Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - David
ManingDing, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 195665 Present: VELASCO,
JR., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD,
VILLARAMA,
JR.,* and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: September
14, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the June 25, 2010 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03854, which affirmed the
January 29, 2009 Decision[2] in
Criminal Case No. 2006-0688-D of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44 in
Dagupan City. The RTC convicted accused David Maningding of murder.
The charge against accused stemmed from the following Information dated
November 7, 2006:
That on September 13, 2006 at around 10:25 oclock in the evening in Brgy. Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, stab and hit MARLON MUYALDE, inflicting upon him a stab wound on the vital part of his body, causing his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to law.[3]
On December 11, 2006, the arraignment was conducted
and the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. A mandatory pre-trial conference was
conducted. Thereafter, the RTC proceeded with the accuseds trial.
During the trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the
testimonies of Aladino Jorge (Aladino), the owner of the sari-sari store; Dr. Virgilio De Guzman (Dr. De Guzman), the
physician who conducted the autopsy upon the cadaver of the victim, Marlon
Muyalde (Marlon); Rommel Muyalde (Rommel), the brother of the victim; and
Gloria Muyalde (Gloria), the wife of the victim. On the other hand, the defense only presented
the accused as its witness.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
The prosecution presented Aladino as its first
witness. Aladino is a pensioner who owns
and operates a sari-sari store in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
where he has been residing for more than a year when the crime happened.[4] In addition to selling junk foods, candies
and soft drinks in his sari-sari
store, Aladino also operates a videoke to augment his income as a vendor. He testified that on September 13, 2006, at
about 10:25 in the evening, while he was tending to his sari-sari store, he noticed brothers Rommel and Marlon conversing
with each other, while seated on a bench beside his store. While this was
transpiring, the accused arrived. The
victim, Marlon, stood up and greeted the accused, who happened to be his
brother-in-law, good evening.[5]
He stated that the accused kept quiet
and suddenly raised the right hand of Marlon and stabbed him by the armpit with
a knife that he was carrying.[6] Marlon shouted because of the pain, which
caused the people in the neighborhood to come out. At this instance, the accused ran away. Aladino testified that he was only about one
meter away from the incidents site as it was just right beside his sari-sari store.[7] Aladino executed a sworn statement before the
police of Mangaldan, which he was able to positively identify in court. Aladino was also able to positively identify
the accused in court as the person who stabbed Marlon.[8]
Dr. De Guzman was presented
by the prosecution as its second witness.
He testified that Marlon was brought to him at about 10:30 in the
evening on September 13, 2006. At such time,
he said that Marlon was already experiencing shock because of the stab wound,
which he had sustained. Dr. De Guzman
stated that while undergoing surgery, Marlon went on cardiopulmonary arrest.[9] He died of hypovolemic shock, mainly because
of the massive loss of blood that the victim experienced.[10] Based on his autopsy, the victim had a single
stab wound at the edge intercostal space right at the axillary line that
penetrated and lacerated his right diaphragm and his liver. He testified that almost the entire thickness
of the right lobe of the liver was lacerated.
He noted that the injury was so fatal that as a result, the patient
would eventually die. Based on Dr. De
Guzmans experience and findings, the depth of the wound is 14 inches, more or
less, and that it could have been caused by a sharp pointed object. Dr. De
Guzman also caused the issuance of Marlons Death Certificate.[11]
The prosecution next presented Rommel as its
witness. Rommel testified that he is the
brother of the victim[12]
and the brother-in-law of the accused.[13] He stated that on September 13, 2006 at about
10:25 in the evening, he, the victim and a neighbor, Mandy Molina (Molina),
were in front of Aladinos store, singing with the videoke that the latter is
operating.[14] Thereafter, he and the victim were still
engaged in conversation facing each other when the accused, who is their
brother-in-law, arrived. They both
greeted the accused but the latter did not respond. The accused, which apparently was armed with
a knife, suddenly got hold of the victims right hand, raised it and made a
thrust with his left hand.[15] He then pulled the knife and ran away. Molina caught the victim as he was about to
fall down and rushed him to the hospital.[16]
Finally, the prosecution presented Gloria as witness
to establish the civil liability of the accused. Gloria testified that she is the spouse of
the victim.[17] She stated that the victim was gainfully
employed as a farmer and at the same time bought and sold bottles.[18] As a farmer, he harvested 40 or more sacks of
palay every harvest period, which is
twice a year; and earned three hundred pesos (PhP 300) daily from buying and
selling bottles.[19] Gloria also testified that they incurred PhP 33,180
as a result of the victims death.[20] She also stated that the she and the victim
have four (4) children[21]
and that he was 23 years old at the time of his death.[22]
The Defenses Version of Facts
Accused had a different version for his defense and,
hence, a different appreciation of the facts:
He stated that on September 13, 2006 at about 10:25 in
the evening, he was on his way home from carrying passengers with his tricycle
when he saw the victim with four other people at the sari-sari store of Aladino, having a drinking spree.[23] He stated that the victim actually called for
him and invited him for a drink, which he refused. According to the accused, the victim then
embraced him by extending his arm to his shoulder. He testified that at this instant, he noticed
that the victim was pulling a knife from his waist with his right hand, which
he was able to grab.[24] As he was being embraced by the victim at
such time and since they both fell thereafter, he did not know that he was
actually able to stab the victim.[25] When he saw blood coming out of the victim,
he ran away out of fear.[26] No other witness or evidence was presented by
the defense for its case.
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused. The
dispositive portion of its Decision dated January 29, 2009 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused DAVID MANINGDING guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpertua and to pay the heirs of the late MARLON MUYALDE, Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death, Php33,180.00 as actual damages for the burial and expenses incurred during the wake of the victim and Php100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In deciding
for the prosecution and convicting the accused of the crime charged, the RTC
gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions eyewitnesses, Rommel and
Aladino.[28] The RTC also held that the accuseds flight
negated his claim of self-defense.
Finally, his allegation that the victim was drunk at the time of the
incident was not supported by any other evidence. Contrarily, the Medical Certificate of the
victim is silent as to any presence of alcohol.
The RTC found
that treachery attended the stabbing of the victim, being sudden and
unexpected.[29] The RTC also explained that the facts
indicate no showing that there was any altercation between the accused and the
victim immediately prior to the stabbing that could have warned the latter of
the said ensuing incident.[30]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
The accused appealed the Decision of the RTC,
reiterating his argument of self-defense.
On June 25, 2010, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 January 2009 of the
SO ORDERED.[31]
The appeal seeks to determine whether the RTC erred in convicting accused-appellant
of the crime charged. Particularly, accused-appellant
maintains that the stabbing of the victim is justified by self-defense.
We sustain the conviction of accused-appellant.
The
factual determination of the RTC
should
be afforded full faith and credit
We have held in People v. Gabrino[33] that the factual determination of the
RTC should not be disturbed unless there is a showing of misinterpretation of
materials facts or that it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion:
We have held time and
again that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality. As We have reiterated
in the very recent case of People v. Jose
Pepito Combate, where there is no showing that the trial court
overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its
discretion, then We do not disturb and interfere with its assessment of the
facts and the credibility of the witnesses.
This is clearly because the judge in the trial court was the one who
personally heard the accused and the witnesses, and observed their demeanor as
well as the manner in which they testified during trial. Accordingly, the trial court, or more
particularly, the RTC in this case, is in a better position to assess and weigh
the evidence presented during trial.
In the present case,
in giving weight to the prosecutions testimonies, there is not a slight
indication that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, or that it
overlooked any material fact. In fact, no allegation to that effect ever came
from the defense. There is therefore no
reason to disturb the findings of fact made by the RTC and its assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses. To
reiterate this time-honored doctrine and well-entrenched principle, We quote
from People v. Robert Dinglasan,
thus:
In the matter of
credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule
that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the
credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony
of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest
respect, because it had the direct opportunity
to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the
truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a
clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered might
affect the result of the case. (Emphasis Ours.)
In this case, We see no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. Neither a misinterpretation of the material
facts nor a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC is existent or
apparent from the facts of the case.
Self-defense does not exist in the present case
Preliminarily,
it is a settled rule that when an accused claims the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, an accused admits the commission of the act of killing. The
burden of evidence, therefore, shifts to the accuseds side in clearly and
convincingly proving that the elements of self-defense exist that could justify
the accuseds act.[34]
In this case, considering that at the
outset, accused-appellant has already maintained a claim of
self-defense, the burden of evidence rests upon him in proving his act of
stabbing as justifiable under the circumstances.
According to Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his person or rights do not
incur any criminal liability provided that the following requisites concur: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Conversely, the accused must be able to establish that all
three circumstances concur in order for the accuseds act to be justified under
the law.
Particularly, in the case of unlawful
aggression, People v. Gabrino, following the ruling in People v. Manulit,[35]
explained, thus:
Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at
least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of
threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent
to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
dangernot merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when
the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life.[36]
In this case, the records
would show that accused-appellant was clearly not able to establish the
aforementioned requisites. Worse, his sole
evidencehis own testimonywas found by the RTC to be so weak and devoid of
any credibility as against those presented by the prosecution. From the facts of the present case, the RTC
gave credence and weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution, whose
testimonies rule out accused-appellants claim of self-defense. As
earlier explicated, We do not disturb or interfere with the findings of fact of
the RTC unless there is a clear showing of mistake or a grave abuse of
discretion. From the testimonies of
Rommel and Aladino, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. If there was any, it came from accused-appellant himself for having unsuspectingly attacked
the victim, who was peacefully engaged in a conversation with Rommel during the
stabbing incident.
Treachery exists in the present case
In People
v. Dela Cruz, this Court
discussed that in order for an accused to be convicted of murder, the following
elements must concur:
1. That a person was
killed.
2. That the accused
killed him.
3. That the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not
parricide or infanticide.[37]
Moreover, Art. 248 of the Code states that [a]ny
person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with x x x treachery.[38] There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[39] These means or methods are made in the form
of a swift, deliberate and unexpected attack, without any warning and affording
the victim, which is usually unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance at all to
resist or escape the impending attack.[40]
In this case, it is undisputed that it was
accused-appellant who stabbed and killed the victim, which is neither a crime
of parricide nor infanticide. We are,
therefore, left with the issue of whether there was treachery in the
attack. Going over the records of the
case, We are convinced that, indeed, treachery was employed and present in the
stabbing by accused-appellant of the victim, which led to the latters ultimate
death.
We look into the testimonies of Aladino and Rommel,
which established the existence of treachery:
Testimony of Aladino Jorge:
Q: You
said that Rommel and Marlon were having conversation, where, in what particular
portion of your store were they having conversation?
A: Beside
my store, they were seated on a bench.
Q: Will
you describe to us how they were seated at the time?
A: They
were facing each other and in-between them is a table.
Q: And
while Marlon and Rommel were having conversation, what transpired next if any?
A: David
Maningding suddenly arrived.
x
x x x
Q: And
when David Maningding arrived, what did he do if any?
A: The
brother-in-law paid respect to David Maningding by greeting him good evening.
Q: Who
is that brother-in-law who gave his respect to David Maningding by saying good
evening?
A: Marlon
Muyalde, sir.
Q: When
Marlon Muyalde said good [e]vening to David Maningding who just arrived,
where was Marlon Muyalde at the time?
A: He
was already standing.
Q: About
Marlons brother Rommer, where was he when Marlon said good evening to David
Maningding?
A: They
were still at the same place, both of them.
Q: When
Marlon said good evening to David Maningding, how far was [he] from David
Maningding?
A: Very
near, but David Maningding did not answer.
Q: When
Marlon Muyalde was already standing, what transpired next if any?
A: When
Marlon Muyalde was already standing David Maningding raised the right hand of
Marlon and instantly stabbed his armpit.
x x x x
Q: What
happened to Marlon Muyalde after being stabbed by David Maningding?
A: Marlon
shouted because of pain causing people to come out, then David Maningding ran
away.
Q: You
said earlier that there was no ex[c]hange of words between David Maningding and
Marlon Muyalde before the stabbing incident because according to you David
Maningding did not reply to the show of respect of Marlon Muyalde, correct?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: For
how long did David Maningding [raise] the hand of Marlon after he arrived.
A: About
five (5) minutes after he arrived.
Q: And
during the period of five (5) minutes after he arrived there was no exchange of
words according to you between Marlon Muyalde and David Maningding?
A: None,
sir.
Q: [How]
[a]bout between Rommel Muyalde and David Maningding?
A: The
same.
Q: It
was Rommel Muyalde who greeted David Maningding good evening, what about
Marlon Muyalde, did he say any word?
A: The
same greeting.
Q: What
about you, was there exchange of words between you, Marlon and Rommel and David
Maningding, you mean to say nothing happened within that five (5) minutes
period before the stabbing?
A: No
more, only the stabbing.
Q: Can
you tell us how many seconds or minutes did it take David Maningding to stab
Marlon Muyalde?
A: Less
than one (1) minute most likely.[41]
(Emphasis Ours.)
Testimony of Rommel Muyalde:
Q: While
you and your brother were having conversation, can you recall what was your
position?
A: We
were already sitting facing with each other.
Q: While
you were on that position, what happen [sic] next, if any?
A: When
we were having conversation at that time my brother-in-law arrived.
Q: What
is the name of that brother-in-law of yours who arrived
A: David
Maningding, sir.
Q: You
are referring to the accused in this case?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
what happen[ed] next after your brother-in-law David Maningding arrived?
A: When
he arrived I paid my respect saying good evening Kuya but he did not answer
and also my older brother greeted him but he did not answer also.
Q: And
what transpire[d], if any?
A: After
my brother greeted him good evening kuya and he did not answer, what he did he
got hold of the right hand of my brother, raised it and then he made a thrust
using his left hand.[42]
x x x x
Q: You
mean to say that after your brother greeted your brother-in-law there was no
response from David Maningding?
A: No
more, sir.
Q: And
for how long did it take after your Kuya Marlon had greeted David Maningding
when the latter raised his right hand and stabbed his lower right armpit?
A: One
or two minutes because after my brother Marlon greeted him, good evening Kuya,
my brother-in-law David Maningding immediately raised his right hand, stabbed
him then removed the knife and ran away, sir.
x x x x
Q: But
before David Maningding stood up he was seated?
A: When
he arrived I greeted him then he sat when my brother Marlon greeted him but
David Maningding did not [respond] and he stood up.
Q: How
many minutes did he sit before he stood up?
A: Two
(2) minutes, sir.
Q: Did
you not have any conversation before he stood up?
A: None,
we did not. We just greeted him. There was no conversation between us because
when he arrived I paid respect to him but when it was the turn of my brother to
[pay] respect he stood up and that was the time he stabbed him.[43]
From the testimonies of Aladino and
Rommel, it cannot be gainsaid that accused-appellant without any warning or
suspicion, and taking advantage of the circumstances, immediately attacked the
victim. The victim did not have any
suspicion that could have alerted him of the impending attack. As clearly demonstrated in the trial court,
the attack was swift and unexpected, even to the eyewitnesses, Aladino and
Rommel. We, therefore, agree with the
RTCs ruling and finding, and We find no reason to veer away from them.
Accused-appellant is liable for damages and interest
Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. In this case, the
RTC was correct in imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, as there existed neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances.[44]
Corollarily, in People v. Combate, We ruled that when the circumstances
surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the Court has ruled that the proper
amounts should be PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000.00 as moral
damages, and PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages.[45]
Following the aforementioned jurisprudence, We,
therefore, reduce from PhP 100,000 to PhP 50,000 the amount of moral damages
awarded by the RTC to the heirs of the victim but impose the additional penalty
of exemplary damages. To summarize, the
following shall be assessed against accused-appellant: PhP 50,000 in civil
indemnity, PhP 50,000 in moral damages, and PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages,
with an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until
paid.[46]
Furthermore, We note the actual damages
awarded by the RTC amounting to PhP 33,180.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03854 finding accused-appellant David
Maningding guilty of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with modification. As thus modified, the ruling of
the trial court should read as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, David Maningding, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER. The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Marlon Muyalde the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, PhP 33,180 as actual damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 1076 dated September 6, 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-8. Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ramon R. Garcia.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 6-12. Penned by Judge Genoveva Coching-Maramba.
[3]
[4] TSN, March 16, 2007, p. 2.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] TSN, May 21, 2007, p. 5.
[10]
[11]
[12] TSN, August 13, 2007, p. 2.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] TSN, October 1, 2007, p. 3.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] TSN October 20, 2008, p. 3.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] CA rollo, p. 12.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Rollo, p. 7.
[32]
[33] G.R. No. 189981, March 9, 2011; citing People v. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010; People v. Agudez, G.R. Nos. 138386-87, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 692, 705; People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312, January 28, 1997, 267 SCRA 26, 39.
[34] People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 186528, January 26, 2011.
[35] G.R. No. 192581, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 426; citing People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 535, 540.
[36] People v. Gabrino, supra note 33.
[37] G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738, 746; cited in People v. Gabrino, supra note 33.
[38] Emphasis Ours.
[39] People v. Gabrino, supra note
33; citing People v. Dela Cruz, supra note 37; People v. Amazan, G.R. Nos. 136251 & 138606-07, January 16,
2001, 349 SCRA 218, 233 & People v.
Bato, G.R. No. 127843, December
15, 2000, 348 SCRA 253, 261.
[40] Id.; citing People v. Dela Cruz, supra note 37; People v. Albarido, G.R. No. 102367, October 25, 2001, 368 SCRA 194, 208; People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 130490, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 725, 746; People v. Lobino, G.R. No. 123071,
October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 606, 615.
[41] TSN, March 16, 2007, pp. 5-7 & 16.
[42] TSN, August 13, 2007, pp. 5-6.
[43]
[44] People v. Gabrino, supra note 33.
[45] G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010; cited in People v. Gabrino, supra note 33; People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999, 313 SCRA 254.
[46]