FIRST DIVISION
JHORIZALDY UY, Petitioner, -
versus - |
G.R. No. 174631 Present: CORONA,
C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. |
CENTRO CERAMICA CORPORATION AND/OR RAMONITA Y. SY and
MILAGROS U. GARCIA, Respondents. |
Promulgated: October 19, 2011 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule
45 assailing the Decision[1]
dated April 21, 2006 and Resolution[2]
dated September 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
88061. The CA annulled and set aside the
Decision[3]
dated July 29, 2004 rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC NCR CA No. 035557-03 which reversed the Labor Arbiters ruling that
petitioner was not illegally dismissed.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner
Jhorizaldy Uy was hired by respondent Centro Ceramica Corporation as full-time
sales executive on March 21, 1999 under probationary employment for six
months. He became a regular employee on
May 1, 2000 with monthly salary of P7,000.00 and P1,500.00
transportation allowance, plus commission.
On March 18, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the respondent company, its President Ramonita Y. Sy (Sy) and
Vice-President Milagros Uy-Garcia (Garcia).
Petitioner alleged that his predicament began when former
VP Garcia was rehired by respondent company in the last quarter of 2001. Certain incidents involving longtime clients
led to a strained working relationship between him and Garcia. On February 19, 2002 after their weekly sales
meeting, he was informed by his superior, Sales Supervisor Richard Agcaoili, that
he (petitioner) was to assume a new position in the marketing department, to
which he replied that he will think it over.
His friends had warned him to be careful saying mainit ka kay Ms. Garcia.
That same day, he was summoned by Sy and Garcia for a closed-door
meeting during which Sy informed him of the termination of his services due to
insubordination and advised him to turn over his samples and files
immediately. Sy even commented that member ka pa naman ng [S]ingles for [C]hrist
pero napakatigas naman ng ulo mo. On February 21, 2002, he was summoned again by Sy but prior to this
he was already informed by Agcaoili that the spouses Sy will give him all that
is due to him plus goodwill money to settle everything. However, during his meeting with Sy, he asked
for his termination paper and thereupon Sy told him that If thats what you
want I will give it to you. She added
that pag-isipan mo ang gagawin mo dahil
kilala mo naman kami we are powerful.[4]
Petitioner further narrated that on February 22, 2002, he
turned over company samples, accounts and receivables to Agcaoili. Thereafter, he did not report for work
anymore. But on March 6, 2002, an
employee of respondent company presented to him at his apartment the following
memorandum:
MEMO OF NOTICE OF CHARGES
MEMORANDUM:
TO: JHORIZALDY B. UY
FROM:
RAMONITA Y. SY
RE:
FAILURE TO MEET QUOTA FOR SALES EXECUTIVE
DATE:
February 21, 2002
Records show that you have failed to meet the
quota for sales executives, set for the period from 1999 to 2001 in violation
of your contract of employment.
In view of the foregoing, please explain in
writing within twenty[-]four (24) hours from receipt hereof, why the company
should not terminate your contract of employment.[5]
He did not receive said memo because
it was not written on the company stationery and besides he had already been
dismissed. As to his alleged low output,
he was surprised considering that last January 2002, he was informed by
Agcaoili that management was satisfied with his performance and he ranked
second to the top performer, Edwin I. Hirang.
By that time, all of the sales people of the company could not meet the P1.5
Million sales quota, so respondents are clearly zeroing in on him.
Finally,
on March 13, 2002, respondents sent him another memo, which reads:
MEMO OF NOTICE OF CHARGES
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 2:
TO: JHORIZALDY B. UY
THRU:
RICHARD B. AGCAOILI
FROM:
RAMONITA Y. SY
RE: NOTICE OF CHARGE OF ABSENCE
WITHOUT LEAVE
DATE:
March 13, 2002
Records show that since February
22, 2002, to date, you have failed to report for work, without informing your
employer of the reason therefor and without securing proper leave in violation
of your contract of employment and existing company rules and regulations. Further, you have refused to receive any of
your monetary entitlements such as salary, commission and other amounts due to
you despite notice that the same are available to you for payment.
Further, to this date, you have not submitted
any explanation in writing in response to our Memo dated February 21, 2002,
requiring you to explain your failure to meet your quota as Sales Executive.
In view of the foregoing, please explain in
writing twenty four (24) hours from receipt hereof, why the company should not
terminate your contract of employment for serious violations of your employment
contract as indicated above.[6]
He referred the above letter to his
counsel who sent the following letter-reply:
MS. RAMONITA Y. SY
Centro Ceramica Corporation
225 EDSA, East Greenhills
Mandaluyong City
We
are writing you in behalf of Mr. Jhorizaldy B. Uy who used to be a Sales
Executive of your firm.
On February 19, 2002, you informed
him that from Sales Executive he was to assume a new position in the marketing
department. He refused and when he later
said that pag-iisipan ko pa you charged him with insubordination. Your Ms. Nita Garcia even lamented in this
wise single (for Christ) ka pa naman. Right then you terminated his services
and was directed to turn over everything that he had which was company owned
and it was on February 22, 2002 that the turn over was made.
On or about March 6, 2002 an
employee of your company saw him in his apartment giving him a memorandum to
explain his alleged failure to meet the quota as Sales Executive. He admits with c[a]ndor that he did not
receive the said memorandum because it was written not on the company stationary. Just the same the contents of the said letter
has bec[o]me irrelevant because he has been already dismissed as of February
19, 2002 and as regards the low output he says that all of the sales people
could not meet the quota and why zero in on him.
Then on Mach 13, 2002 you sent him
a memorandum to explain in writing within twenty four (24) hours why he should
not be dismissed for his alleged absence without leave.
You must have been advised by
someone that your dismissal of Mr. Uy on February 19, 2002 is doubly illegal,
i.e., for lack of due process and sufficient cause and the March 13, 2002
memorandum is to make up for such lapse so that if Mr. Uy files a case of
illegal dismissal, you can conveniently say that he violated his contract of
employment and that he was on absence without leave. Nice move, but it may not be nice later on.
x x x x[7]
For his illegal termination, petitioner asserted that he is
entitled to his unpaid commission, tax refund, back wages and reinstatement.
On the other hand, respondents denied dismissing
petitioner. They countered that petitioners poor sales performance did not
improve even after he was regularized. On February 18, 2002, management met
with the Sales Group on a per agent basis to discuss sales performance,
possible salary realignment and revamp of the Sales Group. Agcaoili relayed to
petitioner the poor assessment of his sales performance and the possibility
that he will be transferred to another department although there was yet no
official decision on the matter.
Petitioner then told Agcaoili that he was aware of the problem and his
possible termination, prompting the latter to convince the former to consider
voluntarily resigning from the company rather than be terminated. The next day, February 19, 2002, petitioner
talked anew to Agcaoili and informed the latter that he will just resign from
the company and sought an appointment with Sy.
When petitioner inquired how much he will get if he will resign, Sy
advised him that he would get salaries and commissions to which he is legally
entitled; hence, for items sold and already delivered, he will be receiving the
commission in full, but for those sold but yet to be delivered, as per company
policy, he will receive the commissions only upon delivery of the items. Upon
hearing this, petitioner suddenly got mad and said that if that is the case,
the company president should just terminate him and walked out. Petitioner was given a chance, through the
two memos issued to him, to explain his failure to meet the prescribed sales
quota and his failure to report for work without informing the company of the
reason therefor. But he never submitted his explanations to his violations of
the contract of employment, and abandoned his job which is another ground for
terminating his employment. While it
would appear that petitioner aimed to secure his alleged money claims from the
respondents, this does not justify abandonment of his work as respondents never
had the intention of terminating his services.
Respondents maintained that petitioner voluntarily left his workplace
and refused to report for work as in fact he indicated to his sales supervisor
that he will just resign; however, he never submitted a letter of resignation.[8]
Respondents also denied the claims of petitioner regarding
an alleged souring of his relations with Garcia, as in fact it was petitioner
who clearly had a personal grudge against her and not the other way
around. The alleged incidents with
client actually showed it was petitioner who was discourteous and abusive. There was likewise no reason for respondent
Sy to say they were powerful because petitioner did not at all threaten to sue
or do something to their prejudice. To
refute petitioners unfounded allegations, respondents presented the affidavits
of the following: (1) co-employee Rommel Azarraga who admitted he was the
person who warned petitioner to be careful and told him mainit ka kay Mrs. Garcia and explained that he only made such
statement in order to scare petitioner and convince him to change his attitude;
the truth is that Mrs. Garcia had not spoken to him about harbouring any ill
feelings towards petitioner and neither does he know of any incident or
circumstance which may give rise to such ill feeling of Mrs. Garcia towards
petitioner; (2) Richard Agcaoili who corroborated the respondents claims,
denying that petitioner was terminated due to insubordination; he further
denied having told petitioner that management was satisfied with his
performance, the truth being that while petitioner may have ranked second to
the top performer, there was actually only two remaining senior sales agents
while the rest have more or less six months experience; considering the number
of years of his service to the company, petitioner should have improved as
against other agents most of whom were newly-hired and still under probation;
and (3) Arnulfo Merecido, respondent companys employee (warehouse helper) who
claimed that he had a fistfight with petitioner sometime in June 2000 which
arose from the latters insulting remarks regarding his family.[9]
Labor
Arbiters Ruling
In
his decision[10]
dated April 8, 2003, Labor Arbiter Elias H. Salinas dismissed petitioners
complaint on the basis of his finding that it was petitioner who opted not to
report for work since February 22, 2002, after offering to resign (as told to
his supervisor) because he could not accept his possible transfer to another
department.
NLRCs
Ruling
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which reversed the Labor
Arbiters ruling. The NLRC found that the dismissal of petitioner was made
under questionable circumstances, thus giving weight to petitioners assertion
that he was being singled out notwithstanding that all sales personnel
similarly could not meet the P1.5 million monthly sales quota. Such finding is reinforced by the fact that
no sanction was imposed on petitioner or any other employee for the supposed
failure to meet the quota, thereby creating the impression that the situation
was tolerated by the respondents. The
NLRC thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Decision dated April 8, 2003 is set aside and reversed. A new one is entered finding complainant to
have been illegally dismissed and thus entitled to reinstatement with
backwages. Respondent Centro Ceramica
Corporation is hereby ordered to pay complainant his backwages reckoned from
the date of his dismissal on February 19, 2002 up to the date of the
promulgation of this decision. As
reinstatement is no longer feasible, complainant should instead be paid
separation pay equivalent to one half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service. In addition, respondents
company should pay complainant his unpaid commission in the amount of
P16,581.00.
All other claims are dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Court of Appeals Ruling
Respondents elevated the case to the CA which reversed the
NLRC and dismissed petitioners complaint.
According to the CA, petitioner by his own account had admitted that it
was he who asked for his dismissal when he narrated that during his meeting
with Sy, he had asked for his termination paper and she threatened to do so if
that was what he wanted. It also noted
the affidavit of Agcaoili who attested that petitioner was merely informed of
the decision to transfer him to another department, which is not denied by the
petitioner; said witness also said that the turnover of company documents and
files was voluntary on the part of petitioner who expressed desire to resign
from the company. Another statement
considered by the CA is that made by witness Azarraga who explained that he
only mentioned the name of Ms. Garcia to petitioner when he warned the latter
to be careful, simply because she is a member of the Couples for Christ who may
have an influence over petitioner who is a member of the Singles for Christ. As to the memos sent by the company to
petitioners residence, this shows that it has not yet terminated the
employment of petitioner. Thus, the CA
held that the evidence on record supports the Labor Arbiters finding that
petitioner informally severed the employment relationship as manifested by
his voluntary transfer of his accountabilities to his supervisor and thereafter
his act of not reporting for work anymore.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied,
the present petition was filed in this Court.
Issue
The sole issue to be addressed is whether petitioner was
dismissed by the respondents or voluntarily severed his employment by
abandoning his job.
Arguments of
the Parties
Petitioner
assails the CAs misappreciation of the facts, completely relying on respondents
allegations particularly on what transpired during the meeting with respondents
Sy and Garcia, of which the appellate court made a twisted interpretation of
their conversation. Hence, instead of
decreeing petitioners illegal termination based on Sys verbal dismissal
without just cause and due process, the CA proceeded to conclude that
petitioner voluntarily and informally severed his relation with the
company. As to the affidavit of
Agcaoili, his statement that he merely informed petitioner of the decision to
transfer him to another department is of no moment because what matters is the
action of Sy who dismissed petitioner outright.
Moreover, Agcaoili, being under the employ of respondents, would logically
be biased and he would naturally tend to protect the company by his statements
regarding petitioners case. On the
other hand, Azarragas confusing and inconsistent statements only confirmed
that Garcia indeed had a grudge against petitioner, as he could not give a
rational explanation for warning petitioner to be careful with Garcia.
Petitioner further contends that his act of turning over
his accountabilities to his supervisor cannot be considered voluntary on his
part as it was done by him knowing that he was already terminated and upon the
specific instructions of Sy and Garcia.
The CA therefore erred in relying on the unbelievable submission of
respondents that such transfer of company documents and samples was indicative
of petitioners desire to resign. It
failed to see that petitioners reaction to his impending transfer to another
department (pag-iisipan ko pa) was
due to his not coming to terms with Garcia and aware of the warning earlier
given by his friends. Under this
scenario, the animosity between petitioner and Garcia was evident such that
Garcia eventually prevailed upon Sy to terminate petitioners services. Unfortunately, it was on the very same day
that petitioner was verbally terminated by Sy on the ground of insubordination
and ordered to immediately turn over his files and samples. It was on February 21, 2002 that Agcaoili
told petitioner that the company will give him all that is due him plus
goodwill money, and in a meeting with Sy he had asked for his termination paper
because he was in fact already terminated on February 19, 2002 but she
responded by saying that if that was what he wanted she will give it to him and
even threatened him to think because respondents are powerful.
In their Comment, respondents assert that the CA committed
no reversible error in concluding that petitioner was not illegally
terminated. They stress that the
evidence clearly established that petitioner was not dismissed but required
merely to explain why he failed to report for work after meeting the company
president. As to petitioners act of
turning over his accountabilities, respondents argue that this cannot be
considered proof of his illegal dismissal because it was done voluntarily in
line with his proposed resignation.
Respondent company was about to conduct its investigation on petitioner
who went AWOL since February 19, 2002 but then he refused to accept the memos
sent to him, thus confirming categorically that respondents were investigating
his failure to report for work and giving him all the opportunity to explain his
absence.
The Courts
Ruling
We grant the petition.
As a general rule, only questions of law may be allowed in
a petition for review on certiorari.[12]Considering,
however, that the Labor Arbiters findings were reversed by the NLRC, whose
Decision was in turn overturned by the CA, reinstating the Labor Arbiters
Decision, it behooves the Court to reexamine the records and resolve the
conflicting rulings.[13]
Scrutinizing the records, we find that the NLRCs finding
of illegal dismissal is supported by the totality of evidence and more
consistent with logic and ordinary human experience than the common finding of
the CA and Labor Arbiter that petitioner informally severed his employment
relationship with the company. It hardly
convinces us that after declining his supposed transfer to another department
as per the information relayed to him by his supervisor, petitioner would
readily turn over his files and samples unless something critical indeed took
place in his subsequent closed-door meeting with Sy and Garcia. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is
irrelevant whether or not he had earlier inquired from his supervisor what he
will receive if he offers instead to resign upon being told of his impending
transfer, for what matters is the action of Sy on his employment status. If
ever petitioner momentarily contemplated resignation and such was the
impression he conveyed in his talk with his supervisor prior to the meeting
with Sy, such is borne by circumstances indicating Garcias antagonism towards
petitioner. In any event, whether such perception of a strained working
relationship with Garcia was mistaken or not is beside the point. The crucial factor is the verbal order
directly given by Sy, the company president, for petitioner to immediately turn
over his accountabilities. Notably, Sy got irked when petitioner asked for his
termination paper. Petitioner apparently
wanted to ascertain whether such summary dismissal was official, and it was
well within his right to demand that he be furnished with a written notice in
order to apprise him of the real ground for his termination.
Contrary to respondents theory that petitioners act
of turning over the company files and
samples is proof of his voluntary informal resignation rather than of the summary
dismissal effected by management, no other plausible explanation can be made of
such immediate turn over except that petitioner directly confirmed from the
company president herself that he was already being dismissed. The subsequent memos sent to petitioners
residence after he did not anymore report for work only reinforce the
conclusion that the belated written notice of the charge against him his
alleged failure to meet the prescribed sales quota was an afterthought on the
part of respondents who may have realized that they failed to observe due
process in terminating him. That
respondents would still require a written explanation for petitioners poor
sales performance after the latter
already complied with Sys directive to turn over all his accountabilities is
simply inconsistent with their claim that petitioner offered to resign and
voluntarily relinquished possession of company files and samples when told of
his impending transfer. In other words,
petitioner was not given any opportunity to defend himself from whatever
charges hurled by management against him, such as poor sales performance as
relayed to him by his supervisor, when Sy unceremoniously terminated him which
must have shocked him considering that his supervisor earlier advised that he
would just be transferred to another department. Under this scenario, petitioners decision
not to report for work anymore was perfectly understandable, as the sensible
reaction of an employee fired by no less than the company president. It was indeed a classic case of dismissal
without just cause and due process, which is proscribed under our labor laws.
As to the affidavits submitted by the respondents, these
are at best self-serving having been executed by employees beholden to their
employer and which evidence by themselves did not refute petitioners main
cause of action -- the fact of his summary dismissal on February 19, 2002. Respondents effort to present the case as
one of an erring employee about to be investigated for poor sales performance
must likewise fail. The NLRC duly noted the discriminatory treatment accorded
to petitioner when it declared that there is no evidence at all that other
sales personnel who failed to meet the prescribed sales quota were similarly
reprimanded or penalized. Incidentally,
the question may be asked if petitioner whose performance was assessed by
management as poor yet admittedly ranked second to the top sales agent of the
company, why was it that no evidence was submitted by respondents to show the comparative sales performance of
all sales agents? Given the strained working relationship with Garcia, or at
least a perception of such gap on the part of petitioner, the latter could not
have been properly informed of the actual ground for his dismissal. But more
importantly, respondents terminated petitioner first and only belatedly sent
him written notices of the charge against him.
Fairness requires that dismissal, being the ultimate penalty that can be
meted out to an employee, must have a clear basis. Any ambiguity in the ground
for the termination of an employee should be interpreted against the employer,
who ordained such ground in the first place.[14]
Resignation is defined asthe voluntary
act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to disassociate
themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of
relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.[15] In this case, the
evidence on record suggests that petitioner did not resign; he was orally
dismissed by Sy. It is this lack of
clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process, that made his
dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement and the award of backwages.[16] Moreover, the filing of a complaint for
illegal dismissal just three weeks later is difficult to reconcile with
voluntary resignation. Had petitioner
intended to voluntarily relinquish his employment after being unceremoniously
dismissed by no less than the company president, he would not have sought redress
from the NLRC and vigorously pursued this case against the respondents.[17]
When
there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers it a case of illegal dismissal. Furthermore,
Article 4 of the Labor Code
expresses the basic principle that all doubts in the interpretation and
implementation of the Labor Code should be interpreted in favor of the
workingman. This principle has been
extended by jurisprudence to cover doubts in the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee.[18] Thus
we have held that if the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
latter.[19]
Accordingly, the NLRCs finding of illegal dismissal must be upheld.
However,
the award of back wages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement should be
modified. Under the doctrine of strained
relations, the payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable
alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or
viable.[20] Under the facts established, petitioner is
entitled to the payment of full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the date of his dismissal
on February 19, 2002 up to the finality of this decision, and separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one month salary for every
year of service, computed from the time of his engagement by respondents on
March 21, 1999 up to the finality of this decision.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 21, 2006 and
Resolution dated September 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88061 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July 29, 2004 of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 035557-03 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS in that in addition
to the unpaid commission of P16,581.00, respondent Centro Ceramica
Corporation is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Jhorizaldy Uy his full
back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the date of his dismissal on February 19, 2002 up to
the finality of this decision, and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
equivalent to one monthsalary for every year of service, computed from the time
of his engagement by respondent corporation on March 21, 1999 up to the
finality of this decision.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
|
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
|
[1] Rollo, pp. 31-41. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Arcangelita Romilla Lontok concurring.
[2] Id. at 43.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 37-44.
[4] Id. at 89-90.
[5] Id. at 73.
[6] Id. at 74.
[7] Id. at 102.
[8] Id. at 76-79, 82.
[9] Id. at 69-70, 133-138, 149-151, 161.
[10] Id. at 103-111.
[11] Id. at 43.
[12] Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[13] Dansart Security Force & Allied Services Company v. Bagoy, G.R. No. 168495, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 694, 699, citing Cabalen Management Co., Inc. v. Quiambao, G.R. No. 169494, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 342, 348-349.
[14] Pascua v. NLRC (Third Division), G.R. No. 123518, March 13, 1998, 287 SCRA 554, 571, citing Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114333, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 237, 243-244.
[15] Fungo v. Lourdes School of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 152531, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 248, 256.
[16] Pascua v. NLRC (Third Division), supra note 14 at 574; Art. 279, Labor Code of the Philippines.
[17] Casa Cebuana Incorporada v. Leuterio, G.R. No. 176040, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 355, 366.
[18] Peaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 177114, January 21, 2010, 610 SCRA 497, 512, citing Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 697, 728 (2005).
[19] Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, G.R. No. 159195, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 308, 323, citing Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 129329, July 31, 2011, 362 SCRA 56, 68.
[20] Century Canning Corporation v. Ramil, G.R. No. 171630, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 192, 206.
[21] Id., citing Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. v. Diamse, G.R. No. 169299, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 239, 251.