Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
MAGLANA RICE AND CORN MILL, INC., and
RAMON P. DAO, Petitioners, - versus
- ANNIE L. TAN and her husband MANUEL
TAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 159051 Present: LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, *PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: September
21, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case originated from the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities of Davao City (MTCC),[1] which adjudged the petitioners
liable for the material injury valued at P83,750.00 sustained by the
vehicle of the respondents arising from the accident involving their respective
vehicles, and for attorneys fees and costs of suit. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 14, in
Antecedents
The
vehicular accident, which involved the Fuso truck owned by petitioner Maglana
Rice and Corn Mill, Inc., driven by its employee, petitioner Ramon P. Dao, and
the Honda Accord sedan owned by the respondents, driven by respondent Manuel
Tan, occurred on
The
version of the respondents is that their car was travelling along the P83,750.00.
Their version was corroborated by the traffic accident report and the court
testimony of traffic investigator SPO4 Manuel C. Espaola (SPO4 Espaola).
The
petitioners gave a different version. A few moments before the accident, Dao
was on board the truck at about
In
its decision dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. and Ramon Dao, enjoining them to pay jointly and severally the following:
1.
The sum of P83,750.00 as the repair expenses of
the Honda car which was damaged during the incident, per Job Order No. 64017 of
Kar Asia Inc., dated
2.
The sum of P15,000.00 as reasonable amount for
and as attorneys fees; and
3. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The
petitioners appealed, but the RTC upheld the MTCC on
Not satisfied, the petitioners
further appealed to the CA, which denied their petition for lack of merit,
thereby affirming the RTC.[7]
The petitioners motion for
reconsideration proved futile, with the CA denying it.[8]
Hence,
this appeal to the Court by petition for review on certiorari, whereby the petitioners reiterate that the fault for
the vehicular accident was attributable to the respondents.
Ruling
The
appeal deserves outright rejection.
I
Appeal under Rule 45 is limited to
questions of law; exceptions
The
issue this appeal poses concerns the real cause of the vehicular accident, that is, whether or not the respondents
car suddenly cut into the lane of the petitioners truck, and whether or not Dao
simply failed to stop on time despite the respondents car having already come
to a full stop due to traffic congestion along the road. The issue is obviously
a factual one because it requires the ascertainment of which driver was
negligent. As such, the appeal fails, for a petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, shall
raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question,
to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. Indeed, there is a question
of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.[9]
Whether
certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or
should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one
side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition
in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and
analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be
said to be strong, clear and convincing;
whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be
accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious
character by the other side; whether or
not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to
justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of
fact. Questions like these are not
reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is
confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly
set forth.[10]
That an appeal by certiorari should raise only questions
of law is not properly to be doubted. The limitation exists, because the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts that undertakes the re-examination and
re-assessment of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial. The appreciation and resolution of factual issues are the functions of
the lower courts, whose resulting findings are then received with respect and
are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.[11]
Although the Court has recognized several exceptions
to the limitation of an appeal by certiorari
to only questions of law, including: (a)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (b) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (f) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (h) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (i) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (j)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion,[12]
this appeal does not come under the exceptions.
II
Appeal to the
Court is frivolous;
Petitioners are
liable for treble costs of suit
In the CA, the petitioners specified
the errors committed by the RTC thuswise:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF DR. MANUEL TAN VIOLATED TRAFFIC RULES (SEC. 39, RA 4136) AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 2185 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT (MCKEE VS. IAC, 211 SCRA 517) HE WAS THE ONE NEGLIGENT AT THE TIME OF THE MISHAP.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT MANUEL TAN WAS TRYING TO COVER UP HIS MISDEEDS BECAUSE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THE INSURANCE OF HIS WIFES CAR ALREADY EXPIRED AND HE WANTED THE INSURANCE OF THE DEFENDANTS TRUCK [TO] SHOULDER EXPENSES FOR THE DAMAGE.
III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ERRONEOUS AND LOADED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS AS PERCEIVED BY THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 2, WHO ORIGINALLY HEARD THIS CASE BUT HE RETIRED BEFORE HE COULD RENDER HIS DECISION ON THIS CASE.
IV. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY BOTH PARTIES, AND COROLLARILY, IT ARRIVED AT A WRONG CONCLUSION.[13]
As stated, the CA rejected the
petitioners submissions.
The rejection by the CA unerringly indicated
that three lower courts with the legal capacity and official function to
resolve issues of fact, namely, the MTCC, the RTC, and the CA, all found and declared
that the police report respecting the accident was unbiased and worthy of
belief; that the truck had been travelling behind the respondents car; and
that the accident had occurred because Dao did not stop after the car had come
to a full stop despite his having a clear view of the road ahead. They noted
that the pictorial evidence revealed no scraping marks or even a dent on the
left side of the car, but instead showed a solitary material damage sustained
on the left rear portion of car, proof that only one collision had occurred
between the two vehicles.[14] They concluded that the version of
the respondents was the more credible one.
In
this recourse, the petitioners have presented no ground sufficient to persuade the
Court to treat their appeal as coming under any of the aforementioned exceptions
as to warrant the review of the uniform findings of fact and conclusions made
by the MTCC, RTC and CA. After the CA upheld the appellate judgment of the RTC,
they should have desisted on their own volition from coming to the Court, seeing
that the only issues that they would be raising were plainly factual in nature.
They did not desist despite their attorney being surely aware of the limitation
to questions of law of any appeal to the Court on account of its not being a
trier of facts. Under such circumstances, their appeal was made notwithstanding
its being patently frivolous.
A frivolous appeal is one where no
error can be brought before the appellate court, or whose result is obvious and
the arguments of error are totally bereft of merit, or which is prosecuted in
bad faith, or which is contrary to established law and unsupported by a
reasoned, colorable argument for change.[15] It is frivolous, too, when it does
not present any justiciable question, or is one so readily recognizable as
devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any,
prospect that it can succeed.[16] A losing party has no right to
prosecute a frivolous appeal, because he and his counsel are not relieved from
the obligation to demonstrate persuasively even when appeal is a matter of
right the substantial and reversible errors committed during the trial.
Given
the frivolousness of the appeal, the Court imposes treble costs of suit on the petitioners.
Rule 142 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 3. Costs when appeal
frivolous. ̶ Where an action or an appeal is found to be frivolous,
double or treble costs may be imposed on the plaintiff or appellant, which
shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the court.
Corpus Juris Secundum explains the
concept of costs of suit thusly:
Costs are certain allowances authorized by statute or court rule to reimburse the successful party for expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending an action or special proceedings. They are in the nature of incidental damages allowed to indemnify a party against the expense of successfully asserting his rights in court. The theory on which they are allowed to a plaintiff is that the default of defendant made it necessary to sue him, and to a defendant, that plaintiff sued him without cause.
xxx
In their origin, costs were given rather as a punishment of the defeated party for causing the litigation than as a recompense to the successful party for the expenses to which he had been subjected. At the present time, the latter theory generally obtains in the legislation with regard to it; but under some statutes, the law of costs is regarded as penal, the right to recover costs being given to the successful party against the unsuccessful party as a penalty for presenting in court as suit or defense that which is without merit, as where the litigant has pleaded frivolous or false matters.
xxx
Costs are a mere incident to, and are in no sense the subject of, the litigation; and while they are incident to all actions they are nevertheless in their nature a mere incident to the judgment to which they attach, especially in cases relating to motions and orders.
The right to costs, although ancillary to the judgment, is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure; although it has been held that costs alone cannot furnish the basis for substantive judgment.[17] [emphasis supplied]
The imposition of treble costs of
suit on the petitioners is meant to remind them and their attorney that the
extent that an attorneys exercise of his professional responsibility for their
benefit as his clients submits to reasonable limits beyond which he ought to go
no further, and that his failure to recognize such limits will not be allowed
to go unsanctioned by the Court. Thus, the Court has not hesitated to impose
treble costs of suit (a) to stress
its dislike for any scheme to prolong litigation or for an unwarranted
effort to avoid the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at;[18] (b)
to sanction an appeal that was obviously interposed for the sole purpose of
delay;[19] (c)
to disapprove of the partys lack of good and honest intentions, as well as
the evasive manner by which it was able to frustrate (the adverse partys)
claim for a decade;[20] (d) to stifle a partys deplorable propensity
to go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law
and the orders of this Court and thereby to cause the case to drag for far
too long with practically no end in sight;[21] (e) to condemn the counsels frantic
search for any ground to resuscitate his clients lost cause;[22] and (f) to reiterate that a litigant, although
his right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, is not permitted
to initiate similar suits once his case has been adjudicated by a competent
court in a valid final judgment, in the hope of securing a favorable ruling for
this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of
justice.[23]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals, and ORDERS the petitioners
to pay treble costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Vice
Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. per Special Order No. 1080 dated
[1] CA rollo, pp. 41-49.
[2]
[3] Rollo, pp. 29-38; penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos (retired), with Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (retired) and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino concurring.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 41-49; penned by Presiding Judge Antonina B. Escovilla.
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, pp. 29-38.
[8]
[9] II Herrera, Remedial Law, 2000 Edition, p. 648; citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979
Edition.
[10] Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680,
[11] FNCB Finance v. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394,
[12] Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86; Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 140043, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 97, 110; Sps. Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).
[13] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[14] Rollo, pp. 34-35 (CA Decision).
[15] Bersamin, Appeal and Review in the Philippines, Second Edition, p. 105; citing Re & Re, Brief Writing & Oral Argument, Seventh Edition, Oceana Publications, p. 55.
[16] De La Cruz v. Blanco and Quevedo, 73 Phil. 596 (1942).
[17] 20 CJS, Costs, 2.
[18] Tumibay
v. Soro, G.R. No. 152016,
[19] Equitable
Banking Corporation v. Liwanag, G.R. No. L-28335,
[20] Uniwide Holdings, Inc. v. Jandecs Transportation Co., Inc., G.R. No. 168522, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 158, 165.
[21] Heirs of Jose Sy Bang v. Sy, G.R. No. 114217, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 534,574.
[22] Diaz
v. Republic, G.R. No. 181502,
[23] Knecht v. United Cigarette Corp., G.R. No 139370,