Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
FIRST
DIVISION
|
OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, - versus - ANTONIO T. REYES, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 170512
Present: Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. Promulgated: October
5, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.:
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Decision[2]
dated July 4, 2005 and the Resolution[3]
dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571. The judgment of the appellate court reversed
and set aside the Decision[4]
dated September 24, 2001 and the Joint Order[5]
dated February 15, 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman for
On January 11, 2001, Jaime B. Acero
executed an affidavit against herein respondent Antonio Reyes and Angelito
Pealoza, who were the Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting
Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin. Acero narrated thus:
That, on January
10, 2001, at about 2:00 oclock P.M. I went to the Land Transportation Office,
at Mambajao, Camiguin to apply for a drivers license;
That, I was made
to take an examination for drivers license applicants by a certain Tata
Pealoza whose real name is Angelito, a clerk in said office;
That, after the
examination, [Pealoza] informed me that I failed in the examination; however
if I am willing to pay additional assessment then they will reconsider my
application and I am referring to [Pealoza] and [Reyes];
That, I asked
how much will that be and [Pealoza] in the presence of [Reyes] answered P680.00,
so I agreed;
That, I then
handed P1,000.00 to [Pealoza] and [Pealoza] handed it to the cashier;
That, [Pealoza]
in turn handed to me the change of P320.00 only and a little later I was
given the LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785 (January 10, 2001) but only for P180.00
which O.R. serves as my temporary license for 60 days; and the balance of P500.00
was without O.R. and retained by Pealoza;
That, I feel
that the actuation of Antonio Reyes and Angelito Pealoza are fraudulent in
that they failed to issue receipt for the extra P500.00 paid to them;
and [Reyes] know that I am with [the Commission on Audit];
That, I execute
this affidavit to file charges against the guilty parties.[7]
Attached to Aceros affidavit was the LTO Official
Receipt No. 62927785, showing his payment of P180.00.[8]
The
above affidavit was apparently filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Camiguin, but the same was later referred[9]
to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
The latter office thereafter ordered[10]
Reyes and Pealoza to submit their counter-affidavits within ten days from
notice.
On June 19, 2001, Pealoza filed his
Counter-Affidavit.[11] He denied telling Acero that if the latter
were willing to pay additional costs, Reyes and Pealoza would reconsider his
application. Pealoza stated that he did
administer the examination to Acero but since he was very busy, he requested
their security guard, Dominador Daypuyat, to check the answers of Acero using
their answer guide. After Daypuyat
checked Aceros paper, Pealoza noted the score of 22/40. Pealoza informed Acero of the failing grade
and told him that it was up to Reyes to decide on the matter. Acero then went to the office of Reyes and
after a few minutes, he came back and returned his application documents to
Pealoza. After examining the application
form, Pealoza saw that the same did not contain Reyes signature but a plus
sign (+) and the number 27 beside the score of 22/40. Pealoza knew that it was Reyes who wrote the
+ 27 and the same indicated that Acero had to pay additional costs in order
to pass the examination, as was done in the past.
Thereafter,
when Pealoza allegedly informed Reyes that Acero was an auditor, the latter
was summoned into Reyes office. Reyes
asked if Acero wanted to retake the examination or just pay the additional
costs. Acero eventually said yes and
Pealoza inferred that the former agreed to pay Reyes the extra costs. Pealoza recounted that Reyes instructed him
to prepare the drivers license of Acero.
Pealoza gave Aceros application documents to Lourdes Cimacio, the
senior statistician, who processed the drivers license. When the cashier asked for Aceros payment,
the latter gave Pealoza a one-thousand-peso bill. The cashier, in turn, handed to Pealoza a
change of P820.00. From the said
amount, Pealoza gave to Acero P320.00, while P500.00 was given
to Reyes. Acero soon left the
office. Pealoza said that Acero called
their office not long after, asking for a receipt for the P500.00. Pealoza then asked if Acero had not come to
an understanding with Reyes that a receipt would not be issued for the
additional cost. Acero insisted on a
receipt then hanged up. Pealoza told
Reyes of Aceros demand and Reyes told him to cancel the drivers license. When told that the same could not be done anymore,
Reyes allegedly gave Pealoza P500.00, instructing the latter to return
the money to Acero under circumstances where nobody could see them. Pealoza stated that he waited for Acero to
come back to their office but the latter did not do so anymore.
Pealoza
also submitted in evidence the affidavit[12]
of Rey P. Amper. Amper narrated that he
started working at the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin in September 1988 as a
driver-examiner. In February 1994, Reyes
became the acting Head of Office, and eventually the Head of Office, of the LTO
in Mambajao. About four months
thereafter, Reyes verbally instructed Amper to send to him (Reyes) all the
applicants for drivers licenses who failed the examinations. In case Reyes was absent, the applicants were
to wait for him. Subsequently, Reyes
gave Amper a piece of paper containing the rates to be charged to the
applicant-flunkers in addition to the legal fees. Amper was also told to deliver the additional
payments to Reyes. Amper stated that his
office table and that of Reyes were located in one room. Reyes would allegedly tell the
applicant-flunkers to either re-take the examinations or pay additional
costs. In most cases, Amper said that
the applicant-flunkers would only be too willing to pay the extra costs. Reyes would then instruct Amper to add more
points to applicant-flunkers scores, which meant that Reyes and the applicants
concerned had come to an agreement for the payment of additional costs. Amper added that the said practice of Reyes
was a goad to his conscience and he talked about it to Pealoza. They allegedly reported the matter to their
District Representative Pedro Romualdo, but the latter could only express his
regrets for having recommended Reyes to his position. The practice of Reyes of claiming additional
costs continued up to the time Amper left the LTO. Amper declared that he knew that it was Reyes
alone who took and benefitted from his illegal exactions. The employees of the LTO in Mambajao were
purportedly aware of the practice of Reyes but they were afraid to come out
against their Head of Office.
The
affidavit[13]
of Margie B. Abdala was also presented by Pealoza. Abdala stated that she accompanied Pealoza
and the latters wife, Ebony, to the house of Acero on January 13, 2001. Ebony urged Acero not to include Pealoza
anymore in the complaint. Acero assured
them that his complaint was principally directed against Reyes for requiring
him (Acero) to pay additional costs for which he was not issued any official
receipt. Pealoza brought with him
Aceros application form for a drivers license, which had already been
approved by Reyes, and he asked the latter to complete the same. Pealoza also tried to return the P500.00
from Reyes that was not covered by a receipt.
Acero, however, refused to fill up the application form and to accept
the money. When Ebony asked why Acero
agreed to pay the additional cost required by Reyes, the latter answered that
he did not understand what was meant by additional cost.
On
June 19, 2001, Reyes manifested[14]
that, for purposes of the instant case, he was adopting the counter-affidavit
he filed in another Ombudsman case, docketed as OMB-MIN-01-0090,[15]
as both cases involved the same parties and the same incident.
In
his counter-affidavit,[16]
Reyes claimed that Aceros complaint was a blatant distortion of the truth and
a mere fabrication of the complainant.[17] Reyes asserted that a perusal of the
affidavit-complaint revealed that the only imputation against him was that
Pealoza allegedly told Acero to pay P680.00 in his (Reyes)
presence. The affidavit revealed that it
was Pealoza who processed the application of Acero; the money was allegedly
given to Pealoza and it was he who handed the change back to Acero; and he had
no participation and was not present when the money changed hands. Reyes stated that when he conducted an
informal investigation on the complaint, Pealoza admitted to having pocketed
the extra P500.00. Reyes
allegedly reprimanded Pealoza and ordered the latter to return the money to
Acero. Based on the receipt submitted by
Acero, the same proved that as far as the LTO and Reyes were concerned, what
was received by the office was only P180.00. Reyes contended that he did not ask or
receive money from Acero and it was Pealoza who pocketed the P500.00.
In
an Order[18]
dated June 20, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed the parties
to appear before its office on July 11, 2001 for a preliminary conference. The parties were to consider, among others,
the need for a formal investigation or whether the parties were willing to
submit their case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record and
such other evidence as they will present at the conference.
On
July 6, 2001, Acero sent the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a telegram,[19]
stating that he was waiving his right to avail of the preliminary conference.
On
July 11, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order,[20]
stating that none of the parties appeared in the preliminary conference scheduled
for that day. In view of the
non-appearance of the respondents therein, they were considered to have waived
their right to a preliminary conference.
The case was then deemed submitted for decision.
On
July 23, 2001, the counsel for Pealoza informed the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao that his client was waiving his right to a formal
investigation and was willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of
the evidence on record. Pealoza also
submitted the additional affidavit of one of their witnesses, Rickie
Valdehueza.
In his affidavit,[21]
Valdehueza stated that on January 5, 2001, he applied for a drivers license with
the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin. He took
an examination on that day, which was conducted by an employee he later came to
know as Dominador Daypuyat. After the
latter checked his test paper, Valdehueza was told that he got a failing
score. His application was then turned
over to Pealoza, who told him to see Reyes.
Valdehueza said that Reyes advised him not to retake the examination
anymore and just pay P1,500.00.
Valdehueza bargained for P1,200.00 since he had no money and
Reyes agreed. Reyes then wrote the sign
+ 20 next to Valduezas score of 30, such that what appeared on the test
paper was 30 + 20. Reyes returned the
test paper and instructed Valdehueza to tell Pealoza to add 20 to his
score. Valdehueza went back to the LTO
on January 10, 2001 bringing P1,200.00.
Before he could go to Reyes office, he was accosted by Daypuyat in the
lobby who informed him that his license was already completed. Daypuyat also took P700.00 to give to
Reyes. Valdehueza gave P500.00 to
the cashier as payment for the P240.00 license fee. He told the cashier to just give his change
to Reyes.
On September 24, 2001, the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170, adjudging
Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding Pealoza guilty of simple
misconduct. The pertinent portion of the
decision reads:
Here, as borne out of the record, there
is no denying the fact that [Acero] failed in the examination given for a
drivers license, yet ultimately, herein complainant was granted a temporary
drivers license. It is therefore very
logical to presume that something in between was agreed upon between the
applicant and the person charged with the grant of license.
Based on the testimony of [Pealoza]
and corroborated by the testimonies of Rey P. Amper (Record, pp. 31-32) and
Rickie Valdehueza (Record, pp. 44-45), [Reyes] would give the flunker the option
of retaking the examination or to simply pay an additional cost to have a
passing grade without actually re-taking the same. As testified to by Rey P. Amper, xxx in
almost all cases, the applicant-flunker would only be too willing to pay the
additional costs, in which case, Mr. Reyes would instruct him to go back to my
table. Then Mr. Reyes would call me,
saying: Ray, just add more to his score., which to me meant that he and the
applicant-flunker had come to an agreement to pay the additional costs. Mr. Amper testifies further that this matter
of extending a passing grade to a flunker for a monetary consideration has been
a system within this LTO agency perpetrated by [Reyes] since he assumed as Head
of Office thereat.
Verily, [Reyes] took advantage of
his position and office in exacting the so-called additional cost from those
who flunked the examination. There is
nowhere in the record authorizing the Head of Office of the LTO to adjust a
failing grade into a passing grade. In
addition, there is nowhere in the record that supports the legality of
collecting additional costs over and above the legal fees. This is a pure and simple case of extortion
and certainly, such act is a breach of his oath of office as well as a
deliberate disregard of existing rules and regulations. Based on the foregoing, this Office finds
respondent [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct.
As regards [Pealoza], while he may
have helped or facilitated in the collection of that additional costs, he could
not be as guilty as [Reyes].
Understandably, it is normal for a
subordinate to keep mum while an anomaly is going on specially when the
perpetrator is the Head of Office. There
is fear in him and normally, such subordinate would just ride along, so to
speak. But nonetheless, [Pealoza] has
to be sanctioned. While the infraction
he had helped accomplished may not have been voluntary on his part but as a
public official, he should have registered his objection regardless of the
consequence that may occur. Based on the
foregoing, this Office finds respondent [Pealoza] guilty of simple misconduct.
WHEREFORE, there being substantial
evidence, this Office finds respondent Antonio T. Reyes guilty of grave
misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service
pursuant to Section 23(c) [Grave Offenses], Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
Likewise, this Office finds respondent Angelito G. Pealoza guilty of
Simple Misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from office
without pay for a period of Six (6) months based on Section 23(b) [Less Grave
Offenses] Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292. In both instances, the execution of
the penalties imposed shall be made immediately after the same shall have been
final and executory.[22]
In
their bid to challenge the above ruling, Reyes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference,[23]
while Pealoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[24] On February 15, 2002, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order,[25]
denying the aforesaid motions of Reyes and Pealoza.
Reyes elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals via a Petition for Review[26]
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 70571.
In the assailed Decision dated July 4,
2005, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the
judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The appellate court reasoned thus:
It must be pointed out that in the
complaint-affidavit filed by Acero, it was only Pealoza who received the money
and the balance of P 500.00 which was without O.R. was retained by
Pealoza. Nowhere in the complaint-affidavit
could one find the name of Reyes, herein petitioner, nor is it alleged there
that Reyes was around when Acero handed to Pealoza the P 1000.00. From the evidence on record, it was, clearly,
only Pealoza all along. Nowhere in the
record is Reyes complicity suggested or even slightly hinted.
x x x x
It does not appear on record that
[Reyes] was the one who ordered and received the additional assessment. Rather, it was Pealoza alone who approached
the complainant, discussed about the additional assessment, and retained the
balance of P 500 basing on the complaint-affidavit filed by Acero.
We note with
sadness that the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, of itself, was considered
enough evidence by the investigation officer in finding [Reyes] guilty of grave
misconduct, and dismissing him from government service. The testimony of Pealoza is, however, a
self-serving declaration considering that he is the co-respondent in the
Ombudsman case filed by Acero. Such a
declaration which was obviously made principally to save his own neck should
have been received with caution. This
vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay
character and to permit its unqualified introduction in evidence would open the
door to frauds and perjuries.
It may be true
that Reyes failed to attend the scheduled preliminary conference where he could
have refuted all the hearsay evidence submitted against him. The introduction of such as evidence does
not, however, give them the probative value which they did not bear in the
first place. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, cannot be given credence.
The self-serving
evidence presented in the form of a counter-affidavit by Pealoza should not
have been taken hook, line and sinker, so to speak, for there was no way of
ascertaining the truth of their contents.
Moreover, in the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13, 2001
[Reyes] claimed that he was not furnished any copy of Pealozas
counter-affidavit. Thus, admissions made
by Pealoza in his sworn statement are binding only on him. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet. The rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.
The charge of
misconduct is a serious charge, a capital offense in a manner of speaking,
which may cause the forfeiture of ones right to hold a public office. Therefore, said charge must be proven and
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Mere allegation will not suffice.
It should be supported by competent evidence, by substantial
evidence. We find the case against
[Reyes] wanting in this regard.
FOR THESE
REASONS, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The decision dated 24 September 2001 and the Joint Order dated 15
February 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
[Reyes] is hereby exonerated from the administrative charge for
insufficiency of evidence.[27]
The
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration[28]
of the Court of Appeals decision. The
same was, however, denied in the assailed Resolution dated October 27, 2005.
Hence,
the Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner) filed the instant petition, raising
the following issues:
WITH DUE
RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN NULLIFYING THE DECISION OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE IN THAT:
(i)
It re-examined and weighed the evidence submitted in
the administrative proceedings and worse, substituted its judgment for that of
the Ombudsman; and,
(ii)
It made a conclusion that substantial evidence does
not exist to warrant a finding of administrative culpability on the part of
respondent Reyes.[29]
In essence, the fundamental issue in
the instant case is whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was
sufficiently proven by substantial evidence.
Petitioner settled this issue in the affirmative, while the Court of
Appeals ruled otherwise.
In
Salazar v. Barriga,[30]
the Court characterized the administrative offenses of misconduct and grave
misconduct as follows:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing
or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of official
functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule must be manifest.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an
official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others.[31]
Here, petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty
of grave misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then the Head of Office of
the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange
for the issuance of a drivers license to the latter, notwithstanding that
Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor.
In assailing the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the Office of the
Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and
credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues that it is not the task of
the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before an
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.[32] In administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for
or against a party. Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.
It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.[33]
Dadulo v. Court of Appeals[34]
reiterates that in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the
province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the
Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an exception
thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result.
After carefully perusing the records
of this case, we find that the above-cited exception, rather than the general
rule, applies herein. Otherwise stated,
the Court deems it proper that a review of the case should be made in order to
arrive at a just resolution.
In the main, the evidence submitted by
the parties in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 consisted of their sworn statements, as well
as that of their witnesses. In the
affidavit of Acero, he categorically identified both Reyes and Pealoza as the
persons who had the prerogative to reconsider his failed examination, provided
that he paid an additional amount on top of the legal fees. For his part, Pealoza ostensibly admitted
the charge of Acero in his counter-affidavit but he incriminated Reyes therein
as the mastermind of the illicit activity complained of. To corroborate this allegation, Pealoza
submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Amper was a former LTO employee who allegedly
had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and pocketing
additional fees; while Valdehueza declared that he was an applicant for a
drivers license who was likewise made to pay the said additional fees to
Reyes. Upon the other hand, Reyes
counter-affidavit repudiated the allegations of Acero, insisting that it was
Pealoza who illegally took the amount of P500.00 from Acero.
Reyes faults petitioner for placing
too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well as the
affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza.
Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said documents
before petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to due
process was violated. Petitioner, on the
other hand, counters that Reyes was afforded due process since he was given all
the opportunities to be heard, as well as the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration of petitioners adverse decision.
On this point, the Court finds merit
in Reyes contention.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[35]
elaborates on the well established doctrine of due process in administrative
proceedings as follows:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all
situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.[36]
Moreover, Department of Health v.
Camposano[37]
restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations[38]
that due process in administrative
proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles:
(1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present
ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in
arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration
of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted
the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such
manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues
involved.[39]
In
the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied
with. Reyes was not properly apprised of
the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of
petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
To
recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, the respondents therein, i.e., Reyes and Pealoza,
were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges
lodged against them. While Pealoza
acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit
transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the main culprit. Pealoza thereafter submitted the affidavits
of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses who would substantiate his
accusations. However, the records reveal
that only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies
of the said affidavits.[40] Thus, Reyes was able to respond only to the
affidavit of Acero. It would appear that
Reyes had no idea that Pealoza, a co-respondent in the administrative case,
would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence
to prove his guilt. The said affidavits
were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioners Decision
dated September 24, 2001.
The
fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via
a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary
Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this
case. Reyes filed the said motion
precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes
was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of
Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision dated
September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it
cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently
answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
It
is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of
a respondent in an administrative case was not violated if he was able to file
a motion for reconsideration to refute the evidence against him. However, the instant case should be
differentiated from Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,[41]
which likewise involved the issue of administrative due process. In the said case, Ruivivar was found
administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions
and was meted the penalty of reprimand.
In her motion for reconsideration, Ruivivar argued that she was deprived
of due process because she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of
complainants witnesses. Thereafter, the
Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be furnished with copies of the affidavits of
the witnesses, with the directive for her to file any pleading that she may
deem appropriate. As Ruivivar still
opted not to controvert the affidavits that were belatedly provided to her, the
Ombudsman ruled that her right to due process was not violated and her
administrative liability was upheld. The
Court affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman, declaring that the law can no
longer help one who had been who had
been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of
the proffered chance.[42]
In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded
Reyes protestations without giving him a similar opportunity, as in Ruivivar,
to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of Pealoza,
Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision
dated September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to
Reyes. This the Court cannot
sanction. A judgment in an administrative
case that imposes the extreme penalty of dismissal must not only be based on
substantial evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the
parties to due process.
WHEREFORE,
the Decision dated July 4, 2005 and the Resolution dated October 27, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571, as well as the Decision dated
September 24, 2001 and the Joint Order dated February 15, 2002 of the Office of
the Ombudsman in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The
records of OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 are REMANDED to the Office of the
Ombudsman, which is hereby ordered (a) to furnish respondent Antonio T. Reyes
copies of the affidavits of Angelito G. Pealoza, Rey P. Amper and Rickie Valdehueza,
and (b) to conduct further proceedings in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 as may be
appropriate.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice
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MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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[1] Rollo, pp. 12-45.
[2] Id. at 46-52; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, concurring.
[3] Id. at 53-54.
[4] Id. at 55-60; penned by Graft Investigation Officer I Quintin J. Pedrido, Jr. and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Antonio E. Valenzuela and Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto.
[5] Id. at 61-65.
[6] Id. at 66-79.
[7] Id. at 123.
[8] Id. at 124.
[9] Records, p. 9.
[10] Id. at 25.
[11] Rollo, pp. 127-130.
[12] Id. at 134-135.
[13] Records, pp. 33-34.
[14] Id. at 36-37.
[15] OMB-MIN-01-0090 was the criminal case filed by Acero against Reyes and Pealoza for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[16] Rollo, pp. 125-126.
[17] Id. at 125.
[18] Records, p. 40.
[19] Id. at 41.
[20] Id. at 42.
[21] Rollo, pp. 131-132.
[22] Id. at 58-59.
[23] Id. at 80-85.
[24] Records, pp. 62-66.
[25] Rollo, pp. 61-65.
[26] Id. at 86-103.
[27] Id. at 49-52.
[28] Id. at. 66-79.
[29] Id. at 186.
[30] A.M. No. P-05-2016, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 449.
[31] Id. at 453-454.
[32] Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 pertinently provides:
SEC.
27. Effectivity
and Finality of Decisions. x x x
x
x x x
Findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1)
month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
[33] Bascos, Jr. v. Taganahan, G.R. No. 180666, February 18, 2009, 579 SCRA 653, 674-675.
[34] G.R. No. 175451, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 357, 363.
[35] G.R. No. 166780, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 444.
[36] Id. at 451-452.
[37] 496 Phil. 886 (2005).
[38] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[39] Id. at 641-644.
[40] Records, p. 26.
[41] G.R. No. 165012, September 16, 2008, 565 SCRA 324.
[42] Id. at 340.