Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
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CARMELITO N.
VALENZONA, |
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G.R. No. 176884 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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BERSAMIN, |
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DEL CASTILLO, and |
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FAIR SHIPPING
CORPORATION |
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VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
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and/or SEJIN LINES
COMPANY |
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LIMITED, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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October 19, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Permanent disability refers to the
inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of
whether he loses the use of any part of his body. What determines petitioners entitlement to
permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days.[1] On the other hand, [p]ermanent total
disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of
work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment
could do. It does not mean absolute
helplessness.[2]
This Petition
for Review on Certiorari assails the
January 17, 2007 Decision[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96303 which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
filed by petitioner Carmelito N. Valenzona (petitioner). Also assailed is the February 28, 2007
Resolution[4]
denying the motion for reconsideration.
Factual
Antecedents
On May 5, 2001, respondent Fair
Shipping Corporation, for and on behalf of its principal, respondent Sejin
Lines Company Limited, hired petitioner as 2nd Assistant Engineer
aboard its vessel M/V Morelos for a duration of nine months.[5]
Before his embarkation on May 23, 2001,[6]
he was declared medically fit to work.[7]
However, while aboard the vessel on
September 29, 2001, petitioner complained of chest pain.[8] He was thus brought to Centro Medico
Quirurgico Echauri in Mexico where he was confined up to October 6, 2001
and diagnosed with hypertensive crisis, high blood pressure.[9]
A day after his repatriation to the
Philippines on October 8, 2001,[10]
petitioner was examined by Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), the
company-designated physician who diagnosed his illness as hypertension.[11]
Dr. Cruz continuously treated petitioner for six months, i.e., from
October 9, 2001 until April 25, 2002.[12]
On April 18, 2002, however,
petitioner consulted another doctor, a certain Dr. Mapapala at the Jose Reyes
Memorial Medical Center who diagnosed him with Hypertensive Cardiovascular
Disease.[13] Considering his prolonged sickness,
petitioner, on April 18, 2002, through Atty. Anastacio P. Marcelo, wrote a
letter[14]
to respondents demanding payment of the balance of his sickness allowance and
permanent disability benefits. However,
same went unheeded.[15]
Thereafter, or on April 25, 2002,
Dr. Cruz issued a certification declaring petitioner as fit to work.[16]
Unconvinced, on April 27, 2002,
petitioner consulted Dr. Rodrigo F. Guanlao, an Internist-Cardiologist at the
Philippine Heart Center who diagnosed him with Ischemic heart disease,
Hypertensive cardiovascular disease and congestive heart failure and also
declared him unfit to work in any capacity.[17]
Hence, petitioner filed a complaint
for recovery of disability benefits, sickness allowance, attorney's fees and
moral damages.[18]
Ruling
of the Labor Arbiter
On January 31, 2003, the Labor
Arbiter[19]
rendered a Decision[20]
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents in solidum to pay
complainant in peso equivalent, the following amount:
1.
P21,581.39 as the balance of his
sickness allowance; and
2.
US$809.00
his one (1) month pay as penalty.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The Labor Arbiter awarded sickness
allowance to petitioner equivalent to four months of his basic wage[22]
pursuant to the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels[23]
(or the POEAs[24] Standard
Employment Contract) and petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).[25] Records
however showed that petitioner already received partial payment of his sickness
allowance, hence he is entitled only to the remaining balance of P21,581.39.[26]
Anent petitioner's claim for
disability benefits, the Labor Arbiter opined that he is not entitled thereto
because under the CBA, said benefits can be claimed only for disability
resulting from accidents and not due to illness.[27] The Labor Arbiter also held that even under
the POEA Standard Employment Contract, particularly Section 20, paragraph B
thereof, petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits since he was
declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. Corollarily, the Labor Arbiter found the
assessment of Dr. Cruz deserving of more credence than the assessments of the private
physicians consulted by petitioner because the former treated petitioner more
extensively.[28] Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter noted that
respondents failed to deploy petitioner even after he was declared fit to work;
thus, the respondents were ordered to pay petitioner his one-month salary as
penalty therefor.[29]
Ruling
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Both parties
filed their appeal to the NLRC. On May
26, 2006, the NLRC rendered its Decision[30]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, complainant's appeal is
dismissed for lack of merit. On the
other hand, respondents' appeal is granted.
The Labor Arbiter's award of P21,581.39 by way of balance of the
sickness allowance is deleted as the same had been extinguished by payment,
while the award of US$809.00 as a penalty is set aside for lack of factual and
legal basis.
SO
ORDERED.[31]
The NLRC affirmed the findings of
the Labor Arbiter that petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits
because the CBA provision awarding the same refers to permanent disability
suffered by the seafarer resulting from an accident and not from an illness.[32] As such, the NLRC found as irrelevant the
issue of whether the company-designated physician's assessment of petitioner's
disability deserves credence.[33]
As regards the sickness allowance, the NLRC noted that during the
pendency of the case, respondents had already paid the remaining amount of P21,581.39. Consequently, respondents' obligation to pay
the same had been extinguished.[34]
Anent the amount of US$809.00 imposed upon the respondents as penalty
for their failure to re-deploy petitioner, the NLRC ruled that the same is
without factual and legal basis. The
NLRC held that petitioner is a contractual employee; consequently, after the
expiration of his contract, the respondents were not duty-bound to deploy him
absent a new contract.[35]
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration[36] but same was
denied in the Resolution[37]
dated July 31, 2006. Petitioner thus
filed a Petition for Certiorari[38]
with the CA.
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
On January 17, 2007, the CA rendered
its Decision[39] denying
the petition and affirming the Decision of the NLRC. The CA concurred with the findings of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that petitioner is not entitled to disability
benefits under the CBA as the same referred to disabilities caused by accidents
and not by illness.[40] The CA further ruled that even under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract, petitioner is still not entitled to disability
benefits because he was declared fit to work by the company-designated
physician.[41] The CA found the evaluation of Dr. Cruz more
accurate since he treated petitioner for more than six months[42]
whereas the physicians consulted by petitioner examined him for only one day.
The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE
COURSE. The decision of the NLRC is
AFFIRMED.[43]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[44]
but same was denied in the Resolution[45]
dated February 28, 2007.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue
The
main issue raised by both parties is whether petitioner is entitled to receive
permanent disability benefits as well as attorneys fees.
The parties' arguments.
Petitioner insists that
he is entitled to permanent disability benefits because he was declared unfit
to work by his private physicians who are expert cardiologist vis--vis Dr.
Cruz who is a general and cancer specialist.[46] More significantly, he claims that the
assessment of Dr. Cruz that he is fit to work was issued after the lapse of 120
days from the date of his repatriation, as such his disability is considered
total and permanent.[47]
On the other hand,
respondents argue that petitioner is not entitled to receive permanent
disability benefits because he was assessed fit to work by the
company-designated physician[48]
whose evaluation is more accurate because he treated petitioner for more than
six months.[49] Respondents also claim that the mere fact
that he was unable to work for more than 120 days does not automatically
entitle him to total permanent disability benefits.[50] They argue that the duration of disability is
not relevant for purposes of determining disability benefits[51]
and that petitioners degree of disability and amount of disability benefits
should be based on the Schedule of Disability under Section 32 of the POEA
contract[52] as
assessed by the doctor and not by the mere lapse of 120 days.[53]
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner is entitled to permanent disability benefits.
a)
The certification by
the company-designated physician that petitioner is fit to work was issued
after 199 days or more than 120 days from the time he was medically repatriated
to the Philippines.
Petitioners Employment Contract[54]
specifically provides that the same shall be deemed an integral part of the
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On
Board Ocean-Going Vessels otherwise known as the POEA Standard Employment
Contract. Section 20(B) of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract provides:
B. COMPENSATION AND
BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
x x x x
3. Upon sign-off from
the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated
physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120)
days.
x x x x
The Labor Code's provision on
permanent total disability applies with equal force to seafarers.[55] Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code
provides, viz;
Art. 192. Permanent total disability. - x x x
x
x x x
(c)
The
following disabilities shall be deemed total
and permanent:
(1)
Temporary
total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days,
except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;
x x x x[56]
Thus, in Quitoriano
v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc.,[57] we held that:
Thus, Court has applied the Labor Code
concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. x x x
x
x x x
There
are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D.
No. 626: (1) temporary total disability,
(2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. Section
2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code
differentiates the disabilities as follows:
Sec. 2. Disability.
- (a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness
the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation
for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided
for in Rule X of these Rules.
(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a
result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise
provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a
result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss
of the use of any part of his body.
In
Vicente v. ECC (G.R. No. 85024, January 23, 1991, 193 SCRA 190, 195):
x x x the test of whether or not
an employee suffers from 'permanent total disability' is a showing of the
capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the
disability he
incurred. Thus, if by reason of the
injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his
customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage
of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in more
detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then
the said employee undoubtedly suffers from 'permanent total disability' regardless
of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
A
total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or
totally paralyzed. What is necessary is
that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and
earn therefrom (Austria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146636, Aug. 12,
2002, 387 SCRA 216, 221). On the other
hand, a total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for
more than 120 days. Thus, in the very recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc.
v. Natividad (G.R. No. 134028, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 268, 270-271),
we held:
Permanent
disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he lose[s] the use of any part of his body. x x x
Total
disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainments could do. It does not mean
absolute helplessness. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.[58]
In Quitoriano, the seafarer
therein was medically repatriated to the Philippines on May 30, 2001[59]
and upon arrival, he underwent several tests at the Medical Center Manila under
the care of Dr. Cruz, the company-designated physician,[60]
who incidentally is the same Dr. Cruz who treated petitioner in the instant
case. After a lapse of 169 days from his
repatriation, or on November 16, 2001, Dr. Cruz declared the seafarer therein
fit to work.[61] Unconvinced, the seafarer consulted an
independent internist-cardiologist who diagnosed him as suffering from
hypertension cardiovascular disease and hyperlipidemia.[62] The seafarer thus demanded from the shipping
company payment of his permanent disability benefits but he was rebuffed on the
ground that he was declared fit to work by Dr. Cruz.[63] The seafarer thus filed a complaint to
recover his permanent disability benefits and attorney's fees. The case
eventually reached this Court raising the issue of whether the CA erred in not
finding the disability of the seafarer as permanent and total and for not
awarding him attorney's fees.[64] The Court ruled in favor of the seafarer
holding that the fact that it was only
on November 16, 2001 that the 'fit to
work' certification was issued by Dr. Cruz or more than five months from the
time petitioner was medically repatriated on May 30, 2001, petitioner's
disability is considered permanent and total.[65]
The ruling in Quitoriano
applies in the instant case.
Similarly, petitioner herein was medically repatriated to the
Philippines on October 8, 2001. However,
it was only on April 25, 2002 or after a lapse of 199 days that Dr. Cruz issued
a certification declaring him fit to work. Thus, we declare herein, just as we
pronounced in Quitoriano, that petitioners disability is considered permanent
and total because the fit to work certification was issued by Dr.
Cruz only on April 25, 2002, or more than 120 days after he was medically
repatriated on October 8, 2001.
b)
The company-designated
physicians certification that petitioner is fit to work does not make him
ineligible for permanent total disability benefits.
We find no merit in respondents'
contention that the company-designated physician's assessment that petitioner
is fit to work makes him ineligible to claim permanent disability benefits.[66] This issue has already been raised, and
rebuffed, in United Philippine Lines, Inc. v. Beseril.[67]
Petitioners therein argued
that the provisions on disability benefits operate only upon certification by
the company-designated physician that the claiming seafarer is indeed disabled,
hence, respondent is not eligible for an award of disability benefits as 'he
was certified fit for sea duty after the conduct of the last medical
examination'.[68] However, this line of argument was
resoundingly rebuffed by the Court, thus:
But even
in the absence of an official finding by the company-designated physicians that
respondent is unfit for sea duty, respondent is deemed to have suffered
permanent disability. Permanent disability is the inability of a
worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether he
loses the use of any part of his body.
It is undisputed that from the time respondent suffered a heart attack
on December 5, 1997, he was unable to work for more than 120 days, his cardiac
rehabilitation and physical therapy having ended only on May 28, 1998.
That respondent was found to be 'fit to
return to work' by Clinica Manila (where he underwent regular cardiac
rehabilitation program and physical therapy from January 15 to May 28, 1998
under UPL's account) on September 22, 1998 or a few months after his
rehabilitation does not matter. x x x[69]
Considering the circumstances prevailing in the instant case, we likewise
rule that it does not matter that the
company-designated physician assessed petitioner as fit to work. It is undisputed that from the time
petitioner was repatriated on October 8, 2001, he was unable to work for more
than 120 days as he was only certified fit to work on April 25, 2002. Consequently, petitioner's disability is
considered permanent and total.[70] In fact, from his repatriation until the
filing of his petition before this Court on March 21, 2007,[71]
or for more than five years, petitioner claims that he was unable to resume his
job as a seaman[72] which thus
strongly indicates that his disability is permanent and total. Also, we note that the certification was
issued only after petitioner consulted a private physician (Dr. Mapapala) and
after he formally demanded from the respondents, through his lawyer, the
payment of his sickness allowance, disability benefits and attorney's
fees.
Consequently,
we find it irrelevant to discuss at this juncture as to which prognosis, that
of Dr. Cruz or petitioner's private physicians', is more accurate.
The case of Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent. Inc. is
not in point.
The
CA[73]
erroneously applied Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent. Inc.[74]
in ruling that petitioner is no longer entitled to claim disability
benefits since he was declared fit to work by Dr. Cruz. The factual circumstances in Sarocam completely
differ from the instant case. In Sarocam,
the seafarer therein was declared fit to work by the company-designated
physician after a lapse of only 13 days from the date of his repatriation[75]
hence way before the lapse of the 120-day mark.
Moreover, the seafarer therein executed a release and quitclaim in favor
of his employers acknowledging receipt of his sickness benefits wages and
freeing his employers of any liability.[76]
The amount of
permanent disability benefits.
In his Petition, petitioner claims
for disability benefits in the amount of US$80,000.00 pursuant to the CBA.[77]
In his Memorandum, however, he concedes that the CBA provision does not apply[78]
and now claims for only US$60,000.00 as disability benefits pursuant to the
POEA Standard Employment Contract.
Indeed, the CBA provision does not
apply as the same refers to disability arising from accidents and not due to
illness as in the case of petitioner. The
pertinent CBA provision reads:
Sec. I: A seafarer who suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident,
regardless of fault but excluding injuries caused by a seafarer's willful act,
whilst in the employment of the Company including accidents occurring while
travelling to or from the Ship, and whose ability to work is reduced as a
result thereof, shall in addition to sick pay be entitled to compensation
according to the provisions of this agreement.
The copy/ies of the medical certificate and other relevant medical
reports shall be made available by the Company to the seafarer.[79]
On the other hand, the POEA Standard
Employment Contract particularly Section 20(B) (6) thereof provides, to wit:
6. In case of permanent
total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness
the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits
enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising
from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of
compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
In turn, Section 32 provides that for an impediment
considered as total and permanent, a disability allowance of US$60,000.00
(US$50,000.00 x 120%) is granted. Therefore, considering our earlier discussion
finding petitioners disability as permanent and total, he is then entitled to
receive disability benefits of US$60,000.00.
Petitioner
is entitled to attorneys fees.
Petitioner
alleges that he is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Article 2208 of the
Civil Code because he was forced to litigate to recover his wages.[80]
On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioners claim for attorneys
fees is without legal and factual basis.
We find for the petitioner. Circumstances show that he demanded from the
respondents the payment of his disability benefits but the same went
unheeded. Left with no other recourse,
petitioner filed the instant case to recover what is rightfully his under the
law. Plainly, he was compelled to
litigate due to respondent[s'] failure to satisfy his valid claim, [thus, he]
is x x x entitled to attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total award at
its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.[81]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The January 17, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its February 28, 2007
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 96303 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are held jointly and severally
liable to pay petitioner permanent and total disability benefits of US$60,000.00
and attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award, both at
its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Palisoc
v. Easways Marine, Inc., G.R. No. 152273, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 585,
596-597.
[2] Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 405
Phil. 487, 494 (2001).
[3] CA rollo, pp. 256-262; penned by
Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Vicente S.E. Veloso and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.
[4] Id. at 284-285.
[5] Contract of Employment, id. at 29.
[6] Petitioner's Position Paper, id. at 19. However, respondents averred that petitioner
boarded the vessel on May 21, 2001; see Respondents' Position Paper, id. at 47.
[7] See Certification dated May 3, 2001 of
Dr. Wilfredo Jose P. Arguelles, Jr., id. at 30.
[8] Petitioner's Position Paper, id. at 19-20.
[9] Id. at 37.
[10] Respondents' Position Paper, id. at 48.
[11] Respondents' Position Paper, id. at 48. See
also Certifications of Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz, id. at pp. 71 & 72.
[12] Respondents' Position Paper, id. at 48.
[13] Id. at 42.
[14] Id. at 44.
[15] Petitioner's Position Paper, id. at 20.
[16] See Certification of Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz
dated April 25, 2002, id. at 72.
[17] Id. at 43.
[18] Petitioner's Position Paper, id. at 17.
[19] Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D. Del
Rosario.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 146-156.
[21] Id. at 156.
[22] US$809.00; see Contract of Employment, id.
at 29.
[23] Particularly Section 20B thereof; see
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, id. at 150.
[24] Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.
[25] Petitioner is a union-member of AMOSUP
(Associated Marine Officers and Seaman's Union of the Philippines) which had an
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Japan's Seaman's Union (JSU);
see Decision of the Labor Arbiter, CA rollo,
p. 147; see also petitioner's Notice of Appeal with Memorandum of Appeal, id.
at 159.
[26] Decision of the Labor Arbiter, id. at 151.
[27] Decision of the Labor Arbiter, id. at 152-153. The CBA provision reads: Sec. I: A seafarer who suffers permanent disability
as a result of an accident, regardless of fault but excluding injuries caused
by a seafarer's willful act, whilst in the employment of the Company including
accidents occurring while travelling to or from the Ship, and whose ability to
work is reduced as a result thereof, shall in addition to sick pay be entitled
to compensation according to the provisions of this agreement. The copy/ies of the medical certificate and
other relevant medical reports shall be made available by the Company to the
seafarer. Id. at 206.
[28] Decision of the Labor Arbiter, id. at 154-156.
[29] Decision of the Labor Arbiter, id. at 156.
[30] Id. at 209-216; penned by Presiding
Commissioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. and concurred in by
Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L. Go.
[31] Id. at 215-216.
[32] Id. at 213-214.
[33] Id. at 214.
[34] Id. at 215.
[35] Id.
[36] Id. at 217-221.
[37] Id. at 223-225.
[38] Erroneously captioned as Petition for
Review on Certiorari, id. at 2-16.
[39] Id. at 256-262.
[40] Id. at 259.
[41] Id. at 259-261, citing Sarocam v.
Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises, G.R. No. 167813, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA
502.
[42] Id. at 261.
[43] Id.
[44] Id. at 264-270.
[45] Id. at 284-285.
[46] Rollo, p. 213.
[47] Id. at 224-225.
[48] Id. at 156-157.
[49] Id. at 161-162, 166, 173.
[50] Id. at 177.
[51] Id. at 182.
[52] Id. at 181.
[53] Id. at 186.
[54] CA rollo,
p. 29.
[55] Palisoc v. Easways Marine, Inc., supra note 1 at 592-594.
[56] Emphasis supplied.
[57] G.R. No. 179868, January 21, 2010, 610 SCRA
529.
[58] Id. at 534-536. Emphasis supplied.
[59] Id. at 531.
[60] Id.
[61] Id.
[62] Id. at 532.
[63] Id.
[64] Id. at 534.
[65] Id. at 536.
Emphasis supplied.
[66] Rollo, pp. 156-157.
[67] G.R. No. 165934, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA
248.
[68] Id. at 260.
[69] Id. at 262.
Emphasis supplied.
[70] Quitoriano v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., supra note 57 at 536.
[71] Rollo,
p. 3.
[72] Id. at 15.
[73] CA rollo, p. 261.
[74] G.R. No. 167813, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA
502.
[75] Id.
at 506.
[76] Id.
[77] Rollo,
p. 16.
[78] Id. at 225.
[79] CA rollo,
p. 206. Emphasis supplied.
[80] Rollo, p. 225.
[81] Quitoriano v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., supra note 57 at
537.