Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
ERDITO QUARTO, Petitioner, - versus - THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN
SIMEON MARCELO, CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO M.
TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS A. GAYYA, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 169042
Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: October
5, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and mandamus[1]
filed by Erdito Quarto (petitioner)
assailing the Ombudsmans January 7, 2004[2]
and November 4, 2004[3]
resolutions which granted Luisito M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and Luis A. Gayya
(collectively, respondents) immunity
from prosecution, resulting in the respondents exclusion from the criminal
informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner seeks to nullify
the immunity granted to the respondents, and to compel the Ombudsman to include
them as accused in the informations for estafa through falsification of public
documents[4]
and for violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.[5]
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The petitioner is the Chief of the
Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division (CESPD),[6]
Bureau of Equipment (BOE), Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Port Area,
On
January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to
investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in 2001.[9] On
January 17, 2002, the committee designated the DPWH Internal Audit Service (IAS) as its Technical Working Group to
conduct the actual investigation.[10]
In
the course of its investigation, the DPWH-IAS[11]
learned that the emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH
service vehicles basically undergo the following documentary process:
I.
Determination
of repairs and/or spare parts needed
a.
The
end-user requesting repair brings the service vehicle to the Motorpool Section,
CESPD for initial inspection and preparation of Job Order; and
b.
Based
on the Job Order, the SIT conducts a pre-repair inspection (to determine the
necessity of repair and whether the repair is emergency in nature) and prepares
a Pre-Repair Inspection Report, with a recommendation for its approval by the
CESPD Chief.
II.
Preparation
and Approval of Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment with accompanying
documents (Job Order and Pre-Inspection Report)
a.
The
Procurement Section, Administrative Manpower Management Service (AMMS) prepares the Requisition for
Supplies and Equipment (RSE), the
Canvass Quotation of three Suppliers, the Certificate of Emergency Purchase,
and the Certificate of Fair Wear and Tear;
b.
The
end-user signs the RSE with the recommending approval of the concerned head of
office; and
c.
The AMMS
Director approves the RSE.
III.
Repair
of Vehicles
a.
The
end-user selects the repair shop/auto supply from accredited establishments;
b.
The
selected repair shop/auto supply repairs the service vehicle and issues the
corresponding sales invoice and/or official receipt;
c.
The
end-user accepts the repair and executes a Certificate of Acceptance;
d.
The
SIT conducts a post-repair inspection (to check if the vehicle was repaired and
whether the repair conformed to specifications) and prepares a Post-Repair
Inspection Report, with a recommendation for its approval by the CESPD Chief. The Motorpool and the end-user would
prepare the Report of Waste Materials also for the signature of the CESPD
Chief; and
e.
The
Assets and Supply Management and Control Division recommends payment of the
expense/s incurred.
The processing of the payment of claims for reimbursement
follows the above process.
Based on this procedure, the DPWH-IAS
discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were
approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in
government losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month
period alone.[12]
Thus,
Atty. Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman[13] a
Complaint-Affidavit[14] and
a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit[15]
charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and employees including the
petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly benefited
from the anomalous transactions with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation,
and violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.[16]
Atty. Ofilada imputed the following
acts to the petitioner:
With
dishonesty and grave misconduct, [the petitioner] x x x approved four (4) job orders for [the] repairs [and/or] purchase of
spare parts of [the vehicle assigned to Atty. Ofilada,] noted the certificate
of urgency of said repairs [and/or] purchase[,] concurred with both the pre-repair and post repair inspection reports
thereon, participated in the accomplishment of the supporting Requisition
for Supplies and Equipment (RSE) x x x[,] and participated in the approval of
the disbursement voucher authorizing payment of said repairs as necessary and
lawful [even if said vehicle was never referred to the Motorpool Section, CESPD
for repair].
The
documents relating to [this vehicle] were filed within a period of one month
(between September to October 2001) [and] were used to authorize the payment of
said non existent ghost repairs to the damage and prejudice of the [DPWH.][17]
(emphases ours)
On the other hand, Atty. Ofilada
charged the respondents with the following:
With dishonesty and grave misconduct, [respondents] as members of the
[SIT] xxx accomplished and signed
Pre-Repair Inspection and Post Repair Inspection Reports in support of the four
job orders [and made] it appear that the vehicle was inspected
prior and after the alleged repair [although they knew that the vehicle was
never turned over for inspection]. The accomplishment of the Pre-Repair and
Post-Repair Inspection Report[s] led to the preparation of the Request for
Supplies and Equipment which was the basis of the preparation of the
disbursement vouchers ultimately authorizing the payment of the said repairs
thru reimbursement scheme to the damage and prejudice of the DPWH.
x x x the [P]re-[R]epair and [P]ost-[R]epair [I]nspection
[R]eports of the [SIT] xxx are fictitious and falsified as no actual inspection
could have transpired[.][18]
(emphasis ours)
The petitioner denied the allegations
against him, claiming that he merely relied on his subordinates when he signed
the job orders and the inspection reports.[19]
In contrast, the respondents admitted the existence of irregularities in the
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles, and offered to
testify and to provide evidence against the DPWH officials and employees
involved in the anomaly in exchange for their immunity from prosecution. The
respondents submitted:
5.2 x x x since we assumed our duties as
members of the SIT xxx, we observed that [the] DPWH vehicles were being sent to
the repair shop in violation of the prescribed guidelines governing the
emergency repair of a service vehicle.
In most instances, service vehicles are immediately brought to a car repair
shop of the end-users choice without bringing it first to the [Motorpool
Section, CESPD, BOE] for the preparation of the required job order by [Gayya]
of the Motorpool Section and the pre-repair inspection to be conducted by the
SIT. After the purported repairs are
done, SIT members are made to sign a post-repair inspection report which
already includes a typed-in recommendation for the payment of repairs, and the
signature of the Head of the [SIT] indicating his alleged concurrence with the
findings of the SIT despite the absence of an actual inspection. The
post-repair inspection report is accompanied by the following attachments, to
wit: a) a falsified job order signed by the head of the [SIT] and the Chief of
the Motorpool Section x x x [and] e) an empty or falsified [p]re-repair
inspection report[.]
5.3 Initially[,] we tried to curb the above
anomalous practices being perpetrated by suppliers and officials of the DPWH x
x x [by making] known [our] objections to the questionable job orders for the
proposed repairs of DPWH service vehicles[,] thus:
a.
On July,
9, 1999, [Tablan] wrote the Head of the SIT a memorandum x x x stating that the
job orders for [several identified vehicles] x x x violated the prohibition
against splitting of job orders x x x. [Tablan recommended for public bidding
the proposed repairs for the said vehicles].
b.
In
connection with the job orders involving [several identified vehicles] x x x Tablan
and Borillo wrote the Head of the SIT a Memorandum x x x recommending that the
whereabouts of the end-user be verified, and the service vehicle be
re-inspected and/or disposed of.
c.
Since
the July 9, 1999 Memorandum was returned to x x x Tablan without any action
being undertaken by the SIT Chief, [Tablan and Borillo] reiterated the
recommendation for the public bidding of the proposed repairs described therein[.]
6.
In our attempts to perform our sworn duties, however, we incurred the
displeasure of the suppliers, the head of [SIT] and other officials of the DPWH
who threatened various administrative sanctions against us if we should not
accede to their wishes. x x x
7. In addition to the foregoing, there are
other factors which conspired to prevent us from properly performing our
duties. For one, the DPWH processes an average of 3,000 repairs per calendar
year. Given the staggering number and extent of repairs, including the volume
of paperwork, it was practically impossible for [us] to implement the rules
which proved too tedious under the circumstance. As such, a short-cut of the
rules was necessary to accommodate the demands of the end-user, the suppliers,
our superiors, and other executives of the DPWH. x x x
8. The anomalous practices of the DPWH
executives and suppliers in the purported repair of DPWH service vehicles were
indeed more widespread and rampant in the year 2001. As a precautionary
measure, we took the initiative of photocopying these sets of falsified
documents as they were presented to us before we affixed our respective
signatures thereon. We grouped these documents into Sets A and B[.]
x x x x
11. x x x That the service vehicle x x x has
not been actually inspected by [Tablan and Borillo] is attested to by the pre
and post repair inspection reports initially bearing the signature of the head
of the SIT as concurring official without the required signatures of Borillo
and Tablan. More importantly, these DPWH officials did not bother, in a
majority of cases, to cover their tracks when they prepared and signed the
pre and post repair inspection reports on the same dates. Based on proper
procedure, a post repair inspection report is to be accomplished only after the
preparation and approval of the Job Order, pre-repair inspection report, RSE,
Cash Invoice and Acceptance by the end-user. In this case, the RSE, Cash
Invoice and Certificate of Acceptance are dated much later than the post-repair
inspection report. Since xxx there was no actual pre-repair and post-repair
inspection conducted, the foregoing sample instances paved the way for the
ghost repairs of DPWH service vehicles, to the detriment and prejudice of the
government.
12. Because of the anomalous transactions,
the joke circulating around the DPWH is that we are actually the directors of
the DPWH since we are the last to sign, so to speak. That the signature[s] of
the [respondent] SIT members are merely pro forma is all the more pronounced in
a sample set consisting of a number of pre-repair inspection reports for a
particular month in 2001. The pre-repair inspection reports of the service
vehicles indicated therein are empty of any findings and bear the signature of
the head of the SIT as concurring official. All the foregoing documents above detailed negate the convenient excuse
proffered by DPWH executives that they sign the documents only after the SIT
had inspected the service vehicle and prepared the pre and post repair
inspection reports.
x x x x
14.1 xxx the above examples are only a
representative sampling of the extent of the anomalous transactions involving
DPWH service vehicles which can be considered ghost repairs. There are more
instances wherein [we] are willing to testify to in exchange for immunity from
prosecution.[20] (emphases ours)
After
conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan[21] several
informations charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with plunder,[22]
estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of
Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the
respondents request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and
cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan, questioning the Ombudsmans grant of immunity in the
respondents favor. The Sandiganbayan, however, dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction and advised the petitioner to instead question the Ombudsmans
actions before this Court.[23]
Hence, this present petition.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the
Ombudsman should have included the respondents in the informations since it was
their inspection reports that actually paved the way for the commission of the
alleged irregularities.[24]
The petitioner asserts that the respondents criminal complicity clearly
appears since no repair could have started and no payment for repairs, ghost
or not, could have been made without the respondents pre-repair and post-repair
inspection reports. By excluding the respondents in the informations, the
Ombudsman is engaged in selective prosecution which is a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion.
The petitioner claims that before the
Ombudsman may avail of the respondents as state witnesses, they must be
included first in the informations filed with the court. Thereafter, the
Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge so that they can be utilized as
state witnesses under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court since the court has the sole province to determine whether
these conditions exist.
These conditions require, inter alia, that there should be
absolute necessity for the testimony of the proposed witness and that he/she
should not appear to be the most guilty. The petitioner claims that the
respondents failed to comply with these conditions as the Ombudsmans
evidence, which became the basis of the informations subsequently filed,
shows that the respondents testimony is not absolutely necessary; in fact, the
manner of the respondents participation proves that they are the most guilty
in the premises.
THE COMMENTS OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE
RESPONDENTS
The
Ombudsman counters that RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) expressly
grants him the power to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses. Given
this power, the Ombudsman asserts that Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, which presupposes that the witness is originally included in the
information, is inapplicable to the present case since the decision on whom to
prosecute is an executive, not a judicial, prerogative.[25]
The
Ombudsman invokes this Courts policy of non-interference in the Ombudsmans
exercise of his discretion in matters involving his investigatory and
prosecutorial powers.[26]
The petitioners claim that the respondents are the most guilty is a matter
of defense which the petitioner may raise not in this proceeding, but in the
trial proper.[27]
On
the other hand, the respondents submit that the Ombudsman has ample discretion
in determining who should be included in the information on the basis of his
finding of probable cause. The courts can only interfere in the Ombudsmans
exercise of his discretion in case of a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, which the petitioner failed to establish.[28]
THE PETITIONERS REPLY[29]
While
conceding that the Ombudsman has the power and the discretion to grant immunity
to the respondents, the petitioner asserts that this power must be exercised
within the confines of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which
requires, inter alia, that the
proposed witness must not appear to be the most guilty. By ignoring this
provision and extending immunity to the respondents whose false reports
ultimately led to the payment for supposed repairs, and who are, thus, the
real culprits,[30] the
Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion a fatal defect correctible by certiorari.
Amplifying
on the respondents guilt, the petitioner cites the DPWHs decision in an
administrative case which the Civil Service Commission affirmed, finding the
respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct involving the same set of
facts.[31]
OUR RULING
We
dismiss the petition on two grounds:
first, the petitioner did not avail
of the remedies available to him before filing this present petition; and, second, within the context of the Courts
policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the grant of
immunity to the respondents was attended by grave abuse of discretion.
I.
The petitioner
did not exhaust remedies available in the ordinary course of law
As extraordinary writs, both Sections
1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there be no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present case,
the petitioner has not shown that he moved for a reconsideration of the
assailed resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this
present petition.[32]
Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the inclusion of the respondents
in the informations before filing the present petition.[33]
These are adequate remedies that the petitioner chose to forego; he bypassed
these remedies and proceeded to seek recourse through the present petition.[34]
Similarly, the petitioner has not
shown that he filed the present petition with this Court within the sixty-day
reglementary period[35]
from notice of the assailed Ombudsmans resolutions. He did not do so, of course, since he
initially and erroneously filed a certiorari
petition with the Sandiganbayan. We
remind the petitioner that the remedy from the Ombudsmans orders or
resolutions in criminal cases is to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65[36]
with this Court.[37]
The petition likewise fails even on
the merits.
II.
The respondents exclusion in the informations is
grounded on the Ombudsmans grant of immunity
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent.[38]
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to
compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or
the particular way discretion is to be exercised.[39]
In the exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who
must be charged.[40]
He also enjoys the same latitude of
discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding
of probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an information in
court)[41] and the degree of
participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and
conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts
except when he gravely abuses his discretion,[42] i.e., when his action amounts to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.[43]
If, on the basis of the same
evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an
indictment some individuals while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies[44]
since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the information all persons
who appear responsible for the offense involved.[45]
Citing the cases of Guiao v. Figueroa[46] and Castro,
Jr., et al. v. Castaeda and Liceralde,[47]
the petitioner argues for the inclusion of the respondents in the criminal
informations, pointing out that the respondents accomplished the inspection
reports that allegedly set in motion the documentary process in the repair of
the DPWH vehicles; these reports led to the payment by the government and the
consequent losses.
In Guiao and Castro, we
ruled that mandamus lies to compel a
prosecutor who refuses (i) to include in the information certain persons, whose
participation in the commission of a crime clearly appears, and (ii) to follow
the proper procedure for the discharge of these persons in order that they may
be utilized as prosecution witnesses.
These cited cases, however, did not
take place in the same setting as the present case as they were actions by the
public prosecutor, not by the Ombudsman.
In the present case, the Ombudsman granted the respondents immunity from
prosecution pursuant to RA No. 6770 which specifically empowers the Ombudsman to
grant immunity in any hearing, inquiry
or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the
performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory
objectives. The pertinent provision Section 17 of this law provides:
Sec. 17. Immunities. x x x.
Under such terms and conditions as
it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and
production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the
truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or
under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under
this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from
criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from
demotion or removal from office.
[emphasis ours]
To briefly outline the rationale for
this provision, among the most important powers of the State is the power to
compel testimony from its residents; this power enables the government to
secure vital information necessary to carry out its myriad functions.[48] This power though is not
absolute. The constitutionally-enshrined right against compulsory self-incrimination
is a leading exception. The states power to compel testimony and the
production of a persons private books and papers run against a solid
constitutional wall when the person under compulsion is himself sought to be
penalized. In balancing between state interests and individual rights in this
situation, the principles of free government favor the individual to whom the
state must yield.[49]
A state response to the
constitutional exception to its vast powers, especially in the field of
ordinary criminal prosecution and in law enforcement and administration, is the
use of an immunity statute.[50] Immunity statutes seek a rational
accommodation between the imperatives of an individuals constitutional right
against self-incrimination[51] (considered
the fount from which all statutes granting immunity emanate[52])
and the legitimate governmental interest in securing testimony.[53] By voluntarily offering to give information on the
commission of a crime and to testify against the culprits, a person opens
himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself had participated in the
criminal act. To secure his testimony without exposing him to the risk of
prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given immunity from
prosecution.[54] In
this manner, the state interest is satisfied while respecting the individuals
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
III.
Nature of the
power to grant immunity
The power to grant immunity from
prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative.[55]
The exclusive power of Congress to define crimes and their nature and to
provide for their punishment concomitantly carries the power to immunize
certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state
interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of crimes with high
political, social and economic impact.[56]
In the exercise of this power, Congress possesses broad discretion and can lay
down the conditions and the extent of the immunity to be granted.[57]
Early on, legislations granting
immunity from prosecution were few.[58]
However, their number escalated with the increase of the need to secure vital
information in the course and for purposes of prosecution. These statutes[59]
considered not only the importance of the testimony sought, but also the unique
character of some offenses and of some situations where the criminal
participants themselves are in the best position to give useful testimony.[60] RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was
formulated along these lines and reasoning with the vision of making the
Ombudsman the protector of the people against inept, abusive and corrupt
government officers and employees.[61]
Congress saw it fit to grant the Ombudsman the power to directly confer immunity
to enable his office to effectively carry out its constitutional and statutory
mandate of ensuring effective accountability in the public service.[62]
IV.
Considerations
in the grant of immunity
While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity,
the authority to implement is lodged elsewhere.
The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted
is a constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function. Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[63]
is instructive on this point:
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. [emphasis ours]
RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this
prosecutory prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject
to such terms and conditions as he may determine. The only textual limitation
imposed by law on this authority is the need to take into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.[64]
This provision requires that:
(a)
There is
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b)
There is
no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c)
The
testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d)
Said
accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e)
Said
accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
This Rule is itself unique as, without detracting from the executive
nature of the power to prosecute and the power to grant immunity, it clarifies
that in cases already filed with the courts,[65]
the prosecution merely makes a proposal and initiates the process of granting
immunity to an accused-witness in order to utilize him as a witness against his
co-accused.[66] As we explained in Webb v. De Leon[67] in
the context of the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act:
The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. [emphasis ours]
Thus, it is the trial court that
determines whether the prosecutions preliminary assessment of the
accused-witness qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural
norms.[68] This relationship is in reality a symbiotic
one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of
justice,[69] largely
exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutors findings and evaluation. On
this point, the Courts pronouncement in the 1918 case of United States v. Abanzado[70]
is still very much relevant:
A trial
judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty
at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the
course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or
possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He must rely
in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the
prosecuting officer in coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for
the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested"; as to the availability
or nonavailability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of
the accused is "most guilty," and the like.
Notably, this cited case also observes that the Rules-provided
guidelines are mere express declarations of the conditions which the courts
ought to have in mind in exercising their sound discretion in granting the
prosecutions motion for the discharge of an accused.[71] In other words, these
guidelines are necessarily implied in the discretion granted to the courts.
RA No. 6770 recognizes that these same principles should apply when the Ombudsman directly grants immunity to a witness. The same consideration to achieve the greater and higher purpose of securing the conviction of the most guilty and the greatest number among the accused[72] is involved whether the grant is secured by the public prosecutor with active court intervention, or by the Ombudsman. If there is any distinction at all between the public prosecutor and the Ombudsman in this endeavor, it is in the specificity of and the higher priority given by law to the Ombudsmans purpose and objective to focus on offenses committed by public officers and employees to ensure accountability in the public service. This accounts for the Ombudsmans unique power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of information in court, a power that the public prosecutor himself generally does not enjoy.[73]
V.
Extent of judicial review of a
bestowed immunity
An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a
review by this Court of the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion. Like all other
officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all their acts must
adhere to the Constitution.[74] The
parameters of our review, however, are narrow.
In the first place, what we review are executive acts of a
constitutionally independent Ombudsman.[75] Also, we undertake the review given the
underlying reality that this Court is not a trier of facts. Since the determination
of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is highly
factual in nature, the Court must, thus, generally defer to the judgment of the
Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the Sandiganbayan or the defense)
to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence presently in his
possession and the kind, tenor and source of testimony he needs to enable him
to prove his case.[76] It should not be forgotten, too, that the grant
of immunity effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of the criminal
liability the accused-witnesses might have incurred, as defined in the terms of
the grant.[77] This point is no less important as the grant
directly affects the individual and enforces his right against self-incrimination.
These dynamics should constantly remind us that we must tread softly, but not
any less critically, in our review of the Ombudsmans grant of immunity.
From the point of view of the Courts own operations, we
are circumscribed by the nature of the review powers granted to us under the
Constitution and the Rules of Court. We
rule on the basis of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 and address mainly the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion. Our
room for intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise
of discretion is shown. Necessarily,
this limitation similarly reflects on the petitioner who comes to us on the
allegation of grave abuse of discretion; the petitioner himself is bound to clearly and convincingly establish that
the Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion in granting immunity in order to fully establish his case.[78]
As a last observation, we note the
unique wording of the grant of the power of immunity to the Ombudsman. It is not without significance that the law
encompassed (and appears to have pointedly not separated) the consideration of Section
17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court within the broader context of such
terms and conditions as the Ombudsman may determine. This deliberate statutory
wording, to our mind, indicates the intent to define the role of Section 17,
Rule 119 in the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion. It suggests a broad grant of discretion that
allows the Ombudsmans consideration of factors other than those outlined under
Section 17, Rule 119; the wording creates the opening for the invocation, when
proper, of the constitutional and statutory intents behind the establishment of
the Ombudsman.
Based on these considerations, we
shall now proceed to determine whether the petitioner has clearly and
convincingly shown that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting
immunity to the respondents.
Under the factual and legal situation before us, we find that the petitioner miserably failed to clearly and convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity to the respondents. While he claims that both conditions (a) and (d) of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court are absent, we observe his utter lack of argument addressing the absolute necessity of the respondents testimony. In fact, the petitioner simply concluded that the requirement of absolute necessity does not exist based on the Ombudsmans evidence, without even attempting to explain how he arrived at this conclusion.
We note in this regard that the
respondents proposed testimony tends to counteract the petitioners personal
defense of good faith (i.e., that he
had no actual participation and merely relied on his subordinates) in approving
the job orders and in his concurrence with the inspection reports. In their
Joint Counter-Affidavit, the respondents narrated the accused DPWH officials/employees
flagrant disregard of the proper procedure and the guidelines in the repair of
DPWH service vehicles which culminated in losses to the government.
Particularly telling is the respondents statement that a number of pre-repair
inspection reports for a particular month in 2001 bear the petitioners
signature despite the fact that these reports are not supported by findings
from the respondents as SIT members.[79] This
kind of statement cannot but impact on how the Ombudsman viewed the question of
absolute necessity of the respondents testimony since this testimony meets
the defense of good faith head-on to prove the prosecutions allegations. Under
these circumstances, we cannot preempt, foreclose, nor replace with our own the
Ombudsmans position on this point as it
is clearly not without basis.
Vb. The respondents
do not appear to be the most guilty
Similarly, far from concluding that the
respondents are the most guilty, we find that the circumstances surrounding
the preparation of the inspection reports can significantly lessen the degree
of the respondents criminal complicity in defrauding the government. Again,
this is a matter that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his discretion, could
not have avoided when he considered the grant of immunity to the respondents.
We note, too, that while the petitioner
incessantly harped on the respondents role in the preparation of the
inspection reports, yet, as head of the SIT, he was eerily silent on the
circumstances surrounding this preparation, particularly on the respondents
explanation that they tried to curb the anomalous practices[80]
in the DPWH. We are aware, of course, that
the present petition merely questions the immunity granted to the respondents
and their consequent exclusion from the informations; it does not assail the
finding of probable cause against the petitioner himself. This current reality
may explain the petitioners silence on the respondents assertions; the
respondents allegations, too, still have to be proven during the trial.
However, these considerations are not sufficient to save the petitioner from
the necessity of controverting the respondents allegations, even for the limited purpose of the
present petition, since his counter-assertion on this basic ground (that the
respondents bear the most guilt) is essential and critical to the viability of
his petition.
In considering the respondents
possible degree of guilt, we are keenly aware of their admission that they
resorted to a short-cut[81] in
the procedure to be observed in the repairs and/or purchase of emergency parts
of DPWH service vehicles. To our mind, however, this admission does not
necessarily result in making the respondents the most guilty in the premises;
not even a semblance of being the most guilty can be deduced therefrom.
In sum, the character of the
respondents involvement vis--vis
the crimes filed against the DPWH officials/employees, coupled with the
substance of the respondents disclosures, compels this Court to take a dim
view of the position that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in
granting immunity to the respondents. The better view is that the Ombudsman
simply saw the higher value of utilizing the respondents themselves as
witnesses instead of prosecuting them in order to fully establish and
strengthen its case against those mainly responsible for the criminal act, as
indicated by the available evidence.
VI.
The respondents administrative liability has
no bearing at all on the immunity granted to the respondents
The
fact that the respondents had previously been found administratively liable,
based on the same set of facts, does not necessarily make them the most
guilty. An administrative case is
altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the
former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although
both may arise from the same set of facts.[82] The most that we can read from the finding of
liability is that the respondents have been found to be administratively guilty
by substantial evidence the quantum
of proof required in an administrative proceeding. The requirement of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (which RA No. 6770 adopted by reference) that the
proposed witness should not appear to be the most guilty is obviously in line
with the character[83]
and purpose[84] of a criminal proceeding, and the much
stricter standards[85]
observed in these cases. They are
standards entirely different from those applicable in administrative proceedings.
VII.
The policy of
non-interference with the Ombudsmans investigatory and prosecutory powers
cautions a stay of judicial hand
The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers, freed, to the extent possible within our governmental
system and structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention,
and insulated from outside pressure and improper influence.[86]
Consistent with this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,[87]
the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsmans
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them, the power to grant
immunity to witnesses[88]),
and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who,
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of
the integrity of the public service.[89] Ocampo
IV v. Ombudsman[90] best explains the reason behind this
policy:
The rule is based not only upon respect for
the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions
of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
Following this policy, we deem it neither
appropriate nor advisable to interfere with the Ombudsmans grant of immunity
to the respondents, particularly in this case, where the petitioner has not clearly
and convincingly shown the grave abuse of discretion that would call for our
intervention.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
JOSE Associate
Justice |
MARIA Associate
Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 103-135.
[3]
[4] Criminal Case Nos. 28098-28100; id. at 257-284.
[5] Criminal Case Nos. 28251-28253; id. at 424, 426.
[6]
[7]
[8] The SIT members represent different divisions/services in DPWH, viz.: the Supplies Property Management Division, the Administrative Manpower and Management Service, the Asset and Supply Management and Control Division, the Comptrollership and Financial Management Service, and the CESPD-BOE; id. at 80-81.
[9] Per Department Order No. 15, Series of 2002; id. at 21, 70.
[10]
[11] January 7 and March 1, 2004 resolutions of the Ombudsman; id. at 117-119, 150-151. Petitioners Reply; id. at 464-466.
[12]
[13] OMB-C-C-02-0507-H.
[14] Filed on August 7, 2002.
[15] Dated October 9, 2002; rollo, pp. 17-68.
[16] Section 43, Chapter V, Book VI.
[17] Rollo, p. 28.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]. On January 20, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, Second Division dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges, Criminal Case No. 27969, for lack of probable cause; id. at 235-256.
[23]
[24] Relying on Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[25] Rollo, p. 413.
[26] Ibid.
[27]
[28]
[29] The petitioner replied thrice (dated November 21, 2005 and May 15, 2007 and October 4, 2007) to the Ombudsmans and the respondents Comments.
[30] Rollo, p. 425.
[31]
[32] Section 7, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) allows the filing of a motion for reconsideration in criminal cases.
[33] Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1993, 227
SCRA 627.
[34] See
[35] See rollo, pp. 6-7; Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC reads:
SEC. 4. When and Where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
[36] RULES OF COURT.
[37] Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 281; Estrada v. Desierto, 487 Phil. 169 (2004); Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, 473 Phil. 372 (2004); Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), 430 Phil. 101 (2002); and Kuizon v. Hon. Desierto, 406 Phil. 611 (2001).
[38] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 3.
[39] Under exceptional circumstances however, as where
there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority, courts may direct the exercise of this discretion. See Angchangco, Jr. v. Hon. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766 (1997).
[40] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Reynado, G.R. No. 164538, August 9,
2010, 627 SCRA 88.
[41] Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 390 Phil. 917 (2000).
[42] Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 303; and Angeles v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133077, September 8, 2006, 501 SCRA 202.
[43] See Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 542 (2003); and D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168 (1996).
[44] Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., G.R. No. 95136,
October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 405.
[45] REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 110, Section 2.
[46] 94 Phil. 1018 (1954).
[47] 111 Phil. 765 (1961).
[48] In United States v. Kastigar (406 U.S. 441), the United States Supreme Court noted that the power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The Sixth Amendment is substantially reproduced in Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[50] The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal, civil, or administrative (Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 125.
[51] CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Section 17.
[52] Varon, Joseph A., Searches, Seizures and Immunities, p. 731.
[54] Commission on Elections v. Hon. Espanol, 463 Phil. 245 (2003).
[55] A legislature is empowered to deprive a witness of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by according him complete immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the testimony relates (81 Am. Jur. 2d 142, the power to suspend a criminal law by the tender of immunity to a witness is a legislative power, citing Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 NY 244).
[56] Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 783.
[57] Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 512 Phil. 590 (2005).
[58] In Philippine constitutional law,
the concept of immunity is firmly established. For one, although the 1935
Constitution did not provide for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it was
considered part of the legal system brought to the country by the Americans
(Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 2003, p.
1268). On the other hand, the Presidents immunity from suit is recognized as
early as 1910 in Forbes, etc. v. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield,
16 Phil. 534 (1910). Similarly, the parliamentary immunity of the Members of
Congress already exists under Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
In
the field of ordinary law enforcement and criminal prosecution, relatively few
immunity laws were enacted then: Commonwealth Act No. 83 (Securities Act,
October 26, 1936); RA No. 602 (Minimum Wage Law, April 6, 1951);
RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property
Found to have been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceedings Therefor, June 18, 1955); and Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 63 (Amending Certain
Sections of Act Numbered Twenty-Four Hundred and Twenty-Seven, otherwise Known
as the Insurance Act, as Amended, November 20, 1972).
[59] PD
No. 749 (Granting Immunity from Prosecution to Givers of Bribes and Other Gifts
and to their Accomplices in Bribery and Other Graft Cases against Public
Officers, July 18, 1975); PD No.
1731 (Providing for Rewards and Incentives to Government Witnesses and
Informants and other Purposes, October 8, 1980); PD No. 1732 (Providing
Immunity from Criminal Prosecution to Government Witnesses and for other
Purposes, October 8, 1980); PD No. 1886 (creating the Agrava Fact-Finding
Board, October 22, 1983); 1987 Constitution, Article XIII, Section 18(8)
(empowering the Commission on Human Rights to grant immunity); RA No. 6646 (An
Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other
Purposes, January 5, 1988); Executive Order No. 14, August 18, 1986; RA No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989, November 17, 1989); RA No. 6981 (Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act, April 24, 1991); RA No. 7916 (The
Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, July 25, 1994); RA No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, June 7, 2002); RA No. 9416 (An Act Declaring as Unlawful Any Form of
Cheating in Civil Service Examinations, etc., March 25, 2007); and RA No. 9485 (Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007, June 2, 2007).
[60] See
[61] Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 396 (2005).
[62] See CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Section 13.
[63] Supra note 56, at 802.
[64] See Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman, 518 Phil. 251 (2006).
[65] Depending on how broad the statutory power to grant immunity is worded, the power to grant immunity may be exercised even during the trial of the criminal case. In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan (supra note 56, at 800-803), the Court, taking into account the exclusivity of the Presidential Commission on Good Governments power to grant immunity, ruled that while the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to review the PCGG-granted immunity, it can only determine the procedural regularity thereof and nothing more.
[66] Section 17, Rule 119 reads:
Discharge of accused to be state witness.When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied[.]
[67] G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 652, 685.
[68] In
Likewise,
in
[69] In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan (supra note 56, at 802), the Court ruled that the courts business is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution since due process demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants.
[70] Supra note 68, at 664.
[71]
[72] People v. Feliciano, 419 Phil. 324 (2001).
[73] Under RA No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act), the grant of immunity to a witness who has participated in the commission of a crime is merely one of the consequences of the witness admission into the Witness Protection Program administered by the Department of Justice (Sections 10 and 12, RA No. 6981).
[74] Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 512 Phil. 590 (2005).
[75] The
pertinent sections of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A
of this Constitution.
Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional
Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not be
decreased during their term of office.
Section 11. The Ombudsman and
his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven
years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any
office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
Section 14. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released. (emphases ours)
Under Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution, the
Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned as protector of the people to function
essentially as a complaints and action bureau. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 175573, September
11, 2008, 564 SCRA 567, 573.) The Philippine Ombudsman is considered at
a notch above other grievance-handling [investigative] bodies (Department of Justice v. Liwag, G.R. No. 149311, February 11, 2005,
451 SCRA 83, 96) given independence that is never enjoyed by his predecessors;
by giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and
corrupt practices and related offenses (Uy
v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil.
154, 172 [2001]); by making his recommendation to a concerned public
officer of taking an appropriate action against an erring subordinate as not
merely advisory but actually mandatory within the bounds of law (Ledesma v. Office of the Ombudsman, 503
Phil. 396, 407 [2005]; Section 13[3],
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution; Section 15[3] of RA No. 6770). The
Ombudsmans disciplinary authority extends over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, except for impeachable officers, members of Congress and the
Judiciary (Section 21 of RA No. 6770). As the Ombudsman is expected to be an
activist watchman, (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Lucero, G.R. No. 168718, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 106, 115)
his actions, though not falling squarely under the broad powers granted him by
the Constitution and RA No. 6770, but are reasonable in line with his official
function, and consistent with law and with the constitution, have been upheld
by the court (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Samaniego, supra).
[76] See People v. Ocimar, GR No. 94555, August 17, 1992.
[77] Commission
on Elections v. Judge Espaol, 463 Phil. 240 (2003). See Brown v. Walker, 161
[78] Should the petitioner clearly and
convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in
granting immunity to the witness, the latter cannot invoke double jeopardy once
he is subsequently included in the information, even assuming that all the
other requisites of double jeopardy exist (Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure). Double jeopardy may be invoked only if the
accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent. Since the grant of immunity operates as a conditional
pardon (for the offenses covered by the immunity) and, thus, requires
acceptance by the grantee (Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the
[79] Rollo, p. 99.
[80] Supra note 20.
[81] Rollo, p. 96.
[82] People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 147.
[83] In a criminal case, the accused is
indicted for an act which constitutes an offense against the State; thus,
criminal cases are brought in the name of the People of the
[84] The purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. On the other hand, the purpose of administrative (disciplinary) proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust (Judge Caa v. Gebusion, 385 Phil. 773 [2000]). Since their purpose is different, the kind of penalty imposable is likewise different consistent with their respective purpose.
[85] The quantum of proof required in criminal proceedings is proof beyond reasonable doubt; whereas in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is all that is required. The technical rules of criminal procedure together with all the rights of an accused come to the fore in criminal cases, unlike in administrative proceedings where technical rules of evidence and procedure are not strictly applied (Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21 [2000]).
[86] Quiambao v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149069, 20 September 2004, 482 Phil. 157; The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, G. R. No. 136192, August 14, 2001.
[87] Section
1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution reads:
The judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[88] Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 158613-14, February 22, 2006.
[89] Quiambao
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149069, 20
September 2004, 482 Phil. 157; The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, G. R. No. 136192, August 14, 2001.
[90] G.R. Nos. 103446-47, August 30, 1993.