Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - ANICETO
BULAGAO, Accused-Appellant. |
G.R. No. 184757
Present: CORONA,
C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: October
5, 2011 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 which
affirmed the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No.
197-M-2001 and Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001 dated January 23, 2006.
Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate
Informations both dated December 21, 2000.
The Informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 197-M-2001
That on or about the 29th day of June,
2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a knife, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA],[3]
14 years old, against the latters will and consent.[4]
CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 198-M-2001
That on or about the 17th day of June,
2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a knife, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA],
14 years old, against the latters will and consent.[5]
Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty on both counts. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand for the
prosecution. AAA was born on April 13,
1986. According to her late-registered
birth certificate, her parents are BBB (mother) and CCC (father). AAA, however, testified that BBB and CCC are
not her biological parents, as she was only adopted when she was very young.[6] CCC died in December 1999.[7]
In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and settled in the house of
her brother DDD (son of BBB and CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other
brothers, EEE and accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao, and her younger sister,
then six-year-old FFF (who were also the children of BBB and CCC).[8]
On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a
room which had no door. AAA was suddenly
awakened when she felt somebody enter the room.
She recognized the accused-appellant as the intruder, and saw that he
was holding a knife. Accused-appellant
poked the knife at AAAs neck, causing her to freeze in fear. Accused-appellant removed AAAs clothes, and
then his own. Both AAA and
accused-appellant were wearing t-shirt and shorts before the undressing. Accused-appellant kissed her neck and inserted
his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up
at this moment, but accused-appellant did not stop and continued raping AAA for
one hour.[9]
On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also
located in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. At
around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was sleeping in the second floor of the
house, where there are no rooms. AAA was
roused from her sleep when accused-appellant was already undressing her. Accused-appellant removed his shorts and
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA
tried to resist, but accused-appellant held her hands. Accused-appellant then touched her breasts
and kissed her. Accused-appellant
remained on top of her for half an hour.[10]
AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the rape
incidents. Upon learning of the same,
BBB did not believe AAA and whipped her.[11]
During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to establish the
character and chastity of AAA, asked AAA about an alleged sexual intercourse
between her and the now deceased CCC.
AAA affirmed her statement in her affidavit that CCC took advantage (pinagsamantalahan) of her when he was
still alive. This allegedly happened
five times, the first of which was when she was only seven years old.[12] Answering a query from the court, AAA
testified that she was currently in the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD).[13]
The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal officer Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray as its second witness.
However, the latters testimony was dispensed with upon the stipulation
of the parties on the fact of examination of AAA by Dr. Viray on September 5,
2000, and the contents of the examination report,[14]
which includes the finding that AAA was in a non-virgin state.
When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a
year later, it also presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony
for the prosecution. This time, she
testified that the sexual encounters between her and the accused-appellant were
consensual. She fabricated the charge of
rape against the accused-appellant because she was supposedly angry with
him. She also claimed that she was instructed
by the police officer who investigated the incident to say that the
accused-appellant used a knife. She also
testified that she was raped by her father CCC when she was seven years old. She was recanting her previous testimony
because she purportedly was no longer angry with accused-appellant.[15]
On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of
rape because she was angry with the accused-appellant for making her do laundry
work for him. However, when asked if she
consented and voluntarily submitted herself to the accused-appellant when she
had sexual intercourse with him, she answered in the negative. She had been released from the custody of the
DSWD and was alone by herself for some time, but she now lives with the family
of accused-appellant. [16]
On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not
force himself upon her. She affirmed
that accused-appellant had a little defect in his mind. On re-cross examination, AAA testified that
accused-appellant was not her sweetheart.[17]
Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical
psychologist. She conducted a mental
examination on accused-appellant on September 12, 2002, and found that
accused-appellant was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of
below 50.[18]
Accused-appellant, who was 40
years old when he testified on June 15, 2005, claimed that AAA seduced him by
removing her clothes. He asserted that they
ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse. He denied pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was
asking for P300 from him after they kissed. Accused-appellant also testified that there
was no legal proceeding for the adoption of AAA (ampun-ampunan lang).[19]
On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision in Crim. Case
No. 197-M-2001 and 198-M-2001, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, and hereby
sentences him to suffer:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the penalty of
DEATH. The accused is likewise directed
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00;
(b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the penalty of
DEATH. The accused is likewise directed
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00.[20]
The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she
testified for the prosecution, and was returned to the family of the
accused-appellant after her original testimony.
It was during the time when she was back in the custody of the
accused-appellants family that she recanted her testimony for the
prosecution. According to the RTC, it is
clear that she had no other place to go to as she was completely orphaned and
was dependent on the family of the accused, and it was understandable that she
may have recanted in order to remain in the good graces of the accused-appellants
family.[21]
As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from
mental retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of
accused-appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of
the complained of incidents. There was
no showing from the findings of the psychologist that accused-appellant had the
same mental or psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. Even assuming that accused-appellant was of such
mental state at the time of the incidents, the psychologist testified that
accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from wrong.[22]
On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that
of the RTC, except with a modification on the penalty in view of the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13, dated 23 January 2006, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed and damages awarded. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, in each of the two (2) counts of rape. He is further directed to pay private
complainant the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, for each count of
rape, in addition to the civil indemnity awarded by the court a quo.[23]
Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal. Both parties manifested that they are waiving
their rights to file a supplemental brief, as the same would only contain a
reiteration of the arguments presented in their appellants and appellees
briefs.[24]
In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant asserted that the
prosecution evidence was insufficient, particularly in view of AAAs withdrawal
of her original testimony.
We have recently held that [c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for
monetary considerations. Hence, a
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon
with considerable disfavor by the courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to
reject the testimony taken before a court of justice, simply because the
witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or another.[25] We have, in the past, also declared that the
recantation, even of a lone eyewitness, does not necessarily render the
prosecutions evidence inconclusive.[26] In the often-cited Molina v. People,[27]
we specified how a recanted testimony should be examined:
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible. The rule is settled
that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different,
if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide
which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of
the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should
not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both
the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and
juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly
scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly
analyzed. x x x.[28] (Emphases supplied.)
These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant
is usually the lone eyewitness. Thus, in
People v. Sumingwa,[29]
where the rape victim later disavowed her testimony that she was raped by her
father, this Court held:
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely on the credibility
of the complainant's testimony. By the
very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim
is left to testify for herself. When a
rape victim's testimony is straightforward and marked with consistency despite
grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent and
credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be
based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does
not necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
A retraction is looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts. It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such
recantation may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses
through intimidation or monetary consideration.
Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based
on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness
on the stand.[30]
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of AAAs accusation and recantation is facilitated by the fact that
her recantation was made in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike in cases where recantations were made
in affidavits, the trial court in this case had the opportunity to see the
demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid details of the alleged
rape by her adoptive brother, but also when she claimed that she made up her
previous rape charges out of anger. As
such, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted
accused-appellant even after examining the young witness as she made a complete
turnaround and admitted to perjury. The legal
adage that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses thus finds an entirely new significance in this case where AAA was
subjected to grueling cross examinations, redirect examinations, and re-cross
examinations both as a prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial court found that the private
complainants testimony for the prosecution was the one that was worthy of
belief.
However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, it is clear to this
Court which of the narrations of AAA was sincere and which was concocted. AAAs testimony for the prosecution, which
was taken when she was in the custody of the DSWD, was clear, candid, and
bereft of material discrepancies. All
accused-appellant can harp on in his appellants brief was AAAs failure to
recall the length of the knife used in the assaults, a minor and insignificant
detail not material to the elements of the crime of rape. She remained steadfast on cross-examination even
as defense counsel tried to discredit her by bringing up her dark past of being
sexually molested by the accused-appellants father when she was seven years
old. This is in stark contrast to her
testimony for the defense, where AAA, now living with accused-appellants
family, claimed that she fabricated a revolting tale of rape simply because
accused-appellant made her do laundry. AAAs recantation even contradicts the
testimony of accused-appellant himself.
While AAA claims in her retraction that she had consensual sex with her
brother, accused-appellant testified that they merely kissed and that AAAs
purported motive for the rape charges was monetary.
As furthermore observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
the cross-examination of AAA as a defense witness revealed that it was taken at
a time when AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay with the family of
accused-appellant and upon a reliance on the familys implied commitment to
send accused-appellant to Mindanao:
PROS. JOSON:
Q: Where
are you staying at present?
A: In
our house, sir.
Q: And
your house where you were staying is the house of the parents of the accused?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
you dont have any relatives where you can go and stay except from that house?
A: None,
sir.
Q: Where
[are] your parents?
A: I do
not know, sir.
Q: Are
they all dead or still alive?
A: They
are deceased, sir.
Q: All?
A: Both
are deceased, sir.
Q: Do
you mean to say that do you have full blood brother and sister?
A: They
all separated, sir.
Q: Do
you know where they were living?
A: No,
sir.
Q: From
the time you were released from the DSWD you are alone by yourself?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
the person[s] who are now taking care of you are giving you shelter and
everyday foods [sic] from the family of the accused, is that correct?
A: Yes,
sir.
x x x x
Q: Ms.
Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will be dismissed because you testify
today[, would] you admit for a fact that he [was] also staying in the house
where you are staying now?
A: No,
sir.
Q: Where
will he stay?
A: In
Mindanao, sir.
Q: Because
that was one of the promise or commitment of the family of the accused, is it
not?
A: No,
sir.
Q: And
how did you know he will stay in Mindanao?
A: Because
my other Kuya will not allow him to
stay in the house, sir.
Q: Because
your other Kuya does not like Aniceto
Bulagao to do the things that you have complaint [sic] against him, is it not?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
what you are isinusumbong is the
case today against him, is it not?
A: Yes,
sir.[31]
Accused-appellant,
in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was suffering
from mental retardation. Nevertheless,
we agree with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental
condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda
Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance
of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence.[32]
Besides, this Court observes that neither
the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in
his testimony, show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was
completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of
the commission of the crime.[33]
Only when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should
the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.[34]
As
previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of death
for each count of rape. The Court of
Appeals modified the penalty to reclusion
perpetua in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. It should be noted at this point that while
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty, the presence
of a qualifying circumstance which would have warranted the imposition of the
death penalty would still cause the award of moral damages and civil indemnity to
be increased each from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) under prevailing jurisprudence.[35]
In the
case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon. Under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A
when committed with the use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This crime was proven as charged in Crim.
Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to have occurred on June 17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating
circumstance was alleged in the Information, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
On the
other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant used a knife on
June 17, 2000, she said that she hid said knife before June 29, 2000, the date
of Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001.[36] As such, the crime that was proven in Crim.
Case No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by any circumstance affecting
criminal liability. However, simple rape
is also punishable by reclusion perpetua
under Article 266-B.
In both
cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed even without the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award of civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00, as well as moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
both for each count of rape. [37] In addition, we have held that since
exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same can be awarded, not only
in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct
of the offender.[38] This Court believes that the conduct of accused-appellant
herein, who raped her minor adoptive sister twice, falls under this category and
is therefore liable for exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
for each count of rape, in line with existing jurisprudence. [39]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 finding accused-appellant
Aniceto Bulagao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, for each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Accused-appellant Aniceto
Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape, in addition to the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals, namely: civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, both for each count of rape;
and
2) All damages
awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate
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[1] Rollo, pp. 2-20; penned by Associate
Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico
and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 44-54.
[3] The
real names of the victim and her family, with the exception of
accused-appellant, are withheld per Republic Act No. 7610 and Republic Act No.
9262, as held in People v. Cabalquinto,
G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[4] Records,
Volume 1, p. 1.
[5] Id.,
Volume 2, p. 1.
[6] TSN,
August 7, 2001, p. 3.
[7] TSN,
May 8, 2001, p. 5.
[8] Id.
at 6-7.
[9] Id.
at 7-11; TSN, June 15, 2001, pp. 2-3.
[10] TSN,
June 15, 2001, pp. 3-9.
[11] Id.
at 13-14.
[12] TSN,
August 7, 2001, pp. 3-7.
[13] TSN,
October 15, 2001, p. 5.
[14] TSN,
January 29, 2002, p. 6.
[15] TSN,
March 5, 2003, pp. 3-5.
[16] Id.
at 5-8.
[17] Id.
at 9-10.
[18] TSN,
April 26, 2004, pp. 2-4.
[19] TSN,
June 15, 2005, p. 5.
[20] CA
rollo, pp. 16-17.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Rollo, p. 19.
[24] Id.
at 27-29, 38-40.
[25] People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 596, 607-608.
[26] Baldeo v. People, 466 Phil. 845-857 (2004).
[27] 328 Phil. 445 (1996).
[28] Id. at 468.
[29] G.R.
No. 183619, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 638.
[30] Id.
at 649-650.
[31] TSN,
March 5, 2003, pp. 5-8.
[32] People v. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June
29, 2010, 622 SCRA 510, 519.
[33] People v. Danao, G.R. No. 96832,
November 19, 1992, 215 SCRA 795, 801.
[34] People v. Condino, 421 Phil. 213, 221 (2001).
[35] People v. Manulit, G.R. No. 192581, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 426, 439.
[36] TSN,
June 15, 2001, p. 16.
[37] People v. Manulit, supra note 35.
[38] People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106,
November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807, 820.
[39] Id.
at 821.