Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND
DIVISION
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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS, Petitioner, - versus - RONALDO E. QUIWA, doing business under the name R.E.Q. Construction, EFREN N. RIGOR, doing businesss under the name Chiara Construction, ROMEO R. DIMATULAC, doing business under the name Ardy Construction and FELICITAS C. SUMERA, doing business under the name F.C.S. Construction, represented by her ATTORNEY-IN-FACT ROMEO M. DE LEON, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 183444 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, SERENO, REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ. Promulgated: October 12, 2011 |
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DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari is the 26 June 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76584,[1] affirming
the trial courts judgment in favor of
herein respondents in their money claims against petitioner DPWH.
The Factual Antecedents
With the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 and the consequent
onslaught of lahar and floodwater,
the rehabilitation of the affected areas became urgent. River systems needed to be channeled,
dredged, desilted and diked to prevent flooding and overflowing of lahar; and to avert damage to life, limb and
property of the people in the area.
In 1992, a number of contractors,
including herein respondents, were engaged by the DPWH through its Project
Manager, Philip F. Meez, for the aforesaid services pursuant to an emergency
project under the Mount Pinatubo Rehabilitation Project. It was alleged that prior to the engagement
of the contractors, Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion of DPWH, who had
overall supervision of the infrastructure and flood control projects, met with
the contractors and insisted on the urgency of the said projects. Respondents claimed that they had
accomplished works on the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River Control Project pursuant
to this emergency project.[2] Ronaldo E. Quiwa claimed that under two
construction agreements with the DPWH, his construction company, the R.E.Q.
Construction, had accomplished the channeling of the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River Control Project
for the excavated spoils of 69,835 cubic meters, pegged at P3,448,258.25 for one project, and
80,480 cubic meters at the cost of P4,019,976.00 for another,
or a total amount of P7,508,234.25.[3] Efren Rigor, on behalf of Chiara
Construction, alleged that the sum of money due him for the channeling of the
Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River was P8,854,654.10 for three accomplished
projects.[4] Romeo Dimatulac of Ardy Construction claimed P1,402,928.45 for double
diking;[5] and
Felicitas C. Sumera, P4,232,363.40 for her construction
company.[6]
Initially, R.E.Q. Construction filed
its money claim with the DPWH, which referred the matter to the Commission on
Audit.[7] The COA returned the claims to the DPWH with
the information that the latter had already been given the funds and the
authority to disburse them.[8] When respondent Quiwa filed his claims with
the DPWH, it failed to act on these, resulting in the withholding of the
payment due him, despite the favorable report and Certification of Completion
made by the Asstistant Project Manager for Operations, Engineer Rolando G.
Santos.[9] Prompted by the prolonged inaction of the
DPWH on their claims, respondents jointly filed an action for a sum of money
against the DPWH.[10] The case was decided in their favor by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 51, in Civil Case No. 96-77180.[11]
As found by the RTC, the respondents,
plaintiffs therein, were duly licensed contractors, who had completed the
construction works on the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River as certified by the DPWH
itself. In 1992, the funding for the
infrastructure and other work requirements under the Mt. Pinatubo
Rehabilitation Program in the amount of P400 million pesos was
initially allocated by the government, and was later increased to P700M. Despite the completion of respondents works
in accordance with the specifications
and the allocation of the funds to cover the said services, the DPWH unjustly
denied the claims. The court a quo
gave credence to the evidence presented by respondents, consisting of contract
agreements; statement of work accomplished, certified and signed by the
engineers of the DPWH; and testimonial evidence of witnesses. It ruled that
respondents were able to prove their claims by a preponderance of
evidence. The RTC found that the
contracts between DPWH and the plaintiffs were valid contracts, as all the
requisites thereof -- consent, subject matter and cause -- were present; and,
notwithstanding the absence of the signature of the regional director on the
agreement executed with Quiwa and Sumera, the contract was ratified when he
affixed his signature to the Inspection and Certification of Completion of the
projects.
The court a quo likewise
sustained the claim of Rigor and Dimatulac even in the absence of a written
contract. It held that there was already
a perfected contract, since there was a concurrence of the essential requisites
thereof. It also, in effect, held that
DPWH was already estopped from repudiating the contract, as the latter had
already made representations and assurances that the plaintiffs would be paid
for the work that they would do, and as even then DPWH Undersecretary Teodoro
T. Encarnacion had told them to
fast-track the project.[12]
The RTC also ruled that the claim of
the respondents against DPWH was proper since they had already made a demand on
the Commission on Audit regarding the
payment of their construction services.
Thus, they first availed themselves of the proper administrative remedy in filing their claim
with COA, which unfortunately referred the claim to the DPWH. The court a quo also reasoned that the
contracts could not be declared void on the ground of the absence of a
certification of availability of funds issued by the proper accounting official. It found that there was already an advice of
allotment from the Department of Budget and Management to cover the projects.[13] The respondents were thus correct in suing
the government for the nonpayment of the services they had rendered. Consequently, the court
a quo disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby ordered in favor of plaintiffs Ronaldo Quiwa doing business under the name R.E.Q . Construction, Efren N. Rigor, doing business under the name Chiara Construction, Romeo R. Dimatulac, doing business under the namme (sic) Ardy Construction and against Felicitas C. Sumera, doing business under the namee (sic) FC.S. (sic) Construction and against defendants Department of Public Works and Highways, Gregorio R. Vigilar, Teodoro T. Encarnacion and Jose P. de Jesus, ordering them to jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the following amounts:
1) To plaintiff Ronaldo Z. Quiwa
First: The principal sum of P3,488,258.25 representing the actual work accomplishments of Quiwas first project, the channeling with disposal of Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River from Sta. 2 + 100 to Sta. 2 + 500 (left bank) in Bamban, Tarlac and the principal sum of P3,843,252.90 representing the actual work accomplishments of Quiwas second project which is Channeling with Disposal of Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River from Sta. 1 + 200 to Sta. 1 + 500 at Bamban, Tarlac with legal rate of interest from July 1992 until fully paid;
Second: The sum of 10% of the total amount due as attorneys fees; and
Third: The sum equivalent to the lawful fees paid by plaintiff Quiwa in entering and docketing the action which must be the proportion of the filing fees for his total claim in the amount of P7,331,511.115 as costs of suit.
2) To plaintiff Efren Rigor
First: The principal sum of P3,843,252.90 representing the actual work accomplishments of plaintiff Rigors first project, the channeling and disposal of Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River Channeling Section 1 + 200 Sta. 1 + 500 in Bamban, Tarlac, and the principal sum of P3,155,641.20 representing the actual accomplisments of plaintiff Rigors second project which is the Channeling and Disposal Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River from Station -0 + 700 to Station-1 + 000 in Bamban, Tarlac with legal rate of interest from July 1992 until fully paid;
Second: The sum of 10% of the total amount due as attorneys fees; and
Third: The sum equivalent to the lawful fees paid by Plaintiff Rigor in entering or docketing the action which must be the proportion of the filing fees for his total claim in the amount of P6,998,849.10 as costs of suit.
3) For Plaintiff Romeo Dimatulac
First: The principal sum of P1,402,928.45 representing the actual work accomplishments of plaintiff Dimatulac project, the Double Diking at Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River Control System from Station 2 + 000 to Station 2 + 400 in Bamban, Tarlac with legal rate of interest from July 1922 until fully paid;
Second: The sum of 10% of the total amount due as attorneys fees; and
Third: The sum equivalent to the lawful fees paid by plaintiff Dimatulac in entering and docketing the action which must be the proportion of the filing fee for his total claim in the amount of P1,402,928.45 as costs of suit.
4) To plaintiff Felicitas C. Sumera
First: The principal sum of P4,232,363.40 representing the actual work accomplishments of plaintiff Sumeras project, the Channeling with disposal of the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River Control covering Station -1 = 500 to Station -1 + 800 in Bamban, Tarlac with legal rate of interest from July 1992 until fully paid;
Second: The sum of 10% of the total amount due as attorneys fees; and
Third: The sum equivalent to the lawful fees paid by
plaintiff Sumeras (sic) in entering and docketing the action which must be the
proportion of the filing fees for her total claim in the amount of
P4,232,363.40 as costs of suit.. (sic)
SO ORDERED.
Not amenable to the trial courts Decision, Petitioner DPWH,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an appeal[14] to
question the said Decision. DPWH mainly
argued that there was no valid contract between it and respondents.[15] It claimed that there was no certification of
the availability of funds issued by the DPWH Chief Accountant or by the head of
its accounting unit as required by Executive Order No. 292, or the
Administrative Code of 1987.[16] It also alleged other deficiencies and
irregularities, which rendered the contract void from its inception, such as
the absence of the requirements enumerated in Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos.
1594 and 1445; and the lack of authority
on the part of Engineer Philip Meez, Project Manager II of the DPWH to enter
into contracts on behalf of DPWH. DPWH
likewise contested the RTCs award of attorneys fees and costs of suit to
respondents.
The Court of Appeals (CA), similar to
the court a quo, sided with respondents.
The CA resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether the respondents
are entitled to their claim representing actual expenses for the construction
projects they undertook. It found that
there was already a fund allocation for the projects, and that the payment for
the channeling services rendered by the respondents had been included in the
said fund allocation as testified to by DPWHs witness, Felix Desierto. It ruled that DPWH officials who approved the
projects, even though middle-rank, had the authority to bind the
department. The CA held:
...[I]t appears that all the procedures
followed by the project managers and plaintiff-appellees were in accordance
with the usual DPWH procedures, such that, there was no reason for
plaintiffs-appellees not to rely on the authority of the project managers who
allowed them to proceed with their projects from start to finish.[17]
The CA further held that revalidation was not part of the
contract and, thus, not a precondition for payment to the respondents. The constitution of the revalidation team
after the commencement of the construction project indicated that approval by
DPWH was not meant to be a condition for the payment of the project.[18] With the completion of the project, the CA
ruled that the DPWH was estopped from refusing to pay plaintiffs:[19]
...[I]t is readily
seen that defendant-appellants conduct in allowing the subject projects to
continue without objecting thereto and in even assigning its own employees to
oversee these projects estopped defendant-appellant from adopting a position
that such projects were not authorized.
Without a doubt, such acts induced plaintiff-appellees to believe that
such projects will be honored by defendant-appellant and that they will be
compensated for all their expenditures.[20]
According to the CA, the absence of a written contract with
R. Dimatulac and Rigor did not affect the validity and the enforceability of
the contracts between DPWH and the contractors.
With the affirmance of the RTC
Decision, DPWH filed a Petition for Review[21] before
this Court, alleging that the following were errors committed by the Court of
Appeals:[22]
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PURPORTED CONTRACTS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES ARE NULL AND VOID FROM THE BEGINNING AND HENCE, NOT BINDING
BETWEEN THEM;
IN NOT FINDING THAT [RESPONDENTS QUIWA ET
AL.] HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST [PETITIONER DPWH];
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT IS UNWARRANTED AND HAS NO BASIS IN LAW.
Petitioner insists that there was no valid contract between
it and the respondents, and, thus, the latter had no cause of action against
the former. Consequently, there was no
basis to grant the Complaint and to
award attorneys fees and the costs of suit in favor of the respondents.[23]
On the other hand, respondents, in their comment, reiterates
the correctness of the RTC and the CA Decisions. They also brought to the
attention of this Court the fact that the individual defendants in the case,
DPWH former Secretaries Gregorio T. Vigilar and Jose P. de Jesus, and
Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion did not file an appeal to this
Court. Both the RTC and the CA Decisions
adjudged these defendants jointly and solidarily liable with DPWH to pay the
amount awarded to the respondents.
Respondents are effectively claiming that the said judgments have become
final and executory against defendant public officials.
The Issues
We find that the crux of the Petition is simply whether the
DPWH is liable to pay the claims filed against them by the plaintiffs. Corollary to this main issue, the following
sub-issues beg for resolution:
Whether, in the absence of the legal
requirements under PD 1445, a valid contract between the DPWH and the
plaintiffs exists;
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
payment for accomplishing 100% of the work, attorneys fees and costs of suit;
Whether the Secretary and the
Undersecretary of DWPH should be held jointly and solidarily liable to
plaintiffs.
The Courts Ruling
It should be borne in mind that a review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is discretionary and must be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor.[24] We find that these reasons are not present in
this case.
As a general rule, the factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, attain conclusiveness and are given
utmost respect by this Court.[25] DPWH never questioned the completion of the
Sacobia-Bamban-Parua river works.
Neither did it question the authority of those who certified the
completion of the works by respondents.
The trial court ruled that the works were completed, as shown by the
evidence presented before it. This
finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
There is, therefore, no reason for us to view these factual findings.
With the findings of the trial and the
appellate courts, there is no longer any issue on whether the contractors
completed the projects in accordance with the specifications agreed upon. The regular course of a contract is that
after the complete rendering of services, the contractors are subsequently
paid. The DPWH, however, deviated from
this course.
It should be noted that the completion
of the works was recognized by the DPWH, as shown by the certifications issued
by its engineers and even by municipal officials. Notwithstanding the said recognition, DPWH
chose not to act on the claims of respondents, and later denied liability for
the payment of the works on the ground of the invalidity of the contracts.
Petitioner
DPWH primarily argues that the contracts with herein respondents were void for
not complying with Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445, or the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order No. 292. These sections require an appropriation for
the contracts and a certification by the chief accountant of the agency or by
the head of its accounting unit as to the availability of funds. It should be noted that there was an
appropriation amounting to P400 million, which was increased to P700 million. The funding was for the rehabilitation of the
areas devastated and affected by Mt. Pinatubo, which included the
Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River for which some of the channeling, desilting and
diking works were rendered by herein respondents construction companies.
It was, however, undisputed that there
was no certification from the chief accountant of DPWH regarding the said
expenditure. In addition, the project
manager has a limited authority to approve contracts in an amount not exceeding
P1 million.[26] Notwithstanding these irregularities, it
should be pointed out that there is no novelty regarding the question of
satisfying a claim for construction contracts entered into by the government,
where there was no appropriation and where the contracts were considered void
due to technical reasons. It has been
settled in several cases that payment for services done on account of the
government, but based on a void contract, cannot be avoided. The Court first resolved such question in Royal
Trust Construction v. Commission on Audit.[27] In that case, the court issued a Resolution
granting the claim of Royal Trust Construction under a void contract. The unpublished Resolution reads as
follows:
NOV 23 1988
Gentlemen
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated NOV 22 1988
G.R. No. 84202 (ROYAL TRUST CONSTRUCTION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT). The petitioner undertook the widening and deepening of the Betis River in Pampanga at the urgent request of the local officials and with the knowledge and consent of the Ministry of Public Works but without any written contract and the covering appropriation. The purpose of the project was to prevent the flooding of the neighboring areas and to irrigate the adjacent farmlands. On December 16, 1985, the petitioner sought compensation in the sum of P1,299,736.00 for the completed portion of the P2.3 million Betis River project, which was implemented or undertaken sometime in mid-May, 1984.
In a memorandum dated February 17, 1986, then Public Works Minister Jesus Hipolito recommended immediate payment of the works already completed from the cash disbursement ceiling of P300,000.00 for Betis River. On July 16, 1986, his successor, Minister Rogaciano M. Mercado manifested that his office was interposing no objection to the proposal to use the P294,000.00 release for Betis River Control, Betis, Mexico, Pampanga, for the partial payment of work already accomplished for the channel improvement of said river from Sta. 2+200 to Sta. 5-100, subject, however, to existing budgetary accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
On July 20, 1987, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit ruled that payment to the contractor for the work accomplished, starting with the first partial payment in the amount of P268,051.14 only on the basis of quantum meruit may be allowed, in keeping with the time-honored principle that no one may be permitted to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. However, in a subsequent indorsement dated August 27, 1987, Chairman Domingo reversed himself and held:
However, this Commission is only too aware of its existing policy on recovery from government contracts on the basis of quantum meruit. Under COA Resolution No. 36-58, dated November 15, 1986, this Commission has adhered to a policy of barring such recovery where the project subject of the contract is patently violative of the mandatory legal provisions relating to, among others, the existence of the corresponding appropriation covering the contract cost. The mere delay in the accomplishment of the required certificate of availability of funds (CAF) to support a contract presents an entirely different situation considering that since the covering funds have in fact been already appropriated and budgetarily allotted to the implementing agency, the delayed execution of the CAF would not alter such fact.
Even so, he added that considering the sacrifices already made by the appellant in accomplishing the project in question, which are favorable circumstances attendant to the claim, payment on the basis of quantum meruit may be given due course but only upon order of a court.
The respondent is now faulted for grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the petitioners claim without an order from a court. The Solicitor General, in support of the Commission on Audit, agrees that the said payment cannot be made because it is barred for lack of the required covering appropriation, let alone the corresponding written contract.
We hold for the petitioner.
The work done by it was impliedly authorized and later expressly acknowledged by the Ministry of Public Works, which has twice recommended favorable action on the petitioners request for payment. Despite the admitted absence of a specific covering appropriation as required under COA Resolution No. 36-58, the petitioner may nevertheless be compensated for the services rendered by it, concededly for the public benefit, from the general fund allotted by law to the Betis River Project. Substantial compliance with the said resolution, in view of the circumstances of this case, should suffice. The Court also feels that the remedy suggested by the respondent, to compensation claimed, would entail additional expense, inconvenience and delay which in fairness should not be imposed on the petitioner.
Accordingly, in the interest of substantial justice and equity, the respondent Commission on Audit is DIRECTED to determine on a quantum meruit basis the total compensation due to the petitioner for the services rendered by it in the channel improvement of the Betis River in Pampanga and to allow the payment thereof immediately upon completion of the said determination.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
Daniel T. Martinez
Clerk of Court
The above case became the
authority in granting claims of a contractor against the government based on a
void contract. This exercise of equity
to compensate contracts with the government was repeated in Eslao vs. COA.[28] In the said case, the respondent therein,
Commission on Audit (COA), was ordered to pay the company of petitioner for the
services rendered by the latter in constructing a building for a state
university, notwithstanding the
contracts violations of the mandatory requirements of law, including the prior
appropriation of funds therefor. The
Court, in resolving the case, cited the unpublished Resolution in Royal
Construction, wherein
the Court allowed the payment of the companys services sans the legal
requirements of prior appropriation.
Royal Trust Construction was again mentioned in Melchor
v. COA,[29]
which was decided a few months after Eslao. In Melchor, it was found that the
contract was approved by an unauthorized person and, similar to the case at
bar, the required certification of the chief accountant was absent. The Court did not deny or justify the
invalidity of the contract. The Court,
however, found that the government unjustifiably denied what the latter owed to
the contractors, leaving them uncompensated after the government had benefited
from the already completed work.
In EPG Construction Co., et al v Hon. Gregorio R. Vigilar,[30] the Court
again refused to stamp with legality DPWHs act of evading the payment of
contracts that had been completed, and from which the government had already
benefited. The Court held:
Although this Court agrees with respondents postulation that the
implied contracts, which covered the additional constructions, are void, in
view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules and lack of legal
requirements, we nonetheless find the instant petition
laden with merit and uphold, in the
interest of substantial justice, petitioners-contractors right to be
compensated for the "additional constructions" on the public works
housing project, applying the principle of quantum meruit.
The Court also held in the above case:
Notably, the peculiar circumstances present in the instant case
buttress petitioners claim for compensation for the additional constructions,
despite the illegality and void nature of the implied contracts forged
between the DPWH and petitioners-contractors. On this matter, it bears
stressing that the illegality of the subject contracts proceeds from an express
declaration or prohibition by law, and not from any intrinsic illegality.
Stated differently, the subject contracts are not illegal per se.
To emphasize, the
contracts in the above cases, as in this case, were not illegal per se.
There was prior appropriation of funds
for the project including appropriation; and payment to the contractors,
upon the subsequent completion of the
works, was warranted.
As to Public Works and Highways officials Gregorio R.
Vigilar, Teodoro T. Encarnacion and Jose P. de Jesus, their personal liability
should not be sustained. They were sued
in their official capacity, and it would be unfair to them to pay the
contractors out of their own pockets. In
Melchor, the Court declared that it was unjust to hold the
public official liable for the payment of a construction that benefited the
government.
We also depart from the CA and the RTC rulings awarding the
respondents attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The Constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.[31] Attorneys fees and costs of suit were not
included in the appropriation of expenditures for the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua
project. In addition, we are not
disposed to say that there was bad faith on the part of the DPWH in not
settling its liability to the respondents for the works accomplished by the
latter. The DPWH relied on P.D. 1445,
Section 87, which provides that contracts in violation of Sections 85 and 86
thereof are void. The subject contracts
undoubtedly lacked the legal requirement of certification of the chief
accountant of DWPH. It was also clear
that the project manager had no authority to approve the contracts, since the
amounts involved were beyond his authority.[32] A strict application of the law, as the DPWH
officials did, would therefore give a reasonable basis for the denial of
the claim and eliminate the badge of bad
faith on their part. The DPWH officials
were apparently apprehensive that they might end up being liable to the
government if they had wrongfully paid the contractors. This apprehension clearly showed in their
letter to the DOJ Secretary.[33]
In conclusion, we uphold the CA in affirming the liability
of the DPWH for the works accomplished by herein contractors. We, however, delete the liability of Gregorio
Vigilar, Teodoro Encarnacion and Jose P. de Jesus, as well as other monetary
awards in favor of respondents, as these awards were not directly for the
subject accomplished works and were not funded by the department.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the assailed 26 June 2008 Decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Gregorio Vigilar, Teodoro Encarnacion and
Jose P. de Jesus are absolved from their solidary liability with the government
for the payment of the subject contracts.
The payment is solely on account of DPWH. Likewise, attorneys fees and costs of suit
are hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
ARTURO D.
BRION BIENVENIDO
L. REYES
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
* Designated as additional member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Jose P. Perez per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October 2011.
[1]Rollo, pp. 47-56; CA rollo, pp. 368-377; Decision penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo concurring.
[2]Records, Vol. 1, pp. 4-5.
[3]Id. at 9-15.
[4]Id. at 15-22.
[5]Id. at 22-24.
[6]Id. at 24-26.
[7]First Folder of Exhibits, p. 32.
[8]Id. at 77.
[9]Supra note 7.
[10]Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-34.
[11]Records, Vol. II, pp. 264-273, penned by Judge Rustico V. Panganiban.
[12]Id. at 270-271.
[13]Id. The Advice of Allotment states: The following allotments are made available in support of their functions, projects, purpose and all other expenditures authorized for the calendar year. The allotment for any given quarter shall only become self-executory at the beginning of that quarter. It is the primary responsibility of the head of the department, bureau or agency concerned to keep expenditures within the limits of the amount alloted. The purpose is to cover funding requirements for the implementation of necessary infrastructure projects and other works under the Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation Project. The appropriation was ₱400 million.
[14]Id. at 284.
[15]CA rollo, p. 56-91.
[16]Id. at 72-75.
[17]Id. at 345-346.
[18]Id. at 346-347.
[19]Id. at 347.
[20]Id. at 349.
[21]Rollo, pp. 8-44.
[22]Id. at 20-21.
[23]Id. at 21.
[24]ROC, R45 6.
[25]See Spouses Pudadera v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 170073, 18 October 2010 citing Uraca v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 253, 267 (1997).
[26] Fourth Folder of Exhibits, Department Order No. 135, Series of 1990, p 1.
[27]Rollo (G.R. No. 84202), pp. 65-66.
[28]G.R. No. 89745, 8 April 1991, 195 SCRA 730.
[29]G.R. No. 95398, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA
704
[30]G.R. No. 131544, 16 March 2001, 354 SCRA 566.
[31]Constitution, Art. VI, 29 (1).
[32]Fourth Folder of Exhibits, p. 1. DPWH Department Order No. 135, Series of 1990.
[33]The letter dated 14 September 1993, written by Joel L. Altea, Asst. Secretary for Comptrollership and Financial Management of the DPWH, was addressed to the then DOJ Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, seeking an opinion on whether the DPWH Secretary would be personally liable in case he signed and allowed claims for work that turn out to have been mistakenly validated by the Validation Committee and the COA.