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Republic of the Philippines SECOND
DIVISION |
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ANSELMO DE LEON CUYO, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 192164 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, SERENO, REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ. Promulgated: October 12, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45
assailing the Order[1]
issued by Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union,
in Special Civil Action Case No. 0001-10.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Anselmo Cuyo and Alejo Cuyo are
estranged brothers. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal possession of
firearms against Alejo. On 20 November 2003, petitioner appeared before Judge
Samuel H. Gaerlan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, San Fernando City,
La Union with regard to the application
for a search warrant by the Criminal Investigation and Detective Group (CIDG)
for the search of the house of Alejo, and, in the course of the proceedings,
made untruthful statements under oath. Consequently, Alejo filed a complaint
for perjury against petitioner.
On 25
August 2009, Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in San
Fernando City, La Union, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
him to imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He was
likewise ordered to pay private complainant Alejo Cuyo the amount of P10,000
for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.[2] Petitioner
was not present during the promulgation of the judgment and was represented by
his counsel instead.
On 28 August 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[3]
of the Decision, but the motion was subsequently denied[4] by the
MTCC on 19 October 2009.
Petitioner received the Order of the MTCC denying
his Motion for Reconsideration on 23 October 2009. He subsequently filed a
Motion for Probation[5]
on 5 November 2009.
On 6 January 2010, the MTCC issued an Order[6] denying
petitioners latter motion on the ground that it had been filed beyond the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days as provided by Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, or the Probation Law of 1976.[7] The reckoning date used by the MTCC in
computing the 15 day period was the day of promulgation on 25 August 2009,
tolled by the period from the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to the
receipt of the Order denying the motion on 23 October 2009. Thus, the MTCC
stated:
It is note worthy (sic) that four (4) days has
(sic) lapsed from August 25, 2009 when the decision was entered in the criminal
docket of this court and the time the motion for reconsideration was filed.
Since the period to apply for probation as
provided for by law in (sic) only fifteen (15) days, the accused has only the
remaining eleven (11) days of the fifteen (15) days reglamentary period to
apply for probation. The 11 day period from October 23, 2009 when he received
the denial of his motion ended on November 3, 2009.
The Motion for Probation was received by the
court on November 5, 2009 when the decision has already become Final and
Executory as of November 3, 2009.
On 7 January 2010, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration[8]
of the latter order, asking for a liberal interpretation of the rules with regard
to the computation of the period for applying for probation. He also filed on
10 January 2010 a Supplemental Motion[9] to the
Motion for Reconsideration praying for the deferment of the issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest or the recall of the warrant if one had already been issued.
The MTCC, however, denied the motion on 3
February 2010. Reference was made to Neypes
v. Court of Appeals,[10] wherein
the appeal period was sought to be standardized, by establishing the rule that a
fresh period of 15 days was allowed within which to file a notice of appeal,
counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or a
motion for reconsideration. The MTCC, however, did not view Neypes as applicable to the case of petitioner. It believed that Neypes applied only to
Rules 40, 42, 43 and 45 appeals and not to a Rule 122 appeal, all under the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a Petition[11] under
Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union
alleging that the MTCC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his Motion for Probation. He
asserted that the fresh period rule established in Neypes should also be applied to criminal cases. Petitioner prayed
for a liberal construction and application of the rules. He also prayed that
the RTC stay the execution of the Decision dated 25 August 2009, and that it
recall the warrant of arrest issued pending the resolution of the issues.
On 26 April 2010, the RTC denied the Petition and
ruled that the application period had lapsed when petitioner neither
surrendered nor filed a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies under
the Rules of Court. In addition, the RTC ruled that petitioner failed to
implead private complainant Alejo Cuyo in violation of Rule 65, Section 5. This
rule mandates that petitioner should join as private respondent the person
interested in sustaining the proceedings of the court.
Petitioner filed the present Rule 45 Petition for
Review, assailing the Order of the RTC. He contends that the RTC erred in
computing the 15-day period provided in the Probation Law; and in dismissing
the petition on procedural issues without determining whether petitioner is
entitled to avail himself of the benefits of probation.
We find some merit in the petition, but only with
respect to the additional ground for dismissal of the certiorari petition cited
by the RTC the failure to implead private complainant as a respondent in the
Petition for Certiorari filed before the RTC. We uphold the rest of the RTC
Decision, and in doing so, fully affirm its dispositive portion.
The RTC held that petitioner failed to observe
Rule 65, Sec. 5, which states:
Respondents
and costs in certain cases. When the
petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court,
quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the
petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with such public
respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the
proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents
to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the
public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs
awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the
private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public
respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the
court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in
or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the
case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondent shall
be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically
directed by the court, they shall not appear of participate in the proceedings
therein.
While it may be correct to say that petitioner
failed to comply with the rule cited above, it would not be correct to dismiss
the petition based on this provision. Rule 3, Sec. 11 states that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Thus, the trial court should have ordered petitioner to add private
complainant as a respondent to the case.
Nevertheless, we agree with the RTC that the
Motion for Probation was filed out of time.
Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Promulgation
of judgment. The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the
Court in which it was rendered. However,
if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside
the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
... ... ...
In case the accused fails to appear at the
scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgement in the criminal docket and serving him
a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the
judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against
the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file
a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of
perjury. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1
year, a period which is considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article 9
of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the
commission of which the penalty of arresto
menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a
light felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore
mandatory for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the judgment.
To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent
when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120,
Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of a light offense that a promulgation
may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. In case the
accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice,
and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose
all the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. One such remedy
was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of the MTCC filed by
petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the
remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should not have entertained
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from
25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion for Probation. The
MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion
instead of immediately denying it.
In People
of the Philippines v. De Grano,[12] we
stated:
When
the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was
present. Subsequently thereafter,
without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only
failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took
cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its
jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with
respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the
joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by
Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their
standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court;
and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner asserts that his failure to appear
during the promulgation was for a justifiable cause. He alleges that he was on
board an international vessel as a seaman at the time of the promulgation. He
further alleges that the MTCC was informed of this fact. He insists that his
absence was justified, thus exempting him from the application of Rule 120,
Sec. 6.
Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for
leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to filing his Motion for
Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave would have been the proper
opportunity for the parties to allege and contest whatever cause prevented
petitioner from appearing on 25 August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed
justifiable. If granted, petitioner would have been allowed to avail himself of
other remedies under the Rules of Court, including a motion for
reconsideration.
Moreover, in his Reply[13] filed
on 14 October 2010, petitioner belatedly questions the propriety of the
promulgation. In so doing, petitioner is barred by estoppel for failing to
raise the issue at the earliest possible opportunity, that is, when the case
was still pending with the MTCC.
As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad[14] that
the rule in Neypes is also applicable
to criminal cases regarding appeals from convictions in criminal cases under
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable to
this case, considering that petitioners Motion for Probation was filed out of
time.
WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The Order issued by the Regional Trial Court in Special
Civil Action Case No. 0001-10 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Designated
as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Jose P. Perez
per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October 2011.
[1]Rollo, pp.
23-27, penned by Judge Victor M. Viloria.
[2] Id. at 52-61, penned by Judge Manuel R. Aquino.
[3] Id. at 62-71.
[4] Id. at 72.
[5] Id. at 73-74.
[6] Id. at 49.
[7] Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period of
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it
may deem best: Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted
whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of
the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying
probation shall not be appealable. (Sec. 1 of P.D. 1990)
The
provisions of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 as above amended, shall
not apply to those who have already filed their respective applications for
probation at the time of the effectivity of this Decree. (Sec. 3 of P.D. 1990).
[8] Rollo,
pp. 75-78.
[9] Id. at 79-84.
[10] G.R. No. 141524, 14 September 2005, 469 SCRA 633.
[11] Rollo, pp.
28-42.
[12] G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009,
588 SCRA 550, 570.
[13] Rollo, p.
148.
[14] G.R. No. 170979, 9 February 2011.