FIRST
DIVISION
|
ALERT SECURITY AND
INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC. AND/OR MANUEL D. DASIG, Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R. No. 182397 Present: Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
|
SAIDALI PASAWILAN,
WILFREDO VERCELES AND MELCHOR BULUSAN, Respondents. |
Promulgated:
September 14, 2011 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1]
dated
The facts follow.
Respondents Saidali Pasawilan, Wilfredo Verceles and
Melchor Bulusan were all employed by petitioner Alert Security and
Investigation Agency, Inc. (Alert Security) as security guards beginning
Respondents aver that because they were underpaid, they
filed a complaint for money claims against Alert Security and its president and
general manager, petitioner Manuel D. Dasig, before Labor Arbiter Ariel C.
Santos. As a result of their complaint,
they were relieved from their posts in the DOST and were not given new
assignments despite the lapse of six months.
On
Petitioners, on the other hand, deny that they dismissed
the respondents. They claimed that from
the DOST, respondents were merely detailed at the Metro Rail Transit, Inc. at the
Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) Compound in Aurora Blvd. because the wages
therein were already adjusted to the latest minimum wage. Petitioners presented Duty Detail Orders[5]
that Alert Security issued to show that respondents were in fact assigned to LRTA. Respondents, however, failed to report at the
LRTA and instead kept loitering at the DOST and tried to convince other
security guards to file complaints against Alert Security. Thus, on
Upon motion of the respondents, the joint complaint
for illegal dismissal was ordered consolidated with respondents earlier
complaint for money claims. The records of
the illegal dismissal case were sent to Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos, but
later returned to the Office of the Labor Arbiter hearing the illegal dismissal
complaint because a Decision[7]
has already been rendered in the complaint for money claims on
On
CONFORMABLY WITH
THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered finding complainants to have been illegally
dismissed. Consequently, each
complainant should be paid in solidum by the respondents the individual awards
computed in the body of the decision, which is hereto adopted as part of this
disposition.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the decision to the
NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter erred in deciding a re-filed case when it
was filed in violation of the prohibitions against litis pendencia and forum shopping.
Further, petitioners argued that complainants were not illegally
dismissed but were only transferred.
They claimed that it was the respondents who refused to report for work
in their new assignment.
On January 31, 2007, the NLRC rendered a Decision[10]
ruling that Labor Arbiter Del Rosario did not err in taking cognizance of
respondents complaint for illegal dismissal because the July 14, 1999 Decision
of Labor Arbiter Santos on the complaint for money claims did not at all pass
upon the issue of illegal dismissal. The
NLRC, however, dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal after ruling that
the fact of dismissal or termination of employment was not sufficiently
established. According to the NLRC, [the]
sweeping generalization that the complainants were constructively dismissed is
not sufficient to establish the existence of illegal dismissal.[11] The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the respondents appeal is hereby given due course and the decision
dated
SO ORDERED.[12]
Unfazed, respondents filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA questioning the NLRC decision and alleging grave abuse of
discretion.
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the motion was denied in a Resolution[15] dated
Petitioners are now before this Court to seek relief
by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it held
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. According to petitioners, the NLRC was
correct when it ruled that there was no sufficient basis to rule that respondents
were terminated from their employment while there was proof that they were merely
transferred from DOST to LRTA as shown in the Duty Detail Orders. Verily, petitioners claim that there was no
termination at all; instead, respondents abandoned their employment by refusing
to report for duty at the LRTA Compound.
Further, petitioners argue that the CA erred when it
reinstated the
On the other hand, respondents claim that the NLRC
committed a serious error in ruling that they failed to provide factual
substantiation of their claim of constructive dismissal. Respondents aver that their Complaint Form[16]
sufficiently constitutes the basis of their claim of illegal dismissal. Also, respondents aver that Alert Security
itself admitted that respondents were relieved from their posts as security
guards in DOST, albeit raising the defense that it was a mere transfer as shown
by Duty Detail Orders, which, however, were never received by respondents, as
observed by the Labor Arbiter.
Essentially, the issue for resolution is whether
respondents were illegally dismissed.
We rule in the affirmative.
As a rule, employment cannot be
terminated by an employer without any just or authorized cause. No less than the 1987 Constitution in
Section 3, Article 13 guarantees security of tenure for workers
and
because of this, an employee may only be terminated for just[17] or
authorized[18] causes
that
must
comply with the due process requirements mandated[19]
by law. Hence, employers are barred from arbitrarily removing their workers
whenever and however they want. The law
sets the valid grounds for termination as well as the proper procedure to take
when terminating the services of an employee.
In De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[20]
the Court, speaking of the Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure to
all workers, ruled:
x x x It only means that an employee
cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than
those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious
exercise of the power to dismiss. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Although we recognize the right of employers to
shape their own work force, this management prerogative must not curtail the
basic right of employees to security of tenure. There must be a valid and
lawful reason for terminating the employment of a worker. Otherwise, it is illegal and would be dealt
with by the courts accordingly.
As
stated in Bascon v. Court of Appeals:[21]
x x x The employers power to
dismiss must be tempered with the employees right to security of tenure. Time and again we have said that the
preservation of the lifeblood of the toiling laborer comes before concern for
business profits. Employers must be
reminded to exercise the power to dismiss with great caution, for the State
will not hesitate to come to the succor of workers wrongly dismissed by
capricious employers.
In the case at bar, respondents were relieved from
their posts because they filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against their
employer for money claims due to underpayment of wages. This reason is unacceptable and illegal.
Nowhere in the law providing for the just and authorized causes of termination
of employment is there any direct or indirect reference to filing a legitimate
complaint for money claims against the employer as a valid ground for
termination.
The Labor Code, as amended, enumerates
several just and authorized causes for a valid termination of employment. An
employee asserting his right and asking for minimum wage is not among those
causes. Dismissing an employee on this ground amounts to retaliation by
management for an employees legitimate grievance without due process. Such stroke of retribution has no place in
Philippine Labor Laws.
Petitioners aver that respondents were merely
transferred to a new post wherein the wages are adjusted to the current minimum
wage standards. They maintain that the
respondents voluntarily abandoned their jobs when they failed to report for
duty in the new location.
Assuming this is true, we still cannot hold that the
respondents abandoned their posts. For
abandonment of work to fall under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended, as gross and habitual neglect of duties there must be the concurrence
of two elements. First, there should be a
failure of the employee to report for work without a valid or justifiable
reason, and second, there should be a showing that the employee intended to
sever the employer-employee relationship, the second element being the more
determinative factor as manifested by overt acts.[22]
As regards the second element of intent to sever the
employer-employee relationship, the CA correctly ruled that:
x x x the fact that petitioners filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal is indicative of their intention to remain
employed with private respondent considering that one of their prayers in the
complaint is for re-instatement. As declared by the Supreme Court, a complaint
for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, because
when an employee takes steps to protect himself against a dismissal, this
cannot, by logic, be said to be abandonment by him of his right to be able to
work.[23]
Further, according to Alert Security itself,
respondents continued to report for work and loiter in the DOST after the
alleged transfer order was issued. Such circumstance makes it unlikely that
respondents have clear intention of leaving their respective jobs. In any case, there is no dispute that in cases
of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the workers last known
address.[24] This petitioners failed to do.
On the element of the failure of the employee to
report for work, we also cannot accept the allegations of petitioners that respondents
unjustifiably refused to report for duty in their new posts. A careful review of the records reveals that
there is no showing that respondents were notified of their new assignments.
Granting that the Duty Detail Orders were indeed issued, they served no
purpose unless the intended recipients of the orders are informed of such.
The employer cannot simply conclude that an employee
is ipso facto notified of a transfer
when there is no evidence to indicate that the employee had knowledge of the
transfer order. Hence, the failure of an
employee to report for work at the new location cannot be taken against him as
an element of abandonment.
We acknowledge and recognize the right of an
employer to transfer employees in the interest of the service. This exercise is a management prerogative
which is a lawful right of an employer.
However, like all rights, there are limitations to the right to transfer
employees. As ruled in the case of Blue
Dairy Corporation v. NLRC:[25]
x
x x The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without
grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and
fair play. Having the right should not
be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by
the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. In particular, the employer
must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or
prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution
of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. x x x
In addition to these tests for a valid transfer,
there should be proper and effective notice to the employee concerned. It is the employers burden to show that the
employee was duly notified of the transfer.
Verily, an employer cannot reasonably expect an employee to report for
work in a new location without first informing said employee of the transfer. Petitioners insistence on the sufficiency of
mere issuance of the transfer order is indicative of bad faith on their part.
Besides, according to petitioners, the reason for
the transfer to LRTA of the respondents was that the wages in LRTA were already
adjusted to comply with the minimum wage rates. Now it is hard to believe that
after being ordered to transfer to LRTA where the wages are better, the
respondents would still refuse the transfer. That would mean that the
respondents refused better wages and instead chose to remain in DOST,
underpaid, and go through the lengthy process of claiming and asking for
minimum wage. This proposed scenario of petitioners simply does not jibe with
human logic and experience.
On the question of the propriety of holding
petitioner Manuel D. Dasig, president and general manager of Alert Security,
solidarily liable with Alert Security for the payment of the money awards in
favor of respondents, we find petitioners arguments meritorious.
Basic is the rule that a corporation has a separate
and distinct personality apart from its directors, officers, or owners. In exceptional cases, courts find it proper
to breach this corporate personality in order to make directors, officers, or
owners solidarily liable for the companies acts. Section 31, Paragraph 1 of the Corporation
Code[26]
provides:
Sec.
31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly
vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with
their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally
for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons.
x x x x
Jurisprudence has been consistent in defining the
instances when the separate and distinct personality of a corporation may be
disregarded in order to hold the directors, officers, or owners of the
corporation liable for corporate debts.
In McLeod v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[27]
the Court ruled:
Thus, the rule is still that the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the corporate fiction
is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law
making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made
personally liable for corporate liabilities. x x x
Further, in Carag
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[28]
the Court clarified the McLeod
doctrine as regards labor laws, to wit:
We have already ruled in McLeod
v. NLRC[29] and Spouses
Santos v. NLRC[30] that Article
212(e)[31] of the Labor Code, by itself, does not make a corporate officer
personally liable for the debts of the corporation. The governing
law on personal liability of directors for debts of the corporation is still
Section 31 of the Corporation Code. x x x
In the present case, there is no evidence to indicate
that Manuel D. Dasig, as president and general manager of Alert Security, is
using the veil of corporate fiction to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. Further, there is no showing that Alert
Security has folded up its business or is reneging in its obligations. In the final analysis, it is Alert Security
that respondents are after and it is also Alert Security who should take
responsibility for their illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE,
the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99861 and
the Decision dated
With costs against the petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
|
WE
CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson |
||
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
||
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
|
|
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 101-110. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas
with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Ramon R. Garcia
concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] CA
rollo, pp. 74, 78 and 81.
[6]
[7] Rollo,
pp. 128-138.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] ART.
282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate
an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by
the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or
offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
[18] ART.
283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended
date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of
labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to
at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of
closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
ART. 284. Disease as
ground for termination. An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found
to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited
by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his
co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent
to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half [1/2] month salary for every
year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months
being considered as one (1) whole year.
x x x x
ART. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established
in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be
entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under
existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other
agreements: Provided, however, That an employees retirement
benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less
than those provided herein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or
agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment,
an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond
sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age,
who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire
and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2)
month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months
being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader
inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days
plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not
more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
An underground mining employee upon reaching
the age of fifty (50) years or more, but not beyond sixty (60) years which is
hereby declared the compulsory retirement age for underground mine workers, who
has served at least five (5) years as underground mine worker, may retire and
shall be entitled to all the retirement benefits provided for in this Article.
Retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or
workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.
Violation of this provision is hereby
declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions provided under Article
288 of this Code.
Nothing in this Article shall
deprive any employee of benefits to which he may be entitled under existing
laws or company policies or practices. (R.A. No. 8558, approved on February 26,
1998.)
[19] ART.
277. Miscellaneous provisions. x x x
(b) Subject
to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to
be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and
without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the
employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a
written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall
afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department
of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of the
Department of Labor may suspend the effects of the termination pending
resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by
the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom
such dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute
or is in implementation of a mass lay-off.
x x x x
[20] G.R. No. 129118,
[21] G.R.
No. 144899,
[22] Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 119724, May 31, 1999, 307 SCRA 747, 753-754, citing Premiere Development Bank v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 114695, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 49, 60.
[23] Rollo, p. 108, citing Cebu Marine Beach Resort v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 143252,
[24] Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 159625, January 31, 2008,
543 SCRA 364, 374, citing Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 609; Section 2, Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code.
[25] G.R.
No. 129843, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 401, 408, citing Phil. Telegraph
and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana, G.R. No. 76645, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA
485, 492 and Philippine Japan
Active Carbon Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 83239, March 8, 1989, 171 SCRA 164, 168.
[26] Corporation
Code of the
[27] G.R.
No. 146667,
[28] G.R.
No. 147590,
[29] Supra
note 26.
[30] G.R.
No. 120944,
[31] Article
212(e), Labor Code of the
ART.
212. Definitions. x x x
x
x x x
(e) Employer includes any
person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor
organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.