Republic of the
Supreme Court
SPOUSES ANSELMO[1]
and PRISCILLA BULAONG,
Petitioners, - versus - VERONICA GONZALES, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 156318
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION, PERez,
SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: September 5, 2011 |
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Petitioners Anselmo Bulaong and
Priscilla Bulaong collectively referred to as the Bulaongs seek, through their petition for review on certiorari, the reversal of the decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
July 31, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55423 and the subsequent resolution of November
27, 2002[3]
reiterating this decision. These CA
rulings reversed and set aside the decision[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 12, that ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-62002 and TCT No. T-62003.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
This
case traces its roots to the conflicting claims of two sets of parties over two
parcels of land. The first parcel of
land, with an area of 237 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-249639,[5]
was originally registered in the name of Fortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha
Limpo.[6]
The other parcel of land, with an area of 86 square meters and covered by TCT
No. T-249641,[7]
was originally registered in the names of Pacifica E. Limpo, married to Nicanor
C. Sincionco, and Fortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha Limpo.[8]
These parcels of land were mortgaged
by the daughter of Fortunato and Bertha Limpo, Regina Christi Limpo, upon the
authority of her father,[9]
to the Bulaongs, to secure a loan in the amount of P4,300,000.00. The mortgage was
evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage dated
The
Bulaongs alleged that before they executed the mortgage,
After
the execution of the mortgage, the Bulaongs once again went to the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to register and annotate the mortgage on the
titles. They learned then that the
Register of Deeds copies of the two titles were among the records that were burned
in the fire that destroyed the entire office of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on
On
Thereafter, on
To the Bulaongs astonishment, the
new titles in
TCT No. T-30395
Entry No. 5306; Kind: Condition: The
property herein described is subject to the prov. of sec. 4, rule 74 of the
rules of court. date of instrument:
(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUS
Register of Deeds
Entry No. 5484; Kind: Mortgage:
Exec. In favor of: Sps. Anselmo Bulaong & Priscilla Bulaong; Condition:
Covering the parcel of land herein described, for the sum of P4,300,000.00
subject to all the conditions stipulated in the deed of mortgage on file in
this office. Doc. No. 428, Page 86, Book XXX, S. of 1993, N.P. Roberto
Dionisio of Mal. Bul. Date of Instrument:
(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUS
Register of Deeds
/5306
(NOTE: Proceed to Entry no. 5484)
Entry No. 7808: Kind: NOTICE OF LEVY
ON EXECUTION: Conditions: Notice is hereby given that by virtue of the Writ of
Execution, issued in Crim. Cases Nos. 9638 to 9646-M, entitled People of the
(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUS
Register of Deeds/negm[15] (emphasis ours)
TCT No. T-30396
Entry No. 5306; Kind: Condition:
One-half (1/2) of the property herein described is subject to the prov. of sec.
4, rule 74 of the rules of court. date of instrument:
(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUS
Register of Deeds
Entry No. 5484; Kind: Mortgage:
Exec. In favor of: Sps. Anselmo Bulaong & Priscilla Bulaong; Condition:
Covering the parcel of land herein described, for the sum of P4,300,000.00
subject to all the conditions stipulated in the deed of mortgage on file in
this office. Doc. No. 428, Page 86, Book XXX, S. of 1993, N.P. Roberto
Dionisio of Mal. Bul. Date of Instrument:
(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUS
Register of Deeds
/5306
(NOTE: Proceed to Entry No. 5484)
Entry No. 7808: Kind: NOTICE OF LEVY
ON EXECUTION: Conditions: Notice is hereby given that by virtue of the Writ of
Execution, issued in Crim. Cases Nos. 9638 to 9646-M, entitled People of the
(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUS
Register of Deeds/negm[16] (emphasis ours)
It appears that a certain Veronica
Gonzales had filed a criminal case for estafa against P275,000.00.[18]
By virtue of a writ of execution issued
on
Based on the annotation referring to
the notice of levy, the subject of the levy was
To satisfy P640,354.14.[20]
The Certificate of Sale was annotated on the titles on
On the other hand, the Bulaongs also had
the mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed, with the sheriff conducting the
auction sale on P4,300,000.00. They also paid the corresponding capital gains tax of P215,000.00, plus P64,500.00 for the documentary stamp
tax, which were required before the titles to the lots could be transferred in
their names. The Certificate of Sale in their favor was inscribed on
Veronica thereafter filed a petition
for the surrender to the Register of Deeds of the owners copies of TCT Nos.
T-30395 and T-30396 with the RTC of Malolos, docketed as LRC Case No. P-292. On
December 16, 1994, the RTC granted the petition and ordered Regina to surrender
her owners copies of the titles; should Regina fail to comply, the RTC ordered
the Register of Deeds to cancel these titles and issue new ones in Veronicas
name. Complying with this order, the Register
of Deeds cancelled TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396, and issued TCT No. T-62002 in
Veronicas name, and TCT No. T-62003 in the name of Veronica and Pacifica
Limpo. These new titles were clean and
did not contain any annotations, liens or encumbrances.
The Bulaongs thus filed a petition
for mandamus with the RTC of Bulacan against Ramon Sampana, the incumbent
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and Veronica, praying that the court order Sampana
to cancel TCT Nos. T-62002 and T-62003, and issue new titles in their names;
and order the respondents therein to pay them moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
On P5,000,000.00 for a judgment of P275,000.00 would result in gross unjust enrichment. The
RTC thus ordered the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue new titles in the
name of the Bulaongs, but only after the Bulaongs had reimbursed the amount of P275,000.00 to Veronica, with interest.
The RTC also ordered Veronica to pay the Bulaongs P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Annulling and cancelling Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-62002 in the name of defendant Veronica Gonzales, and T-62003 in the name of defendant Veronica Gonzales and Pacifica E. Limpo married to Nicanor C. Sincioco;
2. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Bulacan to execute a final deed of sale in favor of petitioner spouses Anselmo Bulaong and Pr[i]scilla Bulaong on the basis of the registered Certificate of Sale executed by said court officer on August 23, 1994, in favor of said spouses-mortgagee, without the owner-mortgagors exercising the right of redemption since then;
3.
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to
issue new titles, in place of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-62002 and
T-62003, this time in the name of petitioner spouses Anselmo Bulaong and Pr[is]cilla
Bulaong, as soon as the aforesaid final deed of sale in their favor is executed
by the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Bulacan and only after said spouses shall have
paid and/or reimbursed Veronica Gonzales lien as judgment creditor in the
amount of P275,000.00, plus
interests at the legal rate computed from November 19, 1995, until fully paid
and satisfied;
4. Order[ing] herein defendants Veronica R. Gonzales and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan upon notice of this judgment, not to effect any transfer, encumbrance or any disposition whatsoever of the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62002 and T-62003, or any part thereof, right or interest therein, either by sale or any form of conveyance, lien or encumbrance; and
5.
Ordering only defendant Veronica R. Gonzales
to pay herein petitioners P50,000.00 as just and equitable attorneys
fees, and the costs of suit, defendant Ramon C. Sampana as the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan having merely performed his ministerial duty of following the
court order of issuing titles to defendant Gonzales.
No pronouncement as to moral and exemplary damages alleged in the petition but not even testified to by petitioners at the trial.[23]
Both parties appealed to the CA, with
the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55423.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
In
its
THE PETITION
The
Bulaongs filed the present petition, raising the following issues:
a)
Whether
Entry No. 7808 is valid;
b)
Whether
Veronica has a superior right over the properties; and
c)
Assuming
the notice of levy earlier annotated in favor of Veronica to be valid, whether
there was a valid foreclosure sale.
THE COURTS RULING
We GRANT the petition.
Procedural issues
Time
and again, we have stated that petitions for review on certiorari shall only raise questions of law, as questions of fact
are not reviewable by this Court. The
main issue of who has a better right over the disputed properties is not only a
question of law but one that requires a thorough review of the presented evidence,
in view particularly of the Bulaongs allegation that fraud attended the annotation
of Entry No. 7808 in the titles. Thus, in the usual course, we would have
denied the present petition for violation of Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Section 1. Filing of
petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth. (emphasis ours)
This
rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Questions of fact may be reviewed,
among others, when the lower court makes inferences that are manifestly
mistaken, and when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of
facts.[24] As will be apparent in the discussions below,
these exceptional circumstances are present in the present case. A review of
the evidence, therefore, is not only allowed, but is necessary for the proper
resolution of the presented issues.
It has not escaped our attention that
the Bulaongs appear to have erroneously filed a petition for mandamus for what
is essentially an action to assail the validity of Veronicas certificates of
title over the subject properties. This lapse, however, is not legally
significant under the well-settled rule that the cause of action in a complaint
is not the title or designation of the complaint, but the allegations in the
body of the complaint. The designation or caption is not controlling as it is
not even an indispensable part of the complaint; the allegations of the
complaint control.[25] We thus proceed to resolve the case, bearing
in mind that the relief the Bulaongs sought before the lower court was to
nullify Veronicas certificates of title and to order the Register of Deeds to
issue new titles in their name.
Redemption
not the proper remedy
The
CA faulted the Bulaongs for not redeeming the properties from Veronica when
they had the option of doing so. For failing to exercise this right, the CA
concluded that the consolidation of the titles to the lots in Veronicas name
thus became a matter of course.
We
disagree.
At
the outset, we observe that this is not a simple case of determining which lien
came first. A perusal of the Bulaongs submissions to the Court shows that they
have consistently maintained that the levy and the corresponding execution sale
in Veronicas favor are null and void. Had the Bulaongs merely exercised the
right of redemption, they would have been barred from raising these issues in
court, pursuant to our ruling in Cometa
v. Intermediate Appellate Court: [26]
The respondent appellate court's emphasis on
the failure of the petitioner to redeem the properties within the period
required by law is misplaced because redemption, in this case, is inconsistent
with the petitioner's claim of invalidity of levy and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the
regularity of the sale and would estop the petitioner from later impugning its
validity on that ground.[27]
(emphasis ours)
The Bulaongs were thus justified in
their refusal to redeem the properties.
Annotation
is valid
The
Bulaongs assail the validity of Entry No. 7808 (relating to the Notice of Levy
on Execution in Veronicas favor) on the two titles, asserting that it is null
and void for being a fraudulent entry. In support of this contention, they note
the following suspicious circumstances: (a) although Entry No. 7808 has a
higher number and appears after Entry No. 5484 (corresponding to the Bulaongs
mortgage) on the titles, Entry No. 7808 appeared in an earlier volume of the
Book of Entries; and (b) although the Notice of Levy on Execution was purportedly
presented to the Registry of Bulacan on January 4, 1993, or prior to the date
when the Bulaongs deed of mortgage was presented on January 13, 1993, the
Notice of Levy on Execution, Entry No. 7808, was numbered and placed after the mortgage, Entry No. 5484, on
the titles.
We
agree that these circumstances render the Notice of Levy on Execution, annotated
on the titles, highly suspicious. These circumstances, however, can be sufficiently
explained when the records are examined.
The
records show that on
The
LRA Administrator responded to the consulta
only on
The
apparent discrepancy in the numbering of the Notice of Levy on Execution and
the date of inscription on the certificates of title is suitably explained by
Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 whose pertinent portion states:
Section 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. Each Register of
Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in
which, upon payment of the entry fee, he
shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including copies
of writs and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He
shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all
instruments, in the order in which they were received. They
shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when
made on the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same
date: Provided, that the national government as well as the provincial
and city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such fees in advance
in order to be entitled to entry and registration. [emphases ours]
In
other words, the order of entries in the Primary Entry Book determines the
priority in registration. Thus, the Register of Deeds merely complied with the
law when she fixed Entry No. 7808s date of inscription as
The
late annotation of the levy on execution on the titles did not at all lessen its
effectivity. Jurisprudence has already
established the rule that the entry of the notice of levy on execution in the Primary Entry Book, even without the
corresponding annotation on the certificate of titles, is sufficient notice to
all persons that the land is already subject to the levy.[30] As we explained in Armed Forces and Police Mutual
Benefit Association, Inc. v. Santiago:[31]
The
notice of levy on attachment in favor of petitioner may be annotated on TCT No.
PT-94912. Levin v. Bass (91 Phil. 420 [1952]; see also Dr. Caviles, Jr. v. Bautista, 377 Phil.
25; 319 SCRA 24 [1999]; Garcia v. Court
of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358; 95 SCRA 380 [19890]) provided the distinction
between voluntary registration and involuntary registration. In voluntary
registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the
owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no payment
of registration fees be made within fifteen (15) days, entry in the day book of
the deed of sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary
registration, such as an attachment, levy upon execution, lis
pendens and the like, entry thereof
in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim.
The
entry of the notice of levy on attachment in the primary entry book or day book
of the Registry of Deeds on
Consequently,
when the Register of Deeds placed the Notice of Levy on Execution in the
Primary Entry Book on
Validity
of the Levy
i.
The
levy on execution for judgment is the act x x x by which an officer sets apart
or appropriate[s,] for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ, a
part or the whole of the judgment debtors property.[33] Every interest which the judgment debtor may have in the property
may be subjected to levy on execution.[34]
As established by the Court in Reyes v.
Grey:[35]
The term "property" as here applied to lands comprehends every species of title, inchoate or complete; legal or equitable. This statute authorizes the sale under execution of every kind of property, and every interest in property which is, or may be, the subject of private ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable rights and interests as it deals with legal, without anywhere expressly recognizing or making any distinction between them. [emphases ours]
In Reyes, the Court set the standard to be applied in determining the
kind of property that can be subject to attachment:
We think the real test, as to whether or not property can be attached and sold upon execution is does the judgment debtor hold such a beneficial interest in such property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? If he does, then the property is subject to execution and payment of his debts.[36] (emphasis and underscoring ours)
Applying the test in Reyes, the Court, in Gotauco & Co. v. Register of Deeds of
Tayabas,[37]
recognized as valid the inscription of a notice of levy on execution on the
certificates of title, even though the titles were not in the name of the
judgment debtor (Rafael Vilar). According to the Court, while the certificates
of title were still registered in the name of Florentino Vilar, since Rafael
Vilar presented a copy of a petition filed with the lower court, from which it
could be inferred that Florentino Vilar was dead and Rafael Vilar was one of
his heirs, Rafael had an interest in Florentinos property that could properly
be the subject of attachment, even if
his participation in Florentinos property was indeterminable before the final liquidation of the estate.
Similarly, in Pacific
Commercial Co. v. Geaga,[38]
the Court held that although the Register of Deeds may properly reject an
attachment where it appears that the titles involved are not registered in the
name of the defendants (debtors), that rule yields to a case where there is
evidence submitted to indicate that the defendants have present or future
interests in the property covered by said titles, regardless of whether
they still stand in the names of other persons. The fact that the present
interests of the defendants are still indeterminate, and even though there was
no judicial declaration of heirship yet, is of no consequence for the purpose
of registering the attachment in question. This is the case since what is being attached and what may be
later sold at public auction in pursuance of the attachment cannot be anything
more than whatever rights, titles, interests and participations which the
defendants may or might have in the property so attached. In other words,
if they had actually nothing in the property, then nothing is affected and the
property will remain intact.[39]
This rule is expressed in Section 35, Rule 39 of the old Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:
Upon the execution and delivery of
said deed [of conveyance and possession], the purchaser, or redemptioner, or
his assignee, shall be substituted to and acquire
all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property
as of the time of the levy[.]
[emphases ours]
Although
we recognize the validity of the annotation of the levy on the execution in the
present case, the question of whether the levy itself is valid remains to be
determined. To do this,
After
carefully reviewing the evidence on record, we rule in the negative.
To
begin with, not only
were the properties subject of the attachment not registered in Reginas name,
the Deed of Absolute Sale on which Regina based her interest was
not even annotated on these titles. While
More importantly, from the records,
it is clear that the subject properties
were finally registered in
Another point to consider is that
These facts, taken together, lead us
to doubt that
The spring cannot rise higher than
its source.[44] Since
ii.
Unregistered sale of land cannot bind third parties
Even assuming that the Deed of Absolute
Sale in
The general rule in dealing with
registered land is set forth in Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529:
Section 51. Conveyance
and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance
with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other
voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a
will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to
the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. [emphases ours]
From the standpoint of third parties,
a property registered under the
Undoubtedly, Veronicas claim on the
properties is rooted in the unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale between
One of the principal features of the
Torrens system of registration is that all encumbrances on the land shall be
shown, or at least intimated upon the certificate of title and a person dealing
with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind the certificate
and inquire into transactions, the existence of which is not there intimated.[46]
Since the Bulaongs had no knowledge of
the unregistered sale between
Execution
sale in Veronicas favor was highly irregular
We also find that the execution sale in
favor of Veronica is invalid because
Section 15. Execution of
money judgments. The officer must enforce an execution of a money
judgment by levying on all the property, real and personal of every name and
nature whatsoever, and which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment
debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such property,
if there be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment
creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing costs
must be delivered to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by the
judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judgment
debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs, within
the view of the officer, he must
levy only on such part of the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and
costs.
Section 21. How property sold on execution. Who may direct manner and order of sale. All sales of property under execution must be made at public auction, to the highest bidder, between the hours of nine in the morning and five in the afternoon. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more shall be sold. When the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots, they must be sold separately; or, when a portion of such real property is claimed by a third person, he may require it to be sold separately. [emphases ours]
Where the property to be sold consists of distinct lots, tracts or
parcels, or is susceptible of division without injury, it should be offered for
sale in parcels and not en masse, for
the reason that a sale in that manner will generally realize the best price,
and will not result in taking from the debtor any more property than is necessary
to satisfy the judgment. It will also enable the defendant to redeem any one or
more of the parcels without being compelled to redeem all the land sold.[47] A sale of additional land or personal property after enough has been
sold to satisfy the judgment is unauthorized.[48]
While the general policy of the law is to sustain execution sales, the
sale may be set aside where there is a resulting injury based on fraud, mistake
and irregularity.[49] Where the properties were sold together when the sale of less than the
whole would have been sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt, the sale may be
set aside.[50]
In Caja v. Nanquil, [51]
we took judicial notice of the fact that the value of a property was usually
bigger than the amount for which it could be mortgaged. Since the two properties, taken together, were mortgaged to the petitioners
to secure a loan worth P4,300,000.00,
we can easily assume that these properties are worth at least this amount. Even
Veronica does not contest this assumption.
From this premise,
we can logically assume that the sale of just one of the lots would have been sufficient to
satisfy the judgment debt. Yet no explanation was provided as to why the
sheriff sold both parcels of land at the execution sale for the paltry sum of P640,354.14. This act undoubtedly resulted in great prejudice to the Bulaongs.
To our minds, this renders the execution sale defective, and provides sufficient
ground for us to set the sale aside.
For the foregoing reasons, we rule and so hold that the levy and the corresponding
execution sale in Veronicas favor are invalid, and must be set aside. Veronica,
however, is not without recourse, as she may still seek to enforce the judgment
debt against
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated P275,000.00, plus interest.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
JOSE
Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1]
Substituted by his heir Joel
Bulaong, pursuant to the Courts
* Designated
as additional Member vice Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes per Special
Order No. 1066 dated
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (a former member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Mariano C. del Castillo, who are Members of this Court. Rollo, pp. 53-61.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Also known as Regina Limpo.
[15] Rollo, pp. 188-190.
[16]
[17] Criminal Case Nos. 9638 to 9653-M; id. at 226.
[18] The dispositive portion of the decision stated:
WHEREFORE, the
prosecution having failed to prove the guilt of any of the three (3) accused
beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby ACQUITTED and these cases against them
DISMISSED. However, it appearing from the facts and the law that both accused
Reggie Christi Schaetchen Limpo and Maria Lourdes (Bong) Gamir Diaz are civilly
liable for the amounts of their checks representing their due obligation to
complainant Veronica R. Gonzales for the jewelry items they obtained from her
still unpaid, judgment is hereby rendered ordering them to pay jointly and
severally to said complainant the total amount of P275,000.00 as actual
damages, plus interests at the legal rate computed from the date of first
demand or on November 19, 1985, until fully paid and satisfied. (
[19] Ibid.
[20]
We presume that this amount
includes the P275,000.00 judgment debt, as well as the interest at the
legal rate.
[21] Rollo, p. 83.
[22] Ibid.
[23]
[24]
Pagsibigan v. People, G.R. No.
163868,
[25] See Sumulong v. Court
of Appeals G.R. No. 108817,
[26] 235 Phil. 569 (1987).
[27]
[28] Rollo, p. 82.
[29] Ibid.
[30] See Villasor v. Camon, 89 Phil. 404 (1951); Levin v. Bass, et al., 91 Phil. 420 (1952); Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358 (1980); Dr. Caviles, Jr. v. Bautista, 377 Phil. 25 (1999); and Autocorp Group and Autographics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 481 Phil. 298 (2004).
[31]
G.R. No. 147559,
[32]
[33] Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Civil Procedure, Volume II, p. 701, citing Llenares v. Valdeavella and Zoreta, 46 Phil. 358 (1924).
[34] Levy Hermanos, Inc. v. Ramirez and Casimiro, 60 Phil. 978 (1934).
[35] 21 Phil. 73, 75 (1911).
[36]
[37] 59 Phil. 756 (1934).
[38] 69 Phil. 64. (1939), cited in Narciso Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 ed., p. 604.
[39] Narciso
Pea, supra, citing LRC Consulta
No. 65, Register of Deeds of Albay, pet.,
[40] Rollo, p. 206.
[41] Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. xxx If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by
public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the
sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of
the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the
affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register
of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned
upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this
rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files
a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death
of the decedent.
[42] Rollo, p. 206.
[43] Supra note 9.
[44] Republic of the Phils. v. Hon. Mamindiara P. Mangotara, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505, 173355-56, 173401, 173563-64, 178779, and 178894, October 13, 2010, citing Sanchez v. Quinio, 502 Phil. 40, 49 (2005).
[45] Narciso Pea, supra note 38, at 189.
[46] Bass v. Dela Rama, 73 Phil. 682 (1942), citing Quimson v. Suarez, 45 Phil. 901, 906 (1924).
[47] See
Vicente J. Francisco, supra note 33, at 747, citing 33 C.J.S.,
448.
[48] Ibid., citing 33 C.J.S., 440.
[49]
[50] Ibid., citing Herman v. La Urbana, 59 Phil. 621, 625 (1934).
[51] 481 Phil. 488 (2004).