Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
PAMELA FLORENTINA P. JUMUAD, Petitioner, - versus - HI-FLYER FOOD, INC. and/or JESUS R. MONTEMAYOR, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 187887 Present: VELASCO, JR, J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR.,* and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: September 7, 2011 |
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O
N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
April 20, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03346, which reversed the August 10,
2006 Decision[2]
and the November 29, 2007 Resolution[3] of the
National Labor Relations Commission, 4th Division (NLRC), in NLRC
Case No. V-000813-06. The NLRC Decision and Resolution affirmed in toto the
Decision[4] of the
Labor Arbiter Julie C. Ronduque (LA) in RAB Case No. VII-10-2269-05
favoring the petitioner.
The Facts:
On
Aside from being responsible in monitoring her subordinates,
Jumuad was tasked to: 1) be highly visible in the restaurants under her
jurisdiction; 2) monitor and support day-to-day operations; and 3) ensure that
all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and
serviced.[6] Among
the branches under her supervision were the KFC branches in Gaisano Mall,
As area manager, Jumuad was allowed to avail of Hi-Flyers
car loan program,[7]
wherein forty (40%) percent of the total loanable amount would be subsidized
by Hi-Flyer and the remaining sixty (60%) percent would be deducted from
her salary. It was also agreed that in the event that she would resign or would
be terminated prior to the payment in full of the said car loan, she could opt to
surrender the car to Hi-Flyer or to pay the full balance of the loan.[8]
In just
her first year as Area Manager, Jumuad gained distinction and was awarded the 3rd
top area manager nationwide. She was rewarded with a trip to
On
Then, sometime in June of 2005, Hi-Flyer audited the
accounts of KFC-Bohol amid reports that certain employees were covering up cash
shortages. As a result, the following irregularities were discovered: 1) cash
shortage amounting to ₱62,290.85; 2) delay in the deposits of cash sales by
an average of three days; 3) the presence of two sealed cash-for-deposit
envelopes containing paper cut-outs instead of cash; 4) falsified entries in
the deposit logbook; 5) lapses in inventory control; and 6) material product
spoilage.[12]
In her report regarding the incident, Jumuad disclaimed any fault in the
incident by pointing out that she was the one responsible for the discovery of
this irregularity.[13]
On
Seeking to hold Jumuad accountable for the irregularities
uncovered in the branches under her supervision, Hi-Flyer sent Jumuad an
Irregularities Report[16] and
Notice of Charges[17] which she
received on
This prompted Jumuad to file a complaint against Hi-Flyer
and/or Jesus R. Montemayor (Montemayor) for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC on
While
the LA found that Jumuad was not completely blameless for the anomalies
discovered, she was of the view that the employers prerogative to dismiss or
layoff an employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion and should
be tempered with compassion and understanding.[20] Thus, the dismissal was too harsh considering
the circumstances. After finding that no serious cause for termination existed,
the LA ruled that Jumuad was illegally dismissed. The LA disposed:
WHEREFORE, VIEWED FROM THE FOREGOING
PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainants dismissal as
ILLEGAL. Consequently, reinstatement not being feasible, respondents HI-FLYER
FOOD, INC. AND OR JESUS R. MONTEMAYOR are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, complainant PAMELA FLORENTINA P. JUMUAD, the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (₱336,400.00), Philippine currency,
representing Separation Pay, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, through
the Cashier of this Arbitration Branch.
Further,
same respondents are ordered to reimburse complainant an amount equivalent to
40% of the value of her car loaned pursuant to the car loan entitlement
memorandum.
Other claims are DISMISSED for lack
of merit.[21]
Both Jumuad and Hi-Flyer appealed to the NLRC. Jumuad
faulted the LA for not awarding backwages and damages despite its finding that
she was illegally dismissed. Hi-Flyer and Montemayor, on the other hand, assailed
the finding that Jumuad was illegally dismissed and that they were solidarily
liable therefor. They also questioned the orders of the LA that they pay
separation pay and reimburse the forty percent (40%) of the loan Jumuad paid pursuant
to Hi-Flyers car entitlement program.
Echoing the finding of the LA that the dismissal of Jumuad
was too harsh, the NLRC affirmed in toto the LA decision dated
From: Jess R.
Montemayor
Sent:
To: bebe
chaves; Maria Judith N. Marcelo; Jennifer Coloma Ravela; Bernard Joseph A.
Velasco
Cc: Odjie Belarmino;
Jesse D. Cruz
Subject: RE:
049 KFC Cocomall Food Safety Risk/Product Quality Violation
I agree if the
sanctions are light we should change them. In the case of Pamela however, the
fact that Cebu Colon store had these violations is not the first time this
incident has happened in her area. The
I know if any
Ops person serves expired product this is ground for termination. I think
serving off specs products such as this lumpy gravy in the case of Coco Mall
should be grounds for termination. How many customers have we lost due to this
lumpy clearly out of specs gravy? 20 customers maybe.
Jess.
The second e-mail,[23]
sent by one Bebe Chaves of Hi-Flyer to Montemayor and other officers of
Hi-Flyer, reads:
From: bebe
chaves
Sent: Sat
9/3/2005
To: Maria
Judith N. Marcelo
CC: Jennifer
Coloma Ravela; Goodwin Belarmino; Jess R. Montemayor
Subject: RE:
049 KFC Cocomall Food Safety Risk/Product Quality Violation
Jojo,
Just an update
of our meeting yesterday with Jennifer. After having reviewed the case and all
existing documents, we have decided that there is enough ground to terminate
her services. IR/Jennifer are working hand in hand to service due notice and
close the case.
According to the NLRC, these e-mails were
proof that Jumuad was denied due process considering that no matter how she would
refute the charges hurled against her, the decision of Hi-Flyer to terminate her
would not change.[24]
Sustaining the order of the LA to
reimburse Jumuad the amount equivalent to 40% of the value of the car loan, the
NLRC explained that Jumuad enjoyed this benefit during her period of employment
as Area Manager and could have still enjoyed the same if not for her illegal
dismissal.[25]
Finally,
the NLRC held that the active participation of Montemayor in the illegal
dismissal of Jumuad justified his solidary liability with Hi-Flyer.
Both Jumuad and Hi-Flyer sought reconsideration of the NLRC Decision
but their respective motions were denied on
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC,
Hi-Flyer appealed the case before the CA in
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (4th
Division) dated
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.[27]
Contrary to the findings of the LA and the NLRC, the CA was
of the opinion that the requirements of substantive and procedural due process
were complied with affording Jumuad an opportunity to be heard first, when she
submitted her written explanation and then, when she was informed of the
decision and the basis of her termination.[28] As for the e-mail exchanges between Montemayor
and the officers of Hi-Flyer, the CA opined that they did not equate to a
predetermination of Jumuads termination.
It was of the view that the e-mail exchanges were mere discussions
between Montemayor and other officers of Hi-Flyer on whether grounds for
disciplinary action or termination existed. To the mind of the CA, the e-mails just
showed that Hi-Flyer extensively deliberated the nature and cause of the
charges against Jumuad.[29]
On the issue of loss of trust and confidence, the CA considered
the deplorable sanitary conditions and the cash shortages uncovered at three of
the seven KFC branches supervised by Jumuad as enough bases for Hi-Flyer to
lose its trust and confidence in her.[30]
With regard to the reimbursement of the 40% of the car loan
as awarded by the labor tribunal, the CA opined that the terms of the car loan
program did not provide for reimbursement in case an employee was terminated
for just cause and they, in fact, required that the employee should stay with
the company for at least three (3) years from the date of the loan to obtain
the full 40% subsidy. The CA further stated that the rights and obligations of
the parties should be litigated in a separate civil action before the regular
courts.[31]
The CA also exculpated Montemayor from any liability since
it considered Jumuads dismissal with a just cause and it found no evidence
that he acted with malice and bad faith.[32]
Hence, this petition on the following
GROUNDS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLD[ING] AS VALID THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONERS SERVICES
BY RESPONDENTS.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION OF
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION OF
It is a hornbook rule that factual findings of
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported
by substantial evidence.[33]
While this rule is strictly adhered to in labor cases, the same rule, however,
admits exceptions. These include: (1) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when
the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner
are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[34]
In the case at bench, the factual findings of the CA differ from that of the
LA and the NLRC. This divergence of
positions between the CA and the labor tribunal below constrains the Court to
review and evaluate assiduously the evidence on record.
The petition is without merit.
On whether Jumuad was illegally dismissed, Article 282 of
the Labor Code provides:
Art. 282. Termination by
Employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of
the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience
by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee
of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
Jumuad was terminated for neglect of
duty and breach of trust and confidence. Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Fraud and willful
neglect of duties imply bad faith of the employee in failing to perform his
job, to the detriment of the employer and the latters business. Habitual
neglect, on the other hand, implies repeated failure to perform one's duties
for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. It has been said that a single or an isolated
act of negligence cannot constitute as a just cause for the dismissal of an
employee.[35]
To be a ground for removal, the neglect of duty must be both gross and habitual.[36]
On the other hand, breach of trust and confidence, as a just
cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that the employee
concerned holds a position of trust and confidence, where greater trust is
placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly
expected. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an
employee is penalized.[37]
It should be noted, however, that the finding of
guilt or innocence in a charge of gross and habitual neglect of duty does not
preclude the finding of guilty or innocence in a charge of breach of trust and
confidence. Each of the charges must be treated separately, as the law itself
has treated them separately. To repeat, to warrant removal from
service for gross and habitual neglect of duty, it must be shown that the
negligence should not merely be gross, but
also habitual. In breach of trust and
confidence, so long as it is shown there is some basis for management to lose
its trust and confidence and that the dismissal was not used as an occasion for
abuse, as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper, and unjustified
and is genuine, that is, not a mere afterthought intended to justify an earlier
action taken in bad faith, the free
will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose
cannot be denied.
After an assiduous review of the facts as contained in the
records, the Court is convinced that Jumuad cannot be dismissed on the ground
of gross and habitual neglect of duty. The Court notes the apparent neglect of
Jumuad of her duty in ensuring that her subordinates were properly monitored
and that she had dutifully done all that was expected of her to ensure the
safety of the consuming public who continue to patronize the KFC branches under
her jursidiction. Had Jumuad discharged her duties to be highly visible in the
restaurants under her jurisdiction, monitor and support the day to day
operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and equipment at
the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced, the deplorable conditions
and irregularities at the various KFC branches under her jurisdiction would have
been prevented.
Considering, however, that over a year had lapsed between
the incidences at KFC-Gaisano and KFC-Bohol, and that the nature of the anomalies
uncovered were each of a different nature, the Court finds that her acts or
lack of action in the performance of her duties is not born of habit.
Despite saying this, it cannot be denied that Jumuad willfully
breached her duties as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence of Hi-Flyer.
First, there is no denying that Jumuad was a
managerial employee. As correctly noted
by the appellate court, Jumuad executed management policies and had the power
to discipline the employees of KFC branches in her area. She recommended actions on employees to
the head office. Pertinent is Article
212 (m) of the Labor Code defining a managerial employee as one who is vested
with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees.
Based on established facts, the mere existence of the grounds
for the loss of trust and confidence justifies petitioners dismissal. Pursuant to the Courts ruling in Lima Land, Inc. v. Cuevas,[38] as long as there is some basis for
such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to
believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported
misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of
the trust and confidence demanded of his position, a managerial employee may be
dismissed.
In the present case, the CERs reports of
Hi-Flyer show that there were anomalies committed in the branches managed by
Jumuad. On the principle of respondeat
superior or command responsibility alone, Jumuad may be held liable for
negligence in the performance of her managerial duties. She
may not have been directly involved in causing the cash shortages in KFC-Bohol,
but her involvement in not performing her duty monitoring and supporting the day to
day operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and equipment
at the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced, could have truly prevented
the whole debacle from ever occurring.
Moreover, it is observed that rather than taking proactive
steps to prevent the anomalies at her branches, Jumuad merely effected remedial
measures. In the restaurant business where the health and well-being of the
consuming public is at stake, this does not suffice. Thus, there is reasonable
basis for Hi-Flyer to withdraw its trust in her and dismissing her from its
service.
The disquisition of the appellate court on the matter is also
worth mentioning:
In
this case, there is ample evidence that private respondent indeed committed
acts justifying loss of trust and confidence of Hi-Flyer, and eventually, which
resulted to her dismissal from service. Private respondents mismanagement and
negligence in supervising the effective operation of KFC branches in the span
of less than a year, resulting in the closure of KFC-Gaisano due to deplorable
sanitary conditions, cash shortages in KFC-Bohol, in which the said branch, at
the time of discovery, was only several months into operation, and the poor
sanitation at KFC-Cocomall. The glaring fact that three (3) out of the seven
(7) branches under her area were neglected cannot be glossed over by private
respondents explanation that there was no negligence on her part as the
sanitation problem was structural, that she had been usually busy conducting
management team meetings in several branches of KFC in her area or that she had
no participation whatsoever in the alleged cash shortages.
x x x
It
bears stressing that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that private
respondent was indeed lax in her duties. Thus, said the NLRC: xxx [i]t is Our
considered view that xxx complainant cannot totally claim that she was not
remiss in her duties xxx.[39]
As the employer, Hi-Flyer has the right to regulate,
according to its discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment,
including work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and
the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Management has the
prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on
erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations.[40]
So long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the
rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, the
employers exercise of its management prerogative must be upheld.[41]
In this case, Hi-Flyer exercised in good faith its
management prerogative as there is no dispute that it has lost trust and
confidence in her and her managerial abilities, to its damage and prejudice. Her dismissal, was therefore, justified.
As
for Jumuads claim for the reimbursement of the 40% of the value of the car loan
subsidized by Hi-Flyer under its car loan policy, the same must also be denied.
The rights and obligations of the parties to a car loan agreement is not a
proper issue in a labor dispute but in a civil one.[42] It
involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer
relations.[43]
Jurisdiction, therefore, lies with the regular courts in a separate civil
action.[44]
The law imposes many obligations on the employer such
as providing just compensation to workers, observance of the procedural
requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of employment. On
the other hand, the law also recognizes the right of the employer to expect
from its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but
also good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to
continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the service will patently
be inimical to its interests.[45]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member in lieu
of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, per Special Order No. 1076
dated
[1] Rollo,
pp. 445-464. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda with the concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and
Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Dealco Farms, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission (5th Division), G.R. No. 153192,
[34] Pagsibigan
v. People, G.R. No. 163868,
[35] St.
Luke's Medical Center, Inc. and Robert Kuan v. Estrelito Notario, G.R. No. 152166,
[36] JGB and Associates, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 324
Phil. 747 (1996); Premiere Development
Bank v. Mantal, G.R. No. 167716,
[37] Caingat v. NLRC, 493 Phil. 299, 308 (2005).
[38] G.R.
No. 169523,
[39] Rollo, pp. 457-458.
[40]
Deles, Jr. v. NLRC, 384 Phil. 271, 281-282 (2000).
[41]
Meralco v. NLRC, 331 Phil. 838, 847 (1996).
[42] Nestl
Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 85197,
[43] Smart
Communications, Inc. v. Astorga, G.R. No. 148132,
[44] Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd., v. Broqueza, G.R. No. 178610,
[45]
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 485 Phil. 248, 279
(2004).