Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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FERDINAND A. CRUZ, |
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G.R. No. 170404 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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Acting Chairperson, |
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BERSAMIN, |
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JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON, |
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[Deceased], |
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PEREZ,⃰ and |
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JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, Acting |
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MENDOZA,⃰ ⃰ JJ. |
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Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court |
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Branch 117, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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September 28, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
While there are
remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of court, same may only be
availed of when the procedures laid down for its availment are satisfied.
By this Petition
for Certiorari,[1]
petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) assails the Order[2]
dated November 25, 2005 issued by the now deceased Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon
(Judge Gingoyon) of Branch 117, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (respondent
court) citing him in direct contempt of court, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE,
Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Accordingly,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P2,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.[3]
Essentially,
petitioner prays for this Court to declare the assailed Order void and that
Judge Gingoyon abused his discretion in citing him in contempt, as well as in denying
his motion to fix the amount of bond.
Antecedent Facts
This case
stemmed from a Civil Complaint[4]
filed by petitioner against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr. (Mina), docketed
as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of nuisance. In the said case, petitioner sought redress
from the court to declare as a nuisance the basketball goal which was
permanently attached to the second floor of Minas residence but protrudes to
the alley which serves as the publics only right of way.
Mina was
declared in default[5]
hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.
After trial, Judge
Gingoyon, in his Decision[6]
dated October 21, 2005, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but
dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked locus standi. Citing Article 701 of the Civil Code, Judge
Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by
the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the
petitioner.
In the same
Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:
Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of
the kind of place they live in. x x x Their place is bursting with people most
of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to
laze around or doing their daily household chores.
Thus,
residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys. The alleys become
the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all
sorts of things to entertain them or pass the time, their wash area or even a
place to cook food in. Take in a few ambulant vendors who display their wares
in their choice spots in the alley and their customers that mill around them,
and one can only behold chaos if not madness in these alleys. But for the
residents of the places of this kind, they still find order in this madness and
get out of this kind of life unscathed. Its because they all simply live and
let live. Walking through the alleys daily, the residents of the area have
become adept at [weaving] away from the playthings that children at play throw
every which way, sidestepping from the path of children chasing each other,
dodging and [ducking]from awnings or canopies or clotheslines full of dripping
clothes that encroach [on] the alleys. Plaintiffs appear to be fastidious and
delicate and they cannot be faulted for such a desirable trait. But they can
only do so within their own abode. Once they step outside the doors of their
home, as it were, they cannot foist their delicacy and fastidiousness upon
their neighbors. They must accept their alleys as the jungle of people and the
site of myriad of activities that it is. They must also learn to accept the
people in their place as they are; they must live and let live. Unless they
choose to live in a less blighted human settlement or better still move to an
upscale residential area, their only remaining choice is for them to live in
perpetual conflict with their neighbors all the days of their lives.[7]
Petitioner
sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration,[8]
he took exception to the advice given by Judge Gingoyon thus:
The 12th and 13th paragraphs
of the assailed decision, though only an advice of the court, are off-tangent
and even spouses illegality;
Since when is living in cramped tenements become a
license for people to invade the alleys and use the said alley for doing all sorts
of things, i.e., as wash area or cooking food?
In effect, this court is making his own legislations and providing for
exceptions in law when there are none, as far as nuisance is concerned;
The court might not be aware that in so doing, he
is giving a wrong signal to the defendants and to the public at large that land
grabbing, squatting, illegal occupation of property is all right and justified
when violators are those people who live in cramped tenements or the
underprivileged poor, as the court in a sweeping statement proclaimed that
residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys;
For the enlightenment of the court, and as was
proven during the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, Edang
estate comprises properties which are subdivided and titled (plaintiffs and
defendants have their own titled properties and even the right of way or alley
has a separate title) and not the kind the court wrongfully perceives the place
to be;
Moreover, the court has no right to impose upon
the herein plaintiffs to accept their alleys as a jungle of people and the site
of myriad of activities that it is. For the information of the court,
plaintiffs have holdings in upscale residential areas and it is a misconception
for the court to consider the
Undersigned is at quandary what will this court do
should he be similarly situated with the plaintiffs? Will the court abandon his
residence, giving way to illegality in the name of live and let live principle?
Nonetheless, what remains bugling [sic] is the
fact that the court in his unsolicited advice knows exactly the description of
the alley where the complained nuisance is located and the specific activities
that the defendants do in relation to the alley. The court should be reminded
that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where
else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the
logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant,
off the record, given that the latter has already been in default.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner
requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on
November 18, 2005.[10]
In an Order[11]
dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on November
18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner,[12]
and directed him to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on even date
why he should not be punished for contempt.[13]
Judge Gingoyon also opined that:
This court, more specifically this Presiding
Judge, has not seen the faintest of shadow of the defendant or heard even an
echo of his voice up to the present.
Plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz is therefore directed to substantiate his
serious charge that he has been
communicating with the defendant off the record, given that the latter has
already been declared in default.
He is therefore ordered to show cause on November 18, 2005, why he
should not be punished for contempt of court for committing improper conduct
tending directly or indirectly to degrade the administration of justice.[14]
On November 18,
2005, petitioner, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued
an Order[15]
in open court to give petitioner another 10 days to show cause. The Order reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff Ferdinand
Cruz specifically prayed that he is submitting his Motion for Resolution and
Approval of this court today, Friday, November 18, 2005, at 8:30 A.M. Fridays
have always been earmarked for criminal cases only. Moreover, long before
plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration, this court no longer scheduled
hearings for November 18, 2005 because there will be no Prosecutors on this
date as they will be holding their National Convention. Nevertheless, since it
is the specific prayer of the plaintiff that he will be submitting his motion
for resolution and approval by the court on said date, the court yielded to his
wish and set his motion for hearing on his preferred date.
When this case was called for hearing today,
plaintiff did not appear. The court waited until 9:45 A.M. but still no
appearance was entered by the plaintiff or any person who might represent
himself as an authorized representative of the plaintiff. Instead it was the defendant and his counsel
who appealed and who earlier filed an Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.
x
x x x
In view of the failure of the plaintiff to appear
in todays hearing, the court considers the motion for reconsideration
submitted for resolution. As for the Order of this court for the plaintiff to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, the court [motu
proprio] grants plaintiff last ten (10) days to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt of court. After the lapse of the said
period, the court will resolve the issue of whether or not he should be cited
for contempt. x x x[16]
In his
Compliance[17]
to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the
same were based on the circumstances of the instant case. He even reiterated his insinuation that
Judge Gingoyon communicated with Mina by posing the query: where
then did this court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad of
[sic] activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the
alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiffs evidence
so exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of
his Decision dated October 21, 2005.[18]
On November 25,
2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order[19]
finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. The Order reads:
Ferdinand Cruz was ordered to substantiate with
facts his serious charge that the Judge has been communicating with the
defendant off the record. But instead of presenting proof of facts or stating
facts, Cruz simply shot back with a query: Where then did this court gather
an exact description of the alley and the myriad activities that the
inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant
was held in default and absent plaintiffs evidence so exacting as the
description made by this court By this token, Cruz adamantly stood pat on
his accusation, which now appears to be wholly based on suspicion, that the
Judge has been communicating with the defendant off the record.
The
suspicion of Ferdinand Cruz may be paraphrased thus: The only way for the Judge
[to] know the blight in his place in
Blinded by his suspicion, Cruz did not consider
that as State Prosecutor, the Judge was detailed in
Cruzs
open accusation without factual basis that the judge is communicating with the
defendant is an act that brings the court into disrepute or disrespect; or
offends its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority. It
constitutes contempt of court. (People vs. De Leon, L-10236, January 31,
1958). x x x By alleging that the judge
communicated with the defendant, Cruz is in effect charging the judge of
partiality. Since there is not an iota of proof that the judge did the act
complained of, the charge of partiality is uncalled for and constitutes direct
contempt (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil.86;
Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113).
WHEREFORE,
Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Accordingly,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P2,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.[20]
An Order of
Arrest[21] was issued against the petitioner on even
date.
On December 1,
2005, at 10:00 A.M., petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest (Ex-Parte Motion)[22]
with the respondent court. In said Ex-Parte Motion, petitioner averred
that:
x x x x
2. To date, undersigned has already filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court;
x x x x
The respondent
court denied the Ex-Parte Motion in
its Order[23]
dated December 1, 2005 based on petitioners failure to attach the alleged duly
filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The respondent court held that unless
petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, Judge
Gingoyon was slain on December 31, 2005.
In a Resolution[24]
dated February 1, 2006, this Court directed the incumbent Judge of Branch 117,
RTC of Pasay City, Judge Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a comment on the petition
inasmuch as direct or indirect contempt pertains to the misbehavior or
disrespect committed towards the court and not to judges in their personal
capacities.[25]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following
issues:
A.
WHETHER x x
x PETITIONER [IS] GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.
B.
WHETHER
C.
WHETHER THE
The issues may
be summed up as follows: whether the respondent court properly adjudged
petitioner in direct contempt of court and whether abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.
Petitioner contends that the alleged
contumacious remark is merely a fair observation or comment and a logical
conclusion made based on the detailed description given by the respondent court
of what has been happening in the alley subject of the civil case. Petitioner avers that no other conclusion can
be had except that Judge Gingoyon was communicating with the defendant off the
record, since the exact description of what was happening in the alley was not
adduced in evidence during trial.
Further, petitioner contends that fair and logical conclusion founded on
circumstances of the case cannot be considered contemptuous.
Petitioner likewise insists that the
respondent court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to fix bond,
therefore violating due process.
Our Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
A pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein
proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt.
[C]ontemptuous
statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt.[27]
[A] pleading x x x containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending x x x has
been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within
the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes
direct contempt.[28]
Based on the
abovementioned facts and consistent with the foregoing principles set forth, we
agree with the finding of respondent court that petitioner is guilty of direct
contempt of court.
The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent court contained a
serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the
defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This
allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the
allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is
his fair observation or conclusion.[29]
Petitioner
vehemently stood by his suspicion and repeated the allegation in the Compliance
to the show-cause Order dated
Instead of
showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the
defendant off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing
contumacious about his allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair
and logical observation. Clearly,
petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis. Suffice it to say that this accusation is a
dangerous one as it exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal
from office.
On the other
hand, a careful perusal of the description as provided by Judge Gingoyon in the
Decision shows but a general description of what is normally seen and what
normally happens in places such as Edang Street, to wit: x x x place is bursting with people most
of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to
laze around or [do] their daily household chores x x x. The alleys become the
grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts
of things to entertain [themselves] or pass the time, their wash area or even a
place to cook food in x x x. Ambulant
vendors who display their wares in the alley and their customers that mill
around them; x x x children chasing each
other, dodging and [ducking] from awnings
or canopies; x x x clotheslines full of dripping clothes that
encroach [on] the alleys x x x.[31]
The act of petitioner
in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the
record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation
in the Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the
petitioner to the respondent court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The
accusation taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions
its impartiality. It is a direct affront
to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public
respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of
justice.
Furthermore,
assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is
still not a valid defense in cases of contempt. Where the matter is abusive or insulting,
evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as
a defense. Respect for the judicial
office should always be observed and enforced.[32]
Moreover, the
charge of partiality is uncalled for, and there being no scintilla of proof
that Judge Gingoyon did the act complained of, petitioners act amounts to
direct contempt of court.[33]
Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to
Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is no abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent court.
Petitioner avers
that the respondent court abused its discretion in denying his Ex-Parte Motion. Petitioner insists that the respondent court
should have granted his Ex-Parte Motion
since he already filed a Petition for Certiorari
before this Court pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He further avers that respondent court
violated his right to due process by fixing the bond only on December 5, 2005
or 10 days after the Orders of contempt and arrest were issued.
Petitioners
contention lacks merit.
The respondent
court was well within the
bounds of its authority when it
denied petitioners
Ex-Parte Motion.
A person may be
adjudged in direct contempt of court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court[34]
without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail of the remedies of certiorari
or prohibition.[35]
Section 2, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Remedy therefrom.
The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom,
but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such
petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered
the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment
should the petition be decided against him. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, we
find that the respondent court properly denied petitioners Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof
that he already filed a petition for certiorari. Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was filed
with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M.[36]
and therein petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari
with this Court. However, perusal of the
records would show that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the
Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06 P.M.[37] Clearly, when the motion was filed with the
respondent court, it cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this
Court. Significantly, the records show
that respondent court was furnished a copy of the Petition for Certiorari
by registered mail and which was received only on December 5, 2005.[38]
It is therefore clear that at the time
that petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent court, he
has not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari. In fact, it was only after filing the Ex- Parte Motion with respondent court that
petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. This explained why no proof of such filing was
presented by petitioner to the respondent court thus prompting it to declare
that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the
remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[39]
Petitioner thus cannot attribute abuse
of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte
Motion. To reiterate, at the time the
said Ex-Parte Motion was filed and
acted upon by the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to the
remedy prayed for. Clearly, the
respondent court did not commit error, nor did it overstep its authority in
denying petitioners Ex-Parte Motion.
All told, we
take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and affirm the Order adjudging
petitioner guilty of direct contempt. However,
as to the penalty imposed upon petitioner, we find the fine of P2,000.00
commensurate with the acts committed.
We also find the
necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed
with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition.[40]
For the guidance of the petitioner, [t]his
Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive.[41] Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA,
and with the RTC in proper cases.[42]
However, this concurrence of
jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs
the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it
by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.[43]
Unwarranted demands upon this Courts
attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Adhering to the
policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, [w]here the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is
in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement
must be presented.[44] In consequence, the instant petition should
have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or
compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to avoid
further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.
Finally, it must
be pointed out that on April 28, 2010, we directed petitioner to cause the
entry of appearance of his counsel[45]
within 15 days from notice. Petitioner
failed to comply hence we directed him to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with in our Resolution dated September 6, 2010.[46] Still, petitioner failed to comply hence he
was fined P1,000.00 in our Resolution dated January 17, 2011[47]
which was increased to P3,000.00 in our Resolution of June 29,
2011. Consequently, petitioner is hereby
directed to pay said fine of P3,000.00 otherwise he would be dealt with
more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Order dated November 25, 2005 of Branch
117 of the P2,000.00. In addition, petitioner is ordered to PAY a fine of P3,000.00 for his
repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court. Petitioner is sternly WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
⃰ In lieu of Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
⃰ ⃰
In lieu of Chief Justice Renato C.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-12.
[2] Exhibit A of the Petition, id. at 12-14.
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 1-8.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Exhibit D of the Petition, id. at 26.
[12] See the Notice of Hearing in the Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit B of the Petition, id. at 21.
[13] In the same
Order, Judge Gingoyon denied the allegation of the petitioner that he was
communicating with the defendant off the record, thus: x x x This court, more specifically this Presiding Judge, has not seen
the faintest shadow of the defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to
the present. x x x.
[14] Records, p. 274
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Rollo,
p. 31.
[25]
[26]
[27] Atty. Ante v. Judge Pascua, 245 Phil. 745, 747 (1988).
[28] Wicker v. Hon. Arcangel, 322 Phil. 476, 483 (1996), citing Ang v. Judge Castro, 221 Phil. 149, 153 (1985) and Atty. Ante v. Judge Pascua, 245 Phil. 745 (1988).
[29] Rollo, pp. 83-89.
[30]
[31]
[32] Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724,
729 (1935), citing In re Stewart, 118
[33] Malolos v. Hon. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113 (1961).
[34] Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be the Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
[35] Rules of Court, Rule 71, Section 2.
[36] See the RTCs stamped receipt on the motion, records, p. 320.
[37] See the Supreme Courts stamped receipt on the petition, rollo, p. 3.
[38] See the RTCs stamped receipt on a copy of the petition, records, p. 328.
[39]
[40] People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418, 427 (1989).
[41]
[42] Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil 28, 34 (2002).
[43]
[44]
Vergara, Sr. v. Judge Suelto,
240 Phil. 719, 733 (1987).
[45] Rollo, p. 121.
[46]
[47]