Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus
- PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
and ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and
Awards Committee, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 167057 Present: CORONA,C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, *
BRION, BERSAMIN,
and VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. Promulgated: April 11, 2012 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court,
except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO),
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain,
prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or
any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Governments direction,
from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way,
site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National
Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting,
executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such
contract or project; and (e)
undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract
or project.
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC)
that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or
project acts contrary to law.
Antecedents
The following antecedents are culled
from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
In
1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an
invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery
of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand
(20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys Rural Electrification
Project. The said contract consisted of
four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms,
necessary for NEAs projected allocation for
Following
a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and eligibility, only four (4)
bidders, including private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the
bidding for the IPB-80 contract.
Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private
respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components
of the contract. NEA then conducted a
pre-award inspection of private respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing plants
and facilities, including its identified supplier in
In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the following:
a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely advantageous to the government. The price difference is equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and
d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and specified in the bid documents and as based on the pre-award inspection conducted.
However, on
On the other
hand, the losing bidders
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000.
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition
No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC
in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v.
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and
Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt
to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and
praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden
poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 03106921, stating
that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that
government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs,
contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the
corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.[3]
On
On
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this Court:
1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for the defendants;
4. DECLARING defendants in default;
5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue
enjoining the defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee
Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the subject bidding upon the
plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for
any damage or damages which the defendants may suffer should it be finally
adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final determination of
the issue in this case by this Court.
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of
a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of P200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel copy of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the
reconsideration of the order of
On
Thence, respondents commenced in the
Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from
the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established
jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents
counsel from representing them.[7]
On
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders
dated July 30 and
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
Issues
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the
following issues:
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also one for damages.
Ruling
The petition fails.
In its decision of
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judges issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
Respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for
TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction
through the assailed order enjoining petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of
the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. xxx
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings and other related construction projects that form part of the government capital investment.
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the case, that would justify respondent Judges blatant disregard of a simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects. Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in the first place, he should not have given due course to private respondents complaint for injunction. Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered by petitioners.[10]
The CAs decision was absolutely correct.
The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the
complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby
contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW
Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction.
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8975 provide:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall
issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and
development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national
government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as
defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution,
execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of
any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or
authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders
or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such
contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which
bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is
null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the
contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same,
without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under
existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no
force and effect.
The
text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left
for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to
them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act
No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and
justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to
comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs
of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and
projects of the Government.
It
is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A.
Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil
Case No. 03106921 had
been raffled, was in fact already found administratively liable for gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of the assailed
TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine him
in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his
intervening retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court stated:
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Courts various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of a government infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project thus:
xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability.
In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases before them.
Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.
The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which judges are expected to know and apply properly.
IN
FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140
of the Rules of Court. He having retired from the service, a fine in the amount
of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed under Section
11 of Rule 140 as an alternative sanction to dismissal or suspension.[12]
Even as the foregoing outcome has
rendered any further treatment and discussion of Nerwins other submissions
superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly
appreciate the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This
failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this decision to reiterate the
norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance
of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them by all
litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil
Case No. 03106921 be avoided.
A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts.[13] It is an ancillary or
preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights
or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when
it is established that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance
of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice
to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.[14]
The
existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable.
In City Government of Butuan v.
Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,[15] the Court elaborated on this
requirement, viz:
As
with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of
a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the
property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears
to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the
existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must
in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final
relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive
writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is
violative of that right; and (c) that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. An injunction will not issue to
protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise
to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by
statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.[16]
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog
v. Court of Appeals,[17] it is enough that:
xxx for the
court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present
right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a
clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify
preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or
complete but need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an
idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision
of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here
involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of
the case still pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary
injunction, the private respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.[18]
In this
regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering
that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often
than not involve and require a factual determination that is not the function
of the appellate courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such
discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though
discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is done, the exercise of
sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.[21]
Moreover,
judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently
or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the
merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard
of that tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never
the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a
case,[23] or to
decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a
preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further
injury,[26] and
irreparable harm[27] or
injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be
settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect
the ability of their courts to render a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost
in their minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will
hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth
remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to
prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant
before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.[31]
WHEREFORE, the
Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Court of Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.
The Court Administrator shall
disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their guidance.
SO
ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Vice Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo who concurred with the decision of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to
the raffle of
[1] An Act to Ensure the Expeditious
Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting
Lower Courts from issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions
or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations
thereof, and for Other Purposes.
[2] Rollo, pp. 11-21; penned by Associate Justice
Magdangal M. De
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Supra, note 2.
[9] Rollo pp. 67-69; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal
De Leon, and concurred in by Associate Justice Brawner and Associate Justice
Del Castillo.
[10] Bold
underscoring is part of original text.
[11] 561
SCRA 38.
[12] Sinsuat
v.
[13] Sec. 1, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[14] Sec. 3, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[15] G.R.
No. 157315,
[16] City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated
Broadcasting System (BS), Inc., G.R. No. 157315, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA
320, 336-337 (Bold emphasis supplied).
[17] Saulog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119769,
[18]
[19] Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117964, March 28, 2001,355 SCRA 537, 548.
[20] Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135074, January 29, 1999, 302 SCRA 403, 409.
[21] Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 622, 628; S & A Gaisano, Inc. v. Judge Hidalgo; G.R. No. 80397, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 224, 229; Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79303, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 124, 133.
[22] Searth
Commodities Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, March 31,
1992, 207 SCRA 622, 629-630; Rivas v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
G.R. No. 53772, October 4, 1990,190 SCRA 295, 305; Government Service
Insurance System v. Florendo, G.R. No. 48603, September 29, 1989,
178 SCRA 76, 88-89; Ortigas v. Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals,
No. L-79128,
[23] 43 CJS Injunctions 5, citing B. W. Photo Utilities v. Republic Molding Corporation, C. A. Cal., 280 F. 2d 806; Duckworth v. James, C. A. Va. 267 F. 2d 224; Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Free Sewing Machine Co., C. A. Ill, 256 F. 2d 806.
[24] 43 CJS Injunctions 5, citing Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 229 N. E. 2d 536, 37 Ill. 2d 599; Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E. 2d 574, 580.
[25] Doeskin Products, Inc. v. United Paper Co., C. A. Ill., 195 F. 2d 356; Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, C. C. A. Minn., 168 F. 2d 694; Spickerman v. Sproul, 328 P. 2d 87, 138 Colo. 13; United States v. National Plastikwear Fashions, 368 F. 2d 845.
[26] Career Placement of White Plains, Inc. v. Vaus, 354 N. Y. S. 2d 764, 77 Misc. 2d 788;Toushin v. City of Chicago, 320 N. E. 2d 202, 23 Ill. App. 3d 797; H. K. H. Development Corporation v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 196 N. E., 2d 494, 47 Ill. App. 46.
[27] Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., C. A. La., 441 F. 2d 560; Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v. Panama S. S. Co., C. A. Wash., 362 U.S. 365.
[28] City
of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Association of St. Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Emp. Of
[29] Meis
v. Sanitas Service Corporation, C. A. Tex., 511 F. 2d 655; Gobel v. Laing, 12
[30] United States v. Adlers Creamery, C. C. A. N. Y., 107 F. 2d 987; American Mercury v. Kiely, C. C. A. N. Y., 19 F. 2d 295.
[31] Republic
v. Silerio, G.R. No. 108869,