FIRST
DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R.
No. 178321 Present: Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: October 5, 2011 |
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VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellants
conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal
Case No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was
charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of
Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,[2]
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th
day of June,
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the
crime of rape of AAA.[3] The second Information,[4]
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That
on or about the 6th day of June,
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges. The two cases were thereafter tried
jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The
prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19
years old at the time of the incident.
Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard
Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA
testified that at around
When AAA
regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her uncles
farm at daybreak on
During
cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when
appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by
affinity. She said that she never
thought he would harm them.[9]
BBB
testified that on
CCC,
neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after
Meanwhile,
Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the
the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are swollen; desquamation and bursting of bullae and denudation of the epidermis in the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots coming from the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of wounds, three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at the chest of the victim[.]
cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab wounds [in] the head and trunk.[13]
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the
testimony of Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifers mother, as to the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent P25,000 for Jennifers
funeral and burial.[14]
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against
him. Appellant testified that he was at
home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay,
Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around
Appellant
further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever
they would ask for rice or money. He claimed
that in the evening of
The
defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went
to appellants house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock in the afternoon,
and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled
seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncles house about seven times because AAA
and his uncle had an illicit affair. He further
testified that appellant arrived before
After
trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision[18]
on
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Appellant
appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our pronouncement
in People v. Mateo,[20]
the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the instant
Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.[21]
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs
affirmance of his conviction for both crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution[22]
dated
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[23]
Appellant
asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
for the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of AAA. He assails AAAs credibility, the
prosecutions main witness, and points out alleged inconsistencies in her
testimony. Appellant also contends that
the prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of
the crimes charged. According to him, AAAs
narration that he waylaid them while walking along the rice paddies on their
way to apply for work negates evident premeditation since there was no evidence
that the said path was their usual route.
Appellant further
contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse of
superior strength to be appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical
attributes of both the accused and the victim should have been shown in order
to determine whether the accused had the capacity to overcome the victim physically
or whether the victim was substantially weak and unable to put up a defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt upon AAAs
testimony, arguing that it lacked some details on how, after she was raped and
stabbed by appellant, she was still able to put on her clothes and crawl to her
grandfathers farm.
The
appeal lacks merit.
Appellant
principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of
credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the
trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while
testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts[24]
and absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the
trial courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally
bound by the formers findings, particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have affected the outcome of the case.[25] This rule is even more stringently applied
if the appellate court concurred with the trial court.[26]
Here,
both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to
the testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing and was herself
brutally attacked by appellant who also raped her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently
weighty reasons for us to
disturb the trial courts evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness credibility.
In particular, we defer to the trial
courts firsthand observations on AAAs deportment while testifying and its veritable
assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From
the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to discern in her the
trepidations of a woman outraged who is about to recount the ordeal she had
gone through. She took her oath with
trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her eyes
were constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with the man
she was about to testify against. After
a few questions in direct, the emotion building up inside her came to the fore
and she burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further with her
testimony. Thus, in deference to her
agitated situation, this Court has to defer her direct-examination. When she
came back, however, to continue with her aborted questioning, this time,
composed and collected, direct and straightforward in her narration, all
vestiges of doubt on her credibility vanished.[27]
Indeed,
records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she took the witness
stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut short her initial direct
examination. However, during the next hearing she was able to narrate her
harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward manner, describing in detail
how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit and attacked her and Jennifer with
a lead pipe and ice pick before raping her. We quote the pertinent portions of
her testimony:
Q: During your previous
testimony, Madam Witness, you said that youre not able to reach your place of work
on
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?
A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
x x x x
Q: Where were you when you were hit?
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by Conrado Laog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?
A: He was beside me, sir.
Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
Q: Then, what happened next?
A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.
Q: And what happened to Jennifer?
A: She fell down, sir.
Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?
A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
A: He came back to me, sir.
Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.
Q: And what happened to you?
A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.
Q: Then, what happened to you?
A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty and my blouse and my bra.
Q: After that, what did he do next?
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
Q: Then, what happened?
A: He sucked my breast, sir.
Q: And after that?
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: After that, he stood up, sir.
Q: And where did he go?
A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did you do?
A: I fell unconscious, sir.
Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing
an inmates uniform and when asked his name, answered: Conrado Laog.
x x x x[28]
On the other hand, appellant merely
interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with his
children and nephew cooking dinner. His
defense, however, cannot prevail over the straightforward and credible
testimony of AAA who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the murder
and rape. Time and again, we have held that
positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[29]
AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as the one who attacked her
and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant
well since they were relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAAs
familiarity and proximity with the appellant during the commission of the
crime, her identification of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon encountering appellant, did
not run away as she never thought her own uncle would harm her and her
friend. Moreover, the most natural
reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the
perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being
committed.[30] There is no evidence to show any improper
motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or to falsely
implicate him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is
that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[31]
In
People v. Nieto,[32]
we reiterated that --
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was
near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of
In view of
the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of denial
and alibi deserve no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot
stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape
victim.[33]
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by
pointing out that while she testified on being very weak that she even passed
out after she was raped by appellant, she nevertheless stated that when she
crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution should have presented the
physician who examined AAA to prove her allegations that she was beaten and
raped by appellant.
We are not
persuaded.
Based on
AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse and bra
were merely lifted up (nililis)
while her undergarments were just pulled down, which therefore explains why she
still had her clothes on when she crawled to her grandfathers farm. Nonetheless,
this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with
the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies
referring only to minor details and collateral matters -- not to the central
fact of the crime -- do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential
credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as these are coherent and
intrinsically believable on the whole.[34]
For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve
as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the
appellant for the crime charged.[35]
It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not
diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.[36]
As to the fact
that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during the
trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be
underscored that the foremost consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone,
if credible, is sufficient to convict.[37] Thus we have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as
well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is
not an indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of
private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,[38]
as what we find in this case.
While
we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the one
who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted
of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire
case for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties.[39] The facts alleged and proven clearly show
that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex
crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.[40]
In
People v. Larraaga,[41]
this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;[] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped on the occasion and in connection with her detention and was killed subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof. Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. x x x[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more
properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the
case of People v. Barros,[43] explained that composite crimes are
neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes
in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a
single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound
crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit
another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes
and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a
single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed
of two or more offenses.[44]
Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single
penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able
to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by
appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed
Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to
run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of
AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated,
appellant purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with
Jennifers body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby.
Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough
to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellants barbaric
deeds were soon enough discovered.
The
facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide
were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone
other than the woman victim of the rape.
An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with
homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other
offenses have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon,[45]
we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.[46] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.[47]
Hence, even if any or all
of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery
with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as
a generic aggravating circumstance only.
Thus we ruled in People v.
Macabales[48]
Finally, appellants
contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present.
They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to
crimes against property. However, we
find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a
generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in
defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was
stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions
surrounded them. In People v.
Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains
in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be
regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and
special penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
There is no special complex crime
of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part
of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex
crime. Logically it could not qualify
the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps
determine the penalty to be imposed.[49]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever
there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor
that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely
selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.[50] It is taken into account whenever the
aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the person attacked.[51]
In
this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the
head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had
brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with
a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly,
unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellants sudden attack caught the victim off-guard rendering her defenseless.[52]
Abuse
of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating
circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty
provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on
The
aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of
deadly weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case
is concerned. While the trial court and
CA were correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and
the rape victim (AAA) are entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis
for such award needs further clarification.
Articles
2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the
killing of Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to
Article 2230. With respect to the rape
committed against AAA, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through
force, threat or intimidation under Article 266-A (a), whenever such rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death. Since the use of a deadly
weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this circumstance would justify the
award of exemplary damages to the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with
Article 2230.
Article
266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances
enumerated therein. Among these
circumstances is minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of
the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAAs
relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the
information but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
x x x x
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
Q How
are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So
she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes,
sir.
x x x x[54] (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information
AAAs relationship to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said
circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In any case, even
without the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may
still be awarded where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. Citing our earlier ruling in the case of People v. Catubig,[55]
this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay[56]:
Prior to the effectivity of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages
in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even
if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the
aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules,
courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven
in the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if
an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will
not award exemplary damages. Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110:
x x x x
Nevertheless, People
v. Catubig laid down the
principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the
aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been
alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the
effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive
application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights
of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of
jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized:
one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was
consequently proven in the light of Catubig;
and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has
both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the
first set are People v. Laciste,
People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v.
Magbanua, People of the Philippines
v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People
of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set
are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin
y Par, and People of the
x x x x
Nevertheless, by focusing only
on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damagestaking
into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary
damages are awarded. Catubig is
enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong
doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but
not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use
of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation
suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for
the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraudthat intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case,
these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down
the very basis of the award. Thus, in People
v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers
with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral
corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a
pregnant married woman. Recently, in People
of the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People
of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to
set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, [t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a public example or correction for the public good.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)
In
this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design
against his niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle would do
any harm to her and her friend, justified the award of exemplary damages. Appellants sudden and fierce attack on AAA
-- hitting her several times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her
face until she fell down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down
her undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless position,
covering her body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field --
was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even more
reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more stab wounds
and beatings, causing her violent death.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the award of
exemplary damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow
the courts to forestall behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences
to society.[58] In line with current jurisprudence, the
amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of Jennifer as exemplary
damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also
affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages
is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.[59]
Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased to P75,000 to conform
with recent jurisprudence.[60] As to expenses incurred for the funeral and
burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount of P25,000
as actual damages, said amount having been stipulated by the parties during the
trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000
to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape, as well as the award of P50,000
as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding
of the fact of rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.[61]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
March 21, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay
the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral
damages, P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages. He is further ordered to pay to
the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral
damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson |
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
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RENATO
C. CORONA Chief Justice |
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[1] Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Sesinando E. Villon concurring.
[2] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
[3] Consistent with our decision in People
v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
[4] Records, Vol. II, p. 1.
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10] TSN,
[11]
[12] TSN,
[13] TSN,
[14] CA rollo, p. 31.
[15] TSN,
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18] CA rollo, pp. 29-33.
[19]
[20] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[21] Rollo, p. 15.
[22]
[23] CA
rollo, p. 70.
[24] People v. Nieto, G.R.
No. 177756,
[25] People v. Dominguez, Jr., G.R. No.
180914,
[26]
[27] CA rollo, pp. 31-32.
[28] TSN,
[29] People v. Caada, G.R. No. 175317,
[30] People v. Honra, Jr., G.R. Nos. 136012-16, September 26, 2000, 341 SCRA 110, 127, citing People v. Pulusan, G.R. No. 110037, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 353, 372.
[31] See
People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724,
[32] Supra note 24 at 527-528.
[33] People
v. Orande, G.R. Nos. 141724-27,
[34] People v. Suarez, G.R. Nos. 153573-76,
[35] People v. Villarino, G.R. No. 185012, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 372, 387, citing People v. Masapol, G.R. No. 121997, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 371, 377.
[36] People v. Wasit, G.R. No. 182454,
[37] People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 655, 663, citing People v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. 176742, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 682, 700-701.
[38] People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 188855, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 672, 688, citing People v. Arivan, G.R. No. 176065, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 448, 468-469.
[39] People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570,
[40] The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on
[41] G.R. Nos. 138874-75,
[42]
[43] G.R. Nos. 101107-08,
[44]
[45] G.R. No. 179943,
[46] Id. at 192-193, citing People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 67; People v. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569, 582; People v. Ponciano, G.R. No. 86453, December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627, 639; and People v. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil. 992, 999 (1956).
[47] People v. Nanas, G.R. No. 137299, August 21, 2001, 363 SCRA 452, 469-470, citing People v. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546, 564 and People v. Sequio, G.R. No. 117397, November 13, 1996, 264 SCRA 79, 101.
[48] G.R. No. 111102,
[49]
[50] See People v. Beduya, G.R. No.
175315,
[51]
[52] Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[53] People v. Villarino, supra note 35 at 389.
[54] TSN,
[55] G.R. No. 137842,
[56] G.R. No. 188106,
[57]
[58] People v. Villarino, supra note 35 at 390.
[59] People
v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343,
[60] People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 180915,
[61] Supra note 38 at 475.