Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD
DIVISION
|
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO,
Complainant, - versus - JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA,
JR., CLERK OF COURT STANLEE D. CALMA and LEGAL RESEARCHER DIANA G. RUIZ, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 Respondents. |
|
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2265
[Formerly A.M. OCA
I.P.I. No. 08-2986-RTJ] Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: September 21, 2011 |
x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Doubtless, the Court will
never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the
norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary.
However, it will not hesitate to protect innocent court employees against any baseless
accusation or administrative charge that only serve to disrupt rather than
promote the orderly administration of justice.[1]
At bench is
an administrative case against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. (Judge Larida, Jr.), Clerk
of Court Stanlee D. Calma (Atty. Calma) and Legal Researcher Diana G.
Cruz (LR Ruiz), all of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18,
The Facts:
In
a Letter-Complaint dated
The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the letter-complaint
and its attachments as follows:
I. Four
(4) Petitions for issuance by the Clerk of Court of Certificates of Sale under
Act 3135, as amended:
1. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner,
Freddie P. Magno, mortgagor, filed on
2. Cavite
Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Sixto & Norma Tolentino,
mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 (Re: application
for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);
3.
Cavite
Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Jonathan & Yolanda
Pearanda, mortgagors, filed on
4. Cavite
Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner,
II. Four (4) Ex-parte Joint Petitions for
the issuance by the Honorable Trial Court of Writs of Possession under Act
3135, as amended:
1. TG-05-1103,
2. TG-05-1104,
3. TG-05-1105,
4.
TG-05-1141,
Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo avers that
the aforementioned Petitions have long been pending before the above-mentioned
court saying that the ongoing hearings of said cases may be further extended by
the respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.
Anent TG-05-1103 and TG-05-1105,
complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo argues that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida,
Jr. committed an error when he recognized the appearance and participation of
Atty. Ireneo Anarna as lawyer for the oppositors to the said petitions in the
hearings thereof, and thereafter gave due course to the two oppositions filed,
both dated 15 November 2005. Respondent
Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed another error when he failed to require
the oppositors and Atty. Anarna the required guaranty bonds as mandated by
Section 47 of Republic Act 8791.
Likewise, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo
bewails the issuance by respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. of the Order
dated 10 July 2008 in TG-05-1141 which denied complainants Ex Parte Joint
Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petitions for the Issuance of
Writs of Possession (in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141)
by ruling that the petitioner has yet to present evidence besides marking of
exhibits. Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo
considers the said Order as contrary to Sections 7 and 8 of Act 3135 which
mandates, among others, that the trial court shall issue the Writ of Possession
regardless of opposition thereto.
In addition, complainant Emmanuel B.
Andamo accuses respondent Diana Ruiz, as then Officer-in-Charge and Acting
Clerk of Court, and Atty. Stanlee Calma, as the incumbent Clerk of Court, for
not having lifted a finger, say, by placing the docket of those eight (8)
long pending cases beside the other dockets already placed on the Hon. Courts
working table by way of requesting his Honor for instruction or reminding his
Honor of the urgency of action thereon, and notwithstanding Mrs. Ruiz[s]
acknowledged receipt of the written instruction of the Hon. Supreme Court
Administrator, dated November 17, 2005 as to how to act thereon.
Furthermore, complainant Emmanuel R.
Andamo implicated Atty. Ireneo Anarna, charging the latter of ignorance on the
provisions of Act 3135 and for obstruction of justice for filing misplaced
oppositions to non-litigious ex-parte petitions for issuance of Writ of
Possession and for not submitting the required oppositors bond.[3]
The
Joint Comment of respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz dated
Respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that
complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo mainly charges them for the non-issuance of
certificates of sale in the abovementioned extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings which were filed by Pepito Abueg as Acting Manager of petitioner
Cavite Rural Banking Corporation.
Respondents Calma and Ruiz declare that in all the aforesaid
applications for foreclosure, were undated certificates of sale signed by then
Deputy Sheriff Victor Hernandez, and Clerk of Court Analiza Luna. However,
these certificates do not bear the signature of approval of then Assisting
Judge (and eventually Deputy Court Administrator) Reuben P. Dela Cruz.
Likewise, respondents Calma and Ruiz
stress that there is an Order in an undocketed case, entitled Cavite Rural
Banking Corporation (then Cavite Development Bank), mortgagee v. Sps. Jonathan
Pearanda, Sps. Simon and Petronila Peji,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and
Yolanda Pearanda; Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji; Celia M. Bay; Spouses
Sixto and Norma Tolentino; and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to
comply with the requirements thereto.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue that the
aforesaid applications for foreclosure, including the petition for issuance of
certificates of sale, were properly brought before and deliberated by the
court. Hence, taking into consideration
the issuance of the
Respondents Calma and Ruiz further
explicate that in a copy of the
In addition, respondents Calma and Ruiz
call as an unfair accusation complainant Emmanuel R. Andamos imputation that
they were the reason for the issuance of the
Lastly, while complainant Emmanuel R.
Andamo charges respondents Calma and Ruiz with gross ignorance of Act No. 3135,
respondents Calma and Ruiz find it ironic that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo
misses the entire point of the issuance of the 17 March 2004 Order which states
complainants failure to show compliance with the same Act No. 3135.[4]
After
perusing the records, the OCA found that the allegations in the complaint and
the defenses raised by respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented
conflicting factual issues that could not be categorically resolved merely on
the basis of the records submitted. Judge Larida, Jr. even failed to submit his
Comment on the matter. The OCA then pointed out the necessity for a formal
investigation where the complainant and the respondents would be given the
opportunity to adduce their respective evidence. Thus, it recommended that the
administrative complaint against respondents be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative case, and the same be REFERRED to a Justice of the Court of
Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the records.
In the Resolution dated January 19,
2011,[5]
the Court resolved to: (1) note the letter-complaint of
Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo against respondents Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and
LR Ruiz, for gross ignorance of the law relative to LRC Case Nos. 05-1105,
05-1104, 05-1103, and 05-1141 for the issuance of writs of possession under Act
3135, as amended, and the joint comment dated October 3, 2007 of respondents
Clerk of Court and Legal Researcher; (2) re-docket the instant administrative
complaint; (3) refer this case to a Justice of the CA for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the records, and direct the Presiding Justice of the CA to raffle the
case among the incumbent Justices of the CA who shall conduct the investigation
and submit the required report and recommendation; and (4) note
the Report dated June 18, 2010 of the OCA.
The
case was eventually assigned to CA Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice
Lazaro-Javier) who, as directed by the Court, conducted the corresponding
investigation on the complaint.
Notably,
during the initial stage of the proceedings, Judge Larida, Jr. filed his Motion
with Leave of Court to Admit Comment[6]
dated
Judge
Larida, Jr. also informed the Court that per Supreme Court Resolution dated
During
the hearing on
Complainant
did not submit an affidavit and opted to adopt his Letter-Complaint as his
direct testimony. He further submitted several documentary evidence.[11]
For
his part, Judge Larida, Jr. submitted his Judicial Affidavit dated
Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz likewise
submitted their undated Joint Affidavit.
Atty. Calma emphasized that then
Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz had long denied complainants undocketed
petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure in CRBC v. Magno, in his Order
of
Aside from those previously submitted
exhibits, Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented the following: (1) Application
for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Magno;[13] (2)
Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Spouses
Tolentino;[14] (3)
Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Jonathan
and Yolanda Pearanda;[15] (4) Application for
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in Celia M. Bay;[16] (5) Certificate of Sale for
the auctioned property of Freddie P. Magno;[17] (6) Unsigned printed name of
Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[18] (7) Certificate of
Sale for the auctioned property of Sps. Tolentino;[19] (8) Unsigned printed
name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[20] (9) Certificate of Sale for the
auctioned property of Jonathan and Yolanda Pearanda;[21] (10)
Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[22] (11)
Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Celia Bay;[23] (12)
Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[24] (13)
Order of Judge Reuben Dela Cruz dated March 17, 2004;[25] (14)
Certification dated June 7, 2004 by Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[26] (15)
Comment dated October 3, 2007 filed before the OCA;[27]
and (16) Joint Affidavit of respondent Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz.[28]
The Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch
18,
After the formal offer of evidence and the
admission of the exhibits, the parties were required to file their respective
memoranda. Only respondent Judge Larida, Jr. complied.
Accordingly, in her Report and
Recommendation dated
Complainants charge of gross ignorance
of the law against respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The
evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that
it was he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the
court, as well. The evidence likewise showed that contrary to complainants accusation, respondents in fact strictly
complied with applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance
of writs of possession or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure.
Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and
mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this unnecessary battle. Precious time, energy and expense were wasted
when the same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose
beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphasis supplied]
Now, the Court resolves.
After a
thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and
recommendation of Justice Lazaro-Javier.
Notably, respondents are all charged
with gross ignorance of the law for their alleged acts or omissions, as
follows:
|
Name |
Cases |
Acts or
Omission Charged |
|
Judge Edwin Larida, Jr. |
LRC No. TG-05-1103 |
Issuing Order dated |
|
|
LRC No.
TG-05-1105 |
Issuing
Order dated |
|
|
LRC Nos.
TG-05-1103 and TG-05-1105 |
a)
Recognizing the appearance of Atty. Ireneo Anarna as oppositors counsel; b) Not requiring the oppositors therein
to file guaranty bonds pursuant to Section 47 of RA 8791. |
|
|
LRC No.
TG-05-1141 |
For
issuing Order dated evidence
besides marking of exhibits. |
|
Atty.
Stanlee Calma and Legal
Researcher Diana Ruiz |
|
For not
having lifted a finger, say, by placing the docket of those eight (8) long
pending cases beside the other dockets already placed on the Hon. Courts
working table by way of requesting his Honor for instruction or reminding his
Honor of the urgency of action thereon, and notwithstanding Mrs. Ruiz[s]
acknowledged receipt of the written instruction of the Hon. Supreme Court
Administrator, dated November 17, 2005 as to how to act thereon. |
As to respondent
Judge Edwin Larida, Jr.
According to complainant,
it was Judge Larida Jr.s ministerial duty under Act 3135, specifically
Sections 7[30] and 8[31]
thereof, to issue the writs of possession in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105,
and TG-05-1141. This being so, there was no need for him to still require
applicant to present evidence as condition for granting them. The fact that he did, nonetheless, was a
clear defiance of his ministerial duty and rendered him guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Complainant is mistaken.
The ministerial character of judicial
duty to issue writs of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is
explained in the case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications. [32]
Thus:
A writ of possession is an order
enforcing a judgment to allow a persons recovery of possession of real or
personal property. An instance when a
writ of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, as amended by act No. 4118,
on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Sections 6 and 7 provide, to wit:
Section
6. Redemption.In all cases in
which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before
referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold,
may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the
date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
section four hundred and sixty-four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the
Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act.
Section
7. Possession during redemption
period.In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser
may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the
property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during
the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of
the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it
be shown that the same was made without
violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of
this Act. Such petition shall be made
under oath and filed in [the] form of the ex-parte motion in the
registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in
special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or
under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any
other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of
any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the
clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees
specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Number
Four hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall , upon approval of the bond,
order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province
in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
From the foregoing provisions, a writ of
possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon
the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without
need of a bond.
Within the redemption period the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing
for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration
or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by a
On the other hand, after the lapse of the
redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser
in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest
over the foreclosed property. Consequently,
the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the
redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no
redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any
time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to
him of a new TCT. After consolidation of
title in the purchasers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property, the purchasers right to possession ripens into the absolute right of
a confirmed owner. At that point, the
issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title,
to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a
ministerial function. Effectively, the
court cannot exercise its discretion.
Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a
writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper. We have consistently held that the duty of
the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial,
and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment. The propriety of the issuance of the writ was
heightened in this case where the respondents right to possession of the
properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and became
absolute upon the petitioners failure to redeem the mortgaged properties.
[Underscoring supplied]
Simply put, after all the
requisite elements for issuance of a writ of possession, which are: (1)
consolidation of ownership in the mortgagors name; and (2)
issuance to mortgagor of a new TCT, shall have been duly established, the trial
court has no choice but to issue the writ prayed for. It cannot withhold,
suspend, or otherwise deny this relief from petitioner.
In this case, Judge
Larida Jr. denied complainants Urgent Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early
Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petition for the Issuance of Writs of Possession
in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 precisely because CRBC
had yet to present evidence to establish its entitlement to the writs
prayed for.[33] As it
was, complainant negatively reacted to Judge Larida Jr.s directive and accused
him of gross ignorance of the law for not instantly resolving the petitions,
for ruling that his client had yet to present evidence and for
recognizing Atty. Anarnas appearance as oppositors counsel.
It is settled that a
judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that
he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad
faith. In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[34]
The reasons cited by
complainant, far from constituting gross ignorance of the law, actually reflect
respondent Judge Larida Jr.s faithful adherence to his judicial duty to review
the cases, serve due process to all parties concerned, and to eventually decide
the petitions based solely on law and evidence. Be that as it may, respondent
Judge Larida, Jr. has nothing more to do with these cases since his detail to
RTC, Branch 74,
At any rate, the filing
of this administrative complainant is not the proper remedy for
complainant. Complainant should have sought
relief from higher courts. The filing of
an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other
judicial remedies provided by law; neither is it complementary or supplementary
to such actions. As regards this matter, the case of Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis[35] is enlightening:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e.,
error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a
motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a
motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are
inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies,
whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted
and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an
inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed.
Complainant
also held against Judge Larida, Jr. his alleged failure to require oppositors
to post guaranty bonds in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141.
Complainant invokes Section 47 of Republic Act (R.A) No. 8791.[36]
Clearly, the provision cited
by complainant refers to restraint of foreclosure proceedings which requires
posting of bond by one who seeks it. It
does not apply to the present case wherein the subject properties had already
been foreclosed and sold at public auction.
Thus, petitioners insistence for imposition of guaranty bonds on the
oppositors in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 is misplaced. On this score too, Judge Larida, Jr. cannot
be accused of gross ignorance of the law for not imposing these bonds in the
cases mentioned.
As to respondents
Atty. Calma and
LR Ruiz
Records bear out that as
early as
Hence, it is very evident, therefore,
that there is no payment of the entry fees; there are no docket numbers assigned
and stamped on the cases; there are no proofs of service of the notices of the
Sheriff to the parties, particularly the mortgagors; there are no xerox copies
of the official receipts attached to the cases, except Spouses Pearanda; and
that official receipts issued do not cover the correct amounts and entries for
each pertinent book of accounts, in violation of RA 3135, as amended and the
issuances of the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and
Yolanda Pearanda, Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji;
SO ORDERED. [Italics supplied]
It is worth noting, too,
that there were no pending motions for reconsideration filed or other incidents
initiated by complainant in the subject cases to warrant their entry in the
court calendar. As a matter of fact,
complainant does not deny that the assailed Order dated
Finally, the trial court,
through then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz, had already spoken when it
denied the petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Pearanda. As stated, it was
beyond Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz to order the trial court what to do next with
these cases. At that time, complainant had plain, speedy, and adequate remedies
available to him under the rules. He
could have filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari from
the Order of denial dated
Clearly, this is a frivolous and
baseless complaint. The respondents cannot be held liable for judiciously
performing their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings as provided
by the Rules. Complainant apparently filed this complaint primarily to divert
the attention of his client from his shortcomings as its counsel, if not to
simply harass the respondents. At this juncture, the Court finds it worth quoting
again the conclusion of the Investigating Justice Lazaro-Javier, to wit:
Complainants charge of gross ignorance
of the law against respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it was
he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client
and to the court, as well. The evidence likewise showed
that contrary to complainants accusation, respondents in fact strictly
complied with applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance
of writs of possession or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure. Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and mentally
tortured respondents by
dragging them into this unnecessary battle.
Precious time, energy and
expense were wasted when the
same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose beneficial
to the interest of public service. [Emphases supplied]
A
repeat of this cannot be tolerated.
This
administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judge,
the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant
abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice. As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or
pervert, the administration of justice.[38] Lawyers
must always keep in perspective the thought that since lawyers are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is
not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to
this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to
and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."[39]
A lawyer
is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a
lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people."[40]
A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned
because, as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that
only add to the workload of the judiciary. Such filing of baseless complaints is
contemptuous of the courts.[41]
WHEREFORE, as recommended by Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the complaint against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida,
Jr., Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Complainant Atty. Emmanuel
R. Andamo is hereby ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subjected
to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint against the
respondent judiciary personnel, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
[1] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2197,
[2] Rollo, pp. 1-8.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
Exhs. A to A-6, B, B-1, and B-1-a, C to C-3, D to D-4, E,
F to F-6-a, G to G-3-a, H to H-4-a, I to I-7-a, J to J-2,
K to K-2, L, M, N, O, P, Q, to X.
[12]
Exhs. 1 (with submarkings), 2 (with submarkings), 3 (with submarkings),
4, 4-a, 5 (with submarkings), 6 (with submarkings), 7 (with
submarkings), unmarked status report.
[13] Exh. 8.
[14] Exh. 9.
[15] Exh. 10.
[16] Exh. 11.
[17] Exh. 12.
[18] Exh. 12-a.
[19] Exh. 13.
[20] Exh. 13-a.
[21] Exh. 14.
[22] Exh. 14-a.
[23] Exh. 15.
[24] Exh. 15-a.
[25] Exh. 16.
[26] Exh. 17.
[27] Exh. 18.
[28] Exh. 19.
[29] Rollo, pp. 154-202.
[30] Section 7. Possession during redemption period.In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
[31] Section 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.
[32] G.R. No. 159882,
[33] Rollo, p. 17
[34] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, supra note
1.
[35] 341 Phil. 299, 312-313 (1997).
[36] Section 47. Foreclosure
of Real Estate Mortgage.In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or
extra-judicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan
or other credit accommodation granted, the mortgagor or debtor whose real
property has been sold for the full or partial payment of his obligation shall
have the right within one year after the sale of the real estate, to redeem the
property by paying the amount due under the mortgage deed, with interest
thereon at rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and expenses
incurred by the bank of institution from the sale and custody of said property
less the income derived therefrom. However, the purchaser of the auction sale
concerned whether in a judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure shall have the
right to enter upon and take possession of such property immediately after the
date of the confirmation of the auction sale and administer the same in
accordance with law. Any petition in
court to enjoin or restrain the conduct of foreclosure proceedings instituted
pursuant to this provision shall be given due course only upon the filing by
the petitioner of a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he
will pay all the damages which the bank may suffer by the enjoining or the
restraint of the foreclosure proceeding.
Notwithstanding act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold
pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the
property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the
registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable
Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier.
Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the
effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their
expiration.
[37] Rollo,
pp. 105-108.
[38]
Cordova v. Hon. Labayen, 319
Phil. 273, 287 (1995).
[39] Cruz
v. Alio-Hormachuelos, A.M. No. CA-04-38,
[40]
[41]
Dela