.
Simple justice demands, therefore, that HLI be justly compensated for the
market value of the homelots. Indeed, while the emancipation of the FWBs from
the bondage of the soil is the primordial objective of the CARP, vigilance for
the rights of the landowner is equally important because social justice cannot
be invoked to trample on the rights of the property owner, who under our
Constitution and laws is also entitled to protection.[29]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to PARTIALLY
GRANT HLIs Motion to Clarify and
Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification of Noel Mallari, et al. in accordance with the foregoing.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
[1] G.R.
No. 69260,
[2]
[3] Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation,
G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000, 334 SCRA 320, 330.
[4] G.R.
No. 78742,
[5] Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the
DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
x x x
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory.
[6] Section 54. Certiorari. Any
decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any
matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or
interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be
brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari
except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of a copy thereof.
The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive
if based on substantial evidence.
[7] DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series of
2003 (Rules for Agrarian Law
Implementation Cases).
[8] Supra,
note 4, at p. 378.
[9] No.
L-59603, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 305, 316.
[10] Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the landowner in
such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP or as
may be finally determined by the court as just compensation for the land.
[11] National Power Corporation v. Maruhom,
G.R. No. 183297,
[12] State By and Through Dept. of Highways of
State of
[13] National Power Corporation v. Maruhom,
G.R. No. 183297,
[14] South Carolina Department of Transportation
v. Faulkenberry, 522 S.E.2d 822 (1999).
[16] National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, No. L-56378, June
22, 1984, 129 SCRA 665, 673.
[17] National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113194, March 11, 1996, 254
SCRA 577, 590.
[18] Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 166833,
[19] State v. Johnson, 100
[20] 554 U.S. 237, 128 S.Ct. 2559,
[21] People v. Rodriguez, 336 Ill.App.3d 1, 782 N.E.2d 718, 270 Ill.
Dec. 159 (2003).
[22] 227
[23] See People v. Villarico, Sr., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 43, which held that the absence of specific
assignments of error does not inhibit the sua sponte rectification of
the omission to grant civil liability and damages to the victim, for the grant
of all the proper kinds and amounts of civil liability to the victim or
his heirs is a matter of law and judicial policy not dependent upon or
controlled by an assignment of error; Euro-Med
Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July
17, 2006,495 SCRA 301, which declared that courts may raise the issue of
primary jurisdiction sua sponte and
its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it; People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July
29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555, wherein the Court held that courts may apply the
precept of retroactivity of penal
laws that is favorable to the accused even if the accused has not invoked it; Republic v. Feliciano, No. L-70853,
[24] Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission,
No. L-68544, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 211.
[25] Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, G.R. No. 150092,
[26] Frost,
A., Limits of Advocacy, Duke Law
Journal, Vol. 59:44, pp. 509-511 (2009).
[27]
[28] Land
Bank v.
[29] Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, October 6,
1995, 249 SCRA 149, 161.