Republic of the
Supreme Court
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ROMARICO J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
- versus - PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 183891
Present: BRION,
J., Chairperson,
PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: October 19, 2011 |
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R E SO L U T I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Romarico J. Mendoza seeking the reversal of
our Decision dated
In our Decision
dated August 3, 2010, we AFFIRMED, with modification, the decree of
conviction issued by both the trial and appellate courts for the petitioners
violation of Section 22(a) and (d), in relation to Section 28 of RA No. 8282 or
the Social Security Act of 1997. To
recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that the petitioner
readily admitted during trial that he did not remit the SSS premium
contributions of his employees at Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. from
August 1998 to July 1999, in the amount of P239,756.80; inclusive of
penalties, this unremitted amount totaled to P421,151.09. The petitioners
explanation for his failure to remit, which the trial court disbelieved, was
that during this period, Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. shut down as a
result of the general decline in the economy.
The petitioner pleaded good faith and lack of criminal intent as his
defenses.
We ruled
that the decree of conviction was founded on proof beyond reasonable doubt, based on
the following considerations: first, the remittance of employee
contributions to the SSS is mandatory under RA No. 8282; and second, the
failure to comply with a special law being malum prohibitum, the
defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are immaterial.
The
petitioner further argued that since he was designated in the Information
as a proprietor, he was without criminal liability since proprietors are
not among the corporate officers specifically enumerated in Section
28(f) of RA No. 8282 to be criminally liable for the violation of its
provisions. We rejected this argument
based on our ruling in Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and
Collection.[1] We ruled that to sustain the petitioners
argument would be to allow the unscrupulous to conveniently escape liability
merely through the creative use of managerial titles.
After
taking into account the Indeterminate Penalty Law and Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, we MODIFIED the penalty originally imposed by the
trial court[2]
and, instead, decreed the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In the
present motion for reconsideration, the petitioner points out that pending his
appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA),
he voluntarily paid the SSS the amount of P239,756.80 to settle his
delinquency.[3] Note that the petitioner also gave notice of
this payment to the CA via a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion
for New Trial. Although the
People did not contest the fact of voluntary payment, the CA nevertheless
denied the said motions.
The present motion for reconsideration
rests on the following points:
First. On
Second. The petitioner alternatively prays
that should the Court find his above argument wanting, he should still be
acquitted since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged.
Third. The
petitioner prays that a fine be imposed, not imprisonment, should he be found
guilty.
The
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment and claims that the passage of
RA No. 9903 constituted a supervening event in the petitioners case that supports the petitioners acquittal [a]fter
a conscientious review of the case.[5]
THE COURTS
RULING
The petitioners arguments supporting
his prayer for acquittal fail to convince us.
However, we find basis to allow waiver of the petitioners liability for
accrued penalties.
The petitioners liability
for the crime is a settled matter
Upfront, we reject the petitioners
claim that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged. This is a matter that has been
resolved in our Decision, and the petitioner
did not raise anything substantial to merit the reversal of our finding of
guilt. To reiterate, the petitioners conviction was based on his admission
that he failed to remit his employees contribution to the SSS.
The petitioner cannot benefit from the terms of RA
No. 9903, which condone only employers who pay their delinquencies within six
months from the laws effectivity
We note that
the petitioner does not ask for the reversal of his conviction based on the authority
of RA No. 9903; he avoids making a straightforward claim because this law
plainly does not apply to him or to others in the same situation. The clear
intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent
contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their
delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Mere payment of unpaid contributions does not
suffice; it is payment within, and only within, the six (6)-month availment
period that triggers the applicability of RA No. 9903.
True, the
petitioners case was pending with us when RA No. 9903 was passed.
Unfortunately for him, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007. By paying outside of the availment period,
the petitioner effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA
No. 9903. This is how the law is
written: it condones employers and only those employers with unpaid SSS
contributions or with pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month
period following the laws date of effectivity. Dura lex, sed lex.
The
petitioners awareness that RA No. 9903 operates as discussed above is apparent
in his plea for equal protection. In his
motion, he states that
[he] is entitled under the equal protection clause to the dismissal of the case against him since he had already paid the subject delinquent contributions due to the SSS which accepted the payment as borne by the official receipt it issued (please see Annex A). The equal protection clause requires that similar subjects, [sic] should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The petitioner is no more no less in the same situation as the employer who would enjoy freedom from criminal prosecution upon payment in full of the delinquent contributions due and payable to the SSS within six months from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9903.[6]
The Court cannot
amplify the scope of RA No. 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and acquit
the petitioner and other delinquent employers like him; it would in essence be
an amendment of RA No. 9903, an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias
politica principle.[7]
RA No. 9903 creates two
classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the SSS contributions of
their employees: (1) those delinquent employers who pay within the six
(6)-month period (the former group), and (2) those delinquent employers
who pay outside of this availment period (the latter group). The creation of these two classes is obvious
and unavoidable when Section 2 and the last proviso of Section 4[8]
of the law are read together. The same
provisions show the laws intent to limit the benefit of condonation to the
former group only; had RA No. 9903 likewise intended to benefit the latter
group, which includes the petitioner, it would have expressly declared so. Laws granting condonation constitute an act
of benevolence on the governments part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their
terms are strictly construed against the applicants. Since the law itself excludes the class of
employers to which the petitioner belongs, no ground exists to justify his
acquittal. An implementing rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent
with the provisions of the enabling statute; it cannot amend the law either by
abridging or expanding its scope.[9]
For the same reason, we cannot grant
the petitioners prayer to impose a fine in lieu of imprisonment; neither RA
No. 8282 nor RA No. 9903 authorizes the Court to exercise this option.
On the
matter of equal protection, we stated in Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy,
et al.[10]
that the guarantee simply means that no person or class of persons shall be denied
the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances. In People v. Cayat,[11]
we further summarized the jurisprudence on equal protection in this wise:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The
difference in the dates of payment of delinquent contributions provides a
substantial distinction between the two classes of employers. In limiting the benefits of RA No. 9903 to
delinquent employers who pay within the six (6)-month period, the
legislature refused to allow a sweeping, non-discriminatory condonation to all delinquent employers, lest the
policy behind RA No. 8282 be undermined.
The petitioner is entitled
to a waiver of his accrued penalties
Despite our
discussion above, the petitioners move to have our Decision reconsidered is not entirely futile. The one benefit the petitioner can obtain
from RA No. 9903 is the waiver of his accrued penalties, which remain unpaid in
the amount of P181,394.29. This waiver is derived from the last proviso
of Section 4 of RA No. 9903:
Provided,
further, That for reason of equity, employers who settled arrears in
contributions before the effectivity of this Act shall likewise have their
accrued penalties waived.
This
proviso is applicable to the petitioner who settled his contributions long
before the passage of the law. Applied to the petitioner, therefore, RA No.
9903 only works to allow a waiver of his accrued penalties, but not the
reversal of his conviction.
Referral to
the Chief Executive for possible exercise of executive clemency
We realize that with the affirmation
of the petitioners conviction for violation of RA No. 8282, he stands to
suffer imprisonment for four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, notwithstanding the payment of his delinquent
contribution.
Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal
Code,[12]
the courts are bound to apply the law as it is and impose the proper penalty,
no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision, however, gives the Court
the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but
are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. Although the petitioner was convicted under
a special penal law, the Court is not precluded from giving the Revised Penal
Code suppletory application in light of Article 10[13]
of the same Code and our ruling in People
v. Simon.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS petitioner Romarico J. Mendozas motion for
reconsideration. The Court AFFIRMS the
petitioners conviction for violation of Section 22(a) and (d), in relation to
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, and the petitioner is thus sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. In light of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 9903, the petitioners liability for accrued penalties is considered
WAIVED. Considering the circumstances of the case,
the Court transmits the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of
executive clemency to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] G.R. No. 170735,
[2] The penalty originally imposed was six (6) years and one
(1) day to eight (8) years of imprisonment.
[3] SSS Special Bank Receipt No. 918224 is attached to the
present motion as Annex A; rollo,
p. 278.
[4] Section 2. Condonation
of Penalty. - Any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all
contributions due and payable to the Social Security System (SSS), including
those with pending cases either before the Social Security Commission, courts
or Office of the Prosecutor involving collection of contributions and/or
penalties, may within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act: (a)
remit said contributions; or (b) submit a proposal to pay the same in
installments, subject to the implementing rules and regulations which the
Social Security Commission may prescribe: Provided, That the delinquent
employer submits the corresponding collection lists together with the
remittance or proposal to pay installments: Provided, further, That upon approval
and payment in full or in installments of contributions due and payable to the
SSS, all such pending cases filed against the employer shall be withdrawn
without prejudice to the refiling of the case in the event the employer fails
to remit in full the required delinquent contributions or defaults in the
payment of any installment under the approved proposal.
[5] Rollo, p. 355.
[6] Citing Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R.
No. 105371,
[7] Refers to the principle of separation of powers among the
three branches of the government.
[8] Section 4. Effectivity
of Condonation. - The penalty provided under Section 22(a) of Republic Act
No. 8282 shall be condoned by virtue of this Act when and until all the delinquent
contributions are remitted by the employer to the SSS: Provided, That, in case
the employer fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions, or
defaults in the payment of any installment under the approved proposal, within
the availment period provided in this Act, the penalties are deemed reimposed
from the time the contributions first become due, to accrue until the
delinquent account is paid in full: Provided, further, That for reason of
equity, employers who settled arrears in contributions before the effectivity of this Act shall likewise have their
accrued penalties waived. [italics ours]
[9] Perez v. Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA
110, 121-122.
[10] 90 Phil. 83, 90 (1951).
[11] 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
[12] Article 5. Duty of the court in connection
with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and
in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act
which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it
shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same
way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
[13] Article 10. Offenses
not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
[14] G.R. No. 93028,
The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article
10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against,
such supplementary application.
Since neither RA No. 8282 nor RA No. 9903 prohibits the
application of the Revised Penal Code, the provisions of the Code may be
applied suppletorily.