Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - ORLITO VILLACORTA,
Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 186412 Present: CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: September 7, 2011 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated
July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02550, which
affirmed the Decision[2] dated
September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, of Malabon,
in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, finding accused-appellant Orlito Villacorta
(Villacorta) guilty of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of Danilo Cruz (Cruz) the sum of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, plus the costs of suit.
On June 21, 2002, an Information[3]
was filed against Villacorta charging him with the crime of murder, as follows:
That on or about 23rd day of January 2002,
in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one
DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby
inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his immediate death.
When arraigned on September 9, 2002, Villacorta pleaded
not guilty.[4]
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses
Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).
Mendeja narrated that on
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the
San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz sustained
the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center,
where he was treated as an out-patient.
Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on
The wound was exposed x x spurs concerted, the
patient developed difficulty of opening the mouth, spastivity of the body and
abdominal pain and the cause of death is hypoxic encephalopathy neuro
transmitted due to upper G.I. bleeding x x x. Diagnosed of Tetanus, Stage III.[8]
The prosecution also intended to
present Dr. Deverni Matias (Dr. Matias), who attended to Cruz at the San Lazaro
Hospital, but the prosecution and defense agreed to dispense with Dr. Matias
testimony based on the stipulation that it would only corroborate Dr.
Belandres testimony on Cruz dying of tetanus.
For its part, the defense
presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta recounted that he was on his way
home from work at around two oclock in the morning of January 21, 2002. Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee
then went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. When Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz
put his arm around Villacortas shoulder.
This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruzs death
upon his arrest on
On
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Orlito Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity for the death of said victim plus the costs of suit.[10]
Villacorta, through his
counsel from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a notice of appeal to
assail his conviction by the RTC.[11]
The Court of Appeals directed the PAO to
file Villacortas brief, within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Villacorta filed his Appellants Brief[12]
on
On
Hence, Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Villacorta manifested that he would no longer file a
supplemental brief, as he was adopting the Appellant's Brief he filed before
the Court of Appeals.[14] The OSG, likewise, manifested that it was no
longer filing a supplemental brief. [15]
In his Appellants Brief, Villacorta
raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME,
HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.[16]
Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness
to the stabbing incident. It was Mendeja
who positively identified Villacorta as the one who stabbed Cruz in the early
morning of
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is fundamental that the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed
by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great
respect, if not conclusive effect. Such
determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under
grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to
assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty
and candor.[17]
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
gave full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness
Mendeja. The Court of Appeals rejected
Villacortas attempts to impugn Mendejas testimony, thus:
Appellants reason for concluding that witness
Mendejas testimony is incredible because she did not shout or call for help
and instead run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court because persons
who witness crimes react in different ways.
x x x the makings of a human mind are
unpredictable; people react differently and there is no standard form of
behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.
Equally
lacking in merit is appellants second reason which is, other persons could
have run after the appellant after the stabbing incident. As explained by witness Mendeja, the other
person whom she identified as Aron was left to assist the appellant who was
wounded. Further, the stabbing occurred
at
His [Villacortas]
other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered impossible
or incredible the identification of the assailant cannot likewise prosper in
view of his admission that he was in the store of witness Mendeja on January
23, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the morning and that he assaulted the victim by
boxing him.
Even
if his admission is disregarded still the evidence of record cannot support
appellants argument. Appellant and the
victim were known to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and regular
customers. There was light in front of the store. An opening in the store measuring 1 and
meters enables the person inside to see persons outside, particularly those
buying articles from the store. The
victim was in front of the store buying bread when attacked. Further, immediately after the stabbing,
witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving her additional opportunity to
identify the malefactor. Thus,
authorship of the attack can be credibly ascertained.[18]
Moreover, Villacorta was unable to present any reason
or motivation for Mendeja to fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta
of stabbing Cruz on
The purported inconsistencies in Mendejas testimony
pointed out by Villacorta are on matters that have no bearing on the
fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz in
the early morning of
In the face of Mendejas positive identification of
Villacorta as Cruzs stabber, Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and
if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi,
it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.[20]
Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings
of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, there is
merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to
have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical
injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the
tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.[21]
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early
morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at
the Tondo Medical Center. On
In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[22] the
Court was confronted with a case of very similar factual background as the one
at bar. During an altercation on
We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano:
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The
incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance
of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus is the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In
the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when
he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place
on
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.[23]
The
incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the
hacking incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created
doubts in the mind of the Court that Javier acquired the severe tetanus
infection from the hacking incident. We
explained in Urbano that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)[24]
We face the very same doubts in the
instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of Villacorta for
murder. There had
been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when
Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus
infection. If Cruz acquired severe
tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a
lot sooner than 22 days later. As the
Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus
infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that
exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred
percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we
can only deduce that Cruzs
stab wound was merely the remote cause,
and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause
of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs
stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
However,
Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical
injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he
inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge
in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of
slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is
necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight
physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of
murder.[25]
We cannot
hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because
the prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. In fact, the Court of Appeals expressly
observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond reasonable doubt,
to wit:
Appellant
stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him on the
left side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument used is not as lethal as those
made of metallic material. The part of
the body hit is not delicate in the sense that instant death can ensue by
reason of a single stab wound. The
assault was done only once. Thus, there
is doubt as to whether appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should
be resolved in favor of the appellant. x
x x.[26]
The
intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus
probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed
should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this
fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such
intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder
but physical injuries only.[27]
Evidence
on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical
treatment immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz
was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no other evidence to establish that
Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more
than nine days. Without such evidence,
the offense is only slight physical injuries.[28]
We
still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being
sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved during trial.
The
Information specified that accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with
intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x.
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly
or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising
from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown
by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of
such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of
the means of execution. To reiterate,
the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack
of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of
any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the
crime without risk to the aggressor.[29] Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned
of the danger to his person, treachery may still be
appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.[30]
Both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this
case, and we sustain such finding. Cruz,
the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation. It was two oclock in the
morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying bread at Mendejas
store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard
down and was totally unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere,
armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz
at the left side of his body, then swiftly ran away. Villacortas treacherous mode of attack left
Cruz with no opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.
Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party from labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.
The penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to
thirty (30) days.[31] The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply
since said law excludes from its coverage cases where the penalty imposed does
not exceed one (1) year.[32] With the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, we can sentence Villacorta with imprisonment anywhere within arresto menor in the maximum period, i.e., twenty-one (21) to thirty (30)
days. Consequently, we impose upon Villacorta
a straight sentence of thirty (30) days of arresto
menor; but given that Villacorta has been in jail since July 31, 2002 until
present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we order his immediate
release.
Under paragraph (1),
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in a criminal
offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim and his family
as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, an award
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for less
serious, as well as slight physical injuries.[33]
WHEREFORE, the
Decision dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02550, affirming the Decision dated September 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, of Malabon, in Criminal Case No. 27039-MN, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and
punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor.
Considering that Villacorta has been
incarcerated well beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause Villacortas immediate release,
unless Villacorta is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this
Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the compliance
with such order. Villacorta is ordered to
pay the heirs of the late Danilo Cruz moral damages in the sum of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice
|
MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 58-60; penned by Presiding Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] CA rollo, p. 6.
[5] TSN,
[6] Records, p. 72.
[7] TSN,
[8] Id. at 6.
[9] TSN,
[10] CA rollo, p. 60.
[11] Records, p. 144.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 37-57.
[13] Id. at 67-96.
[14] Rollo, pp. 30-32.
[15] Id. at 35.
[16] CA rollo, p. 39.
[17] People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 123, 140.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 9-10.
[19] People v. Alcantara, 471 Phil. 690, 700 (2004).
[20] People v. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 187, 211.
[21] Calimutan v. People, 517
Phil. 272, 284 (2006).
[22] 241
Phil. 1 (1988).
[23] Id. at 9-11.
[24] Id. at 11-12.
[25] People v. Vicente, 423 Phil. 1065, 1078
(2001).
[26] CA rollo, p. 13.
[27] People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338,
351-352 (2001).
[28] Li v. People, 471 Phil. 128, 150 (2004).
[29] People
v. Casta, G.R. No. 172871,
[30] People v. Napalit, G.R. No. 181247, March 19, 2010, 616 SCRA 245, 252.
[31] Revised Penal Code, Article 27.
[32] People v. Tan, 411 Phil. 813, 843 (2001).
[33] Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil.
650, 679 (2004); People v. Loreto, 446
Phil. 592, 614 (2003).