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DECISION
SERENO,
J.:
Before us are
consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision[1]
promulgated on
The Facts
In the early 1950s, retired Justice
Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifanio
On
An arcade is defined as any portion of a
building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first
storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.[5]
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant
property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of
5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side of
At the outset, it bears emphasis that at
the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no
building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the
construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units.
Under this particular ordinance, the city
council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of
the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to
construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a
space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish
the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it
for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times.
On
The ordinance covered the property of
Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the
application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an
arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted
favorably on Justice
Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the
condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within
reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when
public interest so demands.[6]
Decades after, in March 2003, the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear
obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila
Councils (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002.[7]
The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to clear the
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in
Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.[8]
On
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the
notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to
demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the
ground floor structure. The records of the present case are not entirely clear on
the extent of the demolition; nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not
disputed. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the building
was being used as a restaurant.
On
The City Government of Quezon City
claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the
use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice
Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice
Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already
violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality.
It further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding
the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely
implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.[13]
The RTC rendered its Decision on
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares Quezon City Ordinance
No. 2094,[15]
Series of 1956 to be unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. The respondents are hereby permanently enjoined from
enforcing and implementing the said ordinance, and the respondent MMDA is
hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of the party wall or wing
wall of the building of the petitioner it destroyed to its original condition.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision
of the trial court. On
Even
with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his
commercial lot, appellee still retains the beneficial ownership of the said
property. Thus, there is no taking for public use which must be subject to
just compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good,
for providing safety and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the
same still redounds to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the
forefront of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded sidewalks, by their
nature, assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat some kind of
protection from accidents and other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of
protection can be a boon to the business activity therein engaged. [17]
Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA
went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found
that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys,
bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice
Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed
with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances. Thus, the
dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the
appeals are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
1) The
validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,[18]
Series of 1956, issued by the City Council of Quezon City, is UPHELD; and
2) The
injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
This ruling prompted the MMDA and
Justice Gancayco to file their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration.[19]
On
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA,
Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed their respective Petitions for Review
before this Court. The issues raised by the parties are summarized as follows:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE
GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT
ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE WING
WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA
LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.
The
Courts Ruling
Estoppel
The MMDA and the City Government of
Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was estopped from challenging the
ordinance, because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of
the ordinance. According to them,
Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government to
regulate the construction of buildings.
To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned
the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1) whether the
ordinance takes private property without due process of law and just
compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of
rights because it allowed exemptions from its application.
On the first ground, we find that
Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to
determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a taking of private
property without due process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003
when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a
portion of the building. Because he was granted an exemption in 1966, there was
no taking yet to speak of.
Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21]
we held:
It is
therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact
that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor
in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said
imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of
respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires
acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null and
void and cannot be given any effect. The
doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise
null and void or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,[22]
we likewise held:
We
find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking
to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as
valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act.
Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to comply with,
and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only later on
filing the subject case praying for the declaration of its unconstitutionality
when the circumstances change and the law results in what it perceives to be
unlawful discrimination. The mere fact
that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner
estopped from assailing its validity. For
courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it
in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has
not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be
raised later. (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the second ground, we find that Justice
Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when
he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco
himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in
1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the
exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from
the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its
different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated,
Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.
Zoning
and the regulation of the
construction of buildings are valid
exercises of police power .
In MMDA
v. Bel-Air Village Association,[23] we discussed the nature of police
powers exercised by local government units, to
wit:
Police
power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects
of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching
and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and
the general welfare.
It bears
stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power
to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body.
To resolve the issue on the
constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether there was a
valid delegation of police power. Then we can determine whether the City Government
of Quezon City acted within the limits of the delegation.
It is clear that Congress expressly
granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue
of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon
City,[24]
which states:
To
make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and
for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such
lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the
provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
Specifically, on the powers of the city
government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also
expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds
of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the
manner of constructing and repairing them.[25]
With regard meanwhile to the power of
the local government units to issue zoning ordinances, we apply Social Justice Society v. Atienza.[26]
In that case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
In the
exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable
and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to
protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable
relation to the end in view.
The means
adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which
reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to
commercial. A zoning ordinance is
defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a result of the
zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their
present location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential
uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the
protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of
In Carlos
Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[27]
we also held:
For this
reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to
promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating
the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis
for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law
has in its favor. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, it is clear that the
primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the
questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and
safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and
the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the
convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the
sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of
Corollarily, the policy of the Building
Code,[28]
which was passed after the Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment
of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states:
Section
102. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with
the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end,
make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a
framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their
location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and
maintenance.
Section 1004 likewise requires the
construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently,
the law allows the local government units to determine whether arcades are
necessary within their respective jurisdictions.
Justice Gancayco argues that there is a
three-meter sidewalk in front of his property line, and the arcade should be
constructed above that sidewalk rather than within his property line. We do not
need to address this argument inasmuch as it raises the issue of the wisdom of
the city ordinance, a matter we will not and need not delve into.
To reiterate, at the time that the
ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the
city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the
city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and
sidewalks in their jurisdiction.
The wing
walls of the building are not
nuisances
per se.
The MMDA
claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se.
We disagree.
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice
Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the
wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do
not per se immediately and adversely
affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may
declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a
nuisance.
Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the
health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the
free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per
se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and
may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.[29]
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit
to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not
consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety
of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily
demolishing the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a
thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a
thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v.
Frabelle Properties Corp.,[30]
we held:
We agree
with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod
is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and
other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang
Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing
is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not
such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.
If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that
question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
(Emphasis supplied.)
MMDA
illegally demolished
the
property of Justice Gancayco.
MMDA alleges that by virtue of
MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice
Gancaycos property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the
MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues,
alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal
structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property
pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.
However, the Building Code clearly provides the
process by which a building may be demolished. The authority to order the
demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent
provisions of the Building Code provide:
SECTION
205. Building Officials.
Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building Official shall be responsible
for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well as the
enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto.
Due
to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public
Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as
Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.
The
designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until
regular positions of Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated
for causes provided by law or decree.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION
207. Duties of a Building
Official. In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the Building Official
shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this
Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He
is the official charged with the duties of issuing building permits.
In
the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or
its premises at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with
the requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the
building permit as issued.
When any building work is found to be contrary
to the provisions of this Code, the Building Official may order the work
stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed
to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order the
discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion
thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION
215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any building or structure is
found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order
its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life,
health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be
taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of
the
MMDA v.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.[31] is
applicable to the case at bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its charter and the
Building Code, summarily dismantled the advertising media installed on the Metro
Rail Transit (MRT) 3. This Court held:
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its
legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks' billboards, signages
and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle,
remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media
installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the
Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited to the
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration.
Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power.
Clarifying
the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:
...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and
the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services
in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan
The MMDA
shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of
local government units concerning purely local matters.
The Court
also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages
and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and
display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to
public areas, but MRT3, being private
property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not
one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages
and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover
MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the
center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not
have included MRT3 in its prohibition.
MMDA's
insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its implementing
rules and regulations is not persuasive. The
power to enforce the provisions of the Building
Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not
in MMDA, considering the law's following provision, thus:
Sec. 201.
Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. -
The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the
imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested
in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications,
hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary."
There is also no evidence showing
that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance
No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings
in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine of
not more than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more
than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court,
Provided, that if the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, or
any juridical entity, the Manager, managing partner, or any person charged with
the management thereof shall be held responsible therefor. The ordinance itself
also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether
there was a violation of the ordinance.
As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the
power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot supplement the provisions of Quezon
City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28.
Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of
Quezon City may be considered to have approved the demolition of the structure,
simply because then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R.
Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In
effect, the city government delegated these powers to the MMDA. The
powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and
abate a nuisance[32]
and to further impose the penalty of removal or
demolition of the building or structure by the owner or by the city at the
expense of the owner.[33]
MMDAs argument does not hold water.
There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim of
the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of
the former. In its Answer,[34]
the city government stated that the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only,
without the participation and/or consent of
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On official leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On official leave)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
No
Part
JOSE C. MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L.
REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA
M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
* On
official leave.
** On sick leave.
[1] Penned by Associate
Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring, rollo (G.R.
No. 177807), pp. 58-79.
[2] Penned by
Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, with Associate Justices Bienvenido L.
Reyes and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring, id. at 81-83.
[3] Formerly
808 Highway 54.
[4]
Rollo (G.R.
No. 177933), pp. 29-31.
[5] Definitions, Annex
A,
[6]
Rollo
(G.R. No. 177933), p. 32.
[7]
[8]
[9] Presidential Decree No.
1096.
[10]
Rollo (G.R.
No. 177933), p. 38.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Note that the
questioned ordinance is Ordinance No. 2904.
[16]
Rollo
(G.R. No. 177933), pp. 86-107.
[17]
[18] Note that the
questioned ordinance is Ordinance No. 2904.
[19]
[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 177807), pp. 81-83.
[21]385 Phil. 956, 978.
[22] G.R. No. 163583,
[23]385 Phil. 586, 601-602.
[24] Enacted on
[25] Sec. 12 (j).
[26] G.R. No. 156502,
[27] G.R.
No. 166494,
[28]
Presidential Decree No. 1096.
[29]
Telmo v. Bustamante,
G.R. No. 182567,
[30] G.R.
No. 166744,
[31] G.R.
No. 179554,
[32] Sec. 12(w).
[33] Sec. 12(jj).
[34]
Rollo
(G.R. No. 177933) pp. 249-270.