Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
FIRST
DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways, through the Hon. Secretary, HERMOGENES EBDANE, Petitioner, - versus - ALBERTO A. DOMINGO, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 175299
Present: Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. Promulgated: September
14, 2011 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.:
In
this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called upon to
reverse and set aside the Decision[2] dated May 19, 2006 and the
Resolution[3] dated October 25, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78813, as well as to declare null and
void the Decision[4]
dated February 18, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.
As
culled from the records, the factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On
April 26, 2002, herein respondent Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages[5] against the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region III, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 333-M-2002 in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18. Domingo averred that from April to September 1992,
he entered into seven contracts with the DPWH Region III for the lease of his construction
equipment to said government agency.[6] The lease contracts were allegedly executed
in order to implement the emergency projects of the DPWH Region III, which
aimed to control the flow of lahar from
P6,320,163.05.
Despite repeated demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH Region III
failed to pay its obligations. Domingo
was, thus, compelled to file the above case for the payment of the P6,320,163.05 balance, plus P200,000.00 as moral and compensatory damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees.[7]
Thereafter,
summons was issued by the RTC. The Proof of Service[8]
of the Sheriff dated May 9, 2002 stated, thus:
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned personally served
the copy of the Summons together with the complaint issued in the
above-entitled case upon defendant The Department of Public Works and Highways,
Region III, San Fernando Pampanga on May 6, 2002 through Nora Cortez, Clerk III
of said office as shown by her signature and stamped mark received by said
office appearing on the original Summons.
WHEREFORE, the original Summons
respectfully returned to the Court DULY SERVED, for its record and
information.
Malolos, Bulacan, May 9, 2002.
Subsequently,
on July 30, 2002, Domingo filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default[9]
in view of the failure of the DPWH Region III to file a responsive pleading
within the reglementary period as required under the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the motion on August 8,
2002, the RTC directed the counsel of Domingo to submit proof of service of
said motion on the DPWH Region III.
Thereafter, the motion was deemed submitted for resolution.[10] Counsel for Domingo timely filed a
Manifestation,[11] showing
compliance with the order of the trial court.
In an Order[12]
dated September 2, 2002, the RTC declared the DPWH Region III in default and
thereafter set the date for the reception of Domingos evidence ex parte.
After the ex parte presentation
of Domingos evidence, the RTC rendered judgment on
February 18, 2003, finding that:
From the
evidence presented by [Domingo], testimonial and documentary, it was
convincingly proven that [Domingo] is entitled to the relief prayed for.
In his
seven causes of actions, [Domingo] has religiously undertaken what is incumbent
upon him in the contracts of lease signed by both [Domingo] and [the DPWH
Region III]. As a matter of course, the [DPWH
Region III] has the duty to pay [Domingo] the amount equivalent to the services
performed by [Domingo] which [in] this case now amount to P6,320,163.05
excluding interest.
Considering
that there was a long delay in the payment of the obligation on the part of the
[DPWH Region III], Article 2209 of the New Civil Code finds application as to imputation
of legal interest at six (6%) percent per annum, in the absence of stipulation
of interest on the amount due.
With
respect to the claim for attorneys fees, although as a general rule,
attorneys fees cannot be rewarded because of the policy that no premium should
be placed on the right to litigate, this rule does not apply in the case at bar
in the face of the stubborn refusal of [the DPWH Region III] to respect the
valid claim of [Domingo] x x x. Award of
attorneys fees in the amount of P30,000.00 appears proper. Moreover, as to [the] demand for moral and
exemplary damages, the same are hereby denied for lack of persuasive and
sufficient evidence.[13]
Thus,
the RTC disposed:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of plaintiff Alberto Domingo and against defendant DPWH Region III,
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:
1. the sum of Six
Million Three Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Sixty[-]Three and 05/100
Pesos (P6,320,163.05) representing the principal obligation of the
defendant plus interest at six percent (6%) per annum from 1993 until the
obligation is fully paid;
2. to pay attorneys
fees in the total amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and
3. to pay the costs
of suit.[14]
On March 12,
2003, Domingo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,[15]
asserting that the DPWH Region III failed to file an appeal or a motion for new
trial and/or reconsideration despite its receipt of a copy of the RTC decision
on February 19, 2003. On March 20, 2003,
the RTC granted the aforesaid motion of Domingo.[16] A Writ of Execution[17]
was then issued on March 24, 2003, commanding the sheriff to enforce the RTC Decision
dated February 18, 2003.
On
August 27, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[18] The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
78813. The Republic argued that it was
not impleaded as an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. The seven contracts sued upon in the trial
court stated that they were entered into by the Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director
and/or Project Manager of the DPWH Region III for and in behalf of the Republic
of the
On
May 19, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, dismissing the
Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic. The appellate court elaborated that:
The hair-splitting
distinction being made by [the Republic] between the DPWH as a department under
the Republic, and the Regional Office of the DPWH fails to persuade Us. Instead, We uphold [Domingos] position that
the regional office is an extension of the department itself and service of
summons upon the former is service upon the latter. x x x.
x x x x
x x x [A] regional office of the DPWH is part of the
composition of the department itself and is therefore, not an entity that is
altogether separate from the department.
This conclusion lends credence to [Domingos] position that service of
summons upon the regional office is service upon the department itself because
the former is essentially part of the latter.
Indeed, what militates heavily against [the Republics] theory is the
simple fact that the regional office is not a different entity at all, but, as
can be gleaned from the manner of its creation, a part of the department
itself, so much so that it does not even have a juridical personality of its
own. x x x.
Anent the
claim that the procedure for service of summons upon the Republic was not
followed because service should have been made on the OSG or the Legal Service
Department of the DPWH, We are likewise not persuaded. A perusal of the Revised Administrative Code
of the
x x x x
Clearly,
nothing [in the functions of the OSG] remotely suggests that service of summons
upon the Republic should be made exclusively on the OSG. What the [provisions] merely state is that
the OSG will represent the government in all proceedings involving it. It cannot be deduced nor implied from this,
however, that summons should be served upon it alone.
The same
conclusion applies to the legal service branch of the DPWH, as there is also
nothing in the law that suggests that service of summons on the DPWH should be
made upon it alone. x x x.
x x x x
Obviously,
petitioners conclusion that the proper procedure for service of summons was
not observed is a mere conjecture because We find nothing in the provisions invoked
by it that such indeed is the procedure sanctioned by law. We are thus inclined to give more credence to
[the Republics] argument that it was the regional offices fault if it failed
to bring the subject case to the attention of the OSG for proper
representation. To allow it to benefit
from its own omission in order to evade its just and valid obligation would be
the height of injustice.
Finally,
anent the argument that the Republic is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court, We rule in the negative. The existence of another case against the
regional office of the DPWH where the OSG appeared is of no moment as it
concerns a totally different transaction.
Thus, it would be erroneous for Us to rule on that basis alone, that the
OSG is already acknowledging the service of summons upon the regional office,
especially considering the categorical stand taken by the OSG on the matter in
the case now before Us. Be that as it
may, however, We still rule, as We have discussed above, that [Domingos]
position is more impressed with merit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for
Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.[19]
The
Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration[20] of the above decision,
but the Court of Appeals denied the same in the assailed Resolution dated
October 25, 2006.
Consequently,
the Republic filed the instant petition before this Court. In a Resolution[21]
dated February 19, 2007, we denied the Republics petition for failure to
properly verify the petition and that the jurat
in the verification and certification against forum shopping did not contain
any competent evidence of the affiants identity. In addition, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues payment (under IBP O.R. No. 663485) of one of the counsels
who signed the petition was not updated.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22]
of the above resolution.[23] On July 2, 2007, the Court resolved[24]
to grant the Republics motion, thereby reinstating its petition.
In
assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Republic brings to fore the
following arguments:
I.
If in the act by which the Republic consents to be sued, no
designation is made as to the officer to be served with summons, then the
process can only be served upon the Solicitor General.
[II.]
The State is not bound by the errors or mistakes of its
agents.
III.
Respondent can recover on the government contracts sued
upon in Civil Case No. [3]33-M-2002 only on a quantum meruit basis.[25]
In
essence, the primary issue that must be resolved in the instant petition is
whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed by the Republic.
Section
1, Rule 47[26]
of the Rules of Court provides for the remedy of annulment by the Court of Appeals
of judgments or final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Under the first paragraph of Section
2, Rule 47[27]
of the Rules of Court, the annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
As a ground for annulment of judgment, lack
of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[28]
In the petition at bar, the Republic argues
that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the former. The Republic reiterates that the service of
summons upon the DPWH Region III alone was insufficient. According
to the Republic, the applicable rule of procedure in this case is Section 13,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that when the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines, the service of summons may be effected on the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG). The DPWH
and its regional office are simply agents of the Republic, which is the real
party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.
The Republic posits that, since it was not impleaded in the case below
and the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it, the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 333-M-2002 are null and void.
On the other hand, Domingo argues that the DPWH Region III
is part of the DPWH itself; hence, a suit against the regional office is a suit
against the said department and the Republic as well. Domingo stresses that the case he filed was
against the Republic, that is, against the DPWH Region III, and it was clear
that the summons and a copy of the complaint was duly served on the said
regional office. Likewise, Domingo
submits that the Republic is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in
the instant case given that he has filed two other civil actions for specific
performance and damages against the DPWH Region III and, in the said cases, the
OSG formally entered its appearance for and in behalf of the Republic. Domingo alleges that the foregoing action of
the OSG proved that it recognized the validity of the service of summons upon
the DPWH Region III and the jurisdiction of the trial court over the said
regional office.
The
Court finds merit in the Republics petition.
Summons
is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Service of such writ is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is acquired through coercive process, generally by the service of summons
issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntary appearance or
submission to the court.[29]
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states
that:
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. When the defendant is the Republic of the
Jurisprudence
further instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated
government agency, which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical
personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's principal, i.e., the State.[30] In the similar case of Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of Appeals,[31] where summons was served
on the Bureau of Telecommunications which was an agency attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications, we held that:
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure
provides:
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. When
the defendant is the Republic of the
It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the
Republic of the
We now turn to the question of whether summons was properly
served according to the Rules of Court. Petitioners rely solely on the
sheriff's return to prove that summons was properly served. We quote its
contents, viz:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 19th day of May 1999, the
undersigned caused the service of Summons and Complaint upon defendant J.A.
Development Corporation at the address indicated in the summons, the same
having been received by a certain Jacqueline delos Santos, a person employed
thereat, of sufficient age and discretion to receive such process, who signed
on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof.
Likewise, copy of the Summons and Complaint was served upon
defendant Bureau of Telecommunications at the address indicated in the Summons,
a copy of the same was received by a certain Cholito Anitola, a person employed
thereat, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt
thereof.
It is incumbent upon the party alleging that summons was
validly served to prove that all requirements were met in the service thereof.
We find that this burden was not discharged by the petitioners. The
records show that the sheriff served summons on an ordinary employee and not on
the Solicitor General. Consequently, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over BUTEL, and all proceedings therein
are null and void.[32] (Emphases supplied.)
In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages filed by Domingo specifically named as defendant the
DPWH Region III. As correctly argued by
the Republic, the DPWH and its regional office are merely the agents of the
former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.
Quite
inexplicably, the Court of Appeals failed to apply, nay, to even consider, the provisions of Section 13, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court in rendering its assailed Decision. A perusal of the Decision dated May 19, 2006
shows that the appellate court mainly dissertated regarding the functions and
organizational structures of the DPWH and the OSG, as provided for in the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in an attempt to demonstrate the
relationship between the DPWH and its regional offices, as well as to refute
the claim that the service of summons upon the Republic should be made
exclusively upon the OSG. Such an
oversight on the part of the Court of Appeals is most unfortunate given the relevance
and materiality of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to the instant
case, in addition to the fact that the Republic itself quoted the aforesaid
provision in its petition before the appellate court.[33]
The Court, nonetheless, subscribes to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Republic is not estopped from raising
the issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar in view of the alleged entry of
appearance of the OSG, in behalf of the Republic, in the other civil cases supposedly
filed by Domingo against the DPWH Region III.
As held by the appellate court, the other civil cases presumably pertained
to transactions involving Domingo and the DPWH Region III, which were totally
different from the contracts involved in the instant case. The fact that the OSG entered its appearance
in the other civil cases, notwithstanding that the summons therein were only
served upon the DPWH Region III, has no bearing in the case now before us. All this indicates is that, despite the
improper service of summons in these other civil cases, there appeared to be
notice to the OSG and voluntary appearance on the latters part.
Here, there was no indication, and Domingo did
not insist otherwise, that the OSG had any notice of the filing of Civil Case
No. 333-M-2002. Domingo speculates that,
in the subsequent civil actions against the DPWH Region III, the latter most likely
brought the said cases to the attention of the OSG. On the other hand, Domingo opines that the DPWH
Region III apparently neglected to inform the OSG of the pendency of Civil Case
No. 333-M-2002. Accordingly, Domingo
asserted that he should not be faulted therefor. The Court disagrees. Domingo ought to bear in mind that it is the
duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for
the complete determination of the action.[34] It was, thus, incumbent upon him to name and implead
the proper defendant in this case, i.e.,
the Republic, and cause the service of summons to be made upon the officer
mandated by law, that is, the OSG. As
Domingo failed to discharge this burden, he cannot now be allowed to shift the
blame on the DPWH Region III or hold in estoppel the OSG.
In sum, the Court holds that the Republic was
not validly served with summons in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Hence, the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the Republic.
Consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court and its Decision
dated February 18, 2003 are hereby declared void.
In
accordance with Section 7, Rule 47[35]
of the Rules of Court, a judgment of
annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution
and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action
being refiled in the proper court.
In view of the above ruling of the Court declaring
the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC, the Court shall no longer pass upon
the other issues raised by the parties in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 25, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78813 are REVERSED. The Decision dated
February 18, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18,
in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 is hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to
the filing of the original action in the proper Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-31.
[2] Id. at 32-45; penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Noel G. Tijam, concurring.
[3] Id. at 46-48.
[4] Id. at 73-80; penned by Presiding Judge Victoria C. Fernandez-Bernardo.
[5] Records, Vol. I, pp. 3-24.
[6] Id., Vol. III, pp. 2-3, 40-41, 75-76, 112-114, 171-173, 230-231, and 261-262.
[7] Id., Vol. I, pp. 22-23.
[8] Id. at 41.
[9] Id. at 42-43.
[10] Id. at 46.
[11] Id. at 47-49.
[12] Id. at 50.
[13] Rollo, p. 79.
[14] Id. at 80.
[15] Records, Vol. I, pp. 76-78.
[16] Id. at 79.
[17] Id. at 80-81.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 1-30.
[19] Rollo, pp. 37-45.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 158-165.
[21] Rollo, p. 129.
[22] Id. at 130-149.
[23] In brief, the Republic proffered the following reasons: (a) the OSGs authority to administer oaths in matters of official business is derived from Presidential Decree No. 1347, hence, the Notarial Law or the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, including the approved forms of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, is not particularly applicable to the said office; (b) the petition was properly verified and the identity and signature of affiant Hermogenes Ebdane was confirmed by the Solicitor/Officer of the OSG administering the oath; (c) IBP O.R. No. 663485 of Solicitor Edgar R. Tupas was paid for the Calendar Year 2006; and (d) substantial compliance with the Rules merits a liberal construction of the Rules with the instant case being determined on its merits rather than on technicality or procedural imperfections. (Rollo, pp. 130-131.)
[24] Rollo, pp. 158-159.
[25] Id. at 263.
[26] Section
1 of Rule 47 reads:
SEC. 1. Coverage. This Rule shall
govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
[27] Section 2 of Rule 47 provides:
SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment. The
annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
[28] Republic of the Philippines v. G Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 608, 617-618.
[29] Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 170926, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 182, 189-190.
[30] Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators, 259 Phil. 650, 655-656 (1989). See also Farolan, Jr. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 42204, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 298, 306.
[31] G.R.
Nos. 150768 and 160176, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 422.
[32] Id. at 431-432.
[33] CA rollo, p. 12.
[34] Nery v. Leyson, 393 Phil. 644, 655 (2000).
[35] Section 7, Rule 47 provides:
SEC.
7. Effect of judgment. A judgment
of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or
resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original
action being refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or
resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on
motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new
trial had been granted therein.