Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
CHARLIE JAO, Petitioner, - versus - BCC
PRODUCTS SALES INC., and
TERRANCE TY,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 163700 Present: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. Promulgated: April 18, 2012 |
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D
E C I
S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
The issue is whether petitioner was
respondents employee or not. Respondents denied an employer-employee
relationship with petitioner, who insisted the contrary.
Through his petition for review on certiorari, petitioner appeals the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
Antecedents
Petitioner
maintained that respondent BCC Product Sales Inc. (BCC) and its President, respondent
Terrance Ty (Ty), employed him as comptroller starting from September 1995 with
a monthly salary of P20,000.00 to handle the financial aspect of BCCs
business;[2] that on October 19,1995, the
security guards of BCC, acting upon the instruction of Ty, barred him from
entering the premises of BCC where he then worked; that his attempts to report
to work in November and December 12, 1995 were frustrated because he continued
to be barred from entering the premises of BCC;[3] and that he filed a complaint dated
December 28, 1995 for illegal dismissal, reinstatement with full backwages,
non-payment of wages, damages and attorneys fees.[4]
Respondents
countered that petitioner was not their employee but the employee of Sobien
Food Corporation (SFC), the major creditor and supplier of BCC; and that SFC
had posted him as its comptroller in BCC to oversee BCCs finances and business
operations and to look after SFCs interests or investments in BCC.[5]
Although Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati
ruled in favor of petitioner on
On
Ruling of the CA
On
After a judicious review of the records vis--vis the respective posturing of the contending parties, we agree with the finding that no employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner BCC and the private respondent. On this note, the conclusion of the public respondent must be reversed for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are the four (4) standards in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, namely, (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative employees conduct. Of these powers the power of control over the employees conduct is generally regarded as determinative of the existence of the relationship.
Apparently, in the case before us, all these four elements are absent. First, there is no proof that the services of the private respondent were engaged to perform the duties of a comptroller in the petitioner company. There is no proof that the private respondent has undergone a selection procedure as a standard requisite for employment, especially with such a delicate position in the company. Neither is there any proof of his appointment nor is there any showing that the parties entered into an employment contract, stipulating thereof that he will receive P20,000.00/month salary as comptroller, before the private respondent commenced with his work as such. Second, as clearly established on record, the private respondent was not included in the petitioner companys payroll during the time of his alleged employment with the former. True, the name of the private respondent Charlie Jao appears in the payroll however it does not prove that he has received his remuneration for his services. Notably, his name was not among the employees who will receive their salaries as represented by the payrolls. Instead, it appears therein as a comptroller who is authorized to approve the same. Suffice it to state that it is rather obscure for a certified public accountant doing the functions of a comptroller from September 1995 up to December 1995 not to receive his salary during the said period. Verily, such scenario does not conform with the usual and ordinary experience of man. Coming now to the most controlling factor, the records indubitably reveal the undisputed fact that the petitioner company did not have nor did not exercise the power of control over the private respondent. It did not prescribe the manner by which the work is to be carried out, or the time by which the private respondent has to report for and leave from work. As already stated, the power of control is such an important factor that other requisites may even be disregarded. In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court emphatically held, thus:
The control test, under which the person
for whom the services are rendered reserves the right to direct not only the
end to be achieved but also the means for reaching such end, is generally
relied on by the courts.
We have carefully examined the evidence submitted by the private respondent in the formal offer of evidence and unfortunately, other than the bare assertions of the private respondent which he miserably failed to substantiate, we find nothing therein that would decisively indicate that the petitioner BCC exercised the fundamental power of control over the private respondent in relation to his employmentnot even the ID issued to the private respondent and the affidavits executed by Bertito Jemilla and Rogelio Santias. At best, these pieces of documents merely suggest the existence of employer-employee relationship as intimated by the NLRC. On the contrary, it would appear that the said sworn statement provided a substantial basis to support the contention that the private respondent worked at the petitioner BCC as SFCs representative, being its major creditor and supplier of goods and merchandise. Moreover, as clearly pointed out by the petitioner in his Reply to the private respondents Comment, it is unnatural for SFC to still employ the private respondent to oversee and supervise collections of account receivables due SFC from its customers or clients like the herein petitioner BCC on a date later than December, 1995 considering that a criminal complaint has already been instituted against him.
Sadly, the private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden of showing with legal certainty that employee-employer relationship existed between the parties. On the other hand, it was clearly shown by the petitioner that it neither exercised control nor supervision over the conduct of the private respondents employment. Hence, the allegation that there is employer-employee relationship must necessarily fail.
Consequently, a discussion on the issue of illegal dismissal therefore becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the public
respondent NLRC dated
SO ORDERED.
After
the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on
Issue
The sole issue is whether or not an
employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and BCC. A finding on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship will automatically warrant a
finding of illegal dismissal, considering that respondents did not state any
valid grounds to dismiss petitioner.
Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The
existence of an employer-employee relationship is a question of fact.
Generally, a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done by the Court
acting on a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only questions of law.
Nor may the Court be bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence adduced and considered
in the proceedings below.[16] This rule is not absolute, however, and
admits of exceptions. For one, the Court may look into factual issues in
labor cases when the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the
CA are conflicting.[17]
Here, the findings of the NLRC differed
from those of the Labor Arbiter and the CA. This conflict among such
adjudicating offices compels the Courts exercise of its authority to review
and pass upon the evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions therefrom.
To
prove his employment with BCC, petitioner offered the following: (a) BCC Identification Card (ID) issued
to him stating his name and his position as comptroller, and bearing his
picture, his signature, and the signature of Ty; (b) a payroll of BCC for the period of October 1-15, 1996 that
petitioner approved as comptroller; (c)
various bills and receipts related to expenditures of BCC bearing the signature
of petitioner; (d) various checks carrying
the signatures of petitioner and Ty, and, in some checks, the signature of
petitioner alone; (e) a court order showing
that the issuing court considered petitioners ID as proof of his employment
with BCC; (f) a letter of petitioner
dated March 1, 1997 to the Department of Justice on his filing of a criminal
case for estafa against Ty for
non-payment of wages; (g) affidavits
of some employees of BCC attesting that petitioner was their co-employee in BCC;
and (h) a notice of raffle dated December
5, 1995 showing that petitioner, being an employee of BCC, received the notice
of raffle in behalf of BCC.[18]
Respondents
denied that petitioner was BCCs employee. They affirmed that SFC had installed
petitioner as its comptroller in BCC to oversee and supervise SFCs collections
and the account of BCC to protect SFCs interest; that their issuance of the ID
to petitioner was only for the purpose of facilitating his entry into the BCC
premises in relation to his work of overseeing the financial operations of BCC
for SFC; that the ID should not be considered as evidence of petitioners
employment in BCC;[19] that petitioner executed an affidavit
in March 1996,[20] stating, among others, as follows:
1. I am a CPA (Certified Public Accountant) by profession but presently associated with, or employed by, Sobien Food Corporation with the same business address as abovestated;
2. In the course of my association with, or employment by, Sobien Food Corporation (SFC, for short), I have been entrusted by my employer to oversee and supervise collections on account of receivables due SFC from its customers or clients; for instance, certain checks due and turned over by one of SFCs customers is BCC Product Sales, Inc., operated or run by one Terrance L. Ty, (President and General manager), pursuant to, or in accordance with, arrangements or agreement thereon; such arrangement or agreement is duly confirmed by said Terrance Ty, as shown or admitted by him in a public instrument executed therefor, particularly par. 2 of that certain Counter-Affidavit executed and subscribed on December 11, 1995, xerox copy of which is hereto attached, duly marked as Annex A and made integral part hereof.
3. Despite such admission of an arrangement, or agreement insofar as BCC-checks were delivered to, or turned over in favor of SFC, Mr. Terrance Ty, in a desire to blemish my reputation or to cause me dishonor as well as to impute unto myself the commission of a crime, state in another public instrument executed therefor in that:
3. That all the said 158 checks were unlawfully appropriated by a certain Charlie Jao absolutely without any authority from BCC and the same were reportedly turned over by said Mr. Jao to a person who is not an agent or is not authorized representative of BCC.
xerox copy of which document (Affidavit) is hereto attached, duly marked as Annex B and made integral part hereof. (emphasis supplied)
and that the affidavit constituted
petitioners admission of the arrangement or agreement between BCC and SFC for
the latter to appoint a comptroller to oversee the formers operations.
Petitioner counters, however, that the
affidavit did not establish the absence of an employer-employee relationship between
him and respondents because it had been executed in March 1996, or after his
employment with respondents had been terminated on December 12, 1995; and that the
affidavit referred to his subsequent employment by SFC following the termination
of his employment by BCC.[21]
We cannot side with petitioner.
Our perusal of the affidavit of petitioner
compels a conclusion similar to that reached by the CA and the Labor Arbiter to
the effect that the affidavit actually supported the contention that petitioner
had really worked in BCC as SFCs representative. It does seem more natural and
more believable that petitioners affidavit was referring to his employment by
SFC even while he was reporting to BCC as a comptroller in behalf of SFC. As
respondents pointed out, it was implausible for SFC to still post him to
oversee and supervise the collections of accounts receivables due from BCC beyond
December 1995 if, as he insisted, BCC had already illegally dismissed him and had
even prevented him from entering the premises of BCC. Given the patent animosity
and strained relations between him and respondents in such circumstances, indeed,
how could he still efficiently perform in behalf of SFC the essential responsibility
to oversee and supervise collections at BCC? Surely, respondents would have vigorously
objected to any arrangement with SFC involving him.
We note that petitioner executed the
affidavit in March 1996 to refute a statement Ty himself made in his own
affidavit dated December 11, 1995 to the effect that petitioner had illegally
appropriated some checks without authority from BCC.[22] Petitioner thereby sought to show
that he had the authority to receive the checks pursuant to the arrangements
between SFC and BCC. This showing would aid in fending off the criminal charge
respondents filed against him arising from his mishandling of the checks. Naturally,
the circumstances petitioner adverted to in his March 1996 affidavit concerned
those occurring before
Further, an affidavit dated
The statements of So really supported
respondents position in that petitioners association with SFC prior to his supposed
employment by BCC went beyond mere acquaintance with So. That So, who had earlier
merely retained petitioner as his accountant, thereafter employed petitioner
as a retained accountant after his supposed illegal dismissal by BCC raised a
doubt as to his employment by BCC, and rather confirmed respondents assertion
of petitioner being an employee of SFC while he worked at BCC.
Moreover,
in determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship,
the Court has consistently looked for the following incidents, to wit: (a)
the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c)
the power of dismissal; and (d) the
employers power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the
work is accomplished. The last element, the so-called control test, is the most
important element.[24]
Hereunder are some of the circumstances
and incidents occurring while petitioner was supposedly employed by BCC that
debunked his claim against respondents.
It
can be deduced from the March 1996 affidavit of petitioner that respondents challenged
his authority to deliver some 158 checks to SFC. Considering that he contested respondents
challenge by pointing to the existing arrangements between BCC and SFC, it
should be clear that respondents did not exercise the power of control over him,
because he thereby acted for the benefit and in the interest of SFC more than
of BCC.
In
addition, petitioner presented no document setting forth the terms of his
employment by BCC. The failure to present such agreement on terms of employment
may be understandable and expected if he was a common or ordinary laborer who
would not jeopardize his employment by demanding such document from the
employer, but may not square well with his actual status as a highly educated
professional.
Petitioners admission that he did not
receive his salary for the three months of his employment by BCC, as his
complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages[25] and the criminal case for estafa he later filed against the
respondents for non-payment of wages[26] indicated, further raised grave doubts
about his assertion of employment by BCC. If the assertion was true, we are puzzled
how he could have remained in BCCs employ in that period of time despite not being paid the
first salary of P20,000.00/month. Moreover, his name did not appear in the
payroll of BCC despite him having approved the payroll as comptroller.
Lastly,
the confusion about the date of his alleged illegal dismissal provides another
indicium of the insincerity of petitioners assertion of employment by BCC. In the
petition for review on certiorari, he
averred that he had been barred from entering the premises of BCC on
With
all the grave doubts thus raised against petitioners claim, we need not dwell
at length on the other proofs he presented, like the affidavits of some of the employees
of BCC, the ID, and the signed checks, bills and receipts. Suffice it to be
stated that such other proofs were easily explainable by respondents and by the
aforestated circumstances showing him to be the employee of SFC, not of BCC.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO
ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 38-46; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by
Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (retired) and Associate Justice Magdangal
M. De Leon.
[2] Id., p. 12.
[3] Id., p. 13.
[4] Id., pp. 236-238.
[5] Id., p. 179.
[6] Id., p. 178.
[7] Id., p. 39.
[8] Id., pp. 105-119.
[9] Id.,
p. 40.
[10] Id.,
p. 38.
[11] Id., pp. 38-46.
[12] Id., pp. 49-50.
[13] Id.,
p. 8.
[14] Id., p. 148.
[15] Id., p. 176.
[16] Diokno
v. Cacdac, G.R. No. 168475,
[17] Pagsibigan
v. People, G.R. No. 163868,
[18] Rollo
pp. 120-147.
[19] Id., pp. 179-180.
[20] Id., p. 146.
[21] Id.,
p. 32.
[22] Id.,
p. 146.
[23] Id.,
p. 25.
[24] Abante,
Jr. v. Lamadrid Bearing & Parts Corp., G.R. No. 159890, May 28, 2004,
430 SCRA 368, 379.
[25] Id.,
pp. 236-238.
[26] Id.,
p. 325.
[27] Id.,
p. 13.
[28] Id.,
p. 236.