Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Petitioner, - versus - HON.
JOSE D. AZARRAGA and JOHN
REY PREVENDIDO, Respondents. |
G. R. Nos. 187117 and 187127 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, SERENO, REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ. Promulgated: October 12,
2011 |
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D E C
I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
In
the present Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Mandatory Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner questions the legality of Chapter V, Section 9 of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC or the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive
Judges and Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties issued by this Court
on 27 January 2004, in relation to Section 90 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
On
7 February 2009, petitioner filed two (2) Informations[1]
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
On
24 February 2009, Judge Salao also issued an Order[3]
whereby she inhibited herself for the reason that Coreen Gemarino was a cousin;
thus, the cases were endorsed to the Office of the Executive Judge for
reassignment.
Citing
Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Executive Judge Antonio M. Natino ordered
the Clerk of Court to forward the entire records of the cases to Branch 37
presided over by public respondent, the pairing judge of Branch 36, which was
the special court that originally handled the cases.[4]
On
16 March 2009, however, as soon as public respondent proceeded with the cases, Prosecutor
Kenneth John Amamanglon filed a Motion to Transfer Case to a Branch of
Competent Jurisdiction.[5]
He questioned the jurisdiction of public respondent to hear the cases, citing
Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165. Prosecutor Amamanglon also claimed that, as the
prosecutor assigned to Branch 37, he was not among the prosecutors who had been
designated to handle cases exclusively involving violations of R.A. 9165.
On
the same day, respondent judge denied the motion on three grounds, to wit:
1. This
motion ought not to have been filed in this court for lack of legal basis;
2. This
court is not without jurisdiction to hear the instant case;
3. The
matter about the appearance of Trial Prosecutor Kenneth John Amamanglon should
have been addressed to the Department concerned.[6]
Respondent
judge thus set the hearing on the Motion for Admission to Bail[7]
filed on 10 February 2008. He directed the city prosecutor to assign an assistant
city prosecutor to handle the case effective 20 March 2009.
Prosecutor Amamanglon, however, moved
for a reconsideration[8]
of respondent judges Order, contending that the trial court needed a special
designation from this Court in order to have jurisdiction over the cases. Thus,
Prosecutor Amamanglon concluded, absent the special designation, respondent
court should remand the cases to the Office of the Executive Judge for
re-raffling to another court specially designated pursuant to R.A. 9165. To
support its contention, petitioner further cited this Courts 11 October 2005
Resolution in A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC, which clarified whether drug courts should
be included in the regular raffle.
Respondent judge denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in its Order dated 20 March 2009.[9]
He held that A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC should
be deemed to have modified the designation of special courts for drug cases. He
declared that, under the circumstances enumerated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,
Branch 37 itself became a special court. He further ruled that A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC
was inapplicable.
On 23 March 2009, the city prosecutor
endorsed the assailed Orders of respondent judge to the Office of the Solicitor
General for the appropriate review and filing of the necessary action.[10]
Thus, on 24 March 2009, petitioner filed the present petition before this Court.
On
27 March 2009, while the Petition for Prohibition was pending, respondent judge
issued an Order[11]
inhibiting himself from hearing the case after private respondent alleged that the
former was biased for the prosecution. The cases were thereafter transferred to
Branch 35, also a regular court, presided by Judge Fe Gallon-Gayanilo.
Absent
a temporary restraining order from this Court, the trial court proceeded to hear
the cases.
The
present petition raises two (2) issues, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE DRUG CASES IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 09-68815/16 DESPITE HIS
ASSIGNMENT TO
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A.M. NO. 03-8-02-SC IS IN
CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 90 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, MANDATING THE DESIGNATION
OF SPECIAL COURTS TO EXCLUSIVELY TRY AND HEAR DRUG CASES[12]
At the outset, it is an
established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before
they can seek relief directly from this Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) it would be an imposition
upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would inevitably result in a
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some
instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because this Court is not a trier of facts.[13]
It is only for special and compelling reasons that this Court shall exercise
its primary jurisdiction over the extraordinary remedy of writ of prohibition. However,
in the case at bar, since it is only the Supreme Court itself that can clarify
the assailed guidelines, petitioner is exempted from this rule.
The
petition, however, must fail.
The
crux of the matter in the present case is whether or not this Court violated
Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 when it issued A.M. 03-8-02-SC, particularly Chap. V, Sec.
9, which prescribes the manner in which the executive judge reassigns cases in
instances of inhibition or disqualification of judges sitting in special
courts. Petitioner insists that should respondent judge (now Judge Fe
Gallon-Gayanilo of Branch 35) continue hearing and trying the case, it would
result in the circumvention of the legislative conferment of jurisdiction to a
court to exclusively try and hear
drug offenses only.[14]
Contrary
to the assertion of petitioner, this Court did not commit any violation of R.A.
9165 when it issued the assailed guidelines. Rather, it merely obeyed Article
VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that the rules
promulgated by this Court should provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, in conformity with the right of all
persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.[15]
As this Court stated in San Ildefonso
Lines v. Court of Appeals,[16]
there must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural
rules are designed not to defeat, but to safeguard, the ends of substantial
justice.
Petitioner
grounds its assertion on Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165, which states:
Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall designate special
courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to
exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number
of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population
and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.
... ... ...
Trial
of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than
sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on
said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date
of submission of the case for resolution.
Petitioner interprets
the above provision to mean that a court must be specifically designated by the
Supreme Court as a special court. But what is Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC if not an express designation of a special court?
Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
provides:
Raffle and
re-assignment of cases in special courts where judge is disqualified or
voluntarily inhibits himself/herself from hearing case. (a) Where a judge in
a court designated to try and decide
... ... ...
(3) cases involving violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, or ...
is disqualified
or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself from hearing a case, the following
guidelines shall be observed:
... ... ...
(ii) Where there are more than two special
courts of the same nature in the station, the Executive Judge shall immediately
assign the case by raffle to the other or another special court of the same
nature. In case the Presiding Judge of
the other special court is also disqualified or inhibits himself/herself, the
case shall be forwarded to the pairing judge of the special court which
originally handled the said case. If the pairing judge is also disqualified or
inhibits himself/herself, the case shall be raffled to the other regular
courts. At the next raffle, an additional case shall be assigned to the
disqualified or inhibiting judge/s to replace the case so removed from
his/her/their court... (Emphasis supplied.)
Under
R.A. 9165, Congress empowered this Court with the full discretion to designate
special courts to hear, try and decide drug cases. It was precisely in the exercise
of this discretionary power that the powers of the executive judge were
included in Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC vis--vis Sec. 5(5) of Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, in cases of inhibition or
disqualification, the executive judge is mandated to assign the drug case to a
regular court in the following order: first, to the pairing judge of the
special court where the case was originally assigned; and, second, if the
pairing judge is likewise disqualified or has inhibited himself, then to another
regular court through a raffle. Under these exceptional circumstances, this
Court designated the regular court, ipso
facto, as a special court but only for that case. Being a designated special court, it is
likewise bound to follow the relevant rules in trying and deciding the drug
case pursuant to R.A. 9165.
Petitioner
also contends that the legislative intent of R.A. 9165 is to make use of the
expertise of trial judges in complicated and technical rules of the special
drug law. Thus, petitioner suggests that in instances in which all the judges
of special courts have inhibited themselves or are otherwise disqualified, the
venue for the affected drug cases should be transferred to the nearest station that
has designated special courts.
Petitioners
suggestion is ill-advised. To subscribe to this suggestion is to defeat the purpose
of the law. Undoubtedly, petitioners
unwarranted suggestion would entail the use of precious resources, time and
effort to transfer the cases to another station. On the other hand, the
assailed guidelines provide for a much more practical and expedient manner of
hearing and deciding the cases. To
reiterate, over and above utilizing the expertise of trial judges, the rationale behind Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 and
Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC is to effect an efficient administration
of justice and speedy disposition of cases, as well as to breathe life into the
policy enunciated in Sec. 2 of R.A. 9165, to wit:
Declaration of policy. It is
the policy of the State to safeguard the
integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the
youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental
well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to
their development and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the State needs
to enhance further the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs, it being
one of today's more serious social ills.
Toward
this end, the government shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign
against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances
through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of
anti-drug abuse policies, programs, and projects. The government shall however
aim to achieve a balance in the national drug control program so that people
with legitimate medical needs are not prevented from being treated with
adequate amounts of appropriate medications, which include the use of dangerous
drugs.
It
is further declared the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or
measures to re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to
drug abuse or dangerous drug dependence through sustainable programs of
treatment and rehabilitation. (Emphasis supplied.)
As
a matter of fact, this Court also issued similar guidelines with regard to
environmental cases,[17]
election cases involving elective municipal officials,[18]
and cases that involve killings of political activists and members of media.[19]
Foremost in its mind is the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Petitioner
further points out that this Court issued A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC to define the
phrase to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act to
mean ...[c]ourts designated as special courts for drug cases shall try and
hear drug-related cases only, i.e., cases involving violations of RA 9165, to
the exclusion of other courts. Hence, petitioner submits, drug cases should
not be assigned to regular courts according to the procedure provided in A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC; in other words, the two issuances contradict each other.
Again,
this Court disagrees.
Petitioner
underestimates the rule-making power of this Court. Nothing in A.M. No.
05-9-03-SC or in A.M. No. 03-8-03-SC suggests that they contradict each other.
In fact, both were issued with a common rationale,
that is, to expeditiously resolve criminal cases involving violations of R.A.
9165, especially in the light of the strict time frame provided in Sec. 90 of
R.A. 9165. Both provide for the guidelines regarding the assignment of drug
cases to special courts. Thus, A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC provides for the exemption
of special courts from the regular raffle under normal circumstances, while A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provide for the
assignment of drug cases to special courts except under special circumstances that would warrant reassignment to a regular
court.
Moreover,
the exemption of special courts from the regular raffle was not established as
an ironclad rule. A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC does in fact allow special courts to acquire
jurisdiction over cases that are not drug cases. In the interest of justice, executive
judges may recommend to the Supreme Court the inclusion of drug courts in the
regular raffle, and this Court has the discretion to approve the recommendation,
as the Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, Executive Judges
and presiding judges of special courts for drug cases shall hereby observe the
following guidelines:
... ... ...
4. If,
in the opinion of Executive Judges, the caseload of certain drug courts allows their inclusion in the regular
raffle without adversely affecting their ability to expeditiously resolve the
drug cases assigned to them and their inclusion in the regular raffle becomes
necessary to decongest the caseload of other branches, the concerned Executive Judges shall recommend to this Court the
inclusion of drug courts in their jurisdiction in the regular raffle. The
concerned drug courts shall remain exempt from the regular raffle until the
recommendation is approved. (Emphasis supplied.)
In
conclusion, the two sets of guidelines are examples of this Courts foresight
and prudence in the exercise of its rule-making power. These guidelines were
issued to prevent or address possible scenarios that might hinder the proper
administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the Petition for Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
BIENVENIDO
L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate
Justice
A T T
E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated
as Acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Jose P. Perez
per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Id at 10.
[13]
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005,
455 SCRA 460; Liga ng Mga Barangay
Motional v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 154599,
21 January 2004, 420 SCRA 562.
[14] Rollo, p. 15.
[15] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16.
[16] G.R. No. 119771, 24
April 1998, 289 SCRA 568.
[17] Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 23-08, Designation
of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Environmental Cases, 28 January
2008.
[18] Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 54-07, Designation
of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Election Contests Involving Elective
Municipal Officials, 11 May 2007.
[19] Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 25-07, Designation
of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Cases Involving Killings of Political
Activists and Members of Media, 1 March 2007.