Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
ADELAIDA
MENESES (deceased), substituted by her
heir MARILYN M. CARBONEL-GARCIA, Petitioner, - versus - ROSARIO G.
VENTUROZO, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 172196 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, MENDOZA, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: October 19, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
of the Court of Appeals Decision dated
The
Court of Appeals Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of
The
facts are as follows:
On June 8, 1988, plaintiff Rosario G.
Venturozo, respondent herein, filed a Complaint[2]
for ownership, possession x x x and
damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City against defendant Adelaida
Meneses, petitioner herein, alleging that she (plaintiff) is the absolute owner
of an untitled coconut land, containing an area of 2,109 square meters, situated
at Embarcadero, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and declared under Tax Declaration No.
239. Plaintiff alleged that she purchased the property from
the spouses Basilio de Guzman and Crescencia Abad on January 31, 1973 as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale,[3]
and that the vendors, in turn, purchased the property from defendant as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale[4]
dated June 20, 1966. Plaintiff alleged
that she has been in possession of the land until May 1983 when defendant with
some armed men grabbed possession of the land and refused to vacate despite
repeated demands prompting her to engage
the services of counsel. Plaintiff prayed
that after preliminary hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be
issued; and that after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring her as the
owner of the property in dispute, ordering defendant to vacate the property in
question and to pay her P5,000.00 as attorneys fees; P1,000.00
as litigation expenses; P10,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs of
suit.
In
her Answer,[5] defendant
Adelaida Meneses stated that plaintiff is the daughter of Basilio de Guzman,
the vendee in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 that was purportedly
executed by her (defendant) covering the subject property. Defendant alleged that she never signed any
Deed of Absolute Sale dated
In
her Counterclaim, defendant stated that in view of the nullity of the falsified
Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property, and the fact that plaintiff and
her father Basilio de Guzman had never been in actual possession of the
property, plaintiff is under legal obligation to execute a deed of reconveyance
over the said property in her favor.
The
issue before the trial court was whether the sale made by defendant Adelaida
Meneses in favor of plaintiffs father, Basilio de Guzman, was valid.[6]
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1)
Declaring
the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated June 20, 1966 (Exhibit B) and
the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 (Exhibit A) null
and void ab initio;
2)
Declaring
the defendant Adelaida Meneses as the owner of the property in question;
3)
Ordering
the plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo to execute a Deed of Reconveyance in favor
of the defendant Adelaida Meneses over the property in question described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint;
4)
Ordering
the plaintiff to pay to the defendant P10,000.00 as damages; and P1,000.00,
as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The trial court found that defendant
Adelaida Meneses inherited the land in dispute from her father, Domingo
Meneses; that she did not sell her property to Basilio de Guzman in 1966; and
that the signature of Adelaida Meneses on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the
trial court to the Court of Appeals.
On
WHEREFORE, the
appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (Branch 40) is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one rendered declaring plaintiff-appellant the owner of the
subject land and ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and surrender possession
thereof to the former.[8]
The
Court of Appeals stated that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Q. I am showing to you Exhibit 6 and Exhibit
A for the plaintiff a Deed of Absolute Sale o[f] Real Property of one (1)
Adelaida Meneses in favor of Basilio de Guzman.
Will you examine this if you know this Deed of Absolute Sale?
A. I do not know this document, sir.
Q.
There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida Meneses which was
previously marked as Exhibit 6-a and Exhibit A-1 for the plaintiff, will
you examine this signature, if do you (sic) know this signature?
A. This
is my signature, sir.[9]
According to the Court of Appeals, such
admission is binding on her, there being no showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[10]
The
Court of Appeals also stated that mere variance of signatures cannot be
considered as conclusive proof that the same were forged, as forgery cannot be
presumed.[11] Appellee
Adelaida Meneses should have produced specimen signatures appearing on
documents executed in or about the year 1966 for a better comparison and
analysis.[12]
The
Court of Appeals held that a notarized document, like the questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale dated
The
Court of Appeals held that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to present clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the evidentiary force of the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 1966, which appears on its face to have been
executed with all the formalities required by law.
Adelaida
Meneses motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution[15]
dated
Hence,
Adelaida Meneses, substituted by her heir, filed this petition raising this
lone issue:
I
WHETHER THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, WHICH REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, IS IN KEEPING WITH BOTH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.[16]
Petitioner
contends that her statement, made during the course of her testimony in the
trial court, was taken out of context by respondent to be used merely as an
argumentative point. The examining lawyer used the words, Do you know this
signature? viz.:
Q. I am showing to you Exhibit 6 and Exhibit
A for the plaintiff a Deed of Absolute Sale o[f] Real Property of one (1)
Adelaida Meneses in favor of Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine this if you
know this Deed of Absolute Sale?
A. I do not know this document, sir.
Q.
There is a signature over the name of
the vendor Adelaida Meneses which was previously marked as Exhibit 6-a and Exhibit
A-1 for the plaintiff, will you
examine this signature, if do you (sic) know this signature?
A. This
is my signature, sir.[17]
Petitioner contends that in the above-quoted
transcript of stenographic notes, she was merely asked if she was cognizant of
such a signature as hers or whether the signature appearing on the questioned
document was similar to that of her signature, and not if she was the one who
indeed affixed such signature on the said deed of sale.
She avers that the general rule that a
judicial admission is conclusive upon the party invoking it and does not
require proof admits of two exceptions: (1) when it is shown that the admission
was made through palpable mistake; and (2) when it is shown that no such
admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission. For instance, if a party
invokes an admission by an adverse party,
but cites the admission out of context, then the one making the admission may
show that he made no such admission, or that his admission was taken out of
context.[18] This may be interpreted as to mean not in the
sense in which the admission is made to appear.[19]
Petitioner also contends that a
comparison of the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court over appealed
cases from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors
of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are
deemed conclusive.[21] Thus, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze
and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.[22]
However, this rule admits exceptions,[23]
such as when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the
findings and conclusions of the trial court[24]
like in this case.
The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real
rights over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code,[25]
is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability.[26]
As notarized documents, Deeds of Absolute Sale carry
evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution[27]
and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence
so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity.[28]
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so
long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.[29]
A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument.[30] Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization
of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached
to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the
validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.[31]
In this case, it should be pointed out
that contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the Deed of Sale dated
June 20, 1966 did not comply with the formalities required by law, specifically
Act No. 496,[32]
otherwise known as The Land Registration
Act, which took effect on January 1, 1903, as Section 127 of the Act
provides:
FORMS
Section 127. Deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases, releases, and discharges affecting lands, whether registered under this Act or unregistered, shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber, lease, release, discharge, or bind the lands as though made in accordance with the more prolix form heretofore in use: Provided, That every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons executing the same, in the presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the instrument as witnesses to the execution thereof, and shall be acknowledged to be his or their free act and deed by the person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record, or a notary public, or a justice of the peace, who shall certify to such acknowledgment x x x.[33]
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Section
20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
In
regard to the genuineness of petitioners signature appearing on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966,[36]
the Court agrees with the trial court that her signature therein is very much
different from her specimen signatures[37]
and those appearing in the pleadings[38]
of other cases filed against her, even considering the difference of 17 years
when the specimen signatures were made.
Hence, the Court rules that petitioners signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery.
The
Court agrees with petitioner that her admission was taken out of context,
considering that in her Answer[39]
to the Complaint, she stated that the alleged Deed of Sale purportedly executed
by her in favor of Basilio de Guzman is a forgery; that she never signed the said
Deed of Sale; that she did not appear personally before the Notary Public; and
that she did not secure the residence certificate mentioned in the said Deed of
Sale. She also testified that she never sold her land to Basilio de Guzman;[40]
that she never met the Notary Public, Attorney Abelardo Biala,[41]
and that she did not meet Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966.[42] The trial court found petitioner and her
testimony to be credible, and declared the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966
null and void ab initio. These circumstances negate the said
admission.
The
Court finds the Notary Publics testimony self-serving and unreliable, because
although he testified that petitioner was the one who submitted her residence
certificate to him on June 21, 1966,[43]
the next day after the Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed on June 20, 1966, Crescencia de Guzman, respondents mother,
testified that she and her husband got the residence certificate from
petitioner and gave it to the Notary Public on June 21, 1966.[44]
Thus, it is doubtful whether the Notary
Public really knew the identity of the vendor who signed the Deed of Absolute
Sale[45]
dated June 20, 1966.
The
Court notes that the trial court found petitioner and her testimony to be
credible. It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect.[46] Having observed the deportment of witnesses
during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the
issue of credibility.[47]
In
fine, the preponderance of evidence is with petitioner.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ESTELA
M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Docketed as Civil Case No. D-9040,
records, p. 1.
[3] Exhibit B, folder of exhibits,
p. 2.
[4] Exhibit
A, id. at 1.
[5] Records, p. 12.
[6] Pre-Trial Order, id. at 18.
[7] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10] Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 4.
[11] Citing Veloso v. Court of Appeals,
329 Phil. 398, 406 (1996).
[12] Citing Causapin v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107432, July 4, 1994, 233 SCRA 615, 624.
[13] Citing Bernardo v. Court of
Appeals, 387 Phil. 736, 746 (2000)..
[14] Citing Sales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-40145, July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 858, 865.
[15] Rollo, p. 89.
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18] Citing Atilo III v. Court of
Appeals, 334 Phil. 546, 552 (1997).
[19]
[20] Citing People v. Binad Sy Chua,
444 Phil. 757, 766 (2003).
[21] Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335
Phil. 1163, 1167-1168 (1997).
[22] Id.
at 1168.
[23]
[24] Bernales v. Heirs of Julian
Sambaan, G.R. No. 163271,
[25] Civil Code, Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public
document:
(1)
Acts
and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of
real property or of an interest therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2
and 1405.
[26] Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 164,
180.
[27] Rules of Court, Rule 132.
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For purposes
of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public
documents are:
x
x x x
(b)
Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
x x x x
x
x x x
SEC.
23. Public documents as evidence.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of
the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
x
x x x
SEC. 30. Proof
of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or
proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument of document
involved.
[28] Dizon v. Tuazon, G.R. No.
172167, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 487, 494.
[29] Dela Rama v. Papa, G.R. No. 142309, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 233, 244.
[30] Fuentes v.
[31] Dela
Rama v. Papa, supra note 29, at 244-245.
[32] Entitled AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADJUDICATION AND REGISTRATION OF TITLES TO
LANDS IN THE PHILIPPINE
[33] Emphasis
supplied.
[34] TSN,
[35] Fuentes
v. Roca, supra note 30, at 709.
[36] Exhibit B, folder of exhibits, p.
2.
[37] Exhibit 8, id.
[38] Exhibits 3, 3-F-1, 7, 7-F-1,
id.
[39] Records, p. 12.
[40] TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 14-16, 21-23.
[41] Id.
at 13, 15.
[42] Id.
at 15.
[43] TSN, July 18, 1989, pp. 8-9.
[44] TSN, December 19, 1988, pp. 15-18.
[45] Exhibit A, folder of exhibits, p.
1.
[46] Espano
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998, 288 SCRA 558, 563.
[47] Id.