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Republic of the
Supreme Court
ATTY.
TOMAS ONG CABILI,
Complainant, - versus - JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 8, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225
(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ) Present: CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO, velasco,
JR., leonardo-de castro, brion, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR., perez, mendoza, sereno,* and REYES,** JJ. Promulgated: September 6, 2011 |
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D
E C I S I O N
PER
CURIAM:
We resolve
the administrative complaint against respondent Acting
Presiding Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the
Interest of the Judicial Service.[1]
The Factual Antecedents
The
antecedent facts, gathered from the records, are summarized below.
Civil Case No. 06-2954[2] is
an action for damages in Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC against the Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising
from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical
injuries to several others.
On P2,726,189.90.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the Iligan City RTC decision and the CA decision subsequently lapsed to
finality. On
On
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution,
albeit belatedly, in behalf of MSU.[6] The Iligan
City RTC denied the opposition in its
The respondent Judge set the hearing
for the application for the issuance of a TRO on P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[9]
On
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel
of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint
charging the respondent Judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or
Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service for
interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City
RTC, by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90
from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[13]
The respondent Judge denied that he
interfered with the order of Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC.[14]
He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to be heard and
eventually dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.[15]
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating
the elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings of a court of
co-equal jurisdiction.[16] It recommended a fine of P40,000.00,
noting that this is the respondent Judges second offense.[17]
The Court resolved to re-docket the
complaint as a regular administrative matter and to require the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings/records on file.[18]
Atty.
Tomas Ong Cabili complied through his manifestation of April 19, 2010,[19]
stating that he learned from reliable sources that the respondent Judge is
basically a good Judge, and an admonition will probably suffice as
reminder to respondent
not to repeat
the same mistake in the future.[20]
The respondent Judge filed his manifestation on
The Courts Ruling
The
Court finds the OCAs recommendation well-taken.
The
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration
of justice:[22] no
court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.[23]
The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court
that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.[24]
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a
case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the
proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.[25] A
court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes.[26]
To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum
in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of
jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.[27]
Jurisprudence shows that a violation
of this rule warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
In Aquino, Sr. v. Valenciano,[28] the judge committed grave abuse of discretion
for issuing a TRO that interfered with
or frustrated the implementation of an order of another court of co-equal
jurisdiction. In Yau v. The Manila
Banking Corporation,[29]
the Court held that undue interference
by one in the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law.
In Coronado v. Rojas,[30] the
judge was found liable for gross ignorance of the law when he proceeded to
enjoin the final and executory decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) on the pretext that the
temporary injunction and the writ of injunction he issued were not directed
against the HLURBs writ of execution, but only against the manner of its
execution. The Court noted that the judge cannot
feign ignorance that the effect of the injunctive writ was to freeze the
enforcement of the writ of execution, thus frustrating the lawful order of the
HLURB, a co-equal body.[31]
In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera,[32] the
Court penalized two judges for issuing a TRO against the execution of a
demolition order issued by another co-equal court. The Court stressed that when
the respondents-judges acted on the application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were acting on
matters pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City
RTC, which was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil
Case No. 435-T. Nonetheless, respondent-judges still opted to interfere with the order of a co-equal and coordinate
court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard of the doctrine of
judicial stability, a well-established axiom in adjective law. [33]
To be sure, the law and the rules are
not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of
execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this
violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but
to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court.
This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article
VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2,[34]
speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.[35]
In the present case, the respondent
Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a TRO to
temporarily restrain[36]
Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court,
Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the
amount of P2,726,189.90 from MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City
Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on matters pertaining
to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate court
since he even quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.[37]
The respondent Judge should have refrained
from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC retains
jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of
execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Courts deliberations, finds no application to this case
since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the judgment obligor or his
agent;[38] a
third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with
another court[39] which,
in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining
order. In this case, the petition for
injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment
obligor. If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his
authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to
file a motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which
issued the decision, not from any other court,[40]
or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari.[41] In this case, MSU filed the proper motion
with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to
seek recourse through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent
Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim
that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not
against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ
addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a
sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not discretionary.[42]
As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the
implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff
acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body. Significantly, MSU did file its
opposition before the issuing court
Iligan City RTC which denied this opposition.
That the respondent Judge
subsequently rectified his error by eventually dismissing the petition before
him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the respondent Judge can
use.[43] His lack of familiarity with the rules in
interfering with the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence in
the judiciary through his demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed
upon the Iligan public that the kind of interference he exhibited can be done,
even if only temporarily, i.e., that
an official act of the Iligan City RTC can be thwarted by going to the Marawi
City RTC although they are co-equal courts. That the complaining lawyer, Atty.
Tomas Ong Cabili, subsequently reversed course and manifested that the
respondent Judge is basically a good Judge,[44]
and should only be reprimanded, cannot affect the respondent Judges
liability. This liability and the
commensurate penalty do not depend on the complainants personal opinion but on the facts he alleged and proved, and on the
applicable law and jurisprudence.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a
judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would
be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.[45]
Under
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re:
Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious
charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service.
Considering the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court after
prolonged deliberations holds that a fine of P30,000.00 is the
appropriate penalty. This imposition is an act of leniency as we can, if we so
hold, rule for the maximum fine of P40,000.00 or for suspension since
this is the respondent Judges second offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby FOUND
GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount of P30,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
I join the dissenting
opinion of J. Abad
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Please see dissenting opinion
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
No Part. Acted on matter as CAdm.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On Leave)
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(On Official
Leave)
BEINVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
* On Leave.
** On Leave.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 2-9.
[2] Entitled City of Iligan, represented by Mayor Alejo A. Yanez, Heirs of Jesus Ledesma, Jr., represented by Dexter Ledesma, Wendell Boque, Rodrigo Dayta, Mae Gayta, Landenila Jabonillo, Trifon Llloren, Alma Polo, Jeselda Maybituin, Leobert Pairat, Orchelita Ronquillo, Estrella Ratunil, Virginia Salinas, Lucia Sinanggote, Erwin Siangco, Cesar Cabatic and Alicia Sumapig v. Percing Gabriel and Mindanao State University, Government Service Insurance System, and Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippines, Inc.
[3] Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Supra note 1.
[14] Comment dated
[15] Ibid.
[16]
[17] In Benito
v. Balindong (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 41),
respondent Judge was fined P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and
P10,000.00 for violation of the Lawyers Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6 and 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[18] Rollo, pp. 86-87.
[19]
[20] Ibid.
[21]
[22] Republic
of the
[23] Go v.
Villanueva, Jr., G.R. No. 154623, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 126, 131-132; Aquino, Sr. v. Valenciano, A.M. No.
MTJ-93-746,
[24] De
[25] Go v. Villanueva, Jr., supra note 23; Union Bank of the Philippines v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 165382, August 17, 2006, 499 SCRA 253, 264; David v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 177, 187 (1999); Darwin, et al. v. Tokonaga, et al., 274 Phil. 726, 736 (1991); and Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 162, 167 (1987).
[26] Balais v. Velasco, 322 Phil. 790, 806 (1996); and Vda. de Dimayuga v. Raymundo and Nable, 76 Phil. 143, 146 (1946).
[27] Bishop Mondejar v. Hon. Javellana, 356 Phil. 1004, 1017 (1998); and Balais v. Velasco, supra note 26.
[28] Supra
note 23.
[29] 433 Phil. 701, 711 (2002), citing Parco, et al. v. CA, et al., 197 Phil. 240, 257 (1982).
[30] A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2047-48,
[31]
[32] A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170,
[33]
[34] Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[35] Abraham
Kahlil B. Mitra v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 191938,
October 19, 2010; and People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982,
[36] Rollo,
pp. 34-36; TRO issued in Spl. Civil Case No. 1873-09, entitled
[37] Supra note 9.
[38] Fermin v. Esteves, G.R. No. 147977, March 26, 2008, 549 SCRA 424, 431; and DSM Construction and Devt Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 514 Phil. 782, 797 (2005).
[39] Section 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefore is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. See Bon-Mar Realty and Sport Corporation v. De Guzman, G.R. Nos. 182136-37, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 737, 749-750; and Solidum v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161647, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 261, 271.
[40] Collado v. Heirs of Alejandro Triunfante, Sr., G.R. No. 162874, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 404, 413.
[41] Supra note 35.
[42] Ramas-Uypitching,
Jr. v. Magalona, A.M. No. P-07-2379,
[43] Nor is it a viable legal position to claim that a TRO is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ; any complaint against the act of the sheriff must be addressed to the issuing court, not the executing sheriff.
[44] Rollo, p. 89.
[45] In Re:
Partial Report on the Results of the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC,
Branch 1,