Republic of the
Supreme Court
JOEL GALZOTE y SORIAGA,
Petitioner, - versus - JONATHAN BRIONES and PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
G.R. No. 164682
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION, perez, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: September 14, 2011 |
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D
E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before
this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the twin resolutions[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On
The undersigned accuses JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA of the
crime of Robbery in an
That on or about July 22, 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one ROSENDO
OQUINA Y ESMALI who is already charged with the same offense with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 304765, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain, by
means of force upon things, break into and enter the Administration Office of
the Prince Town Inn Corporation located at Valenzuela Street, Sta. Mesa, this
City, which is an uninhabited place, by then and there destroying the Jipson
board ceiling of the said establishment with the use of a fan knife and passing
through the same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, and once
inside, and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, took, stole and carried away cash money in the
amount of P109,000.00 belonging to said Prince Town Inn Corporation, to
the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P109,000.00,
Philippine Currency [sic].
Contrary to law.[2]
The petitioner moved to quash the
above information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed
in form and in substance. The MeTC denied the petitioners motion to quash in
its order of
Via a petition
for certiorari,[5] the
petitioner elevated the unfavorable ruling of the MeTC to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 8,
In its order[7] of
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. The CA dismissed the petition in its
resolution of
The CA held that the petitioner lost
his right to appeal when he failed to appeal within the 15-day reglementary
period under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA explained that the
petitioner should have filed an appeal, instead of a special civil action for certiorari, upon receipt of the RTCs
denial of his motion for reconsideration. The CA also noted that the petitioner
failed to implead the People of the
Philippines as party-respondent in his petition.
The CA saw no merit in the
petitioners argument that the lower courts erred in denying his motion to
quash. It explained that the allegation of conspiracy in his case need not be
alleged with particularity since it was not charged as an offense in itself, but
only as a manner of incurring criminal liability. The fact that the
petitioners alleged co-conspirator had been convicted of the lesser offense of
malicious mischief in another case is not a bar to the petitioners prosecution
for the crime of robbery.
The petitioner moved to reconsider
this resolution, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution[10]
dated
THE PETITION
In the present petition for review on
certiorari, the petitioner claims
that his recourse to a petition for certiorari
before the CA was proper. He argues that both the MeTC and the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when they denied his motion to quash. He alleges that
the trial courts failed to see that the information filed against him was
flawed both in form and in substance.
The petitioner additionally claims
that his failure to implead the People of
the Philippines as party-respondent was not fatal to his petition.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Remedy from the Denial of a Motion to Quash
A preliminary consideration in this
case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the
petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash.
In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the
accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the
lower courts decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise
the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial
court but as an added ground to overturn the latters ruling.
In this case,
the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the
denial of his motion to quash via a special
civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to
quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an
interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the
absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.[11] The
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to
trial as discussed above.
Thus, a direct resort to a special
civil action for certiorari is an
exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly
grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a
"more enlightened and substantial justice";[12] the
promotion of public welfare and public policy;[13]
cases that "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof";[14] or judgments on order attended by grave abuse
of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.[15]
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the
petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The
petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and
circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.
At the RTC
We find no compelling reason to
justify a resort to a petition for certiorari
against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner failed to show
that the factual circumstances of his
case fall under any of the above exceptional circumstances. The MeTC in fact did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash
was consistent with the
existing rules and
applicable jurisprudence. The ground used by
the petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser
than the crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule
117 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that warrant the quashal of a criminal information.[16]
This ground, too, is an extraneous matter
that has no bearing and is irrelevant to the validity of the criminal
information filed against the accused; the designated purpose of a motion to
quash is to assail the validity of the criminal information (or criminal
complaint) for defects or defenses apparent
on the face of the information.[17] A facial examination of the criminal
information against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on its face
considering its conformity with the guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
Under the
circumstances, the criminal
information is sufficient
in form and
substance for it states: (a) the
name of the
petitioner as the accused; (b) the offense of robbery as
the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how the offense of robbery was
committed and the petitioners participation were alleged with particularity;
and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the robbery were also stated
therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the petitioner can be properly tried
under the allegations of the information.
The CA Resolution
To proceed to the merits of the CA resolution
that is the main subject of this review, we find no reversible error in the
CAs dismissal of the petitioners petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs order; the petition was both
procedurally and substantively infirm.
We find that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was a wrong
legal remedy to question the RTC order. The petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner before the RTC was an original
action whose resulting decision is a final order that completely disposed
of the petition;[18] the assailed CA
resolution was in all respect a ruling on the propriety of the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC. Hence,
the petitioners remedy was to appeal the RTC order to the CA pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
Given the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy of appeal, the petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari.[19]
Even on the substantive aspect, the petition
for certiorari filed with the CA must
fail considering the petitioners failure to show any justifiable reason for
his chosen mode of review. In addition, we find no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the RTC since it was merely affirming a correct ruling of denial
by the MeTC of the petitioners motion to quash.
As a final word, we cannot allow a party to
delay litigation by filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave abuse of discretion.[20] We
repeat that it is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances where a
resort to a petition for certiorari is
proper.[21] Under the circumstances, the
petitioners recourses cannot but be dilatory moves that deserve sanction from
this Court.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we DENY the
petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A
T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
*
Designated as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes per Special Order No. 1077 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 22-31; penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and concurred in by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador.
[2] Records, p. 27.
[3] Rollo, pp. 74-75.
[4]
[5] Records, pp. 16-23.
[6]
[7] Rollo, pp. 79-80.
[8] Order of
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. Nos. 154211-12,
[13] Ibid.
[14] Supra note 11, at 361.
[15] Ibid., citing Mead v. Hon. Argel, etc., et al., 200 Phil. 650, 656 (1982); Yap v. Lutero, 105 Phil. 1307, 1308 (1959); and Pineda and Ampil Manufacturing Co. v. Bartolome, et al., 95 Phil. 930, 937 (1954) which cited People v. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752, 756 (1951).
[16] Section 3, Rule 117 enumerates the grounds
for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do
not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse
or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
[17] Los Baos v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588,
[18] See Vios
v. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No. 163103,
[19] Uy Kiao
Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831,
[20]
[21] Ibid.