Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
MAGDALA
MULTIPURPOSE & LIVELIHOOD COOPERATIVE and SANLOR MOTORS CORP., Petitioners, -
versus - KILUSANG
MANGGAGAWA NG LGS, MAGDALA MULTIPURPOSE & LIVELIHOOD CORPERATIVE (KMLMS) and
UNION MEMBERS/ STRIKERS, namely: THOMAS
PADULLON, HERBERT BAUTISTA, ARIEL DADIA, AVELINO PARENAS, DENNIS MONTEALEGRE,
SONNY CONSTANTINO, SHANDY CONSTANTINO, JOSEPH PERNIA, PETER ALCOY, EDILBERTO
CERILLE, FERNANDO LEONOR, TEOTIMAR REGINIO, ALBERTO BAJETA, ALLAN MENESES, RONEL
FABUL, JESUS COMENDADOR, JERRY PERNIA, OSCAR RIVERA, LEO MELGAR, ENRICO
LAYGO, RICKY PALMERO, ROWELL GARCIA, LEOPITO MERANO, ALEJANDRO DE LARA, JOEL
GARCIA, BONIFACIO PEREDA, REMEGIO CONSTANTINO, DICKSON PILAPIL, RANDY
CORDANO, DARIUS PILAPIL, VENICE LUCERO, GREGORIO REANZARES, EULOGIO REGINIO,
MICHAEL JAVIER, DENNIS MOSQUERA, FREDDIE AZORES, ROGELIO CABRERA, AURELIO
TAGUINOD, OSCAR TAGUINOD, DEWELL PILAPIL, JOEL MAS-ING, EDUARDO LOPEZ,
GLICERIO REANZAREZ, JOSEPH FLORES,BUENATO CASAS, ROMEO AZAGRA, ALFREDO
ROSALES, ESTELITO BAJETA, PEDY GEMINA, FERNANDO VELASCO, ALBERTO CANEZA, ALEJANDRO
CERVANTES, ERICK CARVAJAL, RONALDO BERNADEZ, JERRY COROSA, JAYSON COROSA,
JAYSON JUANSON, SHELLY NAREZ, EDGARDO GARCIA, ARIEL LLOSALA, ROMMEL ILAYA,
RODRIGO PAULETE, MERVIN PANGUINTO, MARVIN SENATIN, JAYSON RILLORA, RAFAEL
SARMIENTO, FREDERICK PERMEJO, NICOLAS BERNARDO, LEONCIO PAZ DE LEON, EDWARD
DENNIS MANAHAN, ANTONIO BALDAGO, ALEXANDER BAJETA, Respondents. |
|
G.R. Nos. 191138-39 Present: VELASCO, JR., J.,
Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
JJ. Promulgated: October
19, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioners
Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Cooperative and Sanlor Motors Corp.
assail and seek the modification of the June 30, 2009 Decision[1]
and January 28, 2010 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 88614 and 88645, which affirmed in toto the October 15, 2004 Decision[3] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 040560-04 (NLRC
RAB IV-9-1265-02-R).
The Facts
Respondent Kilusang Manggagawa ng
LGS, Magdala Multipurpose and Livelihood Cooperative (KMLMS) is the union
operating in Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood
Cooperative and Sanlor Motors Corp.
KMLMS filed a notice of strike on March
5, 2002 and conducted its strike-vote on April 8, 2002. However, KMLMS only acquired
legal personality when its registration as an independent labor organization
was granted on April 9, 2002 by the Department of Labor and Employment under
Registration No. RO-400-200204-UR-002.[4] On April 19, 2002, it became officially
affiliated as a local chapter of the Pambansang
Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino when its application was granted by the
Bureau of Labor Relations.[5]
Thereafter, on May 6, 2002,
KMLMSnow a legitimate labor organization (LLO)staged a strike where several
prohibited and illegal acts were committed by its participating members.
On
the ground of lack of valid notice of strike, ineffective conduct of a
strike-vote and commission of prohibited and illegal acts, petitioners filed
their Petition to Declare the Strike of May 6, 2002 Illegal[6]
before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Board (RAB) No. IV in
The Ruling
of the Labor Arbiter
In her March 26, 2004 Decision,[8] Executive
Labor Arbiter Lita V. Aglibut (LA Aglibut) found the May 6, 2002 strike illegal
and declared 41 workers to have lost their employment, the dispositive portion
reading:
WHEREFORE, this Office finds the strike conducted by
the Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS, Magdala / Sanlor Motors-KMLMS, now known and
registered as Kilusang [Manggagawa] Ng LGS/Magdala Sanlor Motors Corporation
PKMP, illegal and the employment status of the following workers are hereby
declared forfeited: x x x.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On
the ground of non-compliance with the strict and mandatory requirements for a
valid conduct of a strike under Article 263(c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code
and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, LA
Aglibut found the May 6, 2002 strike illegal and accordingly dismissed all the
14 union officers of KMLMS. LA Aglibut
likewise found 27 identified members of KMLMS to have committed prohibited and
illegal acts proscribed under Art. 264 of the Labor Code and accordingly declared
them to have forfeited their employment.
Both
parties appealed the Decision of LA Aglibut before the NLRC.
The Ruling
of the NLRC
On October 15, 2004, the NLRC
rendered its Decision affirming with modification LA Aglibuts Decision by
declaring an additional seven (7) union members to have forfeited their
employment status. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed
from is affirmed with modification in that [said seven union members] are also
declared to have lost their employment status for having committed prohibited
acts.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Unsatisfied,
both parties again filed their respective appeals before the CA.
The Ruling
of the CA
The CA rendered the assailed Decision
on June 30, 2009 affirming in toto
the NLRC Decision, the fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the following disquisition, the
respective petitions for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP. No. 88614 and CA-G.R. SP.
No. 88645 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision, dated 15
October 2004, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No.
040560-04 (NLRC RAB IV-9-1265-02-R) is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Thus,
petitioners have come to Us, praying for a partial modification of the assailed
CA Decision by declaring additional 73[12] similarly
erring KMLMS members to have lost their employment.
The Issues
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO SIMILARLY
DECLARE AS HAVING LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS THE REST OF THE UNION STRIKERS
WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE ILLEGAL STRIKE AND COMMITTED PROHIBITED/ILLEGAL
ACTS, TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS[] BUSINESS OPERATIONS.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES AS A RESULT OF THE ILLEGAL STRIKE THAT NEARLY
CRIPPLED THE BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF PETITIONERS.[13]
The
Courts Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue: The May 6, 2002 Strike Was Illegal
There is no question that the May 6,
2002 strike was illegal, first,
because when KMLMS filed the notice of strike on March 5 or 14, 2002, it had
not yet acquired legal personality and, thus, could not legally represent the
eventual union and its members. And second, similarly when KMLMS conducted
the strike-vote on April 8, 2002, there was still no union to speak of, since
KMLMS only acquired legal personality as an independent LLO only on April 9,
2002 or the day after it conducted the strike-vote. These factual findings are undisputed and
borne out by the records.
Consequently, the mandatory notice of
strike and the conduct of the strike-vote report were ineffective for having
been filed and conducted before KMLMS acquired legal personality as an LLO, violating
Art. 263(c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The
Labor Code provisos pertinently provide:
ART. 263. Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts.
(a) x x x
(c) In case of
bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified
or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer
may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the
intended date thereof. In case of unfair
labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the
notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of
its members. However, in case of
dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the
union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the
existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not
apply and the union may take action immediately. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111,
December 24, 1986.)
(d) The notice
must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the
Ministry of Labor and Employment may promulgate.
x x x x
(f) A decision
to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in
meetings or referenda called for that purpose.
A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the
board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a
partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose. The decision shall be valid for
the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered
when the strike or lockout vote was taken.
The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any
affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer
shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before
the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein
provided. (As amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 130, August 21, 1981 and further amended by Executive Order No. 111,
December 24, 1986.)
On the other hand, Rule XXII, Book V
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code likewise pertinently provides:
RULE XXII
CONCILIATION, STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
x x x x
SEC. 6. Who may declare a strike or lockout.
Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike
in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. The employer may declare a lockout in the
same cases. In the absence of a
certified or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in the establishment may declare
a strike but only on grounds of unfair labor practice. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is, thus, clear that the filing of
the notice of strike and the conduct of the strike-vote by KMLMS did not comply
with the aforequoted mandatory requirements of law and its implementing rules.
Consequently, the May 6, 2002 strike is illegal. As the Court held in Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. (HEPI) v. Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of Workers in the Hotel and Restaurant and Allied
Industries (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN),[14]
these requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply renders the
strike illegal.
Striking KMLMS Members Committed Prohibited
Acts
There is likewise no dispute that
when the May 6, 2002 illegal strike was conducted, the members of respondent
KMLMS committed prohibited and illegal acts which doubly constituted the strike
illegal. This is the unanimous factual
finding of the courts a quo which the
Court accords finality, as supported by evidence on record.
The proscribed acts during a strike
are provided under Art. 264 of the Labor Code, thus:
ART. 264. Prohibited Activities. (a) No Labor
organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having
bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after
assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of case involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with
full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and
any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided,
That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had
been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
x x x x
(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit
any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to
or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct
public thoroughfares. (As amended by
Batas Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1, 1982).
Here, the striking workers committed
acts of (1) interference by obstructing the free ingress to or egress from
petitioners compound and (2) coercion and intimidation. As aptly pointed out
by the appellate court:
This is clear from the Police Blotter Certifications,
including a Complaint for Grave Coercion, Affidavits from several workers,
including one from a proprietor, all of whom were prevented from entering the
company premises and doing their work or conducting their business, and the
countless photographs which show the striking workers blocking the gates of the
company premises which became the basis of the judgment of the Labor Arbiter
and NLRC.[15]
Thus, We agree with the CA that the
arguments of respondent KMLMS are bereft of merit as the May 6, 2002 strike was
properly declared an illegal strike and the prohibited and illegal acts
committed by union members during said strike were duly proved by substantial
evidence on record. Substantial evidence
is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[16]
Proper Sanctions for the Illegal Strike
We now come to the proper sanctions
for the conduct of union officers in an illegal strike and for union members
who committed illegal acts during a strike.
The above-cited Art. 264 of the Code presents a substantial distinction
of the consequences of an illegal strike between union officers and mere members
of the union. For union officers,
knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination
of their employment. But for union
members who participated in a strike, their employment may be terminated only
if they committed prohibited and illegal acts during the strike and there is
substantial evidence or proof of their participation, i.e., that they are
clearly identified to have committed such prohibited and illegal acts.
As earlier explained, the May 6, 2002
strike is illegal for non-compliance with provisions of law and its
implementing rules. Consequently, the
termination of employment of the 14 union officers is proper.
In the case of union members who
participated in the May 6, 2002 strike and committed prohibited and illegal
acts of interference by obstructing the free ingress to or egress from
petitioners compound, coercion and intimidation, the forfeiture of their
employment is also proper.
LA Aglibut found 27 union members to
have committed the illegal acts and properly declared the forfeiture of their
employment status. The NLRC found
additional seven (7) union members committing illegal acts and likewise
declared the forfeiture of their employment status. Thus, a total of 34 union members have been
declared to have lost their employment due to their commission of prohibited
and illegal acts during the illegal strike of May 6, 2002. Petitioners, however, take umbrage for the
non-declaration of the forfeiture of employment of 72 other union members who
were similarly situated as the 34 union members whose employment was declared
forfeited in committing prohibited and illegal acts during the May 6, 2002
strike.
In affirming the NLRC Decision and
refusing to declare the other strikers as dismissed, the appellate court found
that not all of the photographs in evidence sufficiently show the strikers
committing illegal acts and that the identification of said strikers is
questionable considering that some were still identified even when their faces
were indiscernible from the photographs.
We, however, cannot agree with the
appellate courts view that there is no substantial proof of the identity of
the other 72 striking union members who committed prohibited and illegal
activities. The prohibited and illegal
acts are undisputed. It is only the
identity of the striking union workers who committed said acts that is the crux
of the partial modification prayed for by petitioners.
In the instant case, We have pored
over the attachments to the pleadings of the parties and We find that
petitioners have substantially proved the identity of 72 other union members
who committed prohibited and illegal acts during the May 6, 2002 illegal
strike, thus:
First, the
photographs[17]
submitted by petitioners graphically depict and show the identities of the
union members who committed prohibited and illegal acts. Second,
the identities of these union members were substantially proved through the
eyewitnesses[18] of petitioners
who personally knew and recognized them as those who committed the prohibited
and illegal acts. Thus, the identities
of these 72 other union members who participated in the strike and committed
prohibited and illegal acts are not only shown through the photographs, but are
also sufficiently supported, as earlier cited, by police blotter
certifications,[19] a
criminal complaint for grave coercion,[20]
and affidavits of several workers[21]
and a proprietor.[22] As aptly pointed out by petitioners, while
several union members were penalized, other union members with them who are
identifiable in the photographs and attested to by witnesses were not so
penalized. This must be corrected, for
these other unpenalized union members were similarly situated with those
penalized in that they all committed the same prohibited and illegal acts
during the strike. Absent any
exculpating circumstance, they must all suffer the same fate with the
statutorily provided consequence of termination of employment.
Thus, We find that there was patent
misappreciation of evidence both by the LA and the NLRC, but it was not
corrected by the CA.
Second Issue: Damages and Attorneys Fees
Anent the issue of the award of
damages and attorneys fees, We affirm the courts a quos uniform findings and rulings that while petitioners prayed
for damages and attorneys fees, they failed to substantiate their claims.
Indeed, the grant of damages and
attorneys fees requires factual, legal and equitable justification; its basis
cannot be left to speculation or conjecture.[23] Petitioners simply bank their claims on the
Affidavit[24] of
Julito Sioson. The claim for actual
damages for losses of PhP 10,000 daily or PhP 260,000 a month, as averred by
Sioson, cannot be sustained by a mere affidavit of the owner without being
buttressed by other documentary evidence or unassailable substantiation. Even if attested to in an affidavit, the
amount claimed for actual damages is merely speculative at most. To be recoverable, actual damages must not
only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. The Court cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture, or
guesswork in determining the amount of damages.[25] Without any factual basis, it cannot be
granted.
That petitioners had to litigate on
the occasion of the illegal strike does not necessarily mean that attorneys
fees will automatically be granted. On
one hand, in labor cases, attorneys fees granted under Art. 111[26]
of the Labor Code apply to unlawful withholding of wages, which indubitably
does not apply to the instant case. On the other hand, Art. 2208(2) of the
Civil Code does not ipso facto grant
the award of damages in the form of attorneys fees to a winning party, for the
exercise of protection of ones right is not compensable.
Besides, jurisprudence instructs that
for the award of attorneys fees to be granted, there must be factual, legal
and equitable justification.[27] As the Court held in Filipinas
Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Ago Medical and
It is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as
an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and
counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state
in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the
legal reason for the award of attorneys fees.[28]
The fact that the courts a quo did not award attorneys fees to
petitioners persuasively shows that they found no factual, legal and equitable
justification for it. Neither do We find
any.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed June 30, 2009 CA Decision in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 88614 and 88645 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that the
following additional 72 union members who committed prohibited and illegal acts
during the May 6, 2002 strike are also declared to have forfeited their
employment: Thomas Padullon, Herbert Bautista, Ariel Dadia, Avelino Parenas,
Dennis Montealegre, Sonny Constantino, Shandy Constantino, Joseph Pernia, Peter
Alcoy, Edilberto Cerille, Fernando Leonor, Teotimar Reginio, Alberto Bajeta,
Allan Meneses, Ronel Fabul, Jesus Comendador, Jerry Pernia, Oscar Rivera, Leo
Melgar, Enrico Laygo, Ricky Palmero, Rowell Garcia, Leopito Merano, Alejandro
de Lara, Joel Garcia, Bonifacio Pereda, Remegio Constantino, Dickson Pilapil,
Randy Cordano, Aurelio Taguinod, Oscar Taguinod, Dewell Pilapil, Joel Mas-ing,
Eduardo Lopez, Glicerio Reanzarez, Joseph Flores, Buenato Casas, Romeo Azagra,
Alfredo Rosales, Estelito Bajeta, Pedy Gemina, Fernando Velasco, Alberto
Caneza, Alejandro Cervantes, Erick Carvajal, Ronaldo Bernadez, Jerry Corosa,
Jayson Corosa, Jayson Juanson, Shelly Narez, Alexander Bajeta, Edgardo Garcia,
Ariel Llosala, Rommel Ilaya, Rodrigo Paulete, Mervin Paquinto, Marvin Senatin,
Jayson Rillora, Darius Pilapil, Venice Lucero, Gregorio Reanzares, Eulogio
Reginio, Michael Javier, Dennis Mosquera, Freddie Azores, Rogelio Cabrera,
Rafael Sarmiento, Frederick Permejo, Nicolas Bernardo, Leoncio Paz de Leon,
Edward Dennis Manahan and Antonio Baldago.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 60-84. Penned by Associate
Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina
Guevara-Salonga and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok.
[2]
[3]
[4] CA
rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 88645), p. 238.
[5] Rollo, p. 363, Certificate of Creation
of Local/Chapter No. PKMP-05.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
Only 72, for the name of Alexander Bajeta was indicated twice (nos. 59 and 73)
in petitioners Prayer (1), id. at 51-52.
[13]
[14]
G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 497.
[15] Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[16] Formantes v.
The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies, which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction, are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
[17] Rollo, pp. 277-302, 319, 322, 324, 327, 331.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
Supra note 18.
[22]
Supra note 18, at 271-273, Affidavit of Julito G. Sioson.
[23] Dutch Boy Philippines, Inc. v. Seniel,
G.R. No. 170008, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 231, 241; citing Pang-Oden v. Leonen, G.R. No. 138939,
December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 93, 102 and Ranola
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123951, January 10, 2000, 322 SCRA 1, 11.
[24] Rollo, pp. 271-273, dated January 14,
2003.
[25] Dueas v. Guce-Africa, G.R. No. 165679, October
5, 2009, 603 SCRA 11, 21-22.
[26] ART. 111. Attorneys Fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand
or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of
wages, attorneys fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages
recovered.
[27] Siga-an v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 173227,
January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 696, 710-711.
[28]
G.R. No. 141994, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 413, 438.