SECOND DIVISION
|
UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - JAIME DOMINGO substituted
by his spouse CARMENCITA PUNZALAN DOMINGO, ANONUEVO REMIGIO, RODOLFO MARCELO,
RAUL NORICO AND EUGENIO OZARAGA, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 186209
Present: VELASCO, JR., J.,* BRION,** Acting
Chairperson, PEREZ, SERENO and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: September 21, 2011 |
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DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
We are confronted with a
curious case of employees demanding the severance of their employment,
insisting on the redundancy of their work and thereafter, when the demands went
unheeded, crying constructive dismissal by the employer.
Assailed in this petition
for review on certiorari[1]
is the Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87502 which granted the petition
for certiorari[3]
filed by respondents Jaime Domingo, Anonuevo Remigio, Rodolfo Marcelo, Raul
Norico and Eugenio Ozaraga and reversed the National Labor Relations Commissions
(NLRCs) finding that there was no constructive dismissal in three (3)
consolidated cases respectively docketed as NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-08-06034-2002,
NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-10-08397-2002, and NLRC CASE NO. 00-10-08407-2002. The
NLRC decision was an affirmance of the Labor Arbiters dismissal of
respondents complaints for constructive dismissal against petitioner United
Laboratories, Inc. (Unilab).[4]
The dispute, which
resulted in the unusual resort by the employees to the principle of
constructive dismissal, arose from the following facts:
Unilab is a prominent
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale, marketing and
distribution of pharmaceutical products.
Respondents Jaime
Domingo, Anonuevo Remigio, Rodolfo Marcelo, Raul Norico and Eugenio Ozaraga
were former employees of Unilab assigned to the Distribution Accounting
Department (DAD) servicing all the accounting requirements of Unilabs sixteen
(16) provincial depotsfourteen (14) distribution centers and two (2) area
officesspread nationwide.
Sometime in 2001, under a
Physical Distribution Master Plan (PDMP), Unilab consolidated its finished
goods inventories and logistics activities (warehousing, order processing and
shipping) into one distribution center located in Metro Manila. As a result,
Unilab closed down its sixteen (16) provincial depots. The job functions of the
employees working thereat were declared redundant and their positions were abolished.
Unilab gave the redundant employees a separation package of two and a half (2)
months pay for every year of service.
In the succeeding year, on 7 January 2002, respondents
wrote Unilab requesting for their separation or retirement from service under a
separation package similar or equivalent to that of the redundant employees in
the provincial depots. Respondents referred to this separation package as the Bagong Sibol Program.[5]
On 9 April 2002,
respondents counsel, on their behalf, wrote Unilab reiterating respondents
previous request to be separated from service under Unilabs purported Bagong Sibol Program. Particularly,
respondents were keen on retiring and receiving 2 months pay for every year
of service, and all the other benefits which Unilab had extended to the
redundant employees in the provincial depots. The message and sentiment were
that they should likewise be retired under the same redundancy plan or
retirement scheme [because] their positions are similarly situated [to] the
retired employees of [Unilabs] distribution centers under the principle that
things that are alike should be treated alike since they also hold the
position of distribution personnel.[6]
In a letter dated 15 April
2002,[7]
Unilab denied respondents claims,
pointing out that:
1. The PDMP is
not a retirement program but a cost restructuring measure which resulted in the
redundancy of the job functions of the employees working in the provincial
depots;
2. Unilab has no
Bagong Sibol Program, and independent
of the PDMP, there is no redundancy program or other severance scheme open
[for] application by any employee;
3. The only
existing and official early retirement program of Unilab is provided for in
Article IV, Section 2, in relation to Article V, Section 2, of the United
Retirement Plan (URP);
4. At the time
of the PDMP implementation, [respondents] were not assigned to the provincial
depot centers performing provincial, [decentralized], distribution functions;
and
5. At present,
[respondents] positions are not redundant, i.e.,
superfluous, or in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the business.
Quite relevantly, in the first half of 2002, Unilab
implemented a Shared Services Policy (SSP) which consolidated and centralized all
accounting functions of the UNILAB Group of Companies, its affiliates and
subsidiaries, under the Finance Division of Unilab. Essentially, accounting
services and requirements of the UNILAB Group of Companies, were merged into a
single pool, and performed in Unilabs main office. After the closure of the provincial depots,
respondents were transferred and re-assigned to the accounting work pool
pursuant to the SSP.
Respondents, along with four (4) other co-employees,
Rosemarie F. Cortez, Exequiel B. Sioson, Wilfredo M. Tumalad, and William C.
Obedencia, filed three complaints for constructive dismissal,
nonpayment/underpayment of separation pay, damages and attorneys fees against
Unilab, which were eventually consolidated. As it turned out, the denial of their
request for retirement covered by a higher retirement package rankled on
respondents.
Interestingly, while
their cases were pending before the NLRC, and thereafter while on petition for certiorari before the CA, Cortez and
respondents Domingo and Remigio remained working at UNILAB. In fact, the three remained
employed at UNILAB until their actual separation therefrom: they received
monies as full retirement benefits and as settlement of all their claims
against Unilab.
On 14 July 2003, the Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed
respondents complaints for lack of merit:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaints for utter lack of
merit. [UNILAB], however, is directed to pay the Remaining Complainants,
namely: Rosemarie F. Cortez, Jaime A. Domingo, Anonuevo S. Remigio and William
Obedencia their separation pay equivalent to one and one-half (1&1/2)
months salary for every year of service.[8]
Dissatisfied, respondents, along with Cortez, appealed to
the NLRC. However, on March 30, 2004, the NLRC denied the appeal and affirmed
the Labor Arbiters dismissal of the complaints.
Posthaste, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging grave
abuse of discretion in the decision of the NLRC. Meanwhile, after respondents
petition was submitted for resolution, Unilab, with respondents Remigio and
Cortez, separately, arrived at an amicable settlement. Remigio, in particular,
received the amount of Four Million Seventy Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety
Seven Pesos and Eighty Seven Centavos (P4,077,897.87) from Unilab as
full settlement and payment of all his claims; he signed a Quitclaim[9]
in favor of Unilab.
Not surprisingly, Unilab
received a Motion for Leave of Court to Withdraw as Petitioner separately filed
by Cortez and Remigio. The motions were similarly worded and filed by the same
counsel on Cortezs and Remigios behalf.
The
reversal by the CA of the NLRC resulted in the ruling
that respondents were constructively dismissed. The CA disposed of the case,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is
GRANTED.
The assailed RESOLUTIONS DATED MARCH 30, 2004 AND AUGUST 31, 2004 of [the] NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION are
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.
[Petitioner]
UNITED LABORATORIES, INC. is ORDERED:
1. To cause the immediate reinstatement of
[respondents] JAIME A. DOMINGO, EUGENIO
P. OZARAGA, RODOLFO R. MARCELO, RAUL C. NORICO, and ANONUEVO S. REMIGIO to their former positions or to substantially
equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits;
2. If reinstatement is no longer possible,
to pay JAIME A. DOMINGO, EUGENIO P.
OZARAGA, RODOLFO R. MARCELO, RAUL C. NORICO and ANONUEVO S. REMIGIO their separation pay, the amount of which shall
be computed on the basis of the United
Laboratories, Inc. Computation of Separation Benefit;
3. To pay full backwages to JAIME A. DOMINGO, EUGENIO P. OZARAGA, RODOLFO R. MARCELO, RAUL C. NORICO and ANONUEVO S. REMIGIO, computed from the
time of the abolition of [Unilabs] Distribution Accounting Department up to
the finality of this Decision without qualification or deduction;
4. To pay 10% of the total award as
attorneys fees.
Costs
of suit to be paid the [petitioner] (sic).[10]
Oddly, despite a motion to withdraw as petitioner signed by
Remigios counsel, the CA did not drop him as petitioner.
Unilab filed separate motions: a Motion for Reconsideration
dated July 2, 2008 and a Motion for Inhibition dated July 7, 2008, both pointing
out that Remigio should have been dropped as petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 87502
given his motion to withdraw as petitioner. Naturally, Unilab likewise alleged
that the CA decision is contrary to law and not supported by the evidence.
In a Resolution dated 28 January 2009, the CA promptly
dismissed Unilabs motions:
EXCEPT
FOR THE FIRST GROUND, [PETITIONER] APPARENTLY REITERATE[S] MATTERS ALREADY
ADDRESSED AND PASSED UPON IN THE DECISION DATED JUNDE 16, 2008. AS SUCH, WE
REJECT THEM AND REITERATE THE DECISION.
ANENT
THE FIRST GROUND, WE HAVE NO RECORD OF THE SO-CALLED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AS PETITIONER SUPPOSEDLY FILED BY
ANONUEVO S. REMIGIO. THE FIRST TIME WE ARE INFORMED OF THE MOTION IS VIA THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES,
THEREFORE, THE FIRST GROUND OF THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS UNWARRANTED AND SHOULD BE DENIED FOR THAT REASON.
II
THE
MOTION FOR INHIBITION, BEING
APPARENTLY WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES AS NOW INDICATED, IS DENIED FOR LACK
OF MERIT.[11]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari positing the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT INCLUDED
REMIGIO IN THE DECISION EVEN IF HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS A PARTY (WITH
ABANDONMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST PETITIONER) AND HIS QUITCLAIM HAVE BEEN PRESENTED
BEFORE IT.
II.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF BOTH THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER ON THE
MATTER OF RESPONDENTS ALLEGED CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL WAS ARBITRARY AND RUNS
COUNTER TO WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF BOTH THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER ON THE
MATTER OF WHETHER RESPONDENTS NORICO, MARCELO AND OZARAGA WERE FORCED TO RESIGN
WAS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND RUNS COUNTER TO WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.
IV.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS DIRECTIVE FOR [UNILAB] TO PAY RESPONDENTS SEPARATION PAY IN THE SAME
WAY IT PAID ITS REDUNDATED EMPLOYEES HAS UTTERLY NO LEGAL BASIS.
V.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO BOTH SEPARATION PAY AND
RETIREMENT PAY NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF [UNILIABS] RETIREMENT PLAN TO
THE CONTRARY IS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IRONICALLY, [UNILABS] RETIREMENT PLAN IS THE VERY SAME PLAN WHICH THIS
HONORABLE COURT EARLIER SUSTAINED AS VALID.[12]
Respondents filed two Comments dated 20 May 2009[13]
and June 8, 2009,[14]
respectively, signed by two different counsels. In the expanded Comment dated 8
June 2009, one of respondents counsel, Romulo Macalintal, manifested that
Remigio has executed an Affidavit declaring under oath that he did execute a
quitclaim in favor of Unilab and no longer intends to pursue his case against
it. Albeit belatedly, Atty. Macalintal clarified
that the Comment he has filed is only for respondents Domingo, Marcelo, Norico
and Ozaraga.
On 13 August 2009, a different counsel
for respondents filed a Manifestation with Motion to Substitute a Party[15]
informing the Court of the death of respondent Domingo and the substitution of
Domingos wife, Carmencita Punzalan Domingo, as respondent in this case.
Preliminarily, regarding the CAs refusal to drop Remigio as
petitioner and its categorical declaration of the inexistence of a Motion for
Leave to Withdraw as Petitioner filed by Remigios counsel, we have checked the
records and found that one of respondents counsels, Atty. Alexander Versoza,
on behalf of Remigio, indeed filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Petitioner
with the CA.[16] In fact, attached to the motion in question is
a Quitclaim executed by Remigio in favor of Unilab, which Remigio does not
disavow. Thus, the CA was mistaken in not dropping Remigio as petitioner
contrary to his motion.
The disingenuousness of Remigios
counsel is not lost on this Court. We note that this peripheral issue could
have been easily settled if respondents counsel, Atty. Versoza, forthwith
acknowledged the existence of this Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Petitioner
he had filed before the CA and had served on Unilab. We likewise note that
Atty. Macalintal who has been co-counsel from the time of the filing of the
complaints before the NLRC, only belatedly and reluctantly admitted that
Remigio has signed a Quitclaim in favor of Unilab. By that time, the issue had
reached us, unnecessarily.
Respondents
counsels ought to be reacquainted with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court. Specifically, Rule 10.01: A lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
We will here review the factual
conclusions of the CA which are contrary to those of the administrative
tribunal. The conflict in findings is a
first signal that a further review may be needed. This is so because, as we have long held in a
number of cases, factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,
which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and
bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence.[17] Such that, while our well-entrenched holding
is that this Court is not a trier of facts,[18]
we can go to the rule exceptions culled from jurisprudence on rule application,
among such exception being that the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.[19]
We so reach a conclusion in this case
different from that of the appellate court.
Two facts relevant to the issues at
hand were not given enough deserved importance by the CA:
1.
The Physical Distribution Master Plan (PDMP) of Unilab
whereby it consolidated the warehousing and distribution of the finished goods of
the sixteen (16) provincial centers into one distribution center in Metro
Manila; and
2.
The Shared Services Policy (SSP) which centralized
all accounting services of Unilab into one pool at its main office.
These
plan and policy had company wide application and effect. As earlier pointed out, the PDMP resulted in
the closure of sixteen (16) provincial depots while the SSP consolidated under
the Financial Division of Unilab all the accounting services in the UNILAB
group of companies, affiliates and subsidiaries. Quite plainly, while the plan and policy
resulted in the personnel movement that included respondents, they were not
conceptualized and implemented by Unilab for the sole purpose of easing the
respondents out of the companys employ, or as the CA underscored, to decrease
the merit rating of respondents. The CA
did not dispute the uniform findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the
PDMP was a cost restructuring strategy program and that the SSP was a recognized
management prerogative. Indeed, the
legitimacy of Unilabs plan and policy was not questioned by the
respondents. It was the implementation
of the management projects that respondents complained about. They wanted to avail of the separation
package for employees declared redundant because of the PDMP. They refused their transfer to the centralized
Financial Division as
planned under the SSP. When they were
not included among those considered as redundant employees, they wanted their
transfer to the Financial Division declared as constructive dismissal, and Unilab
pronounced liable for damages and attorneys fees, aside from non-payment of
separation pay.
The
primary facts of respondents employment are enough to support the submission
of Unilab that the CA was wrong in reversing the NLRCs conclusion that there
was no constructive dismissal.
Respondents were accountants or were performing accounting functions all
assigned to the Distribution Accounting Department (DAD) servicing the
accounting requirements of distribution centers such as Unilabs sixteen (16)
provincial depots. The closing of the
provincial depots did not result in the abolition of respondents position as
accountants. While they had assignments pertaining to the
provincial depots, they did not perform goods distribution or warehousing
functions. They were accountants and
their work as such was appropriately covered by the SSP that transferred all
accounting functions to the Finance Division of Unilab.
The concept of constructive dismissal is inapplicable to respondents. Constructive
dismissal is a derivative of dismissal without cause; an involuntary
resignation, nay, a dismissal in disguise.[20] It occurs when there is cessation of work
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely
as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to
the employee leaving the latter with no other option but to quit.[21]
In
turn, dismissal without cause is prohibited because of the Constitutional
security of tenure of workers.
Thus,
it is stated in Article XIII, Section 3 of
the Constitution that:
xxx [Workers] shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. xxx
The
Labor Code describes as basic policy the workers security of tenure. Thus:
ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between worker and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and humane conditions of work.
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
It
should be remembered, however, that the entitlement of workers to security of
tenure is correlative to the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments.[22] The rights are measured each in relation to
the other.
In one
section under the same title of Article XIII, the Constitution mandates that
all workers shall be entitled to security of tenure and commands at the same
time in the same way, that the State shall recognize the right of enterprises
to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth. Such that, in this jurisdiction, we recognize
that management has a wide latitude to regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to
transfer and reassign employees according to the requirements of its business. The
right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested rights to
their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to
change their assignments or to transfer them.[23] Managerial prerogatives, on the other hand,
are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements,
and general principles of fair play and justice.[24]
Simply
put, security of tenure from which springs the concept of constructive
dismissal is not an absolute right. It
cannot be pleaded to avoid the transfer or assignment of employees according to
the requirements of the employers business.
Such transfer or assignment becomes objectionable only when it is not
for reasonable returns on investments, and for expansion and growth which
are constitutionally recognized employers rights, but is sought merely as a convenient
cover for oppression. No such thing transpired in the instant
case. We cite with favor the uniform
ruling of the NLRC and the labor arbiter:
It is not disputed that Unilab instituted a cost restructuring strategy program called the Physical Distribution Master Plan (PDMP) which resulted in the closure of [Unilabs] provincial depots nationwide sometime in March 2002. As a necessary consequence of the closure of [Unilabs] provincial depots, the positions affected were became redundant and were declared to be so. Thus, the personnel affected by the redundancy were separated from the service and paid a generous separation pay, i.e., 2.5 months pay for every year of service.
It is likewise not disputed that complainants Cortez, [respondents] Domingo, Marcelo, Norico, Ozaraga, and Remigio were all accountants and/or performing accounting functions who, with the sole exception of complainant Cortez and prior to the implementation of the PDMP, were all assigned to the Distribution Division. Also not disputed is the fact that [Unilab] came up with its Shared Services Policy where accounting services within the Unilab group of companies were pooled and consolidated under [Unilabs] Finance Division.
According to [respondents] Domingo, Remigio, Norico, Marcelo and Ozaraga, they were in effect constructively dismissed after the closure of [Unilabs] provincial depots. They claim that the job or work subsequently assigned to them were either menial or servile or they were never given new assignments at all. This Office is not convinced.
Records will reveal that [respondents] Domingo, Remigio, Norico, Marcelo and Ozaraga as accountants or employees performing accounting functions were affected by the Shared Services Policy of the Company. Thus, after the provincial depots were closed down, they were reassigned to [Unilabs] Finance Division to service the accounting requirement of the Unilab group of companies. Thereafter, [respondents] Norico, Marcelo and Ozaraga voluntarily resigned while respondentns Domingo and Remigio remained with [Unilab].
This Office notes that [respondents] were transferred to the Finance Division on account of the Shared Services Policy of [Unilab]. In San Miguel v. NLRC, it was held that the abolition of departments or positions in the company is one of the recognized management prerogatives. Likewise, in Castillo v. NLRC, the Supreme Court reiterated the long standing rule that it is the prerogative of the employer to transfer and reassign employees for valid reasons and according to the requirements of its business. There is therefore nothing irregular or illegal in the transfer of [respondents] to the Finance Division after [Unilab] came up with its Shared Services Policy.[25]
That the respondents were indeed not constructively dismissed is
supported by substantial evidence.
First. The CAs ruling easily unravels
because three (3) of the complainants before the NLRC, including herein
respondents Domingo and Remigio, even while their petition for certiorari was pending before the CA,
remained employed at UNILAB. In those instances, there was actually no
dismissal to speak of.
Most recently, The University of
the Immaculate Concepcion v. National Labor Relations Commission[26]
iterated that a crucial element in a finding of constructive dismissal is a
cessation of employment relations between the parties.
A claim of involuntary resignation or being left with no choice but to
quit presupposes an employee actually quitting or resigning. But not all
respondents quit: Domingo stayed on with Unilab until his retirement while
Remigio, and even complainant Cortez, although they eventually settled with
Unilab, never resigned.
Plainly, respondents Domingo and Remigio, even Cortez, cannot claim that
their employment circumstances with Unilab were so unbearable and left them with
no other option but to quit.
Second. As regards respondents Marcelo,
Norico and Ozaraga, the ruling of the labor tribunals that the three
voluntarily resigned and were not constructively dismissed is again, and also, supported
by substantial evidence.
To substantiate its finding that
Noricos, Marcelos and Ozaragas resignations were involuntary, the CA pointed
out that Marcelo and Ozaraga had children who were still studying, and,
obviously had great need for continued employment. Moreover, the CA finds
incredulous respondents reasons for resigning: Marcelo to venture into
business and Ozaraga to pay off his mounting debt. For the CA, their
resignations forego a steady income from continued employment and, therefore,
inconsistent with a voluntary resignation.
The reasoning of the CA is specious
and pure conjecture.
It is not unheard of that employees
who have opted for early retirement have used the windfall therefrom to start
their own business and to pay off their debts. The trade off with having a
steady income and continued employment is to be their own boss or to turn
over a new leaf, free from debt. We can likewise surmise, as the CA has so
easily done, that Ozaraga would have been buried deeper in debt if he expected
to pay it off with only his steady income. In any event, the CAs vaguely
drawn theory as to the impetus for respondents resignations can be easily
debunked by similarly plausible reasons.
It is indeed apropos, to once more refer to the correlation between the
workers right to security of tenure and the right of enterprise to reasonable
returns on investment. The right of
enterprise in the case at bar was exercised by Unilab through the PDMP which
resulted in the abolition of the provincial depots but did not erase the
respondents accounting functions that, in the same manner that the logistic
activities at the provinces were centralized in Metro Manila, were consolidated
under the Finance Division of Unilab under its SSP. Absent a showing that the PDMP and the SSP
were illegal or meant to defeat respondents security of tenure, we cannot
uphold their proposition that they must, like those in the provincial
distribution centers, also be considered redundant employees. Respondents, who are accounting employees,
cannot refuse their assignment to the Finance Division. As we have delared on more than one occasion:
Certainly, the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employers decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employees wishes that should be made to prevail. On the basis of the qualifications, training and performance of the employee, the prerogative to determine the place or station where he or she is best qualified to serve the interests of the company belongs to the employer.[27]
As a final point, the allegations of
respondents and the factual findings of both the labor tribunals and the
appellate court bring to the fore respondents obvious position that they have
the option to claim redundancy as reason for severing their employment from Unilab.
From the start, respondents insisted
that Unilab has unjustifiably refused to grant them the same separation package
granted to the redundant employees in the provincial depots. Respondents
demanded that this higher separation package be applied for their retirement as
they are similarly situated with the redundant employees. Respondents wished
for the cessation of their employment, specifying, however, their availment of
retirement benefits equivalent to the separation package of the redundant
employees. Effectively, respondents were exercising their right to terminate
their employment, invoking a hodgepodge of provisions from the Unilab
Retirement Plan, Unilabs purported Bagong
Sibol Program, and the Labor Code.
Respondents are laboring
under a cloud of confusion. Retirement and redundancy, while both resulting in
the cessation of employment relations, are two entirely different things.
Significantly, the Labor Code divides Book 6 on Post Employment into two
titles: Title 1 on Termination of Employment and Title II on Retirement from
the Service. Specifically, Article 283 of the Labor Code lists redundancy as an
authorized cause for the employer to terminate an employee, while Article 287
thereof provides for the retirement from the service of an employee, thus:
ART. 283. Closure of establishment and
reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of
any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of the operation of
the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the
installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby
shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay
or to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In
case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses
or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or to at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered
one (1) whole year.
ART. 287. Retirement. Any employee retirement may be retired upon reaching
the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract.
In
case of retirement, the employees shall be entitled to receive such retirement
benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective
bargaining, and other agreement: Provided, however, the employees retirement
benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreement shall not be less
than those provided herein.
In
the absence of retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits
of employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond
sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age,
who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire
and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2)
month salary for every year of service , a fraction of at least six (6) months
being considered as one whole year.
Unless
the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month
salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth of the 13th
month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leaves.
xxx
xxx
Violation
of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal
provisions under Article 288 of this Code.
Petitioner has an elaborate Retirement Plan that lists all possible
benefits for retiring and resigning employees, and, significantly to this case,
a separate article on involuntary separation due to redundancy.[28]
The requirements for, and the benefits from, the several
and different manners of termination of employment are, naturally, also
distinct and different. The employees
cannot mix and match rights and obligations which are set and settled by law or
agreement of the parties. This is
particularly evident in this case where respondents demanded either the
redundancy of their services in the face of the employees continuing need for
such services, or the benefits from redundancy upon their retirement or
resignation. The demand cannot be
honored.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87502 is SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-08-06034-2002, NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-10-08397-2002,
and NLRC CASE NO. 00-10-08407-2002 is REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice Acting Chairperson |
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO
L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Per Special Order No. 1084 dated 13 September 2011.
** Per Special Order No. 1083 dated 13 September 2011.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now a Member of this Court) with then
Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
(now retired) and Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, concurring, rollo. pp. 70-90.
[3] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[4] Rollo, pp. 100-112.
[5] Id.
at 458.
[6] Id. at 459-460.
[7] Id. at 461-467.
[8] Id. at 147.
[9] Id. at 716.
[10] Id. at 88-89.
[11] Id. at 92-94.
[12] Id. at 25-26.
[13] Id. at 784-789.
[14] Id. at 791-808.
[15] Id. at 813-819.
[16] See Annexes Q, R and S of the
Petition, rollo, pp. 773-775.
[17] Benguet
Electric Cooperative v. Fianza, 468 Phil. 980, 993 (2004).
[18] Merck
Sharp & Dohme v. Robles, G.R. No. 176506, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA
488, 494.
[19] Dealco Farms, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission (5th Division), G.R. No. 153192, 30 January 2009, 577 SCRA 280, 292.
[20] CRC Agricultural Trading v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G. R. No. 177664, 23 December
2009, 609 SCRA 138, 149.
[21] Supra note 18.
[22] Article
XIII, Sec. 3, paragraph 4 of the Constitution.
[23] Philippine
Japan Active Carbon Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 253
Phil. 149, 153 (1989).
[24] Norkis
Trading Co., Inc. v. Gnilo, G.R. No. 159730, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA
279, 290.
[25] Rollo,
pp. 138-141.
[26] G.R. No. 181146, 26 January 2011.
[27] Supra
note 17 at 997 citing Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. Laplana, G.R. No. 76645, 23 July 1991, 199 SCRA 485.
[28] Article IV
NORMAL
RETIREMENT
Section
1.
A
member shall be retired on the 30th day after attaining age 60 and
shall be entitled to the full normal retirement benefits as provided for in
succeeding Article V of this Retirement Plan.
Section
2.
A
member may elect to retire upon attaining age 50, provided he has at least 10
years of service, and shall be entitled to the early retirement benefits as
provided for in the succeeding Article V, Section 2 of this Retirement Plan.
Article
V
NORMAL
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Section
1.
Upon attainment of the normal
retirement date as in Article IV, Section 1, a Member shall be entitled to the
normal retirement benefits as follows:
A.
From Trust Fund A
A lump sum of one and one-half months pay per year of
service based on the Members last or terminal basic monthly salary (as
amended), December 16, 1992).
B.
From Trust Fund B
The members total contributions
and accumulated income less any loss.
Section
2.
Upon attainment of the early
retirement date as in Article IV, Section 2, a Member shall be entitled to the
early retirement benefits as follows:
A. From Trust Fund A
A lump sum of one and one-half
months pay per year of service based on the members last or terminal basic
monthly salary (as amended, December 16, 1992) reduced in accordance with
Article VIII of this Retirement Plan.
However, if a member should
avail of early retirement after reaching the age of 55 regardless of the number
of years of service, he shall be entitled to a lump sum of one and one-half
months pay per year of service based on the members last or terminal basic
monthly salary.
Section A.
From Trust Fund B
The Members total contributions and accumulated
income less any loss.
xxx
Article
VIII
RESIGNATION
BENEFITS
Section
1.
If a member (Manager or
Non-Manager) should resign before reaching age 60, he shall be entitled to the
following benefits:
A. From Trust Fund A
A lump sum of one and one-half
months pay per year of service based on the members last or terminal basic
monthly salary (as amended, December 16, 1992) reduced as follows:
|
Years of Continuous Service |
Percentage of Normal Retirement Benefit |
|
less than 5 |
none |
|
5 to less than 6 |
25% |
|
6 to less than 7 |
30% |
|
7 to less than 8 |
35% |
|
8 to less than 9 |
40% |
|
9 to
less than 10 |
45% |
|
10 to less than 11 |
50% |
|
11 to less than 12 |
55% |
|
12 to less than 13 |
60% |
|
13 to less than 14 |
65% |
|
14 to less than 15 |
70% |
|
15 to less than 16 |
75% |
|
16 to less than 17 |
80% |
|
17 to less than 18 |
85% |
|
18 to less than 19 |
90% |
|
19 to less than 20 |
95% |
|
20
or more |
100% |
However, if a member should
resign after reaching the age of 55 regardless of the number of years of
service, he shall be entitled to a lump sum of one and one-half months pay per
year of service based on the members last or terminal basic monthly salary.
B.
From Trust Fund B
The Members total contributions
and accumulated income less any loss.
Article
IX
INVOLUNTARY
SEPARATION
Section
1.
A member who is terminated
beyond his control due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, retrenchment program initiated by the employer as a result of
merger or to prevent losses or other similar causes, or where the Employee
suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the Employee
concerned shall be entitled to the same benefits as provided for under Article
VIII of this Plan or the New Labor Code or similar legislation, whichever is
applicable. Rollo, p. 48.