Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
|
TOBIAS SELGA and CEFERINA GARANCHO SELGA, Petitioners, - versus - SONY ENTIERRO BRAR, represented by
her Attorney-in-Fact MARINA T.
ENTIERRO, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 175151 Present: CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, and PEREZ,*
JJ. Promulgated: September
21, 2011 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision[1]
dated May 31, 2006 and Resolution[2]
dated September 28, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72987, which reversed
the Decision[3] dated July
27, 2001 of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental (RTC-Branch 56), in Civil Case No. 573 for Legal Redemption with
Damages.
The following facts are not disputed:
Francisco Entierro (Francisco) died
intestate on March 7, 1979, and left behind a parcel of land, identified as Lot
1138-A, located in Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, with an area of 39,577
square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-10273
in his name (subject property).
On May 15, 1985, Franciscos
spouse, Basilia Tabile (Basilia), and legitimate children, Esteban, Herminia,
Elma, Percival, and Gilda, all surnamed Entierro (collectively referred to as
Basilia, et al.), executed a Deed of
Sale with Declaration of Heirship. In said
Deed, Basilia, et al., declared
themselves to be Franciscos only heirs who inherited the subject property; and
at the same time, sold the subject property to petitioners, spouses Tobias
Selga and Ceferina Garancho Selga, for P120,000.00. By reason of said sale, TCT No. T-10273 in
Franciscos name was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134408 in petitioners
names.
Seven years later, on July 10,
1992, respondent Sony Entierro Brar, represented by her sister-in-law and
attorney-in-fact, Marina T. Entierro, filed before Branch 55 of the RTC of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental (RTC-Branch 55) a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale with Damages against petitioners, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 276. Respondent claimed that she was one of the
legitimate children of Francisco and Basilia, and that she had been preterited
and illegally deprived of her rightful share and interests in the subject
property as one of Franciscos legal heirs.
Among respondents allegations in her Complaint was:
10. That as one of the co-heirs of the
undivided portion of the questioned lot 1138-A, [herein respondent] is legally
entitled to redeem the said property from the [herein petitioners] for the
price the said [petitioners] have paid her co-heirs as appearing in the Deed of
Sale with Declaration of Heirship, Annex B.[4]
Respondent prayed that RTC-Branch
55 render judgment:
1.
Declaring
the [herein respondent] as one of the legitimate children and legal heirs of
the late Francisco Entierro and is legally entitled to inherit and share in Lot
No. 1138-A of Himamaylan, which the latter had left behind upon his demise on
March 7, 1979;
2.
Declaring
the annulment of the Deed of Sale with Declaration of Heirship, Annex B,
because [respondent] was unduly preterited therein, as one of the children and
heirs of the late Francisco Entierro and consequently, the said document should
be ordered cancelled insofar as [respondents] legal share and participation
over the said Lot 1138-A is concerned;
3.
Ordering
the [respondent] legally entitled to redeem from the [herein petitioners] the
subject Lot 1138-A for the redemption price of P52,000.00 as one of the
co-heirs and co-owners proindiviso of the said property at the time, the same
was sold and conveyed in favor of the [petitioners] on May 15, 1985, as shown
in Annex B hereof;
4.
Ordering
the [petitioners] to account to the [respondent] her share in the produce of
the land in question with respect to her legal share on said property is
concerned from May 15, 1985, up to the time, that [respondents] legal share
and participation therefrom, shall have been ordered delivered to her;
5.
Ordering
the [petitioners] to pay the [respondent] the sum of P50,000.00 by way
of attorneys fee and to pay the costs of this suit;
6.
[Respondent]
further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises.[5]
After trial on the merits, RTC-Branch
55 rendered a Decision dated May 8, 1996.
According to RTC-Branch 55, it was
duly proven that respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Basilia;
a fact admitted by petitioner Tobias Selga himself during his cross-examination. Upon Franciscos death, half of the subject
property was inherited by his spouse, Basilia; while the other half was
inherited by his children, pro-indiviso. The property relation of Franciscos heirs as
regards the subject property was governed by the provisions on
co-ownership. Basilia, et al., validly sold all their rights
and interests over the subject property to petitioners, excluding the rights
and interests over the same pertaining to respondent, who did not participate
in the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC-Branch
55 summed up its findings, thus:
The other
heirs have no right to sell the share belonging to the [herein
respondent]. Although this fact is known
to the [herein petitioners], the [respondents] share was included in the Deed
of Sale by selling the entire Lot No. 1138-A.
The [petitioners], knowing that [respondent] Sony Entierro Brar was
preterited during the settlement and disposition of the subject Lot No. 1138-A,
was in bad faith when he caused for the registration of the entire lot in his
name. Knowing that there was a flaw in
his title, an implied trust was created with respect to that of the share
belonging to respondent Sony Entierro Brar.[6]
RTC-Branch 55 finally disposed:
WHEREFORE,
based on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby renders
judgment declaring the annulment of the Deed of Sale with Declaration of heirship
dated May 15, 1985 adjudicating ownership of Lot No. 1138-A in the name of [herein
respondent] Sony Entierro Brar being one of the legitimate heirs of spouses
Francisco Entierro and Basilia Tabile one eleventh (1/11) share and ten
eleventh (10/11) share in the name of [herein petitioner] Tobias Selga married
to Ceferina Garancho and further orders the following:
1.
For
the relocation survey of Lot No. 1138-A to establish the definite location of
the respective share of the parties, the expenses to be borne by them
proportionately to their share;
2.
The
Register of Deeds of the Province of Negros Occidental is hereby directed to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134408 and in lieu thereof issue a
new transfer certificate of title in the name of Tobias Selga consisting of an
area of Thirty[-]Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy[-]Eight (37,778) square
meters and another new transfer certificate of title in the name of Sony
Entierro Brar consisting of an area of One Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety[-]Nine
(1,799) square meters upon submission of an approved subdivision plan;
3.
For
the [petitioners] to account to [respondent] her share in the produce of the
land from May 15, 1985 up to the time that [respondents] possession of her
share of Lot No. 1138-A is restored to her; and, finally,
4.
For
the [petitioners] to pay [respondent] the sum of P50,000.00 as
attorneys fee and to pay the costs of suit.[7]
Unsatisfied, respondent filed an appeal
of the aforequoted judgment of RTC-Branch 55 before the Court of Appeals, where
it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 9520A UDK.
However, respondent subsequently moved to withdraw her appeal, which the
Court of Appeals granted in a Resolution dated June 13, 1997. The Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch
55 eventually attained finality.
In a Letter dated August 11, 1997,
respondent informed petitioners that she was exercising her right to redeem petitioners
ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property, in accordance with the
final and executory Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case
No. 276. In their Reply-Letter dated
August 20, 1997, petitioners counsel rejected respondents demand for the
following reasons:
Please be
informed that your claim re redemption is devoid of complete merit.
It must
be remembered that in your complaint, you pleaded redemption as one of your
causes of action and even specifically sought the same as a prayer in your
complaint. However, on the basis of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated May 8, 1996, the court did not see
fit to grant you the right of redemption.
It is the
considered view of the undersigned that in line with established jurisprudence,
you cannot now or in the future, exercise this right.[8]
This prompted respondent to
institute on January 21, 1998 a Complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56.
In their Answer with Counterclaim[9] in
Civil Case No. 576, petitioners invoked the defenses of res judicata and/or forum shopping, arguing that the cause of
action pleaded by respondent was among those that had already been litigated in
Civil Case No. 276 before RTC-Branch 55.
In its Decision dated July 27,
2001, RTC-Branch 56 agreed with petitioners and dismissed Civil Case No. 573,
ratiocinating that:
The
primary issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the present action
is barred by res judicata in view of the finality of the decision in Civil Case
No. 276 involving the same parties herein.
Although the prior case was entitled annulment of sale with damages, yet,
the averments in the complaint and the reliefs sought for included the legal
redemption of Lot 1138-A, which is the subject of the present action,
particularly paragraph 10 of the complaint and paragraph 3 of the prayer
therein which were earlier quoted. The
elements of res judicata are (1) the judgment bring sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be based on a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action as
between the prior and the subsequent actions.
Clearly, these elements are present.
It is an elementary rule that the nature of a cause of action is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of
action. There is, therefore, identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two (2) cases.
Since the
decision in Civil Case No. 276 was silent on the issue of legal redemption, it
can be inferred therefrom that the court did not see it fit to grant the
same. Plaintiff should have moved for
the reconsideration thereof or should have appealed to the Court of Appeals
raising this particular issue. It did
not do so. Thus, the decision had become
final and executory.
The
filing of the present action constitutes forum shopping. The filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment amounts to forum
shopping. Only when the successive
filing of the suits as part of an appeal, or a special civil action, will there
be no forum shopping because the party no longer availed of different fora but,
rather, through a review of a lower tribunals decision or order. (Quinsay v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 127058, Aug.
31, 2000.)[10]
Respondents appeal of the
aforementioned judgment of RTC-Branch 56 was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 72987
before the Court of Appeals.
On May 31, 2006, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 72987, which reversed and
set aside the assailed July 27, 2001 Decision of RTC-Branch 56 in Civil Case
No. 573.
The Court of Appeals held that respondent
had validly exercised her right to redemption of the subject property:
As a
rule, co-heir/s or co-owner/s of undivided property are required to notify in
writing the other co-heir/s or co-owner/s of the actual sale of the formers
share in the co-ownership. And, within
one (1) month or 30 days from the said notice, a co-heir or co-owner who wish
to redeem such property must make a claim for the reconveyance of the same by
either consignation in court or offer to repurchase by tendering the vendor
payment of the redemption money.
A
thorough perusal of the records as well as the documentary evidences presented
by both parties reveal that no written notice was given by the heirs of
Francisco Entierro to [herein respondent] regarding the sale of Lot No. 1138-A,
because, [respondent] was preterited or omitted in the inheritance during the
settlement and disposition of the subject lot.
She was initially not considered nor included as heir of Francisco
Entierro not until she was judicially declared one. However, despite the absence of a written
notice, [respondent], in her complaint in Civil Case No. 276, impleaded therein
her claim to redeem Lot No. 1138-A sold by her co-heirs to [herein
petitioners]. Hence, by such act,
[respondent] had effectively enforced her right.[11]
The appellate court further ruled
that Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 was not barred by the final
judgment in Civil Case No. 276 of RTC-Branch 55:
What had
became final and conclusive in Civil Case No. 276 is only with respect to the
filiation of [herein respondent] and [her] right to inherit, but not as to [respondents]
right to redeem the property sold by her co-heirs.
We
disagree with the court a quos holding which provides, to wit: Since the
decision in Civil Case No. 276 was silent on the issue of legal redemption, it
can be inferred therefrom that the court did not see it fit to grant the same.
Right of
legal redemption is a statutory right provided by law as long as the
redemptioner possesses all the essential requisites and comply with the
requirements, such right need not be judicially declared in order for it to be
enforced. The role of the court is only
to ascertain whether the essential requisites and requirements are properly
complied with. As the right of
redemption is inherent to every co-heir or co-owner, denial of the said right
must be explicitly and expressly provided and justified by the court and not by
mere silence only. Silence of the
decision in Civil Case No. 276 on the issue of [respondents] right of
redemption does not mean that the same was denied. Only the issues of filiation and the validity
of the Deed of Sale with Declaration of Heirship were judicially determined by
the lower court on the said case. Hence,
in the instant case, this Court may rule upon the issue of redemption.[12]
The
Court of Appeals decreed in the end:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, Branch 56 dated July 27, 2001 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby ENTERED by recognizing [herein respondents]
legal right to redeem Lot No. 1138-A of Himamaylan Cadastre, Negros Occidental
from [herein petitioners].
[Respondent]
is hereby given thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision within
which to exercise his right of redemption over Lot No. 1138-A by reimbursing
[petitioners] the price of the sale in the amount of P120,000.00 plus
the total value of the improvements, if any, on the subject lot based on the
current fair market value.
Failure
of [respondent] to redeem the property within the period herein provided shall
vest [petitioners] absolute right over subject property.[13]
Petitioners now come before this
Court via the instant Petition for Review, insisting that respondents right to
redemption of the subject property from petitioners was among the causes of
action already litigated in Civil Case No. 276 before RTC-Branch 55; and the
very same cause of action between the same parties involving the same subject
matter was merely duplicated in Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56. Thus, the
prior final judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 276 already barred Civil Case
No. 573.
Respondent counters that Civil Case
No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 involving her legal right to redeem the subject property
from petitioners cannot be deemed barred by the final judgment in Civil Case
No. 276 rendered by RTC-Branch 55 because said issue was not explicitly ruled
upon in the latter case.
We find merit in the instant Petition.
Res
judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final
judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction
on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.[14]
It must be remembered that it is to
the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the
parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which dictates that it would be in the interest of the State that
there should be an end to litigation republicae
ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be
vexed twice for the same cause nemo
debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject public peace
and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification
of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of
public tranquility and happiness.[15]
Res
judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule
39, Section 47(b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39,
Section 47(c).[16] These concepts differ as to the extent of the
effect of a judgment or final order as follows:
SEC.
47. Effect
of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final
order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Jurisprudence taught us well that res judicata under the first concept or as
a bar against the prosecution of a second action exists when there is identity
of parties, subject matter and cause of action in the first and second
actions. The judgment in the first
action is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties
and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all
matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In contrast, res judicata under the second concept or estoppel by judgment exists
when there is identity of parties and subject matter but the causes of action
are completely distinct. The first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved herein.[17]
The case at bar satisfies the four
essential requisites of res judicata
under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, viz:
(a)
finality
of the former judgment;
(b)
the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;
(c)
it
must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d)
there
must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.[18]
It is not disputed that the
Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276 had become
final and executory. Petitioners no
longer appealed the said decision, while respondent withdrew her appeal of the
same before the Court of Appeals.
There is also no question that
RTC-Branch 55 had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in Civil
Case No. 276, and that its Decision dated May 8, 1996 was a judgment on the
merits, i.e., one rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial of the case.[19]
Controversy herein arises from the
fourth requirement: the identity of parties, subject matter and, particularly,
the causes of action between Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573.
There is identity of parties. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573
were both instituted by respondent against petitioners.
There is also identity of subject
matter. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil
Case No. 573 both involved respondents rights and interests over the subject
property as Franciscos legitimate child and compulsory heir.
Finally, there is identity of causes
of action.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. The cause
of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is the sale of the
entire subject property by Basilia, et al.,
to petitioners without respondents knowledge and consent, hence, depriving
respondent of her rights and interests over her pro-indiviso share in the subject property as a co-heir and
co-owner. The annulment of the sale of
respondents share in the subject property, the legal redemption by respondent
of her co-heirs share sold to petitioners, and the claim for damages should
not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but they were the remedies and reliefs
prayed for by the respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against
her.
The allegations in respondents
Complaint in Civil Case No. 573 initially give the impression that the cause of
action therein was petitioners refusal to heed respondents demand to redeem
petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property. But a closer study of said Complaint, as well
as the trial proceedings before RTC-Branch 56, reveal that respondents right
to redeem petitioners ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject property also
arose from the sale of the said subject property to petitioners by respondents
co-heirs and co-owners, alleged to be without respondents knowledge or consent
the very same cause of action at the crux of Civil Case No. 276.
In their Memorandum[20]
filed on September 3, 2007 before this Court, respondent invoked Articles 1088
and 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in support of their right to
redeem the subject property. The said provisions
state:
Art.
1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of
the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
x x x x
Art.
1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise
the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any
of them, are sold to a third person. If
the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay
only a reasonable one.
Should
two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only
do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned
in common.
In her Complaint in Civil Case No.
276, respondent already alleged her right to redemption and prayed, among
others, the RTC-Branch 55 to order respondent legally entitled to redeem the
subject property for the price of P52,000.00. The Decision dated May 8, 1996 of the
RTC-Branch 55 neither discussed respondents right to redemption nor ordered in
its decretal portion for petitioners to accept respondents offer to redeem the
subject property. In consonance with the
provisions of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court cited above, we hold that
all the matters within the issues raised in Civil Case No. 276 were laid before
RTC-Branch 55 and passed upon by it.
Resultantly, the silence of the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case
No. 276 on respondents right to redemption invoked by the latter does not mean
that RTC-Branch 55 did not take cognizance of the same, but rather, that
RTC-Branch 55 did not deem respondent entitled to said right.
Regardless of whether or not
RTC-Branch 55 erred in not ordering the redemption by respondent of the subject
property in the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276, said judgment
can no longer be reviewed or corrected by RTC-Branch 56 in Civil Case No.
573. Any error committed by RTC-Branch
55 in the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276 could only be
reviewed or corrected on appeal.
Although respondent initially filed an appeal of said judgment before
the Court of Appeals, she eventually filed a motion to withdraw the same, which
was granted by the appellate court.
Hence, the Decision dated May 8, 1996 attained finality.
As
we held in
Rams Studio and Photographic Equipment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21] a judgment which has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in
any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to
rest. We added in Manila
Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc.[22] that a
final and executory judgment or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not
infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through
repeated suits on the same claim.
We rationalized in Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company[23] the
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment as follows:
No other
procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment
becomes final, it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or
reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void. The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold:
(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the
discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an
end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be
allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and obligation of every litigant
must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As the Court declared in Yau v. Silverio:
Litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Indeed,
just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the
judgment. Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing
litigant his right to savor the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck
down. Thus, in Heirs of Wenceslao Samper v. Reciproco-Noble, we had occasion to
emphasize the significance of this rule, to wit:
It is an
important fundamental principle in our Judicial system that every litigation
must come to an end x x x Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be
a limit thereto. Once a litigant's rights have been adjudicated in a valid
final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled
license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be
harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be
encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the
detriment of the administration of justice.[24]
Exceptions to the immutability of
final judgment are allowed only under the most extraordinary of
circumstances. The instant case cannot
be considered an exception especially when respondent had the opportunity to
appeal the Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276,
but by her own action, desisted from pursuing the same.
Therefore, Civil Case No. 573
before RTC-Branch 56 should be dismissed, being barred by res judicata, given the final and executory Decision dated May 8,
1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276.
We stress that res judicata,
in the concept of bar by prior judgment, renders the judgment or final order
conclusive between the parties and their privies, not just with respect to a
matter directly adjudged, but also any other matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31, 2006 and
Resolution dated September 28, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
72987 are SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated July 27, 2001 of Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental, dismissing Civil Case No. 573, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
|
* Per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 22-30; penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale with Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring.
[2] Id.
at 31-32.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 36-39.
[4] Records, p. 28.
[5] Id. at 28-29.
[6] Id. at 13.
[7] Id. at 13-14.
[8] Id. at 69.
[9] Id. at 20-25.
[10] CA rollo, pp. 37-39.
[11] Rollo, p. 26.
[12] Id. at 28-29.
[13] Id. at 29.
[14] Pentacapital Investment Corp. v. Mahinay,
G.R. No. 171736, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 284, 307.
[15] La Campana Development Corp. v. Development
Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 146157, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 137,
158-159.
[16] Co v. People, G.R. No. 160265, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 381, 393.
[17] Gamboa
v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 624, 642-643 (1981).
[18] Del Rosario v. Far East Bank and Trust
Company, G.R. No. 150134, October 31, 2007, 537 SCRA 571, 584.
[19] Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company (Phils.),
Inc., G.R. No. 156542, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 535, 546.
[20] Rollo, pp. 55-57.
[21] 400 Phil. 542, 550 (2000).
[22] 425 Phil. 65, 83 (2002).
[23] G.R. Nos. 165697 and 166481, August
4, 2009, 595 SCRA 149.
[24] Id. at 159-160.