Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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AGAPITO ROM, PASTORA P. ROSEL,
VALENTINO R. ANILA, JUANITO P. ROSEL, VIRGILIO R. CASAL, LUIS H. BAUTISTA,
CRESENCIANO M. ARGENTE, ANA M. ARGENTE, GIL B. CUENO, ENGRACIO B. BELTRAN,
ANGELITO B. AURE, ESTEBAN C. BENDO, MARIA ALBAO, GILBERT H. DEL MUNDO,
EUFRONIO H. DEL MUNDO, PASTOR H. DEL MUNDO, ANTONIO H. DEL MUNDO, ALBERTA H.
DEL MUNDO, PEDRO H. DEL MUNDO, ROLANDO B. ATIE, |
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G.R. No. 169331 Present: LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, VILLARAMA,
JR., and SERENO,⃰ JJ. |
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Petitioners, |
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ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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September 5, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
Justifying their resort to a
petition for certiorari before the appellate court and insisting that
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Orders they assailed therein were
issued without jurisdiction, petitioners are now before this Court for
recourse.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
assails the Decision[1]
dated
Factual
Antecedents
On September 30,
1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an
aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44664 from the coverage of
CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994.[4] The application was docketed as DAR ADM Case
No. A-9999-014-98.
Respondent
asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural
land[5]
which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as land devoted to agricultural
activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. Respondent
claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the lands
subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the
Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which
provides that lands already classified by a valid zoning ordinance for
commercial, industrial or residential use, which ordinance was approved prior
to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from the
DAR.[6]
In support of its application for
exemption, respondent submitted, among others, the following documents:
1.
Letter-application
dated 29 September 1997 signed by Elino SJ. Napigkit, for and on behalf of
Roxas & Company, Inc., seeking exemption from CARP coverage of subject
landholdings;
x x x x
3. Photocopy of TCT No. T-44664 and the
corresponding Declaration of Real Property No. 024-17-013-01-001;
4. Location and vicinity maps of subject
landholdings;
5. Certification dated 10 July 1997 issued by Administrator
Reynaldo Garcia [Administrator Garcia], Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that
the subject parcels of land are within the Residential Cluster Area as
specified in Zone VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982,
approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), thru Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983,
dated 4 May 1983;
6. Certification dated 31 August 1998 issued
by Engr. Alfredo M. Tan II [Engr. Tan], Regional Director, HLURB, Region IV,
stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be within the Residential
Cluster Area as specified in Zone VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4,
Series of 1982, as approved under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983,
dated 4 May 1983;
7. Three (3) Certifications all dated 8
September 1997 issued by Administrator Rolando T. Bonrostro, Regional
Irrigation Manager, National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Region IV;
stating that the subject parcels of land are not irrigated, not irrigable lands
and not covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitment; and,
8. Certification dated 18 January 1999, issued
by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Nasugbu,
Batangas, stating that the subject parcels of land are not covered by Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) but covered by a collective Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) No. 6653 issued to twenty-seven (27) farmer-beneficiaries.
x x x x[7]
Ruling of the
Department of Agrarian Reform
Considering that
the application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance
compensation,[8]
the DAR, through its Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation
(CLUPPI-II), directed respondent to submit proof of payment of disturbance
compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide occupants.[9]
To comply with the directive,
respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and attempted to obtain
the required waivers from herein petitioners who are the farmer-beneficiaries
of the subject parcels of land as identified by the DAR. However, the parties failed to reach an
agreement as regards the amount of disturbance compensation, hence, respondent
filed on September 28, 2001 a Petition[10]
to fix disturbance compensation before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication
Board (PARAD) of Batangas.
In its Order[11]
of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Application
for Exemption Clearance from CARP coverage filed by Roxas & Company, Inc.,
involving twenty-seven (27) parcels of land, specifically described in pages 1
and 2 of this Order,[[12]]
being portions of TCT No. T-44664, with an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares
located [in] Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
following conditions:
1.
The
farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their
peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until
a final determination has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation
due and entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas.
2.
No
development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the
appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants who
are determined by the PARAD to be entitled thereto. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation
shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment; and
3.
The
cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer beneficiaries shall be subject of
a separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas.
SO ORDERED.[13]
From this Order, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[14]
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[15]
and Second Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.[16]
They averred that the bases of the DAR in granting respondents application for
exemption were the Certification[17]
dated July 10, 1997 of Administrator Garcia and the Certification[18]
dated August 31, 1998 issued by Engr. Tan of the HLURB, Region IV, both of
which stated that the subject lands are within the residential cluster area as
specified in Zone VII of the (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series
of 1982, as approved under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated May
4, 1983. However, they claimed that these
certifications have already been superseded by Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 30, Series of 1993,[19]
which classified the area of Barangay
Aga as an agricultural zone except for the 50-meter strip from both sides of
the
Said motions, however, were dismissed by the DAR in an Order[20]
dated December 12, 2003.
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari[21] before the CA.
Ruling of the Court
of Appeals
Petitioners averred that Sec. III (B) of DAR AO No. 06, Series of 1994
requires that an application for exemption must be accompanied by certain
documents[22] before
DAR acquires jurisdiction over the application.
And since respondent failed to attach to its application the required
proof of disturbance compensation, petitioners claimed that the DAR has no
jurisdiction to act on the same. Moreover, petitioners alleged that the payment
of disturbance compensation is a condition sine qua non to the grant of
exemption and since no disturbance compensation was paid to them, then the DAR
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its assailed Orders.
Petitioners reiterated their argument that the Certifications dated July
10, 1997 and August 31, 1998, respectively issued by the MPDC and HLURB, and
used as bases for DARs assailed Orders granting the application for exemption,
have already been superseded by Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 30, Series of
1993. This fact was affirmed by the
Certification dated
In a Decision[23]
dated April 29, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper remedy. The CA held that petitioners should have filed
a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[24] Even if the certiorari petition is
considered as properly filed, the CA ruled that it would still dismiss the same
as there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DAR in issuing the
assailed Orders.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25]
and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[26]
but both were denied in a Resolution[27]
dated August 11, 2005.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following
issues:
i.
WHETHER THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE GRANT OF RESPONDENT ROXAS APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM
COVERAGE OF THE CARL DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROPERTY [HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT
OF RESPONDENTS VOLUNTARY OFFER TO SELL TO THE DAR]
ii.
WHETHER THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE GRANT OF RESPONDENT ROXAS APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM
COVERAGE OF THE CARL WITHOUT THE REQUIRED PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION,
WITHOUT ANY UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE SAID COMPENSATION AND WITHOUT ANY BOND BEING
POSTED BY THE LANDOWNER TO SECURE PAYMENT OF SAID COMPENSATION
iii.
WHETHER THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE REMEDY OF APPEAL IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THIS CASE[28]
The
Parties Arguments
Petitioners insist
that a certiorari petition, instead of a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, is the proper remedy since what they principally
questioned before the CA was the jurisdiction of the DAR to take cognizance of
the application. Even assuming that a
petition for review is the proper mode of appeal, petitioners contend that they
can still resort to the remedy of certiorari pursuant to settled
jurisprudence[29]
that the Court, in exceptional cases, may consider certiorari as the
appropriate remedy.[30]
[T]he writ [may] be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or
to do substantial justice.[31]
Since in this case, petitioners stand to lose the land they are tilling without
receiving the appropriate disturbance compensation, the ends of justice dictate
that they be entitled to the writ of certiorari.
Petitioners likewise aver that since
respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell the subject parcels of
land to the DAR, it can no longer withdraw the same from the CARPs coverage. Under DAR Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series
of 1998,[32] a
landowner who voluntarily offers to sell his property but failed to submit the
required documents shall be notified that the property offered for sale shall
be acquired by compulsory acquisition.
This means that once a landowner has voluntarily offered to sell his
property, he can no longer withdraw it from the coverage of the land reform law
as the DAR will nevertheless acquire it through compulsory acquisition even if
he fails to submit the documents required.
Moreover, petitioners claim that estoppel has already set in
considering that respondent filed its application only after eight years from
the time it voluntarily offered to sell the property.
Petitioners
also cite Section III (B), paragraph 8 of DAR AO No. 06, Series of 1994 which
provides that an application for exemption should be accompanied by proof of
payment of disturbance compensation, if the area is occupied by farmers, or
waiver/undertaking by the occupants that they will vacate the area whenever
required. There being no payment of
disturbance compensation here, respondent should have submitted such a waiver/undertaking. Also, when respondent was granted exemption,
conditional as it is since same is subject to the payment of disturbance
compensation, it should have posted a bond in an amount to be determined by the
adjudicator pursuant to paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of DAR AO No. 4, Series of 2003[33]
viz:
4.4. Whenever there is a dispute on the fixing of
disturbance compensation or entitlement to disturbance compensation, the
Regional Director shall refer the matter to the Adjudicator who shall be bound
to take cognizance of and resolve the case despite the non-finality of the
issue on whether or not the subject land is exempt from CARP.
4.5. The Approving Authority may grant a
conditional exemption order, despite non-payment of disturbance compensation or
while awaiting determination of entitlement thereto, subject however to the
condition that the applicant and/or landowner shall post a bond in an amount to
be determined by the Adjudicator.
Notwithstanding the posting of such bond, the property applied for
exemption shall not be developed for non-agricultural purposes and the farmers,
agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers, and actual tillers thereof
cannot be ejected therefrom until the finality of the exemption order.
In contravention
of the above-quoted provisions, however, no bond was posted in this case.
Lastly,
petitioners cite Section VIII of said DAR AO No. 04, Series of 2003
which provides that:
VIII.
EFFECT ON
PRE-EXISTING CARP COVERAGE
When the filing of an application for exemption
clearance is in response to a notice of CARP coverage, the DAR shall deny due
course to the application if it was filed after sixty (60) days from the date
the landowner received a notice of CARP Coverage.
Petitioners
allege that here, respondent filed its application for exemption more than
eight years from its receipt of the notice of CARP coverage on August 23,
1989. While conceding that said
administrative order was issued only in 2003, petitioners argue that same is
applicable to respondent as this merely interpreted both Sec. 3 of R.A. No.
6657 and DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which were already in effect long
before respondent filed its application.
Respondent,
for its part, emphasizes that petitioners resorted to a wrong mode of
appeal. For this alone, it contends that
the CA correctly dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari.
As regards petitioners other arguments,
respondent addresses them point by point.
Respondent refutes petitioners
contention that a landowner can no longer withdraw his property from the
coverage of CARP once he has voluntarily offered to sell the same to the DAR by
invoking this Courts ruling in the related case of Roxas & Company,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[34]
There it was held that as part of
administrative due process, the DAR must first comply with the notice
requirement before a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) is accepted. For failure of the DAR to send notices to Roxas to attend the survey and the
land valuation meeting before accepting the VOS, the acceptance of the VOS and
the entire acquisition proceedings over three haciendas, including Hacienda
Caylaway, where the parcels of land subject of this case are located, were
nullified. Moreover, respondent stresses
that DAR Memorandum Circular No. 02 Series of 1998 upon which petitioners
anchor their assertion that a VOS cannot be withdrawn was issued 10 years after
the VOS in this case was made in 1988.
Aside from arguing that the circular cannot be applied retroactively,
respondent asserts that there is nothing in such circular which prohibits,
either expressly or impliedly, a landowner from withdrawing a VOS. If at all, said circular merely serves as guide
to be followed by the concerned DAR officials in cases where landowners have
voluntarily offered to sell their land to the government.
Anent the claim that payment of
disturbance compensation is a condition sine qua non to the grant of an
application for exemption, respondent invokes the Courts ruling in Bacaling
v. Muya[35] that
farmer-beneficiaries are not entitled to disturbance compensation because the
lots subject thereof never became available for agrarian reform. This was because said lots were already
classified as residential prior to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No.
27 and R.A. No. 6657. Similarly in this
case, respondent contends that petitioners are not entitled to disturbance
compensation because the subject landholdings are not and have never been
available for agrarian reform as they have been classified as residential
properties prior to the effectivity of the CARL. However, believing in good faith that it has
the legal obligation to pay disturbance compensation, respondent still filed a
Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the PARAD after petitioners
refused to accept respondents offer of disturbance compensation or to execute
a waiver/undertaking that they will vacate the area whenever required.
With respect to the requirement of bond
under paragraph 4.5 of DAR AO No. 4, Series of 2003, respondent counter-argues that
such was not a requirement at the time of the filing of its application. It
asserts that said administrative order cannot be retroactively applied to its
application which was filed prior to said administrative orders issuance.
Finally, respondent avers that
petitioners invocation of Section VIII of DAR AO No. 04, Series of 2003 is
downright illogical. It points out that
it received a notice of compulsory acquisition way back in 1989 while said AO
was issued only in 2003. Respondent
asserts that this provision cannot be given retroactive application; otherwise,
it would prejudice its vested right to file an application, which at that time,
was not yet subject to the 60-day period.
More importantly, there was no valid notice of coverage to speak of as
held in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
Our Ruling
There
is no merit in the petition.
We
note at the outset that this case is intimately related to Roxas &
Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals [36]
and Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW,[37] earlier resolved
by this Court on
For
purposes of discussion, a brief overview of said two cases is proper.
Roxas
& Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals involves three haciendas in
Nasugbu, Batangas, namely, Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, owned by herein
respondent Roxas & Company, Inc. At
issue there was the validity of the haciendas coverage under the CARP as
well as Roxas application for their conversion from agricultural to
non-agricultural use. For failure to observe due process, the acquisition
proceedings over the haciendas were nullified. With respect, however, to the application for
conversion, the Court held that DAR is in a better position to resolve the
same, it being the primary agency possessing the necessary expertise on the
matter. In its Decision dated December
17, 1999, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the DAR for proper
acquisition proceedings and determination of Roxass application for conversion.
Roxas
& Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, on the other hand, involved seven
consolidated petitions,[40]
the main subjects of which were Roxas application for conversion from
agricultural to non-agricultural use of said three haciendas and exemption from CARP coverage. Apparently, after the remand of the case to
the DAR in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and during the
pendency of Roxas application for conversion, it likewise filed an application
for exemption of the haciendas from the CARPs coverage on the basis of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520[41]
and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994.[42]
Two
of the seven consolidated petitions relevant to the present case are G.R. Nos.
167505[43]
and 179650.[44]
Both petitions revolved around Roxas application for exemption under DAR AO No.
6, Series of 1994 invoking as basis the same (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4 earlier alluded to. In resolving them, the Court recognized the
power of a local government unit to classify and convert land from agricultural
to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL and thus upheld the
validity of said zoning ordinance.
However, in G.R. No. 179650, the Court found that the DAR acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the application for exemption
considering that there exist uncertainties on the location and identities of
the properties being applied for exemption. It stated that Roxas should have
submitted the comprehensive land use plan and pinpointed therein the location
of the properties to prove that they are indeed within the area of coverage of
the subject (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4.
With
respect to G.R. No. 167505, we quote the pertinent portions of the Courts
In
its application, Roxas & Co. submitted the following documents:
1.
Letter-application
dated 29 September 1997 signed by Elino SJ. Napigkit, for and on behalf of
Roxas & Company, Inc., seeking
exemption from
CARP coverage of subject landholdings;
2.
Secretarys
Certificate dated September 2002 executed by Mariano M. Ampil III, Corporate
Secretary of Roxas & Company, Inc., indicating a Board Resolution
authorizing him to represent the corporation in its application for exemption
with the DAR. The same Board Resolution
revoked the authorization previously granted to the Sierra Management &
Resources Corporation;
3.
Photocopy of
TCT No. 985 and its corresponding Tax Declaration No. 0401;
4.
Location
and vicinity maps of subject landholdings;
5.
Certification
dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia, Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrtor of Nasugbu, Batangas,
stating that the subject parcels of land are within the Urban Core Zone as
specified in Zone A. VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), under Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;
6.
Two (2)
Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo Tan II, Director,
HLURB, Region IV, stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be within
the Residential cluster Area as specified in Zone VII of Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, Series of
1982, approved under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983, dated 4 May, 1983
x x x x
By Order of
1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels
of land shall be maintained in their peaceful possession and cultivation of their
respective areas of tillage until a final determination has been made on the
amount of disturbance compensation due and entitlement of such farmer-occupants
thereto by the PARAD of Batangas;
2. No development shall be undertaken within
the subject parcels of land until the appropriate disturbance compensation has
been paid to the farmer-occupants who are determined by the PARAD to be
entitled thereto. Proof of payment of
disturbance compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days
from such payment; and
3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the
farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject of a separate proceeding before the PARAD
of Batangas.
DAMBA-NSFW moved for
reconsideration but the DAR Secretary denied the same x x x x.
x x x x
On DAMBA-NSFWs petition for
certiorari, the Court of Appeals, x x x x sustained, by Decision of
December 20, 1994 and Resolution of May 7, 2007, the DAR Secretarys finding
that Roxas & Co. had substantially complied with the prerequisites of DAR AO
6, Series of 1994. Hence, DAMBA-NFSWs
petition in G.R. No. 167505.
The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals assailed
issuances, the orders of the DAR Secretary which it sustained being amply
supported by evidence.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original.)
In view of this,
the Court ordered the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to farmer-beneficiaries
of the nine parcels of land in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505, conditioned, however, on
the satisfaction of the disturbance compensation of said farmer-beneficiaries
pursuant to R. A. No. 3844, as amended[46]
and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994.[47]
Remarkably, in
its application for exemption in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this
case, respondent submitted documents in support of its application for
exemption similar to those submitted by it in DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505.
And, having established through said documents that the 27 parcels of
land are within the coverage of the said (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 4, the DAR declared as well that respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of DAR AO No. 6, series of 1994 in DAR ADM Case No.
A-9999-014-98. The DAR thus granted the
application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the same tenor as that
issued in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98.
Given this
backdrop, we are inclined to uphold the DARs
On this ground
alone we can already deny the petition.
Nonetheless, we shall proceed to discuss the issues raised by
petitioners.
Petitioners resorted to a wrong
mode of appeal.
Section
61[50]
of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or
decisions are governed by the Rules of Court.
The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for
judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary.[51] Hence here, petitioners should have assailed
before the CA the
Petitioners
assert that a certiorari petition is the proper mode since what they
principally questioned before the CA was the jurisdiction of the DAR to take
cognizance of respondents application for exemption.
We
are not persuaded. It bears stressing that it is the law which confers upon the
DAR the jurisdiction over applications for exemption.[53] And, [w]hen a court, tribunal or officer has
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment
are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.[54]
Besides, petitioners basis in claiming that the DAR has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of respondents application for exemption is gravely flawed. The submission of proof of payment of
disturbance compensation is not jurisdictional as to deprive the DAR of the
power to act on an application for exemption.
To reiterate, jurisdiction over the subject of a case is conferred by
law.[55]
Also
untenable is petitioners assertion that even assuming that a petition for
review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy, they are still entitled to the writ
of certiorari. Petitioners posit that
an exceptional circumstance in this case calls for the issuance of the writ, i.e., they stand to lose the land they
till without receiving the appropriate disturbance compensation. It is well to remind petitioners, however,
that the assailed
Thus,
we are totally in accord with the CAs finding that petitioners resorted to a
wrong remedy.
The fact that respondent had
previously voluntarily offered to sell the subject properties to the DAR is
immaterial in this case.
Indeed, respondent
had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the DAR Hacienda Caylaway,
where the properties subject of this case are located. However, this offer to sell became irrelevant
because respondent was later able to establish before the DAR that the subject
27 parcels of land were reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by
virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 prior to the effectivity
of the CARL on
Respondent substantially complied
with the requirements of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990.
Indeed,
respondents application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of
disturbance compensation or by petitioners waiver/undertaking that they will
vacate the subject parcels of land whenever required. However, this Court finds that respondent has
substantially complied with this requirement found under Section III (B) of DAR
AO No. 6, Series of 1990.
Records
show that upon being required by CLUPPI-II to submit proof of payment of
disturbance compensation and/or waiver of rights of bona fide occupants after
an evaluation of its application for exemption revealed that it was not
accompanied by the same,[58]
respondent exerted efforts to comply with the said requirement. It offered to pay petitioners their
disturbance compensation but they failed to agree on the price. Petitioners also refused to execute a waiver/
undertaking. Respondent thus filed a
Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the PARAD. To prove these, it submitted to the DAR a (1)
Certification dated September 10, 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO
of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that there was failure to reach an amicable
settlement on the matter of disturbance compensation between the parties; and
(2) copy of the Petition to fix disturbance compensation duly received by the
PARAD on September 28, 2001.[59]
To us, these constitute substantial compliance with the said particular
requirement of Section III (B), DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2002. At any rate, the lack of proof of such
payment later proved to be of no consequence since the assailed November 6,
2002 Order of the DAR was nevertheless made subject to the condition of payment
of disturbance compensation to petitioners.
In fact, the Order likewise states that 10 days from such payment, proof
of payment of disturbance compensation must be submitted to the DAR.
The issues regarding respondents
non-posting of bond pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 4.5 of DAR AO No. 4,
Series of 2003 and its non-compliance with Section VIII thereof were belatedly
raised.
A
careful review of the records reveals that petitioners raised the issues of respondents
non-posting of bond pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 4.5 of DAR AO No. 4,
Series of 2003 and its non-compliance with Section VIII thereof only in their
Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs assailed Decision. While petitioners themselves alleged that DAR
AO No. 4, Series of 2003 was already in effect during the pendency of their
Motions for Reconsideration before the DAR, there is no showing that they raised
these points therein. It is
well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or
quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process
impel this rule. Any issue raised for
the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.[60] Thus, petitioners cannot now be allowed to
challenge the assailed Orders of the DAR on grounds of technicalities belatedly
raised as an afterthought.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate
Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
⃰ In lieu of Associate Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin, per Raffle dated August 31, 2011.
[1] CA rollo, pp. 211-227; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[2]
[3]
[4] Guidelines for the Issuance of Exemption Clearances based on Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657 and the Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 Series of 1990.
[5] Sec.
4. Scope The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private and agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
x
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
[6] Said Department of Justice Opinion states that the legal requirement for the Department of Agrarian Reform clearance in cases of land use conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses applies only to conversion made on or after June 15, 1988, the date of the agrarian reform laws effectivity.
[7] See pp. 2-3 of the Department of Agrarian Reforms assailed Order of November 6, 2002, CA rollo, pp. 20-21.
[8] III (B) of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1990 provides:-
III. FILING OF
THE APPLICATION
x x x x
B. The application should be duly signed by the landowner or his
representative, and should be accompanied by the following documents:
1. Duly notarized Special Power
of Attorney, if the applicant is not the landowner himself;
2. Certified true copies of the titles which is
the subject of the application;
3. Current tax declaration(s) covering the
property;
4. Location Map or Vicinity Map
5. Certification from the
Deputized Zoning Administrator that the land has been reclassified to
residential industrial or commercial use prior to June 15, 1988;
6. Certification from the HLURB that the
pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the Board prior to June 15,
1988;
7. Certification from the National Irrigation Administration
that the land is not covered by Administrative Order No. 20 s. 1992, i.e., that
the area is not irrigated, nor scheduled for irrigation rehabilitation nor
irrigable with firm funding commitment.
8. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation, if the area is presently being occupied by farmers, or waiver/undertaking by the occupants that they will vacate the area whenever required. (Emphasis supplied.)
[9] See DAR CLUPPI-IIs Letter dated July 31, 2001 addressed to respondents representative Atty. Mariano Ampil III, CA rollo, p. 68.
[10]
[11]
[12] The 27 parcels of land subject of the application are particularly described as follows in the said DAR Order:
|
DAR LOT NO. |
DAR SURVEY PLAN |
AREA (in has.) |
|
79 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
3.3234 |
|
87 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.2408 |
|
88 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.0706 |
|
89 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.7027 |
|
90 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
2.3763 |
|
91 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.2663 |
|
92 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
1.0109 |
|
99 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.4619 |
|
100 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
1.5665 |
|
101 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.5449 |
|
102 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.4069 |
|
139 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.1645 |
|
141 |
Psd-04-045072 (AR) |
0.2716 |
|
548 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.3941 |
|
549 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
1.0917 |
|
550 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.1871 |
|
551 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
2.0000 |
|
552 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
1.6392 |
|
553 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.5236 |
|
554 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.3841 |
|
555 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.2260 |
|
556 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.2783 |
|
557 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.6531 |
|
564 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.9600 |
|
565 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.3757 |
|
655 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.2437 |
|
681 |
Psd-04-045071 (AR) |
0.7597 |
|
|
TOTAL |
21.1236 |
[13] CA rollo, pp. 23-24.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] See
the Certification to that effect issued on January 29, 2003, id. at 35.
[20]
[21]
[22] Supra note 8.
[23] Supra note 1.
[24] The section provides that Rule 43 shall apply to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among the agencies enumerated is the Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657.
[25] CA rollo, pp. 233-241.
[26]
[27] Supra note 3.
[28] Rollo, p. 24.
[29] Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Phil. Export Processing Zone, 402 Phil. 271, (2001) and Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 293 (1999).
[30] Like for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from injurious effect of the judgment complained of. Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Phil. Export Processing Zone, supra at 284.
[31] Gutib v. Court of Appeals, supra at 307.
[32] Compulsory Acquisition of Landholdings Covered by Voluntary Offer to Sell.
[33] 2003 Rules on Exemption of Lands from CARP Coverage Under Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990.
[34] 378 Phil. 727 (1999).
[35] 430 Phil. 531 (2002).
[36] Supra note 34.
[37] G.R. Nos. 149548, 167505, 167540, 167543, 167845, 169163, and 179650, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 33.
[38] G.R. No. 167505 entitled Damayan ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW), petitioner, vs. Secretary of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform, Roxas & Co., Inc. and/or Atty. Mariano Ampil, respondents.
[39] TCT No. T-44664 which covered the 27 parcels of land in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this case is one of the four titles covering the entire 867,4571 hectares of Hacienda Caylaway.
[40] G.R. No. 149548 entitled Roxas & Company, Inc., petitioner, v. DAMBA-NFSW and the Department of Agrarian Reform, respondents; G.R. No. 167505 entitled Damayan ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW), petitioner, v. Secretary of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform, Roxas & Co., Inc. and/or Atty. Mariano Ampil, respondents; G.R. No. 167540 entitled Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid sa Hacienda Roxas, Inc. (KAMAHARI), rep. by its President Carlito Caisip, and Damayan ng Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW), represented by Lauro Martin, petitioners, v. Secretary of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform, Roxas & Co., Inc., respondents; G.R. No. 167543 entitled Department of Land Reform, formerly Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), petitioner v. Roxas & Co., Inc., respondent; G.R. No. 167845 entitled Roxas & Co, Inc., petitioner, v. DAMBA-NFSW, respondent; G.R. No. 169163 entitled DAMBA-NFSW, represented by Lauro V. Martin, petitioner, v. Roxas & Co. Inc., respondent; and G.R. No. 179650 entitled DAMBA-NFSW, petitioner v. Roxas & Co., Inc., respondent.
[41] Declaring the Municipalities of Maragondon
and Ternate in
[42] Supra note 4.
[43] Subject of this petition was Roxas application for exemption of nine parcels of land located in Hacienda Palico docketed as DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98.
[44] Subject of this petition was Roxas application for exemption of six parcels of land also located in Hacienda Palico docketed as DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97.
[45] Supra note 37 at 64-66.
[46] An Act To ordain The Agricultural Land Reform Code And To Institute Land Reforms In The Philippines, Including The Abolition Of Tenancy And the Channeling Of Capital Into Industry, Provide For The Necessary Implementing Agencies, Appropriate Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes, As Amended By Republic Act No. 6389; It mandates that disturbance compensation be given to tenants of parcels of land upon finding that the landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some urban purposes.
[47] It directs payment of disturbance compensation before the application for exemption may be completely granted.
[48] CA rollo, p. 22.
[49] Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan, G.R. No. 149050, March 25, 2009, 582 SCRA 369, 376-377.
[50] Sec. 61. Procedure on Review. - Review by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall be governed by the Rules of Court. x x x.
[51] Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 607 (2003).
[52]
[53] Sec. 50 of the CARL provides:
Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform x x x.
Thus, Section 3, Rule II of
the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The
Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the
administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as
enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under
the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of
the DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:
x x x x
3.7 Application for exemption pursuant to
Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44 (1990);
x x x x
[54] Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, supra note 51 at 608.
[55]
[56] G.R. No. 103302,
[57] De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156965, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 238, 245.
[58] Supra note 9.
[59] CA rollo, p. 21.
[60] Besana v. Mayor, G.R. No. 153837, July 21, 2010, 625 SCRA 203, 214.