Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
|
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his
personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY
L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI
J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners, - versus - SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the
President Executive Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and
ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
- versus - SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, - versus - PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity
as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING
Petitioners, - versus - THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through
its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B.
TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,
Petitioner, - versus - THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner, - versus - EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. x--------------------------------------------x MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents-Intervenor. |
G.R. No. 196271
Present:
CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, SERENO, REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated: October 18, 2011 G.R.
No. 196305 G.R. No. 197221 G.R. No. 197280 G.R. No. 197282 G.R. No. 197392 G.R. No. 197454 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
On
Even before its formal passage, the
bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their
validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in
petitions filed with this Court. These
petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through
Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Section 18 of the Article, on the
other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous
regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act
for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act
shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective
and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act
(RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on
RA No. 9054
(entitled An Act to Strengthen and
Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending
for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative
act passed. This law provided further refinement
in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and
reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law
affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1] -
on
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a
plebiscite held on
RA No. 9333[2]
was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in
a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next
ARMM regional elections should have been held on
RA No. 10153 originated in the House
of Representatives as House Bill (HB)
No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled on
After the Senate received HB No.
4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on
As mentioned, the early challenge to
RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality of
both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with
the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari
Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed
another petition[4] also
assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No.
10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of
the following petitions against its constitutionality:
a)
Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition[5]
filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives against
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
b)
Petition
for Mandamus and Prohibition[6]
filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as
G.R. No. 197282;
c)
Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus,
Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed
by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;
and
d)
Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus[8]
filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive
Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and
Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido
Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the
ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition
for Prohibition and Mandamus[9]
against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and
RA No. 10153.
Subsequently,
Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and
Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own
Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and
Comment-in-Intervention dated
Oral arguments
were held on
On
The Arguments
The
petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article
XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions
assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article
VI of the Constitution. Also cited as
grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of
ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative
character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs
to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials
elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the
President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section
16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the
parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the
parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a
supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute
an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable
laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the
1987 Constitution?
IV.
Whether RA No.
10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs
violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI.
Whether the proposal
to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the
order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality
of RA No. 10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization
as a recognized constitutional mandate
The
respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the
Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,[10]
which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective
behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among
others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the
least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections
whether national or local to once every three years.[12]
This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.[13]
These
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections,
starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in
recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmea v.
Commission on Elections,[14]
we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections,
the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as
it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional
construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they
have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical
terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails.[15] As this
Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16]
[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Understood
in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor
political subdivision.[17]
Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and
regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification,
since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited
region of ARMM.
From the perspective of
the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X
of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted
to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions
of the Republic of the
Thus, we find the
contention that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the
regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious.
We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed
in this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity
of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article
VI of the Constitution[18]
which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19]
explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the
following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed
with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2]
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the
bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in
its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the
certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third
readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [
In the present case, the
records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no
necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no
public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our
ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national
emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President
under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights
of individuals may be of hazard. But
the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress,
certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the
Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full
recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No.
10153. Under the circumstances, nothing
short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress
can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to
provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and this
Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and
respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by
the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the
Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement
for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to
enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them.
Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters
they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress
through the enactment process.[23]
We find, based on the
records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents
of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In
this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not
amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1
and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions
require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of
the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this
Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier
than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No.
9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.
As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for
the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for
the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections,
which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously,
these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot
be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any
provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054
or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.
This view that Congress thought it
best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative
discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA
No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not
only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the
specific date of the first ARMM elections,[24]
leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA
No. 7647,[25]
RA No. 8176,[26]
RA No. 8746,[27]
RA No. 8753,[28]
and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM
elections. Since these laws did not change or modify
any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter
law. Consequently, there was no need to
submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second
Organic Act RA No. 9054 which
lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be
held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9140[30]
to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the
ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was
not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31]
which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law
was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these
legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws
which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct
from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when
it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement
unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32]
has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the
Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum
to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the
House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is
generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII
of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order
to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is
higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served
to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws
it had passed. The Courts pronouncement
in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis
and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a
legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative
body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing,
exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a
legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future
amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making
power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old,
unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or
limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by
enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body
may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power
of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect
of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34]
(Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a
total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious
because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X
of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not
only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite
requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement,
we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section
18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and,
hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic
areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is
that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement
in order to become effective,[35]
questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably
arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the
obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean
that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e.,
those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must
provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the
Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional
government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts
with personal, family, and
property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative
powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does
not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated
Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the
supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in
the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the
Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.
IV. The
synchronization issue
As we discussed above,
synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate
that Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM
elections. On this point, an existing
law in fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA
No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local
elections with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old
matter for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are
not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is
already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality
local elections by express constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily
has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should
have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of
the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May
2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court
identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem.
These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in
office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No.
9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;[38]
(2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to
expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3)
to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No.
10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the
discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to
appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely
valid law.
V.
The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A.
Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options,
certain underlying material premises must be fully understood. The first
is the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization
of elections; and the third is
on the concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987
Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.[42]
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law.[43]
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of
Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing
with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on
what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in
particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally
clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of
the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section
15.[44] In other words, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the
national and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts
characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No.
10153. To succinctly describe the legal
situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional
elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections)
left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in
the intervening period between the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months
away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13,
2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim
measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution
and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept
of autonomy. Interim measures, to be
sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The
Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures
for transition from the old constitution to the new[46] and for the introduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of
elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first
transpired under the Transitory Provisions.
The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough,
particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections
would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.
The creation of local government
units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur[48]
and Dinagat Islands,[49]
the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim governor,
vice-governor and members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan although these positions are essentially elective in character;
the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials
shall have been elected and qualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in
the transition of a local government from a sub-province to a province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim
measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches
were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a
manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted
norms. Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic
concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our
discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought
about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly understood as
interim measures that Congress had to provide.
The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime
materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be
measured, i.e., given the
constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did
Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when it
addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment of
elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is
Unconstitutional
We rule out the first
option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative
positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress
could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term
of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM
officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court
put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the
legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution
has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the
Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though
the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as
follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office
the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the
incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution. [Emphasis
ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where the
Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the
matters so determined or mandated should be respected until the Constitution
itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional
process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government
can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution
itself may allow.[53]
If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize
the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is
non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the
mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.[54]
In the case of
the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect
to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation
from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay
at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress.
If it will be
claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint
the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that
cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.[55]
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of
the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President.[56]
Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm
option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence,
of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was
brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The
present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v. Comelec,[58]
and Montesclaros v. Comelec,[59] where the Court ruled that the elective
officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases
refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials
whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the
Constitution; the present case, on the other hand,
refers to local elective officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor,
and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within
the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an
extension beyond the term for which they were originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is
constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60]
we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153,
made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule
that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The
deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress
to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
C. The
COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the
petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to
immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date
of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and
exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI,
applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8.
Unless otherwise provided by law,
the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the
same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local
government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for xxx the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the
conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of
President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when
so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to
whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain
or fill in the details in the execution of that power.[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the
ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date
After Congress has so acted, neither
the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.
This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the
power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or
for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narrow ground
and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant
the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done
in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No.
197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind
that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of
Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to
enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election.[65]
Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections
unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.
True, Congress did grant, via Sections
5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another
date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the
specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of
election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension
of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP
881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but have to be postponed
because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, (d) force
majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of
such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term analogous causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the
holding of the scheduled elections. These analogous causes are further
defined by the phrase of such nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881
applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled
but do not take place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism,
(d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect.
As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do
not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen
circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is
by law i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these
reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that
obstruct the holding of elections.
Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the
guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by
the lawmakers.[66]
Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present
case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold
special elections.
D. The
Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
Even assuming that it is legally
permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no
legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall
hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections
shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not
empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution,
the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be
exercised only in the case of barangay
officials,[67] is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power,
as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining
the least votes,[68] and
extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69]
in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same
power. The settled rule is that terms
fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and
certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local
officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the
constitutionally mandated three years[71]
as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term
of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a
term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In
sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress
can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM
elections instead of acting on their term (where the term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while
the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
the office).[72] As with
the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM
officials. They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their
discretion if they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations
leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the appointment
by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress
can make. This choice itself, however,
should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the
outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be
strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated
in order to be recognized.[73]
The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision
classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These
are:
First, the heads of the executive
departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the
government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.[74]
Since the Presidents
authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest
challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section
3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the
constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation
whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the
issue, we hold that this alleged
constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real
only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM
(RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office
of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. This
power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in
the May 2013 elections.
As we have already
established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements,
the legal reality is that RA No. 10153
did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization
of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read
in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.[75] Aside
from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate
question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for
Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization
unavoidably brought with it. In more
concrete terms and based on the above considerations, given the plain
unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of
constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the
elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for
a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable
choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of
the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of
appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization
would be to foster a government that is not democratic and republican. For
then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be
systemically
withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach
the elective and representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would
not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153
where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance both
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically
be touched nor affected at all. To
repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only
for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections
requires.
Viewed from another
perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a
local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but
this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure
in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation
of local government units[76]
and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.[77]
These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the
synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis
the regional interests involved). The
adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise
by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one of the
essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of
the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the
representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be
affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of
the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted by the
appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA
No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments
by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in
the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their
Qualifications.
Based on these
considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a
law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy
provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has
been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power
to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace
elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands
that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress,
not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers
of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited
in what it can legislatively undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular
August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose the
synchronization of elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA
No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise
clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for
the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections
and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power
already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent
ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the
expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct
special elections, the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in
governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire
situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21
months or close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM
elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective officials
begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our
Significantly, the grant
to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor
innovative. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under
Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the
President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices,
in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit
both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code
and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the
procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the
present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the
correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President
who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members
of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in
favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an
anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the
constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.
In a republican form of
government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to
that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily,
there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the
people of
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM
Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays
in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of
the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to critical
developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the
President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power
to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while
synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat
or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in
this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between two
recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy
such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous
approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,[81]
and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the
primacy of one over the other is clear.[82] We refer to the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83]
thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be
construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting
provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all
of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally
entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this Court should
reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153
which provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with
the least disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be
respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter,
change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and
only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it
has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with
the national and local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM
and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of
nationwide and local elections. This
argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned
and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM
as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of
the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national
government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for
regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a
complete separation from the central government, but rather an efficient
working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government.
We see this as an effective partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy
is not really thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger
political framework of the nation.[84]
[Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and
expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the
Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same
Article that autonomy shall be within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the
territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Interestingly, the
framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article
X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted
to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further
reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to make it
clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the
autonomous government. Those not
enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national government[.][85]
Of note is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel,
Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86]
which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers
over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose
of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective
at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development
at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted
to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since
the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national
one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM
cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a
national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and
pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of national and
local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153.
This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation.[87]
As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts
about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate
the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a legislative
problem. It is not within the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws;
otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of
Congress.[89] The
petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections
despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture
into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic
principles of a republican and democratic government the separation of
powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we
should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA
No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA
No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of
choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness
in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress,
therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal
to perform its duty. We thus find no
reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No.
10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that
every statute is presumed valid.[91]
Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its
acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task
of rebutting this presumption.[92]
Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor
of its constitutionality.[93]
As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the
President of the
Given the failure of the
petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No.
10153, we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS
the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of
merit, and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of this law. We
likewise LIFT the temporary
restraining order we issued in our Resolution of
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I join the
dissent of J. Velasco with respect to the appointment
of the OIC Governor and vote to hold the law as unconstitutional
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
See Dissenting Opinion
|
I join the
dissent of J. Carpio but disagree on the power of the Pres. to appoint
OIC-Governor of ARMM Associate Justice |
|
I join the
dissent of Justice Velasco Associate Justice
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice
|
|
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice
|
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
|
|
I join the
dissent of J. Velasco Associate Justice |
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
I join the
dissent of J. Carpio Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J. Carpio |
JOSE
CATRAL Associate Justice
|
|
MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO |
BIENVENIDO
L. REYES |
|
|
|
ESTELA
M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Entitled An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the approval of the amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the last Monday of November 2001, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended, and for other purposes.
[2] Entitled An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended
[3] Filed by petitioners
Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal capacity, and in representation of
Maguindanao Federation of Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc., Hadji
Muhmina Usman, John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T. Odin, Asrin Timbol Jaiyari,
Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-e, Kessar Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh
Saupi.
[4] Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order dated
April 11, 2011 was filed
against Sixto Brillantes, as Chairperson of COMELEC,
to challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having been submitted to a
plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is inoperative, any other law seeking to amend it
is also null and void.
[5] With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writs of Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction dated
[6] With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo
Order and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated
[7] With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated
[8] With Injunction and
Preliminary Injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order dated
[9] With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the Issuance of
Writs of Preliminary Injunction, Both Prohibitory and Mandatory dated
[10] Section 1. The first elections of Members of the
Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to
be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of
the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of
the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives,
and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall
serve until
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the
first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years
and the remaining twelve for three
years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and
Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. [emphasis
ours]
[11] To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution fixes the term of office of elective local officials at three years, under the above-quoted provisions, the terms of the incumbent local officials who were elected in January 1988, which should have expired on February 2, 1991, were fixed to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. In the same vein, the terms of the incumbent President and Vice President who were elected in February 1986 were extended to noon of June 30, 1992. On the other hand, in order to synchronize the elections of the Senators, who have six-year terms, the twelve Senators who obtained the lowest votes during the 1992 elections were made to serve only half the time of their terms.
[12] Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.), p. 1199, citing Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 429-4.
[13] MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will
now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads:
THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS
ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF
JUNE 1992.
This
was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner
Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I
would only state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section
2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: THE
SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST
ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the
Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and
Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the
Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three
years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said
officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never
attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three
years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in
1992, and consequently, we should
not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990
for them to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if we also
stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in
1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in
1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is
for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have
elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to
only 12 Senators and of course to local officials and the Members of the Lower
House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every
three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we
adopted the term of six years for the President and another six years for the
Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and
12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And
so my proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election which
would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower House
and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the
committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de
Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the
synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in order to
synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved the
first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in
office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing.
That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the
President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992,
we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This
time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first twelve
Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and
then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election
every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner
Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every three years
which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. What
will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and
Vice-President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not
the reverse. Will the committee
not synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials with the
election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It
works both ways, Mr. Presiding
Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision of the
Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
would really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single
election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the municipal officials.
[emphasis ours] (V Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431;
October 3, 1986)
[14] G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 and 100420,
[15] J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).
[16] 271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occena v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52265, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 755.
[17] Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, p.1327 (1993).
[18] Section 26(2) No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
[19] G. R. No. 115455,
[20] A copy of the letter that the President wrote to
Honorable Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker of the House of Representatives
dated
OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
of the
Malacaang
HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.
Speaker
House of Representatives
Dear Speaker Belmonte:
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 26 (2) of the 1987 Constitution, I hereby certify to the necessity of
the immediate enactment of House Bill No. 4146, entitled:
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION
OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH THOSE OF THE NATIONAL AND
OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9333, ENTITLED
AN ACT FIXING THE DATE FOR REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM
to address the urgent need to protect and
strengthen ARMMs autonomy by synchronizing its elections with the regular
elections of national and other local officials, to ensure that the on-going
peace talks in the region will not be hindered, and to provide a mechanism to
institutionalize electoral reforms in the interim, all for the development,
peace and security of the region.
Best wishes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
cc: HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Senate President
Philippine Senate
Pasay City
Taken from: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/15th/1st/15C_1RS-64b-031611.pdf.
Last accessed on
[21] See Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
[22] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995.
[23] Tolentino, id., citing 1 J. G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 10.04, p. 282 (1972).
[24] Section 7, Article
XIX of RA No. 6734 states: The first regular elections of the Regional
Governor, Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Assembly under this Organic
Act shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the ratification of this Act. The Commission on Elections shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of
said election.
[25] Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of Regular
Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and
for other purposes, which fixed the date of the ARMM elections on the second Monday after the Muslim month of
Ramadhan.
[26] Entitled An Act Changing the Date of Elections for
the Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, Amending
for the Purpose Section One of Republic Act Numbered Seventy-Six Hundred and
Forty-Seven Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular Elections
for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other
purposes, which changed the date of the ARMM elections to the second Monday of March, 1993 and every three
(3) years thereafter.
[27] Entitled An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular Elections
of Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Further
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7647 entitled An Act Providing for
the Date of Regular Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes, As Amended, and for other purposes,
which moved the regional elections to the second
Monday of September and every three (3) years thereafter.
[28] Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for
the Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Provided for
Under Republic Act No. 8746 and for other purposes, which reset the regional
elections, scheduled on
[29] Entitled An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for
Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Second
Monday of September 2001, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8953,
which reset the May 2001 elections in
ARMM to September 2001.
[30] Entitled An Act Fixing the Date of the
Plebiscite for the Approval of the Amendments to Republic Act No. 6734 and
setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the Last Monday of November 2001,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen
and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
as amended, and For Other Purposes.
[31] Entitled An Act Fixing the Date of Regular Elections
for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Pursuant to
Republic Act no. 9054, Entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended, which rescheduled the ARMM regional elections
scheduled for the last Monday of November 2004 to the second Monday of August
2005.
[32] Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of
the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
[33] G.R. No. 127383,
[34]
[35] This has been established by the following exchange
during the Constitutional Commission debates:
FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far
with respect to this organic act are: What segment of the population will participate
in the plebiscite? In what capacity would the legislature be acting when it
passes this? Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a legislative body?
What is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to ordinary
statutes and the Constitution? Finally, if we are going to amend this organic
act, what process will be followed?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light
of what is now appearing in our report.
First, only the people who are residing in the units
composing the region should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite.
Second, the organic act has the character of a charter passed by Congress, not
as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the
organic act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary legislative
process as now constituted, unless the Gentleman has another purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But
with plebiscite again. [Emphasis ours.];
III Record of the Constitutional
Commission, pp.182-183;
[36] Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic
act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
[37] See discussions at
pp. 14-15.
[38] Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional
Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be
for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at
[39] Fernando, The Philippine Constitution, pp. 175-176 (1974).
[40] Id. at 177; citing the
concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran,
63 Phil. 249, 266 (1936).
[41] Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212 (1946).
[42]Ople v. Torres, et al., 354 Phil. 948 (1998); see concurring
opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran, supra note 40, at 266.
[43] State ex rel.
Green v. Collison, 39 Del 245, cited in
Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law,
Vol. 1 (2000 ed.)
[44] Sec. 15. There shall be
created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting
of provinces, cities and municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines.
[45] An empire within an
empire.
[46] Bernas, Joaquin,
Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government Notes and Cases Part I, 2005
ed., p. 1249.
[47] Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives (paragraph 2, Section 5, of Article VI of the Constitution), and the validation of the power of the Presidential Commission on Good Government to issue sequestration, freeze orders, and the provisional takeover orders of ill-gotten business enterprises, embodied in Section 26 of the Transitory Provisions.
[48] RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del Sur Province
was rejected by the voters of Quezon Province in the plebiscite of November 13,
2008.
[49] RA No. 9355.
[50] Section 50, RA No.
9355 and Section 52 of RA No. 9495.
[51] Section 462, RA No. 7160.
[52] Supra note
14.
[53] In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections [146 Phil. 798 (1970)] the Court held that,
"The three departments
of government
in the discharge of
the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to [the Constitutions] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. 146 Phil. 798 (1970).
[54] In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration [No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413, 423], the Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique, stated: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever
be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimum.
[55] Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad
Water District, G.R. No.
166471,
[56] Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, citing Bernas,
Joaquin, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.) 768.
[57] 481 Phil. 661 (2004).
[58] G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403.
[59] G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2011.
[60] Section 7. Terms of
Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of
office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years, which
shall begin at
[61] Guekeko v.
[62]Lozano
v. Nograles, G.R.
187883,
[63] Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, No.
L-25349,
[64] See CONSTITUTION,
Article VIII, Section 1.
[65] See CONSTITUTION, Article IX (C), Section 2(1).
[66] Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 654, 663, citing Lapid v. CA, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738, quoting Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. 29658, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.
[67] CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.
[68] Article XVIII, Section 2. The Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the
first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years
and the remaining twelve for three years.
[69] Article XVIII, Section 5. The six-year term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of
June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and
Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
[70] Cruz, Carlo. The Law of Public Officers, 2007 edition, p. 285, citing Mechem, Section 387.
[71] Ponencia, p. 21.
[72] See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946); Alba, etc. v. Evangelista, etc., et al., 100 Phil. 683, 694 (1957); Aparri v. Court of Appeals, No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231.
[73] Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National Police Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S. Urro, et al., G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011, citing Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549.
[74] Sarmiento III v. Mison, supra.
[75] If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 451
Phil. 812 (2003).
[76] Supra notes 47 and 48.
[77] Supra note 50.
[78] The after-effects of
the Maguindanao massacre where the Ampatuans stand charged, the insurrection by
the MILF and its various factions, and the on-going peace negotiations, among
others, are immediately past and present events that the nation has to vigilant
about.
[79] 274 Phil. 523 (1991).
[80] Id. at 532.
[81] Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.
[82] As noted under
footnote 37.
[83] 118 Phil. 1468 (1963).
[84]Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, August 11, 1986, p. 179.
[85] Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 560.
[86] 391 Phil. 84, 102 (2000).
[87] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
[88] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil. 411, 427 (1997) citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya, 225 SCRA 511 (1993).
[89] Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468, 581.
[90] Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315.
[91] Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., 210 Phil. 187, 207 (1983); Peralta v. Commission on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 and L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
[92] See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001); Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[93] Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[94] G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.
[95] Id. at 523.