Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
EMIRATE SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS, INC. and ROBERTO A. YAN, Petitioners,
- versus - GLENDA M.
MENESE, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 182848
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: October 5, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before
the Court is the petition for review on certiorari[1]
which assails the decision[2]
and the resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) rendered on
The Antecedents
The
facts of the case are summarized below.
On
June 5, 2001, respondent Glenda M. Menese (Menese)
filed a complaint for constructive dismissal; illegal reduction of salaries and
allowances; separation pay; refund of contribution to cash bond; overtime, holiday,
rest day and premium pay; damages; and attorneys fees against the petitioners,
Emirate Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. (agency) and its General Manager, Robert A. Yan (Yan).
Menese
alleged in the compulsory arbitration proceedings that on P9,200.00 and an
allowance of P2,500.00, for a total of P11,700.00 in compensation.
Effective May 2001, her allowance was allegedly reduced to P1,500.00
without notice, and P100.00 was deducted from her salary every month as
her contribution to a cash bond which lasted throughout her employment. She was
required to work seven (7) days a week, from
Menese
further alleged that on
Menese
claimed that she was told not to worry because if she was still interested in
working with the agency, she could still be retained as a lady guard with a
salary equivalent to the minimum wage. She would then be detailed to another
detachment because Dapula did not like to see her around anymore. If the offer was acceptable to her, she
should report to the agencys personnel officer for the issuance of the necessary
duty detail order. Menese thought about
the offer and soon realized that she was
actually being demoted in rank and salary. She eventually decided to decline
the offer. She continued reporting to the PGH detachment and performed her
usual functions as if nothing happened.
Menese
alleged that at this juncture, Claro reported at the agencys PGH detachment
and performed the functions she was doing. She bewailed that thereafter she
continuously received harassment calls and letters. She was also publicly
humiliated and badly treated at the detachment. The agency, through Security Officer
Alton Acab, prohibited her from using the office computer. On
Still
not satisfied with what they did, the petitioners allegedly withheld her salary
for
The
petitioners, for their part, denied liability. They alleged that on
On
the basis of Dapulas letter, Yan sent Menese a memorandum dated
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
In
a decision dated P83,443.75
(latest computation); P66,924.00 in monetary benefits; P50,000.00
and P20,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, respectively; and
attorneys fees of P15,036.74.
The
petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On
On
The Petition for Certiorari
Menese
elevated her case to the CA through a petition for certiorari[11] under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the main, she argued that the agency was in
bad faith when it issued the memoranda dated
The
agency, in rebuttal, posited that Menese was not illegally dismissed, but was
merely transferred to its head office in response to the request of the new
head of the UP-PGH security division for the transfer. The action, it maintained, was a valid
exercise of its management prerogative. Thus, Menese was guilty of abandoning
her employment when she refused to report for work at her new posting.
The CA Decision
The
CA granted the petition in its decision of
As
the labor arbiter did, the CA found Menese to have been constructively, and
therefore illegally, dismissed. It noted that the memoranda[16]
on Meneses transfer were prompted by Daculas letter, dated
The
CA brushed aside the petitioners argument that it was their prerogative to
transfer Menese from the agencys PGH detachment to its head office at
The
CA sustained all the other findings of the labor arbiter. On the whole, it
ruled that the NLRC misappreciated the evidence in the case. The petitioners
moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of
The Petitioners Case
Aside
from the petition itself,[21]
the petitioners filed a reply to Meneses comment[22]
and a memorandum[23] where
they asked for a reversal of the assailed CA rulings on the ground that the CA
gravely erred in:
(1)
Affirming
the labor arbiters findings that Menese was constructively dismissed;
(2)
Holding
Yan solidarily liable with the agency for damages; and
(3)
Sustaining
the award of backwages, damages and attorneys fees, as well as overtime pay.
The petitioners insist that Menese
was not illegally dismissed. They argue that it was Menese who deliberately and
unjustifiably refused to work despite several notices[24]
to her after she was validly relieved from her current work assignment due to a
clients request. They maintain that since Menese chose not to return to work,
she must be considered either to have resigned from or to have abandoned her
employment. They further maintain that nothing on record shows any positive or
overt act of the agency in dismissing Menese.
Moreover, the petitioners regard
Meneses continued refusal to report to the agencys head office as an act of
gross insubordination constituting a just cause for termination under Article
282(a) of the Labor Code. They argue that under this law, an employer may
terminate an employment for serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representative in
connection with his work.
The petitioners posit that she is not
entitled to reinstatement and backwages since she failed to comply with the
reinstatement option stated in the NLRC resolution. Neither is she entitled to
overtime pay because she did not work beyond the eight (8)-hour working period;
her one (1) hour time off from
The petitioners likewise take
exception to the award of attorneys fees as the labor arbiters decision and
the NLRCs resolution failed to state the justification for the award. They further contend that the CA gravely
erred in upholding the labor arbiters ruling that Yan is solidarily liable
with the agency, as Yan was merely acting in his capacity as the agencys
general manager, and that there is no showing that Yan acted maliciously or in
bad faith when he ordered Meneses transfer. They also point out that Menese
did not challenge before the CA the NLRC ruling absolving Yan from any
liability.
The Case for Menese
By
way of her comment[25]
and memorandum,[26] Menese
asks that the appeal be denied for lack of merit.
She
claims that at the arbitration stage, the petitioners readily admitted the fact
of her removal, manifesting in open session their lack of interest to settle
the case amicably as they have a strong evidence to support their defense of
her dismissal for cause. She observed during the hearing that the petitioners
were very confident about their case, because according to them, they had
Dapulas letter asking for her immediate removal.[27]
Menese
further claims that the petitioners realized that they did not have the
necessary evidence, so Yan wrote Dapula a letter asking her for proof of the
complaints or grievances of the security guards against Menese.[28] Dapula
did not produce or present the evidence they asked for resulting in their
failure to substantiate their defense of dismissal for cause. Menese contends
that the petitioners then revised their theory of the case and made it appear
that she was not actually dismissed but was merely transferred, purportedly in
the exercise of their management prerogative.
She
posits that her transfer was motivated by ill will and bad faith, as it was
done to facilitate the entry of a favored applicant to the PGH detachment. She intimates that the labor arbiter resolved
the case correctly when he found her to have been constructively or illegally
dismissed. She bewails the NLRCs surprising reversal of the labor arbiters
decision, but feels vindicated when the CA set aside the NLRC ruling.
Menese
submits that the CA is correct in nullifying the NLRCs reversal of her illegal
dismissal case because the labor tribunal closed its eyes to the fact that bad
faith attended her transfer. She points out that the petitioners twin
directives, vis--vis her transfer upon which the NLRC based its ruling, were
both issued for a selfish and immoral purpose;[29]
the first, dated May 16, 2001,[30]
was issued for the purpose of creating a vacancy, and the second, dated May 22,
2001,[31]
was intended to cover up the wrongdoing that was earlier committed. In other
words, the directives were tainted with malice and ill will. On the matter of Yans liability, Menese
maintains that the NLRC committed a serious error in allowing him to get away
with his wrongdoing considering the injustice done to her as a result of her unceremonious
dismissal.
In
a different vein, Menese assails the NLRCs exclusion of the one-hour meal
break as overtime work, for it erroneously assumed that her employer had been
giving its employees a 60 minute time-off for regular meals and that she was
not performing work during the period. She argues that this was not the actual
practice in the workplace, contending that she continued working even during
the one-hour meal break.
Finally,
Menese maintains that the CA correctly reinstated the labor arbiters award of
attorneys fees and the imposition of solidary liability on Yan and the
agency. She posits that in her quest for
justice because of her unceremonious dismissal, she was constrained to engage
the services of a counsel to handle her case.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit. The evidence of Meneses unwarranted,
unjustified and, in her own language, unceremonious dismissal is so glaring
that to ignore it is to commit, as the NLRC did, grave abuse of discretion.
We
note as a starting point that at the time material to the case, Menese ceased
to be the agencys payroll and billing clerk at its PGH detachment. The
position was taken away from her as she had been transferred to the agencys
main office on
Citing
On
a superficial consideration, the petitioners position looks unassailable as
indeed an employer can regulate, generally without restraint and according to
its own discretion and judgment, every aspect of its business, including work
assignments and transfer of employees, subject only to limitations imposed by
law.[36] This
submission, however, glossed over or suppressed a crucial factor in the present
labor controversy. We refer to Dapulas letter to Yan in early May 2001,[37]
asking for Meneses transfer allegedly due to numerous complaints from security
guards and co-workers regarding her unprofessionalism and because of nepotism;
Menese is the wife of a member of the UP
Had
Yan inquired into Dapulas claim of Meneses alleged unprofessionalism, ideally
through an administrative investigation, he could have been provided with a
genuine reason assuming proof of Dapulas accusation existed for Meneses transfer or even for her
dismissal, if warranted. That the agency did not get into the bottom of
Dapulas letter before it implemented Meneses transfer is indicative of the sheer
absence of an objective justification for the transfer. The most that the
agency did was to write Dapula a letter, through Yan, asking her to provide
documents/evidence in support of her request for Meneses transfer.[38] Significantly,
Yans request came after the labor arbiters summons to Yan regarding Meneses complaint.
Dapula never responded to Yans letter and neither did she provide the evidence
needed for the agencys defense in the complaint.
As
Menese noted, the petitioners did not submit as annex to the petition Yans
letter to Dapula, and the reason appears to be obvious they were trying to
avoid calling attention to the absence of proof of Meneses alleged
unprofessionalism and her involvement in nepotism. Evidently, the basis for
Dapulas request did not exist. We thus find credible Meneses contention that
her transfer was a ploy to remove her from the PGH detachment to accommodate
the entry of Dapulas protge. In short, the agency wanted to create a vacancy
for Claro, the protge. Confronted with
this clear intent of the petitioners, we cannot see how Meneses transfer could
be considered a valid exercise of management prerogative. As Menese rightly put
it, her transfer was arbitrarily done, motivated no less by ill will and bad
faith.
In
Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC,[39] the
Court stressed as a matter of principle that the managerial prerogative to
transfer personnel must be exercised without abuse of discretion, bearing in
mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with
the manner in which that right is exercised.
Thus, it should not be used as a subterfuge by the employer to get rid
of an undesirable worker. Measured against this basic precept, the
petitioners undoubtedly abused their discretion or authority in transferring
Menese to the agencys head office. She had become undesirable because she
stood in the way of Claros entry into the PGH detachment. Menese had to go,
thus the need for a pretext to get rid of her. The request of a client for the
transfer became the overriding command that prevailed over the lack of basis
for the transfer.
We
cannot blame Menese for refusing Yans offer to be transferred. Not only was
the transfer arbitrary and done in bad faith, it would also result, as Menese
feared, in a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. Although Yan informed
Menese that based on the request of the client, she will be transferred to
another assignment which however will not involve any demotion in rank nor
diminution in her salaries and other benefits,[40]
the offer was such as to invite reluctance and suspicion as it was couched in a
very general manner. We find credible Meneses submission on this point, i.e., that under the offered transfer: (1)
she would hold the position of lady guard and (2) she would be paid in
accordance with the statutory minimum wage, or from P11,720.00 to P7,500.00.
In
these lights, Meneses transfer constituted a constructive dismissal as it had
no justifiable basis and entailed a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay
for her. For a transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer
must be able to show that the transfer is for a valid reason, entails no
diminution in the terms and conditions of employment, and must be unreasonably inconvenient
or prejudicial to the employee. If the
employer fails to meet these standards, the employees transfer shall amount,
at the very least, to constructive dismissal.[41]
The petitioners, unfortunately for them, failed to come up to these standards.
In declaring Meneses transfer to be
in the valid exercise of the petitioners management prerogative, the NLRC
grossly misappreciated the evidence and, therefore, gravely abused its
discretion in closing its eyes to the patent injustice committed on Menese. It
completely disregarded the obvious presence of bad faith in Meneses transfer.
Labor justice demands that Menese be awarded moral and exemplary damages[42]
and, for having been constrained to litigate in order to protect her rights,
attorneys fees.[43]
Yans solidary liability
Yan
had been aware all the time of the utter lack of a valid reason for Meneses
transfer. He had been aware all the time that Dapulas charges against Menese
the ostensible reason for the transfer were nonexistent as Dapula failed to
substantiate the charges. He was very much a part of the flagrant and duplicitous
move to get rid of Menese to give way to Claro, Dapulas protge.
Based
on the facts, Yan is as guilty as the agency in causing the transfer that was
undertaken in bad faith and in a wanton and oppressive manner. Thus, he should
be solidarily liable with the agency for Meneses monetary awards.
The overtime pay award
While
the labor arbiter declared that Meneses claim for overtime pay is unrebutted[44]
and, indeed, nowhere in the petitioners position paper did they controvert
Meneses claim, we hold that the claim must still be substantiated. In Global
Incorporated v. Commissioner Atienza,[45] a
claim for overtime pay will not be granted for want of factual and legal basis.
In this respect, the records indicate that the labor arbiter granted Meneses
claim for holiday pay, rest day and premium pay on the basis of payrolls.[46] There is no such proof in support of Meneses
claim for overtime pay other than her contention that she worked from
Also,
the NLRC noted that the award of P2,600.00 for the refund of the cash
bond deposit is overstated and should be adjusted to P600.00 only, as indicated
by the payrolls. We likewise find the adjustment in order.
All
told, except for the above clarifications on the overtime pay award and the
refund of the cash bond deposit, we reiterate and so declare the petition to be devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, except for the overtime pay award and the refund of
deposit for the cash bond, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED, with the following
modifications:
1) The deletion of the overtime pay
award; and
2)
Adjustment of the refund of the cash or
surety bond deposit award from P2,500.00 to P600.00.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-44; filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
[3]
[4] Entitled Glenda M. Menese v. National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division, Emirate Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. and Roberto A. Yan.
[5] Rollo, p. 117; Petition, Annex F.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Supra note 6.
[13] Rollo, p. 119; Petition, Annex H.
[14]
[15] Supra note 2.
[16] Supra notes 12, 13 and 14.
[17] Supra note 5.
[18] Rollo, p. 237; Meneses Rejoinder before the Labor Arbiter, Annex F.
[19] Supra note 7.
[20] Supra note 3.
[21] Supra note 1.
[22] Rollo, pp. 242-269.
[23]
[24] Supra notes 12, 13 and 14.
[25] Rollo,
pp. 221-230; filed on
[26]
[27] Supra note 5.
[28] Supra note 18.
[29] Rollo, pp. 320-321; Meneses Memorandum, pp. 8-9, par. 29.
[30] Supra note 6.
[31] Supra note 13.
[32] Supra note 6.
[33] Supra note 13.
[34] Supra note 14.
[35] G.R. No. 155421,
[36]
[37] Supra note 5.
[38] Supra note 18.
[39] 373 Phil. 179 (1999).
[40] Supra note 1, at 14; Petition, p. 12, par. 17.
[41] Aguilar
v. Burger Machine Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 172062,
[42]
[43] LABOR CODE, Article III; Implementing Rules & Regulations, Book III, Rule VIII; and CIVIL CODE, Article 2208, (1) and (7).
[44] Supra note 7, at 114.
[45] 227 Phil. 64 (1986).
[46] Supra note 8, at 89.